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1 .  CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 'HOM EGROWN' 
CONST ITUTIONS 
P.G . Sack 
The islands of the Pacif ic r epresent the last maj or sect ion of the 
g lobe where cons t i tut ion-mak i ng entered its heyday . In v iew of the 
increas ing scept ic i sm with wh ich const itut ions are be ing seen in the West 
and in v iew also of the unhappy fate of const itut ions in other parts of the 
Th ir d World , the eagerness with wh ich the Paci f i c  Islands keep on demand ing 
const itut ions upon independence is r emar kable . In the l ight of the centr al 
role the asse r t ion of Pacif ic ways and values plays in the accompanying 
rhetor ic , the convent iona l i ty of the produc t they usually adopt i s ,  
perhaps , even more surpr is ing . The bells o f  autochthony have a hollow r ing 
in the Pac i f ic .  The cycle wh ich star ted two hundred years ago i n  Nor th 
Amer ica and France seems to be r each ing its mechanical complet ion instead 
of g iv ing way to much needed new departures . 
Why i s  it that the tr uly ' homeg rown ' Pac i f ic constitut ion a 
const itut ion express ing P ac i f ic values and adopting Pac i f ic forms of 
socio/po l i t ical organisat ion - remains a utopian dream ,  although everyone 
claims to want it and no-one seems to be satisfied with what takes i ts 
place? Th is paper suggests that the c r uc ial r easons may be technolog ical 
and ideolog ical r ather than econom ic or pol i t ical . I t  arg ues that : 
1 .  the ' constitutional ist ' leg al technology av ailable in the Pac i f ic at 
present is designed to produce ' convent ional ' const itut ions , 
i r respect ive of the intent ions o f  the ind iv idual user s 1  and 
2 .  that coherent and v iable alternat ive forms of leg al technology will 
only emerge i f  the Pacif ic I slands ( and the rest of the wor ld)  manage 
to escape from the bureaucracy/economic development v ice wh ich 
const i tut ional i sm has proved unable to control . 
Despite these assertions it is not my intent ion e i ther to attack 
const itut ional i sm or to present a case for ' haneg rown ' Pac i f ic 
constitut ions . I am merely t rying to ident ify some of the problems and 
choices wh ich must be faced if the wish to adopt such cons t i tut ions i s  
t aken ser iously and I am do ing th is b y  emphas i s ing cer tain technolog ical 
l imitat ions of constitutional i sm and the i r  ideolog ical root s .  I am not 
advocat ing that Pac i f ic I s lands should do without convent ional 
' const itut ional ist ' con s t i tut ions . Nor do I claim that it was po intless to 
try to make these cons t i tut ions more respons ive to Pac if ic ways and 
values . 1 What I am argu ing is that wh ile there may be compel l ing 
internat ional reasons ag ainst the former approach , the latter cour se can 
merely prov ide stop-gap measures wh ich are by themselves insuffic ient and 
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wh ich may , with the best will in the wor ld , in the long r un do more harm 
than good . The dec is ive battle for ' homegrown ' P ac i f ic const itut ions must 
be fought with d ifferent weapons - if i t  i s  to be fought at all and 
lawyer s  are at present i l l-equipped to pe r form the role wh ich law should 
play in i t .  
* * * * * * 
Ben Nwabue ze , then De an of Z ambi a  Law Schoo l ,  pub l ished 
Constitutionalism in the Emergent States in 1 973 . There is noth ing 
acc idental about the t itle of h is book . Nwabueze d id not want to wr ite 
about const itut ional developments in the Th ird Wor ld ,  but about the role of 
const itut ional ism in the format ion o f  new states . Th is , I suggest , was not 
so much the resul t of h is per sonal ideolog ical commitment to 
const i tut ional ism ,  as due to the fact that he found it , as a 
Western- trained lawyer , imposs ible to d isc uss const itut ional prob lems 
outs ide the theor et ical framework prov ided by const i tut ional ism .  
The opening par ag r aph o f  h is f ir st chapter sets the stag e  accord ing ly :  
Government i s  un iversally accepted to be a necess ity,  
s ince man cannot fully r eal i ze h imse l f  h is 
creat iv ity , h is d ignity and h is whole pe r sonal i ty 
except wi th in an ordered soc iety . Ye t the necess i ty 
for government creates its own problem for man , the 
problem of how to l imit the arbi t r ar i ness inherent in 
government , and to ensure that its powers are to be 
used for the good o f  soc iety . It i s  th is l imit ing of 
the arb itrar iness o f  pol i t ical power that i s  expressed 
in the concept o f  const itutional i sm .  Cons t i tut iona l i sm 
recogn ises the necess i ty for government but ins ists 
upon a l imitat ion be ing placed upon i t s  power s .  I t  
connotes in essence therefore a ' l im i tat ion on 
government ; i t  is the ant ithes is of arb itrary r ul e ;  
its  opposite i s  despo t ic government , t h e  government of 
will instead of law '  (ibid . : 1 ) . 
A fr amework  wh ich treats ' const itut ion ' as synonymous with ' the l im itat ion 
of gover nmental power by law ' 2 cer tainly t urns the d i scuss ion of Afr ican 
const itut ional r ea l i ty into a manageable task . The quest ion is whether it 
also permits an adequate unde r stand ing o f  the problems ( and prom i se s )  i t  
poses . 
Nwabue ze ' s  ver s ion of the h istory o f  const itut iona l i sm and its 
extens ion to the Th ird Wor ld i s  equally stra ightforward : 
From the e ighteenth century onwards ,  as a result of 
armed rebell ion aga inst the arbitrariness o f  monarch­
ical absolut i sm ,  inspired in many cases by the 
revolut ionary teach ing s  of doctr inaire ph i losopher s ,  
proclaim ing the messag e  o f  l iber ty ,  equa l i ty and 
fr atern ity , unwr itten const itut ions , with the i r  
corollary o f  absolute , unl imited sovere ignty of the 
government , have become d iscred ited and have g iven 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
place to wr itten constitut ions consc iously fr amed by 
the people as a supreme law ,  c reat ing , defin ing and 
l imiting government s • • •  Th is development has been 
g iven new boost by the emergence f rom colon ial i sm of a 
host of new nat ions in Afr ica and As ia wh ich needed 
wr itten constitut ions to launch them into the i r  new , 
i ndependent ex i stence and to impose checks against 
maj or i ty power in the interests o f  tr ibal , r ac ial or 
r e l ig ious m inor i t ies (ibid . :S) . 
3 
The central messag e  is a sense of inev itab i l ity : emergence from 
coloni al ism must mean the creat ion of nat ion s tates wh ich must have wr itten 
const i tut ions of a certain type . 
I f  th i s  wer e  t r ue the task o f  const itut ional development would indeed 
r equ i r e  no more than the implementat ion of the obv ious solut ion to a s ing le 
problem - as Nwabue ze (with some help from a fr iend) tr ies to make us 
bel ieve : 
The l im itat ion of government by the var ious techn iques 
outl ined above creates a d i lemma - that of ensur ing 
that government is not thereby so weakened as to be 
incapable of governing e ffect ively to solve the complex 
problems of modern soc iety The problem is to 
maintain a proper balance between power and law .  As 
Professor Cowen has put i t ,  ' although there i s  a deep 
chasm between un fettered power and l aw ,  power must be 
reconc iled with law ;  for there can be ne ither 
government nor law w i thout the exerc ise of power . And 
freedom , too , must be under law; for otherwise it 
degene rates into licence and confus ion . In shor t ,  
unfettered power i s  despotism or tyr anny ; unfet tered 
freedom is l icence or anarchy . But between these two 
extremes there i s  a m iddle way, where power tamed by 
l aw g uar antees t r ue freedom ' ( ibid. :2 1 ) . 
Th is i s  one s ide of Nwabueze . The other can best be il lustrated by 
h is descr ipt ion of the g lor ious dawn of peace after the failed ' secess ion 
attempt ' in N iger i a :  
Out o f  the b itterness and suffe r ing o f  the exper ience 
has been bor n a new soc iety in wh ich , it is hoped , the 
b igotry and prej ud ice s  of the past will  g r adually d ie 
away , and be r eplaced by a broadened outlook and a new 
spi r i t  of mutual tolerance and fratern i ty .  The 
re integration of the lbos into the new N iger i an nat ion 
has been g reatly fac i l itated by the enl ightened and 
benevolent pol ic ies of Gene r al Gowan ' s  Federal m i l itary 
government • • •  Never before in h i story has an armed 
con f l ict , fought with so much br utal i ty and unbr id led 
v itupe r a t ion , ended with no r epr isals , no tr i als and no 
shooting s .  But almost overnight in N iger ia former 
enem ies m ing le together aga in with apparent cord i al ity, 
as i f  noth ing had h appened ( ibid. :299-300 ) . 
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I t  would be po int less to d i sm iss passages such as th is as leg ally 
ir relevant propag anda . They are - at least in par t  - the express ion of a 
widespr ead feel ing among academ ic lawyer s  in Afr ica that it is s imply not 
good enough for them to be competent technic ians but that they must get 
involved in much broader soc ial and po l it ical issue s . However ,  the 
quest ion is aga in whether the approach chosen by Nwabueze - a combinat ion 
of convent ional leg al technology with na ive po l i t ical j ournal ism i s  
l ikely t o  b e  productive . 
Nwabue ze bases h is approach on the following assumption : 
The new states in Afr ica have defin itely come to stay .  
Th ey are colon ialism ' s  great leg acy t o  the cont inent . 
They must be nur tured to matur ity , for they prov ide the 
best hope of salvat ion ( ibid. :300 ) .  
He therefore must reinterpret h is exam inat ion of Afr ican const i tut­
ional r eal i ty ,  suggesting that he had been unduly pes s imistic in present ing 
const itut ional ism as a failur e :  
Does not failure connote a more o r  less pe rmanent state 
of affair s ,  and is the present state of constitut ion­
al ism in these countr ies not a mani festat ion of the 
normal teeth ing trouble assoc i ated with infancy? 
( ibid. :300 - 1 ) .  
He caut iously admits that there has been an " eros ion o f  the foundat ions and 
pr inc iples of constitut ional ism " , 3 but mainly because of the constitut ions ' 
" lack of leg it imacy for the masses , and perhaps more d isastrous , for the 
r ul ing pol it ic ians " : 
Po liticians in developing countr ies are ye t to develop 
the r ight att itude towards the consti tut ion The 
constitution lacks sanctity because the values and 
ideas wh ich it enshr ines are d i fferent and opposed to 
those of the r uler s and soc iety alike . Wh ile a 
const itut ion is meant to be a check upon power , a 
l im itat ion upon the arbitrar iness of d iscret ion , the 
pol i t ic ians ' or ientat ion is author itar i an .  They tend 
to be impat ient with , and want to break away from all ,  
const itut ional restra ints ; and i f  the const itut ion 
proves an obstac le ,  then it must be bypassed or be made 
to bend to the i r  desires ( ibid. :30 1 ) . 
Ergo , the bas ic problem const itut ional ism faces in ' emergent states ' 
i s  human r ather than inst itut ional . Moreover , it is pr imar i ly caused by 
the Afr ican pol it ic ians who - unl i ke the i r  leg al brethren - have not yet 
attained the r e qu i r ed he ight of mor al per fect ion . Nwabue ze cont inues : 
[ T ] he mot ivat ion for the pol i t ic ians ' a uthor itar ian 
tendenc ies i s  power together with its  wealth and 
prest ige . D i spropor t ionate pr em i um is attached to 
wealth in a community where poverty is the g eneral  
cond it ion for the overwhelming maj or i ty of the 
populat ion . The ab i l ity to help one ' s  fr iends and 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
r elat ives w i th j obs and contracts i s  h ighly pr i zed in a 
countr y  in wh ich unemployment is w idespread , and in 
wh ich the government is the main employer of labour 
<ibid . )  • 
Ye t ,  the ult imate v ictory of const itut ional ism in Afr ica is assured : 
Pove r ty and unemployment cannot r emain a permanent 
cond i t ion o f  the emergent states . Development has been 
launched upon i ts d i f f icult and desultory cour se , ye t 
no matter how long-drawn it is going to be , the 
exper ience o f  the developed soc iet ies g ives ground for 
an opt imistic futur e .  When the new states have 
atta ined a suffic ient degree of development in 
educat ion , technology and industr ialisat ion , the cr aze 
for power and wealth should d iminish , and polit ical 
power would then be cut to its proper d imens ions 
(ibid . ) . 
5 
Although cons t itut ional l aw i s  largely a facade in Afr ica ' s  present 
s ituat ion , ther e  i s  thus no need for basic ( theo r e t ical or pract ical) leg al 
r e forms . Cons t i tut ional ism is an eternal and univer sal ideal , a g iven 
shape into wh ich Afr ican r eal i ty will  and must g r ow .  
* * * * * * 
Nwabue ze bor rowed quite leg itimately a s impl ified model of 
cons t i tut ional i sm .  To apprec iate the hold it has acqui r ed over lawyers , 
includ ing those in Th ird Wor ld countr ies , i t  must be examined more closely . 
One of the most prominent among the recent prophets of 
cons t i tut iona l i sm was Carl Jo achim Fr ied r ich , for many decades Professor of 
Pol it ical Sc ience at Harvard Un ive r s i ty .  In t h e  1 95 0 s  and 1 96 0 s  he took a 
spec i al interest in constitut ional developments in the Th ird Wor ld and 
pub l i shed in 1 967  a handy summary of h i s  v iews as Some RefZections on 
ConstitutionaZism for Emergent PoZiticaZ OPders . 
The paper shows Fr iedr ich as tor n  between the conv ict ion that 
const itut ional i sm is the un ique product of a unique process in weste rn 
h istory and the des ir e  to declare that the type of po l i t ical order it 
produced i s  nonetheless not only un iver sally appl icable but also 
un iversally des i r able . H i s  conclus ions for the Th ird Wor ld are thus 
ambiguous . They are made even vag uer by the wisdom of old age ,  in th is 
case a res igned acceptance o f  the futil ity o f  pol i t ical r evolut ions as well 
as the impos s ib i l ity of those i n  the intellectual sphere : 
to ut qa cha.nge, tout c 'est Za meme chose . The new 
countr ies need governments that will funct ion effect­
ively in solving the i r  problems by s u itable publ ic 
po l ic ies . These gover nments ought to be constitut­
ional , but cannot be , because the prerequis ites of 
const itut ional gover nment are l ac k ing and will have to 
be developed . Th is i s  a slow process involving all the 
basic tasks wh ich gene r al pol i t ical theory has 
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ident if ied • • • Ther e i s  l ittle sense in ins ist ing t hat 
the only yardstic k  is government in Br itain or i n  the 
Un ited States - as if one thought that all was wor k ing 
sat isfactor ily here - but there i s  e qual ly l ittle sense 
in t reat ing the " new wor ld" as so new that no past 
pol i t ical and const itut ional expe r ience applies to i ts 
operat ions . The m iddle road i s ,  as so o ften in l ife , 
the one wh ich men with the i r  l im i ted means will be well 
advised to travel both in theory and pr act ice 
( ibid. : 3 3 )  • 
Hi s bel ief in the h istor ical un i queness of (Western)  constitut ionalism 
notwithstand ing , Fr iedr ich thus must take a stand ag ainst those who claim 
that in conse quence Western polit ical theory i s  inappl icable to non-We stern 
pol i t ic s : 
Such a complete relat iv i sm • • •  is incompat ible with 
the sp ir it of sc ience and the fundamental prem i se of 
all genu ine theory [ namely , that there i s  only one 
tr uth ] ( ibid. : 1 1 ) . 
The express ion of th is noble sent iment is followed by a more pr act ical 
( albe i t  c ircular ) asser t ion : 
The numerous str i k ing proposit ions wh ich pol i t ical 
theory offe r s  concerning power , r ule and influence are , 
of cour se , appl icab le to developing countr ies ; i f  they 
were not , they would not be t r ue generali zations 
(ibid. ) • 
I t  does not come as a surpr ise that he turns to Max Weber ( the L iber als ' 
answer to Marx ) in search of examples : 
Sur ely Max Weber ' s  celebr ated threefo ld d iv i s ion of 
leg it imacy into a t r ad i t ional , a r at ional- legal , and a 
char i smatic one i s  meant to be appl icable and is in 
fact qu ite meaning ful in deal ing with the pol i t ical 
orders o f  emergent countr ies (ibid. : 1 1 - 1 2 ) . 
But Fr iedr ich i s  anx ious to switch bac k  from the un iversal 
appl icab i l ity of We stern po l it ical theory to the un i queness of Western 
const itut ional i sm .  The latter problem , he now real ises , i s  but an aspect 
"of the more general problem of what d i st ing u ishes the We stern from other 
cultur e s "  ( ibid . : 1 6 ) . Ag ain , he f inds tha t  Max Weber has prov ided a ,  
generally speaking ,  s at i s fac tory solut ion i n  h i s  var i at ions o n  the theme of 
Western rat ional i ty and cultur al dynam i sm .  Of the f ive key factor s 
Fr iedr ich ident if ies in Weber ' s  wor k  he s i ng les one out for comment : 
Weber ' s  s tress on bureaucr acy , wh i le very sound in 
itse l f ,  i s  m islead ing when i t  i s  not l inked with the 
growth o f  const itut ional ism .  To be sur e ,  s uch 
const itut ional i z ing presupposes the establ ishment o f  a 
bureaucr acy , the core of the modern state , but the 
modern state is not fully developed unt i l  that 
bur eaucracy has been made " respons ible , "  i . e . , 
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const itut iona l i zed . The long l ine of th inkers from 
Mach i avelli  through Bodin and Hobbes to Montesquieu , 
Kant , and Hegel in fact were all more concerned , 
theoret ically , w i th the problem of const i tut iona l i sm 
and its r elat ion to the state than with the act iv it ies 
of the bur eaucracy wh ich was g rowing up all around 
them . The challenge of " sovere ignty" was essent ially 
bor n  of these concerns with the state and its 
const itut ion . " The state" Bodi n  had descr ibed as the 
government of an assoc iat ion of fam i l ies , and to be 
well ordered he thought it r equi red a s i ng le sovereig n ,  
that i s  t o  say , a pe r son o r  g roup of pe rsons who 
possess supr eme leg islat ive powe r .  The focus of 
attent ion , hence , was on leg islat ion r ather than 
administration . Wh ile the bureaucr acy had the dec is ive 
hand in leg islat ion under monarchical absolutism ,  the 
sanct ity of the law and the halo sur round ing all 
law-g iv ing g r eatly r e inforced assoc iat ion of the 
rat ional with the leg al and the consequent r ise of 
const i t ut ionalism .  Sanct ioned by gene r al proposit ions 
of G r eek ph i losophy and Roman law ,  the conv ict ion 
became pr edominant that government itself must be 
conducted accord ing to law ,  and that such l aw must be 
embod ied in a const itut ion ( ibid. : 1 6- 1 7 ) . 
7 
Without developing any of these po ints , Fr iedr ich moves straight on to 
ind iv idual r ights and the i r  enforcement vis-a-vis the state as the main 
weapon o f  constitut ionalism ,  treat ing them as a separ ate matter , closely 
connected with the ( o f  cour se , un ique ly We ste rn)  "Chr i s t i an bel ief in the 
d ignity of every human per son" (ibid. : 1 1) . Th is is unfortunate since 
Fr iedr ich was within reach of a key to understand ing the ideolog ical base 
of const itut ional i sm - as well as i ts technolog ical l im itat ions . 
Wh i le Fr iedr ich deserves pr aise for accept ing the probably not 
altogether welcome ( h istor ical as wel l  as log ical) l inks between 
constitut iona l ism and bureauc racy , the ir s ignif icance can only be 
understood if  it is apprec iated that it i s , in fact , absolutism - to wh ich 
constitut ional ism was the ( h istor ical but not log ically necessary) response 
- r ather than const itut ional ism itse l f  wh ich presupposes bureaucracy , s ince 
only bureauc r acy ( i f def ined suff iciently broadly) has the administr at ive 
capac ity for absolute government . 4 Furthermor e ,  const itut ional i sm under­
stood as the control o f  the bur eaucracy through law ,  can only wor k  because 
bureaucracy is already r ule-gove rned administr at ion . 5 Const itut ionalism may 
have , h istor ically , contr ibuted to a leg al domesticat ion of government 1 
seen as a technolog ical system , it presupposes administrat ion accord ing to 
the law. 
Th is h as important impl icat ions for the ways in wh ich constitut­
ional ism c an or cannot control the bureaucracy . It also explains why the 
const i tut ional i sts we re pr imar ily concer ned with the control of the 
leg islature . S i nce bur eaucracy i s  administrat ion in accordance with r ules , 
he who makes the r ules - so they thought - would control the bureaucracy . 
Cons t i t ut ional ism was not concerned with a change in administr at ive methods 
but with a change in the control o f  pol it ical power , espec i ally leg islat ive 
power . Cons t itut ional ism ( as a h istor ical movement) aimed at the 
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expropr i at ion o f  the leg islat ive powers from the k i ng ,  not at r eplac i ng 
trad i t ional forms of government with moder n  r a t ional forms : const itut ion­
al ism is the result not the cause of modern rat ional gover nment . 
Th is is why the ear ly theor ists o f  const itut ional ism were not 
interested in dev i s i ng a rat ional system of government but in  wor k ing out 
an ideology wh ich was able to control the bureaucracy ( although it 
obv iously had to be inst itut ional i sed to be e f fect ive) • Look ing at the 
th inkers l isted by Fr iedr ich i t  i s  also clear that the ideology of 
const itut ional ism was by no means un iform . Compare ,  for i nstance , Kant ' s 
ind iv idual ised , c r i t ical r at ional i sm and Hegel ' s  pub l ic-or iented ideal­
i sat ion of the state but then Hegel is hardly the prototype of a 
const itutional ist theor ist in the sense i n  wh ich const itut ional i sm is 
commonly under stood today . 
The main l ink be tween const itut ional ism and ph i losophy is cr i t ical 
ind iv idual ism and not the ideal isat ion of the state - although the latter 
l ink i s  o f  cons iderable ind irect impor tance because it connects 
constitut ional ism with nat ional i sm ,  wh ich in  turn prov ides a leg itimation 
for the terr i tor ial state . On the other hand , pr act ically speak ing , 
const itut ional ism was mor e concerned with controll ing than with 
leg i t imat ing the monopo l i sat ion of po l it ical powe r by the ter r i tor ial 
state . In th is contex t the r ights o f  the i ndiv idual we re indeed its main 
leg al as well as ideolog ical weapons - and , to complete the picture , i t  
should be added that a n  ind iv idual r ights approach pr esupposes the 
ex istence of a modern ( ter r itor ial)  state , or , put neg at ively , the 
destruct ion of the sovereign ( personal)  group .  
Bureaucracy and ind iv idual ism are the two k ey e lements in  Fr iedr ich ' s  
v i s ion o f  const itut ional ism . A third , e qually impor tant element is 
miss ing : const itut ional i sm i s  not only l inked with bur eaucr acy and 
ind ividual ism but also - and ag ain log ically as wel l  as h istor ically - with 
the idea of econom ic prog r ess . Constitut ional ism in its  classical form 
pr esupposes not only a bureaucrat ic administrat ion but also a market 
economy : ' laisse z-f aire ' i s  the econom ic aspect o f  ind iv idual ism ,  and the 
not ion of general econom ic deve lopment - wh ich will  ult imate ly bene f i t  the 
public good - i ts ideolog ical j us t i f icat ion . 6 
The state is there to protect the ind iv idual from other ind iv idual s 
( and other states) and the const itut ion i s  there to protect the ind iv idual 
from the state . The not ion o f  a centr al sphere of ind iv idual freedom 
sur rounded by a double laye r of protect ion - from the state and by the 
state - is the core of c lass ical const itut ional ism .  From th is pe r spect ive 
i t  matter s  l ittle that the legal controls o f  the bur eaucr acy are l im i ted to 
the protect ion of ind ividual r ights . Th is is all that r eally counts , the 
market economy and the ideology of const i tut ional i sm t ake care of the rest . 
For class ical const itut ionalism ,  government i s , by def i n it ion , l im i ted 
government and its control dev ices are des igned to control the government 
with i n  these l im its and not to l im i t  the g rowth o f  government - j ust as i t  
i s  unable t o  control t h e  g rowth o f  t h e  economy ( although the latter i s  also 
seen as ideolog ically des i r able ) . 
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Because of th i s ,  const i tut ional i sm is in the end ne i ther technically 
nor ideolog ically equipped to control the g r owth of the bureaucracy when 
economic development produces the needs and the means for such a growth . 7 
Hence the strained relat ions between const i tut ional ism and the we lfare 
state wh ich uses the technology of const it ut ional ism without be ing 
respons ive to its  ideolog ical controls . 8 
However ,  th is is s t i l l  not the c r uc ial aspect of const itut ional ism . 
Wh ile it i s  important to understand that const itut iona l i sm beg an as an 
ideology aimed at r at ional i s ing and leg i t imat ing as well as controll ing 
fundamental , soc i al ,  economic , pol i t ical and c ultural changes , it is even 
mor e  impor tant to recognise that , in the process , it became locked into a 
systemat ic , inst itut ional i sed technology , wh ich made it incapable of 
fundamental change and thus also incapable of fulfill ing its ideolog ical 
control func t ions in the face of new problems . Today , const itut ional ism is 
pr imar ily a sel f- leg it imat ing technolog y ,  a k ind of institutional ised 
systems theory ,  wh ich predeterm ines the moves of those operat ing with in its 
f r amewor k even if they are opposed to its ideolog ical foundat ions or soc ial 
and po l it ical impl icat ions . 
* * * * * * 
Wh i le Fr iedr ich s t i ll saw noth ing wrong in investigating the relevance 
of Western cons t i tut iona l i sm for the - ver y  d ifferent - pol i t ical real ity 
in the Th ird Wor ld , other ' cons t i tut ional ists ' t r ied to t r avel in the 
oppos i te d irect ion , as we shall see , with s im i lar results . 
In the early 1 96 0 s  Richard Lowenthal , Pr ofe ssor of Po lit ical Sc ience 
at the Free Un ive r s ity in Be r l in ,  was asked to contr ibute a paper on 
developing countr ies to a sympos i um  on ' Democr acy in a Chang ing Society ' . 
Instead of d i sc uss ing the future of impor ted we ste rn democratic 
inst itut ions and values in the Th ird Wor ld , he had the good sense to adopt 
a d ifferent per spect ive : 
I f  our [ !] polit ical sc ience is to avoid r ash 
ideolog ical generali zat ions on the value of d i fferent 
forms o f  government , i t  must above all bear in mind 
th at • • • [ they] are not s imply d ifferent answe rs to one 
and the same need , but that they r epr esent attempts to 
meet a g reat var iety of needs , to ful fill  [ s ic ]  quite 
d i fferent funct ions accord ing to the h i stor ical 
contex t , to the cultur al char acter ist ics , and the stage 
of development o f  the soc iety in wh ich we find them . 
As soon as the pol i t ical analyst ventures beyond the 
con f ines of h is nat ive cultur e and per iod - as he can 
not help doing when deal ing with developing countr ies -
he must therefore beg in by ask i ng whiah are the 
speaifia tasks whose soZution aonstitutes the yardstiak 
for the effeativeness of poZitiaai institutions in 
those aountries ( 1 96 4 : 1 78-79 ) . 
De spite th i s  funct ional plan Lowenthal is immedi ately dr awn back into 
an evolut ion i st , h istor ical cur rent . He star t s  by d istanc ing h imself from 
the un il ineal interpr etat ion of h istor ical development to wh ich Rostow had 
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j ust g iven new c ur r ency in The Stages of Economic Growth9 and finishes by 
propos ing an ( equally naive) b i l ineal scheme of development , contrast ing 
the un i que West with the und ifferent iated Th ird Wor ld :  
Hence : 
Ne ither the t r ad i t ional soc iet ies of the despo t ic As ian 
empires nor the t r ad i t ional soc iet ies o f  Afr ica have 
tended to gener ate that dynam ism of development wh ich 
created the f i r st modern i ndustr ial countr ies in the 
West . The d ifferent levels of development we observe 
in present-day soc iet ies can be explained ne i ther by 
colon ial exploitat ion nor by d i f fe rences in b iolog ical 
substance , but by the d i fferences in the structure of 
the premodern , t r ad i t ional soc ieties from which they 
have spr ung in the h istor ical sta r t ing po int 
(ibid . : 1 8 1 ) . 
A ''developing country " is a country with a non-dynamic 
traditional social order in which dynamic as pirations 
have been aroused by its clash with the outside world 
( ibid. : 1 84-5 ) . 
The f ir st result of the impact of the dynam ic West on trad it ional 
soc iet ies wh ich proceeds (miraculously) in all of them along the same 
l ine - is generally the decay of the t r ad it ional , non-dynam ic soc ial order 
of those countr ies ( ibid . :1 85 ) . Th is soc ial and po l i t ical cr i s i s  turns 
into a c r i s i s  of ult imate bel iefs , and a sense of mean ing lessness appear s 
as the basic inher i ted values are cal led into que st ion . As th is second 
cr i s i s  is not par t of a self-gener ated intellectual development toward the 
emanc ipat ion of r eason and the c r i t ical ind i v idual , it does not affect the 
people ' s  t r ad i t ional hunger for author ity ' for the i r  psych ic structure i s  
soc i ally cond it ioned t o  r e qu i r e  it•. 1 0 
Th is psycholog ical demand/soc ial supply c r i s i s dete rmines the course 
of pol it ical development in the Th ird Wor ld and requ i res a rever sal of the 
roles played by state and soc iety in Western h istory . Instead of be ing 
moved along by a cultur ally secure cap ital ist m iddle-class ,  pol i t ical 
development in the Th ird World must be ar t i f ic ially created by the state 
wh ich i s  r un by a sch i zophrenic , power-hungr y  inte l l ig ents i a .  
Th is intell igent s i a :  
can only react with a violently ambivalent attitude 
tmJard the West - with the desire to equal its ski l l  in 
producing wealth and acquiring military and political 
power, yet to protect the inde pendence and distinct­
�veness of their own culture against i ts alien 
influence (ibid. :188).11 
Never theless ,  the cour se o f  act ion i s  c lear . 
reacts with a " will to development " ; i t :  
The intell igentsia  
conceives the 
superstructure " 
task of creating a new ''po li tical 
as an instrument for transforming the 
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nondynamic "social basis . "  They assign to political 
action and to state power a creative, revolutionary 
function that differs fundamentally from the role 
played by these factors in the deve lopment of the 
dynamic societies of the West ( ibid. : 1 90 ) . 
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Lowenthal uses th i s  scenar io for estab l ish ing the funct ions of 
government i n  developing countr ies : they must procur e the necessary 
c apital funds for mater ial development and take the respons ibi l ity of 
d istr ibut ing them in accordance with the goal of development . But i t  is 
not real istic to expect them to follow the c lass ical Western road of a 
l iberal mar ket economy : i f  it " could do the j ob in countr ies with th is 
type of social structure , they would not have remained under-developed in 
the f irst place " ( ibid. :1 92 ) . 
Econom ic development must be suppor ted by cultural development , 
although subord i nating culture to econom ic goals : a s t r uggle against 
mag ical bel ie fs to break the resistance aga inst changes in the trad it ional 
methods of product ion , a s t r uggle aga inst forms of soc ial l i fe wh ich are 
incompat ible with the r at ional ( !) org anisat ion o f  production - in shor t ,  
the a im i s  the cr eat ion o f  a Protestant Wor k  Ethic (ibid . :1 92-93 ) .  
S ince the " pol i t ical factors"  wh ich must accompl ish th is combined task 
( the state and the pol it ical movements )  will  usual ly f irst  have to be 
created , and s ince the people ' s  emotional iden t i f icat ion with the new state 
and the ir will to par t ic ipate in its  affairs are usual ly also lack ing , a 
pol i t ical revolut ion is a pr econd it ion for both these developments : 
It is r evolut ionary , not necessar ily in the sense of a 
v iolent overthrow of the const itutional order but in 
the sense of a clear ly mar ked break i n  the cont inu i ty 
of the e l i tes r unning the state , of the pr inc iples by 
wh ich they leg i t im i ze the i r  r ule , and o f  the tasks they 
set themselves . Whether the break is const ituted by 
emanc ipat ion from a colon ial reg ime or from ind irect 
forms of dependence or by the overthrow of an 
ind igenous trad it ional ist form of government , the 
v ictory of a " reg ime of development " is the 
pr econd it ion for a comprehens ive attempt to tackle the 
tasks we have enumerated ( ibid. :1 95 ) . 
By identifying the government of a developing country with a " r eg ime 
of development " , Lowenthal has not only answered h is quest ion as to the 
funct ion o f  government , but also prov ided the yardstick for measur ing the 
appropr iateness of its form : 
How e ffect ive have var ious forms of government proved 
in accompl ish ing the tasks of a " r eg ime of 
development " ?  ( ibid. ) . 
The f i r st stage of h i s  answer remains c rypt ic because he is trying to 
k i l l  too many b i rds with one stone . 1 2  H i s  immed iate a im is to establish 
" the pr act ically r elevant r ange of poss ible reg imes of development " .  For 
th i s  purpose he const r ucts an ( exclus ive) alter nat ive be tween " democr at ic 
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leg i t imat ion " and " tr ad it ional author ity" ( wh ich i s  always " by the Gr ace of 
God" ) . 
Lowenthal tr ies to j ustify th is constr uct ion as well as 
exc lus ion o f  the t r ad i t ional al ternat ive as impr ac t ical - with re fer ence 
the "Japanese model" ( being careful not to label it as a " reg ime 
development " , although i t  obv iously fulfil led the same task and , 
looks at pr esent , w i th even g r eater success than the Un ited States)  • 
[ A ] ttempts to r epeat the "J apanese road" of 
moder n i zat ion from above under an autocr acy leg i t imated 
by t r ad i t ional author ity seem to become except ional and 
to have much smaller prospects of success than the i r  
n i neteenth-century model . Probably the pr inc ipal 
reason is that the str atum whose act ive cooperat ion i s  
c r uc ial for t h e  creat ion of a modern state and the 
execut ion of a prog r am of development is no longer 
pr epared to obey a tr ad i t ional author ity and to act in 
its  name : the nat ionalism of th is stratum today means 
to them not only an obl igat ion to serve the ir  own 
people , but a need to be leg it imated by the people ' s  
w i 11 (ibid • : 1 9 7 ) • 
as 
the 
to 
of 
it 
The " pr act ical ly r e levant r ange " is thus l imited to " governments of 
revolut ionary or ig in claiming to represent the will of the people" .  
I t  extends from a deve lopment-or ientated democr acy of 
the Indian type at one ex treme v ia the var ious forms of 
one-par ty pr edominance , mili tary d ictator sh ip,  and 
one-par ty d ictator sh ip , to the ideolog ical d ictatorsh ip 
of a Conununist Party reg ime at the other extreme 
(ibid. : 1 98 )  • 
A compar i son of the actual per formance of governments with in th is 
r ange culminates in an impress ive pseudo- t r u ism :  these countr ies have , 
with in cer tain l im its , a :  
cho ice between the extent o f  plur al ist ic freedom they 
can afford and the pace of development they can ach ieve 
(ibid. : 204 ) . 
Th is i s, of cour se , not a " d ilemma of absolutes" , but : 
every degree of increased freedom has to be paid for by 
some slowing dawn of development, every degree of 
aaaeleration by some Zoss of freedom. In the nature of 
the process o f  st ate-d irected development th is seems 
inev itable (ibid.). 
To see Lowenthal ' s  v i ews in the i r  proper per spect ive , we must 
apprec iate the lesson they hold , in h i s  opin ion , for the developed West : 
I f  we remain consc ious of the d i lemma of cho ice between 
the pace of deve lopment and the degree of fr eedom , we 
shall not try in those countr ies to oppose Communist 
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dogmatism by ultra- l iberal dogmatism .  Ra ther ,  we shall  
seek  to serve the long- term prospects of a l iberal­
democr a t ic evolut ion by promot ing in each pa r t icular  
case what appear s  as the  most promising alternat ive to 
stagnat ion on one s ide and to tota l i ta r ian d ictatorsh ip 
on the other - whe ther th is alternat ive turns out to be 
an imper fect democracy or an undoctr ina i r e , open-minded 
" d ictator sh ip of development . "  For in those countr ies , 
max imum approx imat ion to a plural istic democracy under 
the r ule of law , as we know it in the We st , can only be 
the result of a process of development successfully 
completed : I t  can never be its  pr econd it ion 
(ibid . : 2 1 0 ) . 
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Lowenthal  is pr epared to sacr i f ice const i tut iona l i sm in the Th ird 
Wor ld for the t ime be ing because he bel ieves that developmental ism will 
eventua lly b r ing it back into the fold . Cons t i tut iona l i sm has become a 
luxury wh ich only affluent societ ies can afford and for whose ideals no-one 
should any longer  expect anyone to d ie on the ba r r icades . Af fluence has 
become the main p i l lar  of const itut iona l i sm .  The tra i l  to freedom must be 
blazed by g reed . 
Pe rhaps th i s  conclus ion should be elaborated upon to avoid 
mi sunder s tand ing s .  Lowenthal accepts that the re is l ittle hope of an 
immed iate implementat ion o f  the ideology of const itut iona l i sm in the Th ird 
World : econom ic development must come f i r st .  Th is , however does not mean 
that the technology of const i tut iona l i sm ,  its bas ic forms of polit ical , 
administrat ive and legal organi sat ion , should be abandoned . On the 
contra r y ,  Lowenthal - l ike Nwabue ze - env isages the retent ion ( or adopt ion) 
and the streng then i ng of the technolog ical aspect of const itut ionalism as 
an i nstr ument for ach iev ing econom ic development the necessary and 
suff ic ient precond i t ion for freedom . Th e attainment of a tr uly 
const i tu t ional ist technology comb ined with a developmental ist ideology will 
create affluence and , through i t , const i tut ional ist freedom . 
In other words , although the ve il h id ing the forces mov ing 
const itut iona l i sm becomes almost t ransparent , the i l lus ion is ma inta ined : 
The bureaucra t i sat ion of soc iety in the interest of econom ic development is 
still pr esented as the only way o f  ultimately ach iev ing ind iv idual freedom . 
Lowenthal is pr epared to sac r i f ice not constitut iona l i sm but the 
' marke t '  economy . In h i s hands , const i tut iona l i sm develops into an updated 
counterpa r t  of Marx i sm ,  includ ing the same k i nd of ambig u i t ies . Just as 
Ma rx reluctantly accepted , in pr inc iple , that mankind had to pass through a 
capital ist pha se in order to r each its communist dest inat ion , Lowenthal is 
prepared to accept that the non-We ster n  par t  of the wor ld must pass through 
a soc ial ist phase to a r r ive at its l iberal goal . The ma in d i fference 
between these respect ive utopias is that Marx i sm ,  at least in its  pr im it ive 
ideolog ical form , sees the state and the law ' wh ither away ' whereas the 
fully legal ised ( const itut ional ist)  and hence bureaucrat ised state rema ins 
forever the l iberal ist ' s  g uarantor of ind iv idual freedom . Wh i le pr im it ive 
Marx i sm wants to overcome the bureaucracy and economic developmental i sm -
enter ing instead into a cur ious state of h istor ical  suspens ion 
const itut ional ism accepts both ( together with i nd iv idualism) as its base . 
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I n  pr act ice , as we all know , Marx i sm has not , at least not yet ,  
succeeded in do ing without the state , the law and the bureaucr acy - and it 
tends to be j ust as much pr eoccupied with econom ic development as 
capital i sm .  It is also doubtful whether Marx i sm or nee-Marx i sm can , even 
in theoret ical te rms , offer a bas ic alternat ive to the pol it ical and 
admin istrat ive technology produced by con s t itut ional ism . These doubts are 
we ll i l lustr ated by Peter F i t zpat r ic k ' s  r ecent LaUJ and State in Papua New 
Guinea. 
* * * * * * 
F i t zpatr ick , i t  appear s , is led by frustrat ion r ather than conv ict ion 
to try out Marx i sm as a " substantial alternat ive " . He r ushes through the 
pol i t ical and legal h istory of Papua New Gu inea ( PNG ) , s t ic k ing Marx ist 
labe ls onto every puz z l e ,  watch ing with obv ious del ight how they g ive 
pr ed ictable meaning to everyth ing - mean ing , of cour se , wh ich PNG r eal i ty 
der ives from Marx ist theory and not vice versa. Lack ing a pos i t ive 
po l i t ical iden t i f icat ion with Marx i sm ,  he feels no need to j us t i fy the 
adequacy of its analyt ical fr amework in t erms of the consequences it will 
( or must? ) have for the polit ical or leg al future of PNG . There i s  a vag ue 
impress ion that it too is subj ect to Marx ist determ inism ,  that the 
proletar ian r evolut ion will eventually come , but there is no attempt to 
des ign even the pr e l im inar ies for a pol it ical - let alone leg al - str ategy 
wh ich would speed up th i s  necessary development or m in im ise the b i r th pains 
connected with i t .  
Because o f  th i s  approach , F i tzpatr ick c an also af ford to adopt an 
or thodox ( that is , fundamentally uncr it ical)  Marx ist v iew of ' law ' and 
' state ' . Both are for h im exclus ively creatures of c apital ism , instruments 
of c lass-dom inat ion - though tempered by the ( not merely decor at ive ) not ion 
of " bourgeo i s  legality" . Th us trad i t ional law and t r ad i t ional soc iety are 
by themselves outs ide his scope , they only enter the picture as an 
ing red ient of the colon ial scene : the " new imper i al ism "  was based on 
sub s id i s ing fore ign capitalist exploitat ion by maintain ing the local 
trad i t ional mode of produc tion in a subserv ient role . Th us Fi tzpatr ick 
detects an unholy all iance between capital i sm and trad it iona l ism . 1 3  
Moreover , i n  h is Marx i st scheme of th ing s ,  t r ad it ion i s ,  in any case , a 
retard ing force , a maj or stumbl ing b lock in the way of the proletar i an 
revolut ion , obj ect ively more evil even than capital ism ,  s ince the latter , 
at leas t ,  pushes h i story in the r ight d irect ion . 
De spi te h is forceful cr i t ic i sm of the l iber al/conse rvat ive ' law and 
development ' or , more broadly , ' modern isat ion ' theor ies , F i t zpatr ick 
appears to be unconcerned that Marx i s , intel lectually speak ing , part of 
the same l itter as the s i res of these theor ies . Marx i sm i s  as much par t  of 
n i neteenth century Europe as constitut ional i sm - certa inly mor e  r ad ical but 
j ust as ' ethnocentr ic '  and more openly dogmat ic . Someone who , l ike 
Fi tzpat r ick, c r i t ic i ses the PNG Const itut ion from a Marx ist point of v iew 
for its  " per s istent ord i nar iness"  ( 1 98 0 : 209 ) therefore puts h imself 
unwitt ing ly in a most vulne r able posit io n .  For Marx i sm has ne i ther 
developed an or ig inal leg al technology of its own nor has i t  an impress ive 
record in under stand ing non-We stern soc iet ies and cultures or in foster ing 
the v al ues inherent in them . 
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Th is does not matter i f  Marx i sm i s  bas ically r ig h t ,  that i s  to say , i f  
its determinist view o f  h istory i s  cor r ect ( but then very l ittle else 
matter s } . I t  becomes c r uc ial , however ,  i f  Marx i sm is j ust another of the 
' ethnocentr ic '  western pseudo-sc iences wh ich t r ies to prove i tself by 
ful f il l ing its  own pred ict ions through polit ical act ion . 
To say th i s  does not mean to deny the impor tant c r i t ical ins ights 
prov ided by Marx or F i t zpat r ic k . I t  s imply unde r l ines what F i tzpatr ick 
h imsel f demonstr ates : that Marx i sm can be of no d i rect help in dev is ing 
' homeg rown ' Pacific const itut ion s .  I t  is certa inly useful for Pac i f ic 
I s land countr ies to employ the serv ices of ( inter alia) Marx ist consultants 
to adv i se them on means wh ich can be employed to control ( partly and 
tempor ar i ly) the impact of c apitalism and cap ital ist imper ial i sm .  Marx i sm ,  
however , fails  them even mor e  abysmally than const i tut iona l i sm i n  prov id ing 
help in controll ing the bureaucracy , s imply because it too subscr ibes to a 
view of human soc iety g eared towards econom ic development . As far as the 
bureaucr acy is concerned , Marx i sm i s  i n  the same posit ion as constitut­
iona l i sm minus the weapons o f  " bourgeois leg al i ty" ( wh ich i s  in pract ice 
replaced by - i ncreas ing ly bureaucrat ised - party control)  • 
* * * * * * 
Const itut ion-mak i ng in the Pac i f ic does not t ake pl ace in a vacuum . 
In add it ion to the theor et ical d if f iculties in dev ising alternat ives to 
convent ional const itut ions of the Western type - on wh ich th i s  paper has 
concentr ated - there are obv iously strong pract ical forces wor k ing aga inst 
such an approach . 
F i rst of all , const itut ion-mak i ng in the Pac i f ic is par t of a 
' decolon isat ion ' process , desig ned as a ' transfer of powers ' .  
Const itut iona l i sm notwi thstand ing , Western states do not tr ansfer 
sovere ignty to the people o f  the i r  former colon ies . In stead , independence 
comes about as ' state s uccess ion ' ,  effected by a t r ansfer of spec ific state 
power s  of the Western- type from one government to another . Independence 
thus presupposes the ex istence of a government in the former colony , as 
well as the ( i f only f ic t i t ious)  exi stence of a ter r itor ial state . 
Mo reover , the ' transfer of powe r s ' is accompanied by the hand ing over of 
the actual colon i al state mach ine r y .  The ' great leg acy ' of colon ial ism in 
the Pac i f ic i s  not the nat ion state but a te r r itor i al bur eauc r acy - as we 
saw ,  the f i r st of the p i l lar s o f  const itut ional ism . 
At independence the recog n i sed ' polit ical system ' in the Pac i f ic 
Islands cons ists of a government to wh ich We stern-type state powers have 
been t r ansfer r ed , backed ( i f only inst i tut ionally ) by a more or less 
developed Western- type leg islature and j ud ic iary ( usual ly manned by 
expatr iates} , wh ich are more or less eager to control its act iv ities . 
The pos it ion of Pacif ic I s lands wh ich have acqui r ed independence 
through a ' t ransfer of powe rs '  has l ittle in common with the ' great 
revolut ion ' s i t uat ion i n  Fr ance i n  the late e ighteenth century . The ir  
constitut ions cannot be cha r te r s  o f  nat ional revolut ions a imed at chang ing 
the s t r ucture of soc iety by tak ing over the government of a fully- fledged , 
( absolut ist)  nat ion s tate . Independence gover nments in the Pac i f ic - even 
if duly e lected - lac k  a revolut ionary mandate . They also have no mandate 
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f rom the people to continue operating the ex-colon ial state mach inery on 
wh ich the i r  own pol it ical surv ival depends .  
I n  th is s ituation the adopt ion o f  a developmentalist ideology the 
second pillar of const itut ional ism - as an alternat ive base of leg i t imacy 
may seem the only r eal istic cho ice . I f  not the will of the people , the 
promise of development by the gover nment must j ust i fy the ex istence of the 
new ( skeleton) state . After the marr iage between bureaucratic government 
and developmental i sm the adopt ion of a const itut ional ist const itut ion i s  
merely a formality . 14 
When the Fr ench d i scussed the ir revolut ionary const i tutions 200 year s 
ago ,  the r eac t ion of the outs ide wor ld was of compar at ively l ittle concern 
to them . Wh ile sett ing an example wh ich - they thought - other countr ies 
ought to follow , they also knew that those in  power in  the countr ies around 
them would oppose th is new const i tut ion . Ye t ,  they made no attempt to 
m1n1m 1se oppo s i t ion . They expected to have to f ight to retain the i r  new 
l ibe rty and had no intent ion of con forming to internat ionally accepted 
const i tut ional standards , s ince the destruc t ion of those standards - in 
Fr ance - was the aim of the revolut ion . 
On the other hand , wh i le consc ious that the new const itut ional order 
for wh ich they had revol ted brought with i t  the r isk of ex ternal mil itary 
intervent ion , the Fr ench we re not hampered by inter nat ional econom ic 
cons ider at ions . They d id not dr eam of r ece iv ing fore ig n  a id to sub s id i se 
the new order they wanted to establ ish . In shor t ,  the internat ional 
econom ic and po l it ical env ironment was essent ially d ifferent . The Pac i f ic 
I s lands today are pa r t  of a g lobal system of a k ind wh ich d id not ex ist at 
the t ime of the Fr ench Revolut ion but developed in response to it - a 
system with almost compulsory membersh i p ,  exert ing prev iously unknown 
conform i st pr essures . Never theless , noth ing shor t of a withdrawal from the 
sys tem - or i ts g lobal overthrow - is needed , before tr uly ' homeg rown ' 
Pacif ic constitut ions can be implemented . 
I t  is important , i n  th i s  contex t ,  to apprec iate that the hold of the 
system over its par ts is pr imar i ly ideolog ical and not econom ic as i s  
commonly c laimed . Th is appl ies espec ially t o  t h e  ' a id dependence ' of the 
Pac i f ic Island s .  Few c r i t ical observers  doubt any longer  that at least for 
some t ime to come more r ather th an fewe r people will go hung ry in the 
Pacif ic as a result of for e ign a id ,  foreign investment , and even increased 
export earning s .  The j ustif icat ion for the scr amble for funds is 
' deve lopment ' , although an immed i ate need i s  cr eated by the cont inued 
ex istence of a s alar ied state bureaucr acy wh ich , however , is in turn 
j ustif ied by the needs of ' development ' .  
Le t us f i nally look at the other s ide of the co in : the pr ac t ical 
forces wor k i ng in favour of ' homeg rown ' P ac i f ic const itut ions . We are all 
famil iar wi th the f r ustrat ing ly vag ue and r epe t i t ive d i scuss ions about 
Pac i f ic ways and values . We are told ag ain and again that Pac i f ic cult ures 
are less i nd iv idual istic and less mater ial i s t ic than Western c iv i l isat ion , 
that they are more commun ity-or iented and pr efer a consensual r ather than 
adversary approach - but th i s  does not amount to a coherent ideology wh ich 
could serve as a g uide for pol i t ical act ion . At tempts have been made to 
f i l l  th i s  ideolog ical vacuum by nat ional goals , but , quite apar t  from the 
fact that they are , in  form as we ll as in substance , ' Westernised ' and 
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' Developmenta l ist ' , they conta in fundamental  contrad ict ions and , most 
impor tant o f  all , they do not supply a mot ivat ion for ach iev ing them . 
In it ially , the most act ive forces wor k ing for a depar ture from a 
convent ional western- type consti tut ion tend to be negative : ant i-colon ial 
and ant i-Weste rn fee l ing s .  However , these feel ing s rarely grow into a 
pos i t ive , c ultural nat iona l i sm and they are  cer tainly no match for 
developmental i sm .  
Al though a Ma rxist pe r spect ive suggests that there may b e  strong 
external  and internal  econom ic forces suppo r t ing trad i t ional ism ,  they have 
never shown themselves dur ing the const itut ion-mak ing process in the 
Paci f ic .  As r egards polit ical forces , the ch iefs in many par ts o f  
Po lyne s ia a nd Micrones ia we re obv iously a factor t o  b e  reckoned with , and 
d ifferent ways were tr ied of i ncorporat ing them into the const itut ional 
framework . Ye t ,  in no case was the pol it ical power of the trad it ional 
ch iefs strong enough to determ ine the shape of the const itut ion as a whole . 
In other words , the futur e of ' homeg rown ' Pac i f ic const itut ions depends on 
mor e d iffuse , soc ial and cul tural forces . That they are  s t i l l  al ive , we 
all know. We know also that they become most v i s ible in the f ield of land 
tenur e - a lthough they , naturally , r each much fur ther . Land is the hub of 
trad i t ional Pac i f ic I s land const i tut ions and land tenur e rather than the 
const itut ion w i l l  be the a r ena where the dec i s ive const itut ional battles in 
the Pacif ic will  be fought . 
It i s , perhaps , necessary to r em ind our selves at th is po int , that 
const itut ions are  not an invent ion of constitut iona l i sm or of the ancient 
Greeks , but that every soc iety s ince the beg inn ing of human h istory has had 
its cons t i t ut ion , its  pol it ics and its ways of controll ing polit ical power .  
However ,  the const itut ions o f  trad it ional soc iet ies i n  the Pac i f ic ,  in 
pa r t icular in Me lanes ia ,  we re def i ned by ideals and processes rather than 
by r u les and institut ions . Trad it ional soc iet ies we re held together by a 
ne twor k o f  pe r sonal r e lat ion s rather than a framework of ins t i tut ionalised 
structur es . I t  is no wonder ,  therefor e ,  that the t rad i t ional forces in the 
Pacif ic do not assert  themselves by offe r ing alternat ive rules and 
inst itut ions , but by trying e ither to manipulate or to ignore the imported 
Western products . Wh i le th is process may produce some fasc ina t ing 
var iat ions on the convent ional const itut ional i st themes , it is l i kely to 
br ing out the wor st of both wor lds instead o f  lead ing to a meaning ful and 
wor kable synthes is . To be sure , Western pol it ical and j ud ic ial procedures 
could wel l  do with a he fty dose of consensual i sm ,  but to r un a bureaucracy 
the Pac i f ic way is cour t ing d isaster . 
The search for ' homeg rown ' Pac i f ic constitut ions must beg in with the 
formulat ion of Pac i f ic ideolog ies , ideolog ies wh ich - if they are  based on 
trad it iona l Pac i f ic ways and va lues - are necessa r i ly non-bureaucratic and 
non-developmental i s t .  Such ideolog ies would be of great s ig n i f icance for 
the rest of the wor ld as we ll , s ince people everywhere are look i ng for 
v iable alternat ives to bureaucrat ic developmental ism - so far in va in . 
Perhaps Pac i f ic I s lander s  have a better chang e of succe ss than people in 
e i ther the We st or the East . After a l l , was not mode rn western 
constitut ional ism ,  and the improvements it represents over anc ient or iental 
despo t i sm ,  the product of many hundreds of years of European 
' underdevelopment '  wh ich al lowed a new sta r t  when the t ime was r ipe? Maybe 
the extra 2000  ' stat ic '  year s  the Pac i f ic enj oyed can be turned to s im ila r 
advantage . Even so it is bound to be a long and messy bus iness - but then 
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a s lowing down of the hect ic pace of mechan ical , developmental ist h i story 
m ight be the f i r st goal . Pac i f ic constitut ions do not grow on trees , 
certa inly not on tr ansplanted Eng l ish oaks however drastically they h ave 
been pr uned . Wi lhelm von Humboldt ' s  1 79 1  ver s ion o f  the Denn ing compar i son 
may not be c loser to the t r uth , but it shows , at least , g reater pat ience : 
Const itut ions c annot be g r afted on people l ike shoots 
on trees . I f  t ime and nature h ave not pr epared the 
g round i t  is l ike tying flowe rs to them with str ing s : 
they w i lt i n  the f ir st m idday s un . I s  
NOTES 
II do not even d ispute the need to g ive prominence to what may be called 
' defens ive prov i s ions ' ,  for i nstance r elat ing to c i t i zensh ip and for e ig n  
investment . 
2Qu ite apart from ident i fying self- r eal isat ion with order and order with 
gover nment . 
3shor t ly a fterward s , Nwabueze returns to " a  systemat ic pervers ion of the 
inst itut ions and processes of government coupled with a spate of 
amendments to the constitution where it is thought necessary to maintain 
some facade of legal ity" (ibid. ) .  
4A despot without a bur eauc r acy at h is command may be able to k ill  s i ng le 
s ubj ects with impun ity i f  he d isl ikes the colour of the i r  hai r ,  but he 
cannot , however much he wants to , govern all  h is s ubj ects absolutely . 
5If  there we re a non- r ule gover ned form of administration of compar able 
effic iency i t  would not be near ly as r espons ive to legal controls as a 
bureauc r acy to wh ich consti tut ionalism speaks in its  own lang uage . 
6The ident i f icat ion of const i tut ionalism with a ' mar ket '  economy - instead 
of the idea of econom ic pr og r es s  - is m is lead ing . I t  h ides the fact that 
constitutional i sm i tsel f  is  development-or iented . The fact that it 
ident if ies with a ' mar ket ' economy as the only leg i t imate means o f  
ach iev i ng econom ic development i s  par t  of a str ategy designed t o  l im i t  
the bureaucracy . A s  a technology , const i tut ional ism f its j ust as we ll -
i f  not better - with a bur eaucrat ic economy . 
7.Ju st as the ' mar ket ' ideology was unable to control the bureaucrat i sat ion 
of the pr ivate sector in  the econom ic f ield . 
8Fr ied r i ch , n atur ally , does not dwe l l  on th i s  aspect o f  the scenery . Nor 
does he point out that the early Engl ish champions of const itut ionalism 
were to a large extent the same member s  of the nob i l ity who were beh ind 
the enclosure movement in the interests of economic development and 
greater pe r sonal wealth and power - and opposed to the pub l ic welfare 
moves o f  the embr yonic royal bureauc r acy , o r  that the banke r s  and 
industr ial ists were perhaps the dec i s ive force beh ind the constitut ion-
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alist  movement s  dur ing the n ineteenth century - in the interests of 
internat ional po l i t ical stab i l ity and economic g rowth r ather than in  the 
interests of individual freedom or in order to make the s tate bureaucracy 
mor e respons ible . 
9" I t i s  not t r ue that the underdeveloped countr ies ever set out on the 
same road , from the same star t i ng po int , as  the old industr ial countr ies , 
yet inexpl icably lagged beh ind them . The truth i s  that they set out from 
utter ly d ifferent star t ing po ints that the trad i t ional , pr emode r n ,  
pr e i ndustr ial soc ial struc tures o f  these countr ies were utter ly d ifferent 
from the premoder n  soc ial order from wh ich modern Europe and its over seas 
settlements have emerged" ( ibid. : 1 80-8 1 ) .  
1 0The Th ird Wor ld ,  as we can see , ope r ates in accordance with Pavlov and 
not with Weber . 
1 1Lowenthal r ecog n ises a s im ilar ( though m ilder )  process in the ' under­
developed ' countr ies o f  Europe : m id e ighteenth centur y Fr ance in 
relat ion to England , late e ighteenth centur y Ge rmany in re lat ion to 
F r ance and n ineteenth century Rus s i a  in rel at ion to ' the West ' .  He has 
spec ial r easons for th is  observation : both G e rmany and Ru ss i a ,  where 
these developments got out o f  hand , left , at leas t tempor ar i ly ,  the path 
of l iberal v i rtue and turned total itar i an .  Lowenthal does not d iscuss 
the re lat ions of the Br it i sh intelligent s i a  to Ame r ica in the ear ly 
twentieth century .  He was , o f  cour se , at the t ime of wr i t i ng ,  unable to 
take the var ious cr i ses of the Western inte l l igents ia s ince 1 960  into 
account (see also below) • 
1 2For Lowenthal the future of the Th ird Wor ld is  int imately l inked with 
that of the Commun ist , Second Wor ld .  Wh i le it i s  inev itable that the 
Th ird Wor ld wi l l ,  for a t ime , follow a parallel cour se to that of the 
Second Wor ld ,  it is also i nev itab le that the Second Wor ld ( together with 
the Th ird)  wil l ,  i n  the long r un ,  r eturn to the path of Western l iber al 
v i r tue s .  He therefore t reats all commun ist  countr ies as developing 
countr ies , and sees all  total itar ian reg imes in developed countr ies , 
includ ing Ge rman Fasc ism ,  as momentary abe r r at ions . For Lowenthal , every 
affl uent pe r son (or state) becomes automat ically l iberal . He re fuses to 
see th at developmental i sm as s uch m ight be l inked with total itar ian i sm ,  
thus present ing a cons tant d anger to c iv i l  l iber t ies i n  the F i r s t  Wor ld 
as well .  
1 3From a determ inist po int o f  v iew h istory must appear a s  a ser ies of 
consp i r ac ies . 
1 4The ' autochthony debate ' i s  l arg e ly an attempt to ac t out a r i tual , leg al 
pseudo- r evolut ion . 
1 5Quoted i n  Lang 1 969 : 275 (my tr anslat ion) . 

2. CONSTITUTION-MAK ING IN THE PACI F IC ISLANDS I N  TH E 
N I N  ETE ENTH-CENTURV 
S. Utiikefu 
Cons t i t ut ion-mak ing in the Pac i f ic dur ing the n ineteenth centur y was a 
Polyne s ian phenomenon . F i j i i s  included in Po lynes ia here for the reasons 
g iven by the prominent F i j i an anthropolog ist , the l ate Ruc iate Nyacakalou , 
that wh ile the F i j ians were Me lanes i an in the i r  phys ical appear ance , they 
were def in i tely Po lyne s ian in  the ir  cultures (pe r sonal commun icat ion) . 
Th is const itut ion-mak ing was a product of cent r a l ised governments , 
part icular ly kingdoms , and it was only in Po lynes ia that they emerged in 
the n ineteenth centur y .  Microne s i a  and Melane s i a  were not yet in a 
pos i t ion to estab l i sh centr al ised gover nments o f  the ir  own . It was left to 
the colonial ists to do that for them . Nor was the pos it ion in Polynes ia 
un i form. 
The Ki ngdom of Tah it i ,  for example , had not ex isted long enough to 
produce a const itut ion be fore Fr ance declared a Pr otector ate over it in 
1 842 (see Mo rrell 1 9 60 : 7 6-8 ) . The ne ighbour ing Cook Islands never managed 
to produce one e i ther , mainly because no cent r al ised government emerged in 
the g roup be fore Br itain declared it a Protector ate in 1 8 88 (see G i lson 
1 9 80 : 59-60 ) . In both areas however , codes of  laws had been dr awn up , 
promulg ated and enforced , at t imes with g r eat enthus iasm prompted by the 
excess ive m i s s ionary zeal of the i r  producer s .  Samoa established her 
central Gove rnment r ather late in the century,  and managed to produce thr ee 
short- l ived Const itut ions : 1 87 3 , 1 875  and 1 8 87 . The K i ngdom of Bau and 
the Lau Confederat ion , F i j i ,  produced one each in 1 867 . Hawa i i  had the 
dist inct ion of produc ing the most Const itut ion s ;  i n  fact f ive of  them in 
1 8 40 , 1 852 , 1 864 , 1 887  and 1 894 . Tong a produced only one Const itut ion in 
1 8 75 , and it is the only one that has surv ived - w i th amendments - to the 
twent ieth centur y and to the present . 
The a im of th i s  pape r i s  to ex am ine the reasons for the promulgat ion 
of the se Const itut ions , for the ir collapse , and for the surv ival of the 
Tong an Const i tut ion . 
Several reasons appear to have accounted for the product ion of these 
nineteenth century Const itut ions in Po lynes ia :  there was a general des ire 
among certain  leader s  and the i r  European constitut ional adv isers to make 
the newly-eme rged centr al governments of k ingdoms modern and mor e 
democ r atic in the ir  structures , pol ic ies and funct ion s ;  there was a des ire 
among these new nat ions to maintain the i r  independent sovere ignty ag ainst 
increas ing pressures from the We stern powe r s  for annexat ion ; there was a 
determinat ion among some conservat ive rule r s  to restore some of the ir  lost 
power s  and to guard ag a inst wh at they reg arded as extreme l iberal ism and 
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power- shar ing wh ich the ir  people could not under st and or wer e  unable to 
h and le properly;  and f inally there was the determinat ion among the r apidly 
g rowing numbe r s  of econom ically powe r fu l  for e ign settler s  to dev ise 
const itut ions wh ich would pr imar i ly serve the i r  own inter ests . 
When Kamehameha I uni ted Hawa i i  into a k i ngdom in 1 795  he established 
an almost absolute monarchy . One wr iter  r e fe r s  to h i s  Gover nment as " a  
feudal autocr acy" i n  wh ich h i s  powe r was almost absolute ( Kuykendall 
1 9 68 : 1 57 ) . Th ere was a coun c i l  of  ch iefs wh ich he often consulted on 
impor tant matte r s , but th is  counc il was a purely advi sory body . The f inal 
dec is ion on anyth ing was made by the k i ng h imsel f .  Because of h i s  
outs tand ing qualit ies h e  managed , in  gener al , t o  maintain inter nal law and 
order and to promote external t r ade and po l it ical r elat ions quite 
sat isfactor ily ,  but h i s  autoc r at ic r ule allowed no place in the dec i s ion 
mak ing for h i s  people , chiefs and commone r s  al ike . There was very l ittle 
room e i ther for any change in  the t r ad i t ional way commone r s  wer e  t r e ated . 
Nevertheless , seve r al factors emerged to st imulate soc ial changes wh ich in  
turn necess itated con s t itut ional change that led to the Bill  of  Rights in 
1 839  and the f i r s t  Const itut ion in 1 840 . 
Consc ious o f  the weakness of h i s  son and he i r , Liho l iho ,  who later 
became h i s  s uccessor as Kamehameha I I ,  Kamehameha I made his f avour i te and 
r emar kably able wife , Kaahumanu , a kuhina-nui , a co- r uler with the K i ng . 
Kuhina-nui is often tr anslated into Engl ish as ' pr ime m i n i ster ' o r  
' pr em ie r ' b u t  this  i s  mislead ing . T h e  o f f ice was l a t e r  de f i ned in t h e  1 840  
Cons t itut ion in t h e  following way : 
Al l bus iness connected with the spec ial interests of  
the k i ngdom , wh ich the K i ng w i shes to t r ansact . Shall 
be done by the Kuh ina-nui under the autho r i ty of  the 
K i ng .  Al l documents and bus iness of  the k i ngdom 
executed by the Kuh ina-nui  shall be cons ider ed as 
executed by the K i ng ' s  author i ty . • •  The Kuh ina- n u i  
shall b e  t h e  K i ng ' s  spec i al counsellor in t h e  g re at 
bus iness of the k i ngdom . The K i ng shall not act 
without the knowledge of the Kuhina- nu i ,  nor shall the 
Kuh ina- n u i  act without the knowledge of  the K i ng ,  and 
the veto of the K i ng on the acts of  the Kuh ina-nu i 
shall arrest the bus iness . Al l important bus iness  of 
the k i ngdom wh ich the K i ng chooses to t r ansact in  
pe r son , he may do i t  but not without the approbat ion of 
the Kuh ina-nui ( Kuykendall 1 968 : 6 4 ) . 
Th us emerged a un ique dual r uler sh ip wh ich under the weak leadersh ip of  
Karneharneha I I  and the long pe r iod dur ing wh ich h is s ucces sor Kamehameha I I I 
r emained a minor , became a s ign i f icant means by wh ich the absolute powe r s  
of  the K i ng we re rnod i f  ied . The counc il of c h i e f s  also g r adual ly beg an to 
evolve a leg is lat ive role . 
The corning of the protestant m i ss ionar ies  of the Ame r ican Board of  
Commissione r s  for  Fo re ign Miss ions ( ABCFM) i n  1 820 , a year after  the death 
of  Kameharneha I ,  contr ibuted s ign i f icantly to these changes . The ABCFM was 
a non-denominat ional , but pr edom inantly Cong r eg at ional and Presbyte r ian 
body , founded in Boston in 1 8 1 0 .  The m i s s ionar ies of Hawa i i  shared the new 
l iber al Calvan i srn wh ich harmon i sed well and , in fact , as one wr i ter points 
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out ,  " r e infor ced the g rowing Ame r ic an spi r it o f  self- r e li ance and growing 
movements both in England and Ame r ica for soc ial r e form" (Judd 1 96 1 : 4 0- 1 ) .  
They natur ally tr ied to t r ansfer these democ r at ic changes to the i r  conver ts 
in Hawa i i ,  for they came to Hawa i i  not only to save souls but to c ivil ise 
( i . e . , to Wes te r n i se )  the Hawa i i ans . They shared with the i r  Eng l ish 
counterparts , the London M i ss ionary Soc iety , Wesleyans and Ang l ican 
miss ionar ies ,  the f i rm bel ief that only by c iv i l is ing the people of the 
Pac if ic would they be enabled to under st and Ch r i st ian ity.  The m i s s ionar ies 
wer e  obv iously unhappy with the undemoc r at ic and oppr ess ive nature of the 
Hawai i an Government , and in  spite of m i s s ion pol icy of str ict non­
involvement in pol i t ic s ,  they found that they wer e  inev itably dr awn into 
the pol i t ic al arena because of the very nature of the ir wor k .  One 
miss ionary wrote : 
There i s  much ag itat ion on the pub l ic mind . The 
influence of the m i ss ionar ies , e spec ially those lately 
ar r ived , i s  very dec ided ag a inst the ancient system of 
gover nment . The ' r ights of men ' , ' oppress ion ' , ' blood 
and s i news ' are much talked o f ,  and a sor t  of 
impat ience i s  pe rce ivable that changes are made so 
slow . The probable consequence is  that the people and 
the ch iefs will  not come up to our expectat ions as to 
re form and we , at least some of us , will  be looked on 
with s uspic ion ( quoted in Kuykendal l 1 968 : 1 58 ) . 
The miss iona r ies ' d i scontentment was , as expected , r eflected in many of the 
ear ly and mor e  able conver ts . Among these was the f i r s t  kuhina-nui herself 
as wel l  as her s uccessor , K inau , a daughter of  Kameharneha I and half- s i s te r  
of both Pomare I I  and Pomare I I I , and other prom inent young men who later 
became c lose fr iends and influent i al adv ise r s  to the monarchy , s uch as 
Daniel and John I i ,  Dav id Malo , Boaz Mahune and T imothy Haal i l i o .  
The latter became the pr ivate secretary and bus iness manager for 
Kamahameha I I I for many year s .  According to one observer : 
Be s ides acqua intance with mercant ile t r ansactions , he 
also acqu ired a very full knowledge o f  the pol it ical 
relat ions of  the country.  He was a st renuous advocate 
for a const itut ional and representat ive government , and 
aided not a l ittle in  effect ing those changes by wh ich 
the r ights of  the lowe r classes have been secur ed . He 
was well acqua inted with the pr act ical influence of the 
former system of government , and cons idered change 
necessary to the wel fare of the nat ion ( quoted in 
ibid . : 1 58 ) . 
Rebe ll ing ag a inst the l iber al and mor al influence of the miss ionar ies and 
the i r  ardent conver ts the young K i ng K amehameha I I I , who was then n ineteen 
year s old ,  g ave the following address to an assembly of the people on 1 5  
March 1 833 : 
These are my thoughts to all ye ch i ef s , c lasses of  
subj ects and fore ig ne r s  r espect ing th is  country wh ich 
by the v ictory of  Mok uohai was conquer ed by my Father 
and h i s  ch iefs i t  has descended to us as h i s  and 
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the i r  poster i ty .  Th is is more - a l l  th at is with i n  i t ,  
the l iv ing and the dead , the good and the bad , the 
ag ree able and the unple asant - all are m i ne . I shall 
r ule w i th j u st ice over a l l  the l and , make and 
promulgate all laws : n e i ther the c h i e f s  nor the 
fore ig ne r s  h ave any voice in mak i ng l aws for th i s  
coun t r y .  I a lone am the one . Those three l aws wh ich 
we r e  g iven out forme r ly r emain s t i l l in force , v i z .  not 
to murde r , not to steal , not comm i t  adulte r y ;  
ther e fore gover n  you r s e lves accord ing ly ( quoted in 
ibid. : 1 35 ) . 
K i nau , the kuhina-nui at the t ime , who was the K i ng ' s own e lder 
half- s i s te r , and the ch iefs , h ad no intent ion o f  g iv ing up the 
con s t i t u t ional advantag e s  and re spons ib i l it ies that they h ad then g a ined , 
and v igorously r e s is ted th is at tempt to r e t u r n  to the former autoc r at ic 
r ule of the K i ng .  Th e K i ng ,  who d id not possess the powe r fu l  and 
autoc r at ic pe r son al ity o f  h i s  f athe r , eventually g ave up the at tempt , and 
in 1 8 36 , the Br it i sh Co nsul wrote : 
Ka u i ke aoul i ( or Kameh ameh a)  i s  now about twenty- th r ee 
ye a r s  o f  ag e and is possessed of mor e  t alent than 
almost any other nat ive , but be i ng o f  very i ndolent 
hab i t s  and exce s s ively fond of ple asur e s  he doe s not 
attend to the a f fa i r s  of Gove r nment , but tr usts K i nau 
h i s  hal f s i s ter with the r e i n s , she i s  ent i r e l y  
gover ned b y  the Ame r ic an M i s s iona r ies who through h e r  
gover n  the I s l and s with un l im i ted sway ( quoted in 
ibid . : 1 36 )  • 
Th is l ib e r a l  tr end in con s t i t u t ional deve lopment led to the declar at ion of 
r ights in 1 83 9 .  It has been c l a imed that among the i n f l uences that led to 
the dec lar at ion o f  th i s  B i l l  of Rights , wh ich has been h a i l ed as the 
Hawa i ian Mag na Carta , wer e  letter s pub l i shed by g r ad uate and unde r-g r ad uate 
students o f  the m i s s ionary t r a i n ing inst i t u t ion at Lah a i naluna in 1 8 38 (see 
ibid . : 1 58 ) . Th e B i l l  a f f i rms that God h as bestowed c e r t a i n  r ig h t s  on a l l  
men r eg ardless o f  the i r  r ank and nat ional i ty and that people and c h i e f s  
al i ke are g iven " l i fe , l imb , l ib e r t y ,  t h e  l abour of h i s h and s , a n d  the 
prod uc t ion s  o f  h i s  m i nd " . I t  goe s  on to dec lare : 
God has a lso e s tab l i shed gove r nments and r ule for the 
purposes o f  peace , but i n  mak i ng l aws for a nat ion it 
i s  by no means prope r to enact l aws for the protect ion 
of r ul e r s  on ly , w i thout also pr ov id ing protect ion for 
the i r  s ubj ects ; ne ither is it prope r  to enac t  laws to 
enr ich the c h i e f s  on ly , w i thout r eg a r d  to the enr ich i ng 
of the i r  s ubj ects also ; and h e r e a fter , ther e  shal l by 
no means be any l aw enacted wh ich is incons i stent w i th 
wh at i s  above expressed , ne ither sh all any t ax be 
assessed , nor any se r v ice or l abor r e qu i r ed of any man 
i n  a manne r at var i ance with the above sent iments 
( q uoted in ibid . : 1 60 ) . 
In i ts conc lud ing sect ion it states that any ch i e f  who v iolates th i s  
Const i t ut ion " shall n o  long e r  remain a ch i e f  o f  t h e  Sandwich I s l ands , and 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY CONSTITUTIONS 2 5  
the same shall b e  tr ue o f  the governor s ,  off icer s ,  and a l l  land agents" 
( quoted in  ibid . : 1 6 1 ) . The lang uage and sent iment used in  th is  declarat ion 
re flect undoubted miss ionary influe nce wh ich must have been g reatly 
enhanced by the employment in  1 839  of W i l l i am Richards , one of the 
miss ionar ies , in  the serv ice of the K i ng ( see Blac kman 1 9 06 : 1 05-6 ) . 
In 1 840 , a year afte r the declar at ion of the B i l l  of Rights , the f i r st 
wr i tten fully- fledged const itut ion in  the Pac i f ic was promulg ated by the 
K i ng and the ch iefs of Hawa i i .  The B i l l  of Rights was sl ightly modif ied 
and made the pr eamble of the new Cons t i tut ion . It stated a plan of 
government and def ined the dut ies and powe r s  of var ious o f f ic ials . I t  also 
contained important innovat ions . In add it ion to the House of Nobles wh ich 
was composed of the K i ng ,  the kuhina-nui and four teen nobles ,  a House of 
Representatives was also cr eated , to be chosen annually by the people , as 
par t of the leg is lat ive body . For the f i r st t ime , the commoners  wer e  g iven 
a place in government and dec i s ion-mak i ng . Another important innovat ion 
was the creat ion of the Supr eme Cour t ,  compr is ing the K i ng ,  the kuhina-nui , 
and four other j udges appo inted by the House of Repr e sentative s . The 
Execut ive was made up of the K i ng ,  the kuhina-nui , the four Gove rnors of 
the main is lands (who appointed the d istr ict cour t j udges)  and the tax 
collectors ( who we re also in charg e of public wor ks ,  as wel l  as act ing as 
j udges in all cases ar is ing unde r  the tax law) . One author ity r ightly 
po inted out that : 
The Constitution of 1 840 was a c r ude affai r , its  
phraseology vag ue and provocat ive of abund ant mis­
apprehens ion , its d i fferent iat ion of the leg islat ive , 
j udicial , and execut ive funct ions wanting in prec i s ion , 
and its spi r it cur iously compounded of customary and 
feudal , b ib l ic al , Br i t i sh and Ame r ican elements ; but 
i t  was a long step onward (Blackman 1 9 06 : 1 09 ) . 
With r apid advances in educ at ion among the Hawa i i ans themselve s ,  and 
through the involvement of Ame r ican ex-miss ionar ies s uch as w. Richards , 
Richard Armstrong and Dr G . P .  Judd,  and the f i r st lawyer to come to Hawa i i ,  
John Ricord o f  New Yor k , who ar r ived i n  1 8 43  and was made the fi r st 
At torney-General in the Gove rnment of Hawa i i , the def ic ienc ies of the 
Const itut ion of 1 840 became more and mor e  obv ious . Efforts we re then taken 
to r emedy the s ituat ion . Be tween 1 8 45 and 1 8 4 7  th ree impor tant amendments 
wer e  made to the Const itut ion , but they we re called Organ ic Acts . The 
f i r st wh ich was passed in Oc tober 1 845 d iv ided the Execut ive into f ive 
depar tments : Fi nance , For e ig n  Re lat ions , Inte r ior , Law and Publ ic 
Instr uct ion . The Ministers  of these Depar tments formed the Cabinet , and 
they , the four Gove rnor s ,  and certain honorary member s appo inted by the 
K i ng ,  formed the Pr ivy Counc il . The second Organic Ac t wh ich was passed in 
Apr il 1 846 laid down in g reat detail the f unct ions of var ious departments 
and establ i shed a Land Commiss ion to settle land t itles . The th ird Organ ic 
Act passed in September 1 8 47 dealt with the j ud ic iary,  mak ing the j udges 
independent of the Execut ive , organ i sed fully the var ious cour ts and 
def ined the i r  respect ive j ur i sd ict ions . 
The next important s tep in th is  development came in 1 8 50 when the 
Hou se of Representatives was enlarged from seven to twenty- four , and 
author ity was g iven to the Minister s to s i t  in the House of Nobles . Most 
impor tantly , a comm ittee was set up to pr epare a new con s t i tut ion . Dr afted 
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mainly by Ch ief Justice Wi l l iam L .  Lee ,  a br i l l iant and strong-minded 
lawyer from New Yo rk , who cal led in to Honolulu in 1 846 and was per suaded 
by Dr Judd and Ricord to enter the Gover nment serv ice as a j udge , the new 
Const i tut ion was adopted by the Leg i s latur e and was promulgated in Decembe r  
1 8 52 . I t  embod ied the spir it of  the 1 840 Const itut ion and t h e  var ious 
pol i t ic al r e forms i n i t i ated by the three Organic Acts of 1 8 45  to 1 8 47 . One 
author i ty s ums up the 1 8 52 Const itut ion in  th i s  manne r : 
I t  mar ks a g r eat advance upon the Const itution of 1 840 
i n  clearness of  concept ion and prec i s ion of statement . 
It incorpor ates the pr inc iples o f  the Organ ic Ac ts o f  
1 845-7 ; d i fferent i ates mor e  fully the leg islat ive , 
execut ive and j ud ic ial functions o f  the gover nment ;  
cont inues for sent imental reasons the cur ious off ice of  
Kuh ina-Nu i ,  or Prem ier ; prov ide s  for un ive r sal 
suffrage , without qua l i f icat ions e i ther for r epre sent­
at ives or vote r s ;  and places impor tant checks on the 
arbitr ary power s  of  the k i ng (Bl ackman 1 9 06 : 1 32 ) . 
In other parts of Polyne s i a  the impact of the miss ionar ies was 
s imilar ly r e flected in some of the const itut ional prov i s ions in the codes 
of  laws they helped to d r aw up for the i r  ch iefly conver t s  and the i r  people .  
In Tong a ,  for example ,  the 1 8 62 Code of Laws included prov is ions wh ich were 
const itut ional in  natur e , in  that they fur n i shed a fr amework  of  gover nment .  
C l auses I ,  I I I  and V ,  for instance , wer e  concerned with the power s  and 
duties of the K i ng and h i s  assembly , the j udges and gover nors  r e spect ively . 
Th e most impor tant prov 1s 1on in th is  Code was the declar at ion of  
emanc ipat ion for  all people in Tong a .  Cl ause XXXIV, 2 r e ad s : 
Al l chiefs and people are to all intents and purposes 
set at l iber ty from ser fdom , and all vassalage , from 
the inst itut ion of th is law ;  and it shall not be 
lawful for any ch ief or per son , to se i ze , or take by 
force , or beg author itat ively, in Tongan fash ion , any 
thing from any one ( quoted in La tukefu 1 9 74 : 247 ) . 
The other impor tant factor influe nc ing const i tut ion-mak ing in 
Po lynes ia was the des i r e  among the leade r s  and the i r  adv i se r s  to maintain 
the i r  independent sover e ignty in  the face of strong pressures from 
for e igner s  and the i r  respect ive governments , who wer e  then steeped in 
compl icated and often very b itter internat ional r ivalr y  for spheres  of  
influence in Afr ica , As i a , the Car ibbean and the Pac i f ic .  
The com ing o f  Europeans to the Pac i f ic brought mixed bless ing s  to the 
I s l ande r s ,  par t ic ul a r ly with regard to economic and r e l ig ious i ssues wh ich , 
of cour se , g reatly influenced pol i t ical development and , for the interest 
of  th i s  pape r , consti tut ion-mak ing in the Pac i f ic .  The explor at ion o f  the 
Pac i f ic by Europeans led to interest in  t r ade , ( par t icular ly) in  the 
i n i t i al stages ,  i n  i tems need ed for the pr o f i t able Ch ina t r ade , and late r , 
r aw mate r i als for the factor ies in the We stern countr ies , and mar kets for 
the ir  manufactured goods . The frequent c al l  of t r ad ing and whal ing sh ips 
in certain ports  in the Pac i f ic led to the emergence of  European 
sett lements the beach commun i t ie s  in Honol ul u ,  Papeete , Api a ,  Bay of 
I s l ands , Levuka and Noumea where mer chants and tr ader s  dec ided to se ttle to 
t r ade with the I s l ande r s  and , i n  par t icular , prov ide for the needs of  
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for e ig n  sh ips . The c iv i l  war in  the Un i ted S t ates (US ) from 1 8 6 1  t o  1 86 5  
s topped the supply o f  cotton and other tropical products from the south to 
nor the r n  US and Europe . Th is and the d iscovery by sc ient ists in the 1 840s  
that coconut o i l  could be used in the manufacture of soap , and the 
d iscovery in the 1 8 60s  of copr a product ion , led to the influx of Europeans 
to the Pac i f ic to exploi t  cheap land and cheap labour , wh ich , they hoped 
would make them wealthy quickly so they could return home in g lory.  
Profess ionals such as doctor s ,  l awyer s  and teache r s ,  and s k i lled tr adesmen 
in a var iety of occupat ions followed as needs for the i r  profess ions and 
skills  arose . As Europeans ' bus iness interests increased they fe lt that 
they needed secur ity.  Where there was no central gover nment they 
establi shed the i r  own mun ic ipal government , e . g . , in  Ap i a .  In  places where 
ind igenous centr al governments ex i sted such as  Hawa i i  and Tong a ,  the 
settler s despised them and looked to the i r  own home gover nments for 
protect ion . Representat ives of the ma in powe r s  we re appo inted to the 
Islands to look after the interests of the i r  respect ive nat ionals l iv ing 
there and most of these shared the att itudes of the settlers towards 
ind igenous gover nments , wh ich was one of utmost contempt . Us ual ly through 
the i r  misrepresentat ions of events and shameless fabr icat ions , naval 
war sh ips cal led frequently to settle d i sputes between the i r  nat ionals and 
Pac i f ic I s l ander s ,  includ ing rel ig ious d i sputes between the established 
Pr otestants and the newly a r r ived Roman Catho l ic s , mostly ,  of cour se , i n  
favour of the i r  own nat ional s .  
I n  1 83 9  Captain C . P . T .  Laplace o f  the Fr ench fr ig ate Artemise arr ived 
in Hawai i .  He complained about d i scr iminat ion against Roman Cathol ic 
miss ionar ies and the i r  converts , and the ban on the import of Fr ench br andy 
by the Hawai ian Government . He then " threatened war unless the Hawai ian 
gover nment toler ated Catho l ic i sm and paid $ 2 0 , 0 0 0  as a surety of good 
conduc t " . He also forced the K i ng to s ign a treaty ag ree i ng : 
that accused Fr enchmen should be tr ied by a j ur y  of 
for e igne r s  selected by the Fr ench Counsul , and the 
Fr ench commod it ies , espec ially wine and br andy , should 
pay no more than 5 per cent duty (Judd 1 9 6 1 : 5 7 ) . 
In Aug ust 1 8 42  another Fr ench war ship commanded by Captain s .  Mal let 
ar r ived at Honolul u .  He accused the Hawa i i an Gove rnment of v iolat ing the 
Lapl ace treaty of 1 83 9 , and : 
made a number of over-bear ing demands ,  of wh ich one 
would have g iven to Fr ench Catho l ic pr iests in Hawa i i  
the power to appo int sever al off ic ials i n  the Hawai ian 
Administrat ion (ibid . : 6 1 ) . 
I n  the following ye ar , 1 84 3 , a young over-enthus iast ic Br it ish 
Commander , Lord George Paulet , through g ross misrepr esentat ion from the 
then Ac t ing Br it i sh Counsul in Hawa i i , Alex ander S impson , for ced the K i ng 
to cede Hawa i i  to Gr eat Br ita i n ,  a cess ion that lasted only for five months 
when the Br i t i sh Gover nment declared the se i zure  of the Hawa i ian Islands to 
be completely unauthor ised ( see Kuykendal l and Day 1 9 66 : 6 5-8 ) . These and 
many other s imilar epi sodes brought home quite v iv idly to Hawa i ian leader s  
and the ir  adv ise r s  the need for a sound const itut ion wh ich would prescr ibe 
a str ucture of government , po l ic ie s  and funct ions wh ich would be acceptable 
to the main powe r s , and help to br ing about a recognit ion of the i r  
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independent sover e ig nty . Th is  conv ict ion played a very impor tant r ole in  
the c reat ion of the 1 840  Const itut ion and the much mor e r e f i ned 1 8 52 
Const i t ut ion wh ich late r bec ame the model for other constitut ions in  the 
Pac ific . 
I n  Samoa , Apia beg an as a small beach commun ity in the 1 840 s .  With 
the influx of European settle r s  into the Pac i f ic in the 1 8 6 0 s  and 1 8 7 0 s , i t  
g rew i nto a large settler  community,  and qu ickly became t h e  strongest 
centre for tr ade and commerce in  the South Pac i f ic . Dur ing the c iv i l  war 
over the Mal ietoa t it le wh ich lasted from 1 86 9  to 1 873 , the S amoans 
unwitting ly sold a lot of the i r  land to Europeans for g un s  to win the war .  
By 1 8 73  they suddenly r eal ised that they had sold mos t  of the i r  best 
ag r icultur al land s to for e ig ner s .  Th is shocked them into dropping the i r  
d ifferences and un i t ing t o  form a central  Gove rnment in  a n  e ffor t  to 
counter the encroachment of Europeans ( see Dav idson 1 96 7 : 45-8 ) . A c r ude 
Const itut ion was dr awn up and promulgated in  Aug ust 1 873 , l aying down the 
structure of the Gove rnment , a b ic amer al Leg i slature , Ta 'imua (Upper Hou se)  
and Faipule (Lowe r House) was estab l ished . As  Guy Powles points out i t  
" reflects the Hawa i i an model of House of Nobles and of Repr e sentat ives 
wh ich St . Jul ian and othe r s  had d i l igently advocated" ( 1 9 79 : 9 1 ) .  The 
Executive was made up of the Ta 'irrrua ,  j udges , d i str ict Gove r nor s and other 
offic i al s .  
A much mor e  ref ined Const itut ion was promulgated i n  May 1 87 5  by the 
Steinberger reg ime . The He ad of State was to be K i ng who " was to hold 
off ice only for a four ye ar term; and the holder was to be chosen , 
alternately from Sa Mal ietoa and Sa Tupua " (Dav id son 1 9 67 : 53 ) , and Mal ietoa 
La upepa was appo inted K i ng .  The number of Ta 'imua was increased from seven 
to four teen and the number of Faipu le reduced from about 2 0 0  to twenty . 
The He ad of the Execut ive was to be a Pr em ie r  appo inted by the K i ng ,  and in 
each d istr ic t  there wa s to be a Gove rnor and other offic ials r e spons ible to 
the P r em ier . Judges we re also to be appo inted . Steinberger was appo inted 
Prem ie r  and Ch ie f Judge , and was also g r anted the r ight to speak in both 
Ta 'irrrua, and Faipule . The S amoans accepted al l th i s  without quest ion . 
They t r usted Steinbe rger . The Const itut ion was r eg arded by them as an 
adm i r able attempt to solve inter nal problems , to un ite the country ag a inst 
the t ide of European encroachment , and to maintain Samoa ' s  much treasur ed 
independent sover e ig nty . 
I n  Tong a ,  K i ng George rece ived rough treatment from Fr ench offic ials 
and naval captains as h i s  counterpar ts i n  Hawai i  and Tah it i had done . In  
1 8 55  a treaty , s im ilar to those imposed on Hawa i i an and Tah it ian leader s ,  
was forced on h im by the Fr ench Governor of Tah it i .  A Fr ench naval 
captai n ,  at the request of Fr ench pr iests in  Tong a , a r r ived in Tonga in 
1 8 58 , and forced K i ng George and h i s  chiefs to prov ide land for the Fr ench 
pr iests in Ha ' apia ,  and have houses built  for them equal to those owned by 
the Wes leyan m i ss ionar ies . In 1 860  another naval capta in threatened to 
car ry K i ng George off to New Caledon i a ,  if the K i ng would not d ismi ss the 
Governor of  Ha ' apai who o ffended the Fr ench pr i e s t  the r e . The K i ng h ad no 
alternat ive but to accept all these demands .  
The settle r s  also g ave the K i ng and h i s  Gover nment a d i f f ic ul t  t ime . 
They r eg ar ded it as unth in kable that they,  who belonged to the c iv i l ised 
' Ang lo-Austr al ian ' r ace , should be governed by laws produced by a 
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half-c iv i l i sed K i ng and h i s  chiefs , ass isted by ignorant miss ionar ies . One 
of them wrote to the Fiji Times in 1 870 : 
They will  find the i r  effor ts to stay the t ide of 
immig rat ion useless • • •  and Eng land , being aware of the 
j ust ice and importance of protect i ng , if not actually 
g overning her subj ects in these sea s ,  the Anglo­
Austr alian r ace will settle and f i nd a l iv ing in the 
Fr iendly Islands , in spite of all the laws passed by 
K i ng s  and chiefs ( quoted in Latukefu 1 974 : 1 84 ) . 
These people obv iously r e sented the r e st r ic t ions placed by the Government 
on cer t a i n  aspects of the i r  trad ing ventur e s ,  s uch as the str ict 
proh ibit ion of the sale of land under any c ir c umstances , and the severe 
restr ict ions placed on the sale of spi r it uous l iquor s .  The pr inc ipal 
trader s  sent a pet i t ion to the Gover nor of New South Wales a few year s 
later , requesting h im to " de f i ne a l im i t  to the arbitrary author i ty of a 
government wh ich to say the least , i s  and only c an be semi- c iv i l ised " 
(Ruthe r ford 1 9 7 1 : 50 ) . 
Al l the se influences pr essed home most v igorously to the K i ng and h i s  
chiefs the need t o  establ ish a n  e f f ic ient con s t i tut ional government wh ich 
the main powe r s  would recog n i se . In  one of h i s  letter s  to K i ng George , 
St . Jul ian , a law r epor ter for the Sydney MoPrting Herald, and later 
Hawai i an Consul in  Sydney , po inted out that in order to ach ieve such a 
government it was e ssent ial that : 
s uch fundamental pr inc iples should be laid down as 
would form what i s  te rmed a const itut ion and all 
subseque nt leg islat ion should be in  str ic t accordance 
with these pr inc iples ( quoted in  Lat�kefu 1 9 74 : 1 9 1 ) . 
K i ng George eventual ly dec ided to g rant a const itut ion and in 1 8 72 he 
asked the Reverend Sh ir ley Bake r , the then Chai rman of the Wesleyan Miss ion 
and a close adv iser , to draft it . The wor k  was completed in 1 8 75 , and at 
the opening of the Parl iament that year at wh ich the Const itut ion was 
d i scussed and passed , the K i ng g ave a h ighly emot ionally charged speech in 
wh ich he said : 
You are cal led upon to meet and del iber ate on the new 
wor k  to be done by the Gover nment , to pass the 
Const itut ion , and to govern the land and to have the 
law of the country in accordance with i t .  The form of 
our Gove rnment in the days past was that my r ule was 
absolute , and that my w ish was law and that I chose who 
should belong to the Par l iament and that I could please 
myse l f  to create ch iefs and alter t it les . But that , it 
appear s to me , was a s ign of dar kness and now a new e r a  
h a s  come t o  Tonga - an e r a  of l ight - and it i s  my w i sh 
to g r ant a Constitut ion and to car ry on my duties in 
accordance with i t  and those that come after me shal l 
do the same and the Const itut ion shall be as a f i rm 
rock in Tonga for ever . When the Const itut ion has been 
passed it shal l be a pallad i um of freedom to all 
Tongans for ever . I t  i s  quite c lear now that they are 
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f r ee ;  and let th i s  be the most valuable pr iv i lege of 
the countr y ,  for b y  the pas s ing of  the Const itut ion a 
Tongan can boast that he is as f r ee as wer e  the Romans 
of  forme r days and as the Br it ish ar e now ( quoted in 
Ne ill 1 9 55 : 1 0 1 ) . 
The Tong an Const itut ion was a long document o f  1 3 2 a r t ic le s  d iv ided into 
thr ee main d iv i s ions :  Declar at ion of Rights , Form of Gover nment , and The 
Lands . The f ir st two sect ions followed c losely the 1 8 52  Const itut ion of 
Hawa i i ,  a copy o f  wh ich was sent by St . J u l i an to the Reve rend Thomas We st 
of  the We sleyan Miss ion in Tonga towards the end of  1 8 54 w i th a r equest to 
t r anslate i t ,  and was accord ing ly tr anslated and pr esented to the K i ng (see 
Latuke fu 1 9 74 : 1 63 ) . I t  was the third sect ion of  the Cons t itut ion The 
Lands wh ich was un ique . Al l l and in Tonga was declared to belong to the 
K i ng who could g r ant estates known as tofi 'a to the twenty nobles appo inted 
by h im .  The t i tles and the tofi 'a wer e  to be hered it ar y ,  and the l aws o f  
inher i t ance for the throne and these t itles we re s e t  o u t  in th i s  sect ion . 
The nobles were to lease por t ions o f  the i r  tofi 'a to the people .  The 
Constitut ion made it unl awful for anyone , whether he was K i ng ,  ch i e f  or 
commoner , " to sell one par t  of a foot of the g round of the K i ngdom of 
Tong a ,  but only to lease it in  accordance with th is  Const itut ion" ( c l . 1 09 ) , 
and only leases approved by the Cabinet wer e  to be r ecog n i sed . 
In h i s  c los ing address to P a r l i ament a fter the dr aft Const itut ion 
d iscussed , amended and passed , K i ng George spoke with obvious 
sat i s fact ion and pr ide : 
here i s  the Const itut ion of Tong a ,  wr itten on 
parchment , to be kept in the Par li ament o f  Tong a ,  a 
document to commemor ate and to tes t i fy to the wor k  that 
we are doing to-day .  Th is day I h ave added my n ame to 
it and so it becomes the Law of Tong a .  May you and 
your descendants , you the people of Tong a be ble ssed 
now and for ever wh i le you follow the Const itut ion . 
May the day never dawn for Tong a when someone , or 
anyone , will  alter the bas ic pr inc iples o f  the 
Const itut ion . Le t it become the Foundat ion stone of 
our country for ever • • •  May e ach of you insc r ibe on your 
hearts TONGA FOR THE TONGANS ( quoted in Latuke fu 
1 9 75 : 4 2 ) . 
was 
deep 
The Tong an people shared the sent iments expre ssed by the ir  K i ng and the 
Const itut ion came to be looked upon by everyone as the key to pol it ical 
stabil ity,  econom ic prospe r i ty and independent sover e ignty . 
Another reason for constitut ion-mak ing in the Pac if ic dur ing the 
n i neteenth centur y was the determ inat ion by some r e act ionary g roups to 
re store to the monarchy some , if not al l ,  of its lost powe r s . It only 
succeeded once , and that was d ur ing the r e ign of Kameharneha V who r e igned 
from 1 86 3  to 1 8 72 . The e ffor t s  made by h i s younge r  brother , Alexander 
Kamehameha IV d i sc ussed above , and by Dav id Kalakaua ( 1 8 74  to 1 89 1 ) and h i s  
ill- fated s i ster , Queen L i l iuokal an i ( 1 89 1  to 1 893 ) t o  d o  t h e  same failed 
miser ably as we shall see later . 
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Lot Kamehameha V w a s  a we l l-educ ated , widely exper ienced ( i n matter s  
of  government) , knowledgeable ( in wor ld a f f a i r s ) , l arge bachelor , with an 
extremely react ionary streak . He bel ieved in the d iv ine r ights of k i ng s ,  
loathed Kamehameha I I I ' s  benevolent l ibe r a l i sm ,  and wanted to return to the 
system of government of  h i s  illustr ious g r and fathe r , Kamehameha I .  He was 
conv inced " that the people were not f i tted for the exerc ise of pol it ical 
r ights , and he was j ealous of fore ign influence in affa i r s  of  state " 
(Blackman 1 9 06 : 1 22 ) . He therefore refused to t ake the oath to uphold the 
l iber al 1 852  Const itut ion . He later summoned a convent ion to rev ise the 
Const itut ion , and when member s  reached a deadlock he d issolved the 
convent ion and s imply declared that he h imse l f  would g ive the country a 
const itut ion , and on 2 0  Aug ust 1 8 64  he proclaimed the new Const itut ion : 
It om itted the clause found in the preced ing B i l l  of 
Rights , g uarantee ing elect ions by ballot ; i t  abolished 
the off ice of Kuhina Nui;  it reduced the max imum 
number of Nobles ;  i t  d im i n i shed the powe r s  o f  the 
Pr ivy Counc il , and cor respond ing ly increased those of 
the k i ng ;  it threatened the independence of the 
j ud ic iary ; i t  prov ided that Nobles and representat ives 
should sit tog ether in  one house ; and it estab l i shed a 
prope r ty qua l i f icat ion for representat ives , and a 
proper ty and - i n  the case of those bor n s i nce 1 8 40 -
an educ at ional qual if icat ion for the suffrage 
(ibid. : 1 2 3 ) • 
There is an obv ious swing in th is  Const itut ion from the Ame r ican 
tendency of the 1 8 52 Const itut ion to a more Br it i sh system . The reasons 
for th i s  tr end are not hard to f i nd .  From 1 84 9  to 1 8 50 Dr Judd took the 
two young pr inces , Alexander ,  who later became Kamehameha IV ( 1 854- 1 8 6 3 ) , 
and Lot who late r became Kamehameha V ( 1 863  to 1 8 72 ) , on an almost year­
long d iplomat ic tr ip to US and Europe . Apparently Dr Judd , an 
ex-miss ionary,  imposed a str ict control over the youths dur ing the tr ip ,  
and th i s  tur ned them later aga inst the miss ionar ies who we re , o f  cour se , 
Ame r icans . In Eng land the pr inces were accorded royal treatment , but th is  
was not so in  US , and to make matte r s  wor se ,  a conductor in  Wash ington 
mistook Al exander for a Neg ro and ordered h im out of the t r a i n  (see Judd 
1 9 6 1 : 7 9 ) . Th is  insult was never forgotten . Dur ing th i s  t ime also , several 
Br it i sh subj ects includ ing Robert  C .  Wyl lie , " one of the three or four most 
impor tant f ig ures in the H i story of  the Hawa i i an Ki ngdom" (ibid . : 7 2 ) , 
entered the se r v ice o f  the K i ng .  Wyll ie was a Scott i sh surgeon and " an 
ardent admirer of the Br it i sh const itut ion " (Kuykendal l 1 9 66 : 1 1 5 ) . K i ng 
Kamehameha IV , encour aged by h i s  Queen , Emma , and Wyl l ie ,  estab l i shed the 
Angl ic an Ch urch in Hawa i i  in 1 862 . He d ied the following year , but h i s  
elder brothe r , Lot ,  who succeeded h im :  
shared h i s  brother ' s  ant im iss ionary feel ing s  and 
cont inued h i s  pro-Br i ti sh pol icy.  A por tly and 
pos i t ive bachelor , he showed h i s  d i staste for 
pur i tan ism of the Ame r ican miss ion by r ev iv ing anc ient 
Hawa i ian pr act ices . . .  In  add it ion , and in  fur ther 
repud iat ion of  Ame r ican pr inc iples , he rev ived the 
despotism of the anc ient Hawai ian K i ng s .  He was a 
g r andson of Kamehameha I ( the Gr eat) , whom he resembled 
in phys ique and d i spos it ion ( Judd 1 9 6 1 : 89 ) . 
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I n  add i t ion to all th is , there was a genuine fear of an eventual annexat ion 
of the i s lands by us . Bo th Kamehameha IV and Kamehameh a  V, Wyl l ie and h i s  
non-Ame r ican colleag ue s in the ministry ( Wyll ie hav ing become Min i ster for 
For e ig n  Af fa i r s ) , as well as the Br it i sh and Fr ench r epresentat ives in  
Hawa i i , shared the bel ief that the only ser ious thr eat to Hawa i i an 
independence would come from the Ame r icans . Consequently they wor ked 
together very c losely in  order to save Hawa i i  from the des igns of Amer ican 
annexat ion i st s , bel iev ing that any annexat ion by the US would destroy the 
independent sovere ignty of Hawa i i  and the monarch ical system they valued . 
The f i nal reason for compos i ng const i t ut ions was the determinat ion by 
the increasing ly economically power ful European settle r s  to ach ieve a 
pol it ical system that would serve the i r  own interests bes t . One ev idence 
of th i s  is the so cal led ' Bayone t  Const itut ion ' of Hawa i i ,  wh ich c ame into 
effect in 1 887 as the four th Const it ut ion of the K i ngdom of Hawa i i  (see 
Li l iuokalani 1 9 7 1 : 1 77-84 ) . Th is occur red dur ing the r e ig n  of K i ng Dav id 
Kalakaua who re igned from 1 8 74 to 1 89 1 . Kalakaua had an attr act ive and 
charming per sonal ity, but he : 
was want ing in the i ntel lectual ab i l ity,  the san i ty o f  
j udgement , t h e  mor al f ibr e ,  t h e  chiefly d ig n i ty ,  and 
sense of re spon s ib i l ity , wh ich character i zed mor e or 
less fully all the monarchs of the Kamehameha l ine 
(Blackman 1 906 : 1 25 ) . 
He star ted h i s  r e ig n  we l l ,  but un for tunately it deter ior ated into the most 
cor r upt and most i r r e spons ible reg ime i n  the h i s tory of the K i ngdom . In 
1 88 1  the K i ng ,  and a royal party,  set out on a ten months g r and wor ld tour 
dur ing wh ich he v i s i ted Japan , Hong Kong , S i ng apor e ,  Burma , I nd ia ,  I taly , 
Eng land , Belg i um ,  Ge rmany , Austr i a ,  Fr ance , Spain , Por tug al and US , earning 
thereby the d i stinct ion of be ing the f i r st monarch to c i r c umnav igate the 
wor ld .  He met the Pope , and he and h i s  par ty we re lav i shly entertained by 
r oyal houses and by officials throughout the countr ies they v i s ited . Wh i le 
in Par is  he bought two j ewe l led crown s ,  one for h imse l f  and one for the 
queen for $ 1 0 , 0 0 0  each . Sc andals and ir respon s ible act iv it ies cont inued to 
increase as one h istor ian noted : 
The scandals were large and j u icy.  Spr ecke l s  [ a  s ug ar 
mag nate on Mau i ]  r eceived 2 4 , 0 0 0  acres of crown land on 
Maui for only $ 1 0 , 00 0 .  The leg islature of 1 8 82 
appropr i ated $ 1 0 , 00 0  for a Bo ard of Genealogy and 
$ 3 0 , 0 0 0  for coronat ion expenses . The leg i slature of 
1 886 g ave the government the r ight to sell a monopoly 
on the opi um traffic in  Hawai i  for $ 3 0 , 0 00 . In  t ime 
the nat ional debt soared to we ll over $ 2 , 00 0 , 00 0 .  
Other abuses included the sale o f  gover nment off ices , 
r epeal of the l iquor laws , i l leg al land leases , and 
even the sale of exempt ions to lepe r s  so that they 
might avoid being sent to the sett lement at Kal aupapa 
(Judd 1 96 1 : 99 ) . 
The cl imax c ame in 1 8 87 wh en it became known that the K i ng was involved in 
a secret opi um deal . At the same t ime the K i ng and his Pr ime M i n ister , 
Walter M .  G i bson , a h ighly unscr upulous oppor tun i st , wh ipped up strong 
ant i-European feel ing s  among the Hawai i ans . The leaders of a secret 
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polit ical org an i sat ion , the Hawa i ian League , wh ich was mainly r ec r u i ted 
among for e ig ne r s  and non-nat ive Hawa i i ans , dec ided it was t ime to act to 
stop the rot in the Gove rnment and to make the country safe , as the i r  
leader po inted o u t  r athe r bluntly a t  one of the i r  meeting s : 
We meet to plan the destruc t ion of K i ng Dav id Kalakaua 
and to make the country safe for our selves and our 
ch i ldren ( quoted in  Burns 1 9 55 : 2 8 1 ) .  
These leader s  bac ked by the i r  we l l-armed European supporters  for ced 
the K i ng to d ismi s s  G ibson and h i s  Cabinet , appo int a new Cabinet and to 
proclaim a new Cons t itut ion . It severely : 
r es t r ic ted the powe r of the k i ng .  He could no longer 
d i smiss his m i n i sters  without the consent of the 
leg i s latur e ,  and the cab inet had to r a t i fy each of h i s  
off ic ial acts . In add it ion , a two-th irds vote of the 
leg islature could ove r r ide a royal veto , and the 
nobles ,  prev iously appo inted by the k i ng ,  we re hence­
for th to be elected by voter s  with a compar at ively h igh 
prope r ty qua l i f icat ion . Th is last prov i s ion added to 
the pol i t ical we ight of the wealth ier fore ig ne r s  (Judd 
1 9 6 1 : 1 00 ) . 
Kalakaua d ied in 1 89 1 , and h i s  s i ster , Queen Li l iuokal an i , the last 
Hawai ian Monarch , s ucceeded h im and inhe r ited from his r e ign tr emendous 
polit ical d i scontent and economic d isaster . Unfo r tunately she failed to 
learn from h istory and cont inued to follow r ather c lose ly in her late 
brother ' s  footsteps . She dec ided to issue a new reac t ionary and 
author itar ian Const itut ion s imilar to the 1 864 Cons t itut ion , but the 
Cabinet re fused to endor se it . When i t  was r umoured ear ly in January 1 893  
that the Queen and her  suppo r te r s  planned to expel the reform Cab inet , her 
opponents dec ided that i t  was t ime to act .  A ' C i t izens ' Committee of 
Safety '  dom inated by member s  of a recently estab l i shed secret organisat ion , 
the Annexat ion Club ,  was organ ised . Th is Comm ittee with the help of the US 
r epresentat ive in Hawai i ,  and a large g roup of mar ines from the US ship , 
Boston , deposed the Queen and establi shed a Pr ov i s ional Government with the 
obj ect of ult imate annexat ion to the us . Hawa i i  was declared a Republ ic 
the followi ng ye ar , 1 894 , and a new Const itut ion , the f i fth in Hawai i  
dur ing the n i neteenth century was adopted . I t s  notable features we re : 
1 .  The elect ion of the Pr es ident by the Leg islature as 
in  the Fr ench Republic ; 2 .  the adm itt ance of al iens 
to a qua l i f ied c it i zenship by means of lette r s  of 
den i zation . . .  3 .  The owner sh ip of prope r ty as a 
cond it ion of natur al i zat ion ; 4 .  the requ i rement at 
seve r al po ints of the Engl ish or Hawa i i an lang uage , 
bear ing chie fly ag a inst As iat ic s ;  5 .  a prope r ty 
qual if icat ion for member sh ip in e ither br anch of the 
leg islature , and for the fr anch ise in the elect ion of 
Senator s ;  6 .  member sh ip of the Cabine t in both Hou ses 
of the leg i s latur e ;  7.  the system of c umulat ive 
vot i ng for Repr e sentat ives ; and 8 .  The Counc il of 
S t ate (Blackman 1 9 06 : 1 42 ) . 
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L i ke i t s  immed i ate predeces sor , the ' Bayone t  Const itut ion ' of 1 87 7 ,  th is 
Const itut ion was dr awn up by Europeans , pr imar i ly for  the promot ion and 
protect ion of the i r  own interests . The i r  ult imate a im of Amer ican 
annexat ion was ach ieved four year s later whe n  on 1 2  Aug ust 1 898 sover e ignty 
of the Republ ic of Hawa i i  was tr ansfe r r ed to US . 
The Cons t i tut ion of the K i ngdom of Bau in F i j i in 1 8 67 falls into the 
categor y o f  const itut ions dr awn up by for e ig ne r s .  It was dr awn up by 
Cakobau ' s  secretary,  S . A .  St . John , and was d i scussed and was passed by a 
meeting of 6 0  to 7 0  s ettle r s . Unde r its terms : 
Supreme power was vested in the K i ng [Cakobau] who was 
commander- in-ch ief o f  all m i l i t ary for ces , and might 
declare war , convene counc i l s , make treaties , and 
appo int governor s over the sever al d istr icts . The 
Execut ive Of fice r s  [ all  Europeans] , to be chosen by the 
Ki ng ,  wer e  a Secretary of S t ate , a Treasur e r , a 
Mi n ister of War , a Co llector-Gener al of Revenue , and a 
Mini ster of Pol ice ; and together they con s t ituted the 
Cabinet Counc i l .  The Jud ic iary compr ised a Ch ief 
Justice , and mag i st r ates to pr e s ide over d istr ict 
cour ts . " Every pr iv i lege con s i stent with equ ity and 
orde r "  was prom ised to the wh i te res idents ; nat ive 
lands we re to be thrown open to them for select ion , and 
the eng agement of l abour e r s  was to be fac il i tated . A 
r oyalty of one sh i l l ing an acr e  was to be pa id on all 
land purchased from V i t i  Levu nat ives , and a c apitat ion 
of 5 dollar s ( £ 1 ) a year was r equi r ed for all nat ive 
l abour e r s  employed (De r r ic k  1 963 : 1 64 ) . 
In th is  set-up Cakobau was only used as a puppet and the real fee l i ng s  o f  
most of the settler s towards h im a r e  re flected in  t h e  r e act ion of o n e  of 
them when Cakobau was appointed to head the Governmen t  in  1 8 7 1 : 
was it not [ demanded a planter ]  an insult • • • to every 
wh ite man in the country to have an old n igger l ike the 
K i ng set up , as he is be ing set up? K i ng indeed • • •  he 
would be mor e  in his place d igg ing or weed ing a wh i te 
man ' s g arden , when he would be turned to pro f i t able 
account ( quoted in Scarr 1 967 : 1 9 ) . 
With one except ion , all these Const itut ions wh ich emerged in Polynes ia 
in the n i neteenth century fell into d isuse be fore the turn of the century .  
sever al r easons accounted for that . Some d ied a natur al death as a r esult 
of growth in gene r al soph i s t ic at ion , brought about by improvement in  
educat ion , and wider contact with the outs ide wor ld ,  par t icular ly with 
Europe an s ,  e i the r through Pac i f ic I s l ander s  v i s i t ing for e ign countr ies or , 
more importantly , through Europeans com ing to the P ac if ic .  Many s tayed , 
s uch as m i s s iona r ies and settler s ,  wh ile othe r s , s uch as naval per sonnel 
and government offic i als , only r emained for a sho r t  t ime . Many of them 
made it the ir  duty to g ive Pac if ic I s l ands leader s  adv ice on economic and 
pol it ic al matte r s . Some even helped to d r aw up por t  r eg ul at ions , wh i le 
others pr e fe r r ed to teach the nat ives through pun i t ive measure s . 
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The es tablishment of spec i al t r a in i ng inst i tut ions b y  the 
miss ionar ies ,  s uch as the Lahaina College ( established in  1 83 1 )  and the 
Royal School for Ch ie f ' s  Ch ildren ( estab l i shed in  1 8 3 9 ) in  Hawa i i ;  Malua 
College ( e stabl ished in 1 8 4 5 )  in  S amoa ; and the Tupou College , 
( established in 1 86 6 ) in Tong a , helped to t r a in Pac i f ic leader s  both in 
rel ig ious and secular matte r s . With the improvement in  the ir  knowledge of 
wor ld affai r s ,  they natur ally wanted to improve constitut ional matte r s  in 
the ir coun t r y .  The replacement o f  the 1 840  Const i tut ion of Hawai i by the 
1 852  Const itut ion , and the 1 873 Const itut ion of Samoa by that of 1 875  was 
par t  of th is  natural pr ocess of growth . 
The other factor s wh ich played an impor tant role in th is  were the 
responses of react ionary monarchs and the i r  s uppo r ter s ,  among whom wer e  a 
certain  number of Europeans who stood to g a i n  from support ing them ag a inst 
moves towards more l iber al and democrat ic const i tut ions . Th is  occur red , 
e . g . , when the 1 8 52  Const i tut ion of Hawai i  was r eplaced by Kamehameha V i n  
1 86 4 . 
The f i nal and mos t  impor tant factor in th i s  process was the 
encroachment of European inte rests , f i r st through immig rants and f inally 
through the impact of We stern colon ial ism . Pr ofessor J . W .  Dav idson sums 
th i s  up be aut i fully when he refe r s  to the collapse of the S te i nberger 
reg ime in  S amoa and , o f  cour se , the term inat ion of the then prom i s i ng 1 87 5  
Constitut ion . H e  wrote : 
Steinberger ' s  fai lure was not pr imar ily of h i s  own 
mak i ng , nor had the inexper ience of the Samoans 
contr ibuted s ig n i f icantly to it . Even Captain  S tevens 
and h i s  assoc iates had been no mor e than agents of 
c auses that they on ly vag ue ly unde r s tood . The fai lur e 
was , indeed , an almost inev itable consequence of the 
We stern impact upon Samoa . Much ear l ier , in the 1 83 0 s , 
the Tah it ian k ingdom had become a mockery of sovere ign 
i ndependence when the Fr ench had f i r st used threats of 
force aga inst it . S i nce the 1 85 0 s  the Hawa i ian 
government had been forced increas ing ly to pur sue 
pol ic ies that advanced the inte rests of immig r ant 
plante r s  and merchants , often to the detr iment of the 
Hawa i i ans themselves .  When a un i f ied F i j ian gover nment 
had been formed in 1 8 7 1 , under the nom i nal headship of 
K i ng Cakobau , settler interests had attempted to use i t  
qui te blatantly as a n  instrument for t h e  estab l ishment 
of the i r  own supremacy . Only i n  Tong a ,  where European 
interests were minimal , h ad a modern form of government 
emerg ed and remained effect ive and relat ively 
uncor r upted ( 1 96 7 : 58 ) . 
Th is b r ing s  us to the ques t ion of why the Tongan Cons t i tut ion alone , 
surv ives to the twent ieth century .  There i s  o f  cour se some tr uth in what 
Dav idson ment ions in  the above quotat ion , but i t  is  c lear ly an 
over-s impl i f icat ion of the i ssues involved . Tr ue ,  European interests were 
minimal in Tong a , but th i s  was due mainly to K i ng George Tupou I ' s  wise and 
far-s ighted land pol icy . Land al ienat ion was absolutely proh ib ited by h im ,  
saying that Tong a was only small and i f  land wer e  permitted to be sold the 
people would not have a place to l ive in . In  cont r as t ,  Kamehameha I 
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r ewarded h i s  European adv i se r s  with huge land g r ants , and permitted 
al ienat ion of land to Europeans . When some of h is s uccessors  t r ied to 
control land al ienat ion it was too late . The s ame appl ied in S amoa , Fij i 
and other Pac i f ic I s lands . 
The other important reason was the r e l uctance of Gr eat B r itain to 
annex Tong a because of the expense that the r unning of colon ial 
admin istration there would have incur red to Br it i sh tax payer s .  New 
Zealand (NZ )  leade r s  wanted Br itain to annex Tong a to NZ to make up for the 
loss of Samoa to Germany and US in 1 8 99 . For t unately for Tong a ,  the 
off icer s of the Br it ish H igh Commiss ion for the We ste r n  Pac if ic in S uva 
could not s tand NZ imper ial ist amb i t ions .  They arg ued that the Tong ans 
would not tole r ate any annexat ion to NZ . I f  there was to be an annexat ion 
of Tong a i t  should be to Gr eat Br itain her se l f .  However ,  Br itain wanted 
Tonga to maintain her internal sel f-government as  long as the country was 
governed according to her Const itut ion . 
The other reason was that all Tong ans eventually r eg arded the i r  
Cons t itution a s  a sacred document , and insis ted that the pr inc iples 
conta ined the r e in must never be changed by anyone , as  King George said in 
his c lo s i ng speech at the 1 8 75  P a r l i ament . Even to-day many Tongans would 
not toler ate any s uggest ion to amend the Const itution . Th is  has he lped to 
maintain pol i t ical stab i l ity,  wh ich in  turn  enabled Br itain to allow Tonga 
to escape the devastat ing e f fects o f  colon i al i sm on the n i neteenth centur y 
Pac i f ic const itut ions . 
3. R ITUALS, R H ETOR IC AN D R EAL ITY :  DECOLON I SATION 
AN D ASSOC IATED PHENOM ENA 
J.M. Herlihy 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
The 1 9 8 0 s  mark the d r awing to a close of approx imate ly f i fty years of 
what could be cal led the ' decoloni sat ion er a ' . From the 1 92 0 s , when 
Br itain realised that nat ional i sm was a " s ig n i f icant force " in India and 
Ceylon ( Fi eldhouse 1 966 : 3 97 ) , to the 1 9 70 s ,  when she pul led out of many 
remain ing ter r i tor ies w i th wh at c an only be termed unseemly haste , this e r a  
has been one o f  h igh ideal ism ,  oppor tun ism ,  good intent ions , misunde r­
stand ing s  and confus ion . For countr ies wh ich decolon i sed in the ear ly 
year s of the e r a ,  the ach ievement of independence was a struggle ag ainst a 
colon ial power r e luctant to rel inqui sh its hold . But it was not long 
before the ' s truggle for independence ' was mor e rhetor ical than real . Even 
in  the 1 96 0 s  at the peak o f  the internat ional dr ive for sel f­
dete rminat ion for dependent t e r r i tor ies - opin ion polls and par l i amentary 
debates in  some Th ird Wor ld countr ies r evealed mar ked amb ivalence about the 
prospect of independence . Fo r countr ie s  l i ke the small Pac i f ic nat ions , 
most of wh ich r e ached independence i n  the f inal year s of the er a ,  the 
struggle usually was ag a inst being left , unprepared and i l l-equipped , to 
build a v i able nation . 
Already the 1 98 0 s  h ave seen a revival of concern for the hard real ity 
of nat ion-build ing , r athe r than for its ideolog ical base . Whereas 
decolon i sat ion prev iously was almost synonymous with a need for r apid and 
h ighly v is ible changes , and a g r adual ist  approach was " seldom pract icable " 
and "pol itically unacceptable " ( Fi sk 1 9 75 : 4-5 ) , the developed and 
developing wor lds are real is ing that incremental ch ang e may be the only 
opt ion . Some Th ird World countr ies are now quest ion ing the long-term 
re levance of pol ic ies , prog r ammes and , in  pa r t icular , const itut ional 
clauses d r awn up dur ing a t ime when po l i t ical exped iency d ict ated general 
support for c e r tain decolon isat ion r i tuals and r hetor ical gestur es .  Other 
countr ies have already d i sc arded or mod i f ied them by con s t i tut ional 
reforms , r evolut ions or a g r adual breakdown in  ' law and order ' .  
In one sense , to s ay that decolonisat ion should be analysed as a 
phenomenon with its own un ique matr ix of character i s t ic s  seems equ ivalent 
to r ed iscove r ing the wheel .  Clear ly it is  a un ique stage in any nat ion ' s  
h i story;  and the themes of e l ite nat iona l i sm ,  the decl ine of empire and 
the s t r uggle at independence for post-colon ial powe r are we ll-worn ones in 
the l it e r ature  of As ian and Afr ican pol it ical development (Low 1 9 77 : 5-8 ) . 
In most accoun ts , howeve r ,  the emphas i s  has been on the t r ans it ional per iod 
wh ich pr eceded formal t r ansfer of powe r , or on decolon i sat ion as the f inal 
stage o f  colon ial r ule . Th is echoed the Br it i sh model of const itut ion-
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bu ild ing , wh ich entai led a prog ress ive se r ies of  pre- independence con­
s t itut ions , culminat ing in a def i n it ive and hypothet ically inv iolate 
independence const itut ion . Yet off ic ial i ndependence was often l ittle more 
than one focal po int in the decolon i sat ion con t inuum .  The characte r i s t ic s  
wh ich d i s t inguish t h e  whole decolon isat ion pe r iod usually were dominant for 
some t ime after independence although i t  could be arg ued that the values 
and premise s  that they r epresent are spec i f ic to an abnormal s ituat ion , and 
are not appropr iate to established nat ionhood . 
Pr ior to and after formal t r ansfer o f  powe r ,  pol i t ical act ions and 
att i t udes in many Th ird Wor ld countr ies  d i splayed s imilar i t ies wh ich cut 
ac ross d i f fe rences in  cultur e ,  locat ion , phys ical and h is tor ical factors  
and the  actual t ime of  decolon i sat ion . Though some r e lated pr imar i ly to 
the expe r ience of one country,  they became common r ituals or rhetor ical 
gestur es , often the apparent sine qua non for solemn i s i ng the separ at ion 
from co lon ial author ity . Th is pape r s uggests that such r i tuals and 
gestures wer e  t r ansfe r r ed from the expe r ie nce of one new nat ion to the next 
as tr ied and tested macro- l evel mechani sms for the establ ishment of 
leg islat ive leg it imacy and of  a st rong bargain ing pos i t ion vis-a-vis the 
developed wor ld .  Where they wer e  mod i f ied , the changes tended to 
compen sate for problems o f  previous expe r i ence rather than for the 
s i tuat ion of  the recipient new nat ion - a pattern part icular ly ev ident in 
Pac i f ic decolon i sat ion . It is  argued that these char acter ist ic s  o f  the 
' deco lon isat ion e r a ' are as d i st inct ive as those ascr ibed to the prev ious 
era of colon i al i sm :  and that th is  has s ig n i f icant long-term impl icat ions 
for the pos t-colonial state . 
THE END OF COLON IAL I SM 
In the Pac i f ic , as in many othe r new nat ions , much of the rhetor ic of 
decolon i sat ion contains stereotypes o f  imper ial ist exploitat ion or colon i al 
suppr ess ion wh ich der ive largely from the e ighteenth and n ineteenth 
centur ies .  Ye t the age o f  imper i a l i s t  expans ion was drawing to a c lose 
elsewhere by the t ime the g reat powe rs became ser iously involved in  Pacif ic 
affa i r s , and colon ial r ule had a r e l at ively b r i e f  pe r iod of unque st ioned 
supremacy . By the f i r s t  h a l f  of the n ine teenth centur y ,  the value of the 
empire  to Br itain was con t i nually quest ioned at home . Cr itics of 
government pol icy demanded to know , as they d id in  relat ion to Th ird Wor ld 
colon ies  over a century late r , why Br ita i n  should : 
spe nd money and r i sk war by s upport ing ung r ateful 
colon ies that appar ently longed for independence and no 
longer con fe r red commerc ial advant ages on Br itain ( Ward 
1 966 : 6 ) . 
With the except ion of Fr ance , other for e ign powe rs seemed unl ikely to 
contes t  Br it ish supremacy in the Pac i f ic or , even mor e important , to make 
compensatory moves e l sewhere a s  long as B r i t a i n  mainta i ned a low pro f i le in 
the r eg ion . It was in Br ita i n ' s  interests , the r e fore , not to formal i se her 
Pac i f i c  influence . 
The n i neteenth century brought incr eas ing cont act with Pac i f ic 
I s lander s  through the g r owth o f  the wh al ing , beche-de-mer and trochus shel l  
t r ade s . Ge rman inf luence in  the reg ion expanded , a s  d id sett lement of  
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casual t r aders o f  European , o r  As ian or ig i n .  Ch r i st ian miss ions spread 
across the Pac if ic in the early 1 80 0 s . Nonetheless , for mos t  Islander s  
th is  was a pe r iod i n  wh ich e s sent ially eg al itar ian t r ad ing re lat ionsh ips 
with the outs ide wor ld pr edominated . Although some of the items acqui r ed 
then represented a maj or technolog ical advance , in the subsistence pattern 
of expe r imentat ion and " cultur al bor rowi ng " ( S alisbury 1 96 2 : 2-3 ) the 
process was bas ically a s ubst i tut ion . In gene r a l  the e ffects of contact 
were : 
perhaps not ent irely detr imental • • • •  I t  i s  poss ible 
the i s lander s we re net bene f ic i ar ies ( Amar shi 1 9 79 : 
5-6 ) . 
Pr ess ures for mor e  formal involvement by Br itain came largely from her 
own colon ie s , notably Aust r al i a ,  and from inc r eas ing r ivalry between the 
European powe r s .  In  the Pacif ic , the problem of ' blac kb ird ing ' was added 
to the i nc re as ing ly complex contact s i tuat ion . In Austral ia the 1 8 52  gold 
r ush mar ked the end of tr anspor tat ion of Br it i sh conv icts to the east coast 
(Gunthe r 1 9 72 : 3 6 ) , and i n i t i ated a labour shor tage . The Ame r ic an Civil  War 
in 1 86 1  caused Br ita i n  to cons ider F i j i and Queensland as possible 
alter nat ives for cotton and , l ater , for s ug ar (Gutch 1 97 1 : 1 62 -6 4 ) . With in 
a few years the demand for Pac i f ic labour resulted in k idnapp ing , coerc ion 
and other abuses wh ich , combined with the g rowing demands of res ident 
Europeans for protect ion for themselves and the i r  adopted Pac i f ic 
commun i t ies , led f i nally to the imposit ion largely reluctant - of 
colon ial r ule . 
For the maj or ity of Pac i f i c  communi t ies , colonial r ule repr esented an 
ent i r ely new concept - that of moder n  macro- level government . Th is came 
with , and ope rated with i n ,  a set  of ma rkedly d iffe rent paramete r s  from 
those wh ich regulated t r ad i t ional act iv i t ie s .  Dur ing the colon ial per iod 
the inhe rent con f l ict of str uc ture and scale between macro- level and 
micro- level usually was masked by the I s l ande r s ' percept ion of nat ional 
government as  a for e ig n  enclave and par t  of the organ isat ion of another 
country.  Th ese stereotypes often pe r s i sted th rough decolon i sat ion , 
espec ially i n  Me lane s i a ,  with the re sult that new nat ional governments we re 
pe r ce ived not as representat ive o f  the country,  but as a symbol of colon ial 
oppr ess ion and an exploitable r e source (Herl ihy 1 9 79 : 2 ) . In fact , the 
isolated colon ial gover nments of the Pacif ic faced many of the s ame 
problems that new nat ional gover nments late r addressed with the ir  
deco lon i sat ion r itual s .  Much colon ial effort in the ear ly years in  
par t icular was devoted to leg itim i sing the concept of macro- level 
government and to establ i sh ing the economic base wh ich would reduce the 
colony ' s  dependence on an over seas treasury and par l iament . 
The colonial s ituat ion chang ed d r amatically after Wor ld war I I .  The 
mid- 1 94 0 s  s aw the beg inn ing of a phase in wh ich " administrat ive ideal i sm" 
was h igh (Al lan 1 950 : 58 )  and "a t r emendous effo r t  was made to make up the 
ear l ier ye ar s of neg lec t "  ( Toogood 1 9 7 1 : 4 7 ) . Though th i s  e f fort was often 
severely constra ined by problems of fund ing for post-war reconstruc t ion , 
overall the post-war pe r iod saw cons iderable r e source flows into colon ial 
ter r itor ies , and v igorous attempts to improve wel fare serv ices , economic 
oppor tun i t ies and ind ig enous par t ic ipat ion i n  them . In  add i t ion , the 
decolon isat ion of As ian and Afr ican te r r itor ies released many exper ienced 
off ic ial s ,  some of whom moved to the Pac i f ic .  Towards the end of the 
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colon ial per iod ,  at least for the recently independent countr ies , the 
contact s i tuation had stab i l ised and some benef its of mode r n isat ion , 
however few , had been spread through the v i llage commun it ies o f  the reg ion . 
Coterminous with th is  was an att itudinal swing in Weste rn countr ies 
dur ing the post-war year s ,  ag a inst colon ial ism per se . It was taken up by 
and through the Un ited Nations ( UN) , one of the main outlets for Th ird 
Wor ld g r ievances ag a inst colon i al r ule . The word ' colon i al i sm '  lost its 
ear l ie r  connotat ions o f  law and order , impar t i al j ust ice , even-handed 
admin i s trat ion and protect ion of unsoph i s t icated r ace s , and became a 
pe j or at ive term to denote " the oppres s ion , hum i l i a t ion , or exploitat ion of 
ind igenous peoples " (Nadel and C u r t i s  1 96 4 : 3 ) . By the 1 96 0 s , i t  was c lear 
to most We ste rn powe rs that the colon ial administr ator was : 
d amned i f  he d id and damned i f  he d idn ' t :  to under take 
the r e form of the soc iety was wantonly to impose al ien 
id iosyncrasies  on a rounded and l iv ing cultur e , whereas 
to r e f r a i n  was to protect the ve r y  bac kwardness wh ich 
had j ust i f ied inte rvent ion in  the f i r s t  place ( Emerson 
1 9 62 : 4 0 ) . 
After UN Re solut ion 1 5 1 4  demanded the "br ing ing to a speedy and 
uncond i t ional end colon ial i sm in all  its  forms and man i festat ions " ,  most 
colon ial powe r s  saw l ittle pol it ical advantage in  de laying independence 
unt i l  a country was pol i t ically and econom ically ready for i t , or unt i l  i t  
was demanded b y  a maj or ity . 
The ' decolon i sat ion e r a '  was thus one of d isor ientat ion and 
conf l ict ing values for r espons ible colon i al administrator s ,  as it was for 
many Th ird Wor ld commun it ies . Ac tual per formance as a colon ial power was a 
relat ively i n s ig n i f icant var iable in the internat ional powe r relat ionsh ips 
that determined g lobal value s . We stern g u i l t  and Th ird Wor ld resentment 
ove r  colon ial expe r ience , both of wh ich f r equently were expr es sed in the 
credo that " the expat r i ate cannot r eally g rasp the inner work i ng s  and 
nuances of ind igenous soc ieties"  ( Lasaqa 1 9 73 : 309 ) , c aused widespread 
unce r t a i nty i n  We ste r n  th inking about Weste r n  involvement in Th ird Wor ld 
development . Th is was ex acerbated by the r ap idly expand ing body o f  r ad ical 
d i ag nostic or other cr i t ical analyses o f  pos t-colon ial trends , wh ich we re 
taken up by Th ird Wo rld nat ional ist e l ites with l it t le apprec i at ion of  the 
c r uc ial s ig n i f icance of  t ime factor s and g lobal patterns to the i r  
decolon i sat ion exper i ence . The con fl ict between colonial r espons ib i l it ies 
and the need to avo id even the appe ar ance o f  colon i al or nee-colon ial 
inte rvent ion re sulted in  the concentr at ion o f  Western e f fort for  some t ime 
on ' value-neut r al ' forms of development ass i stance , notably f inanc i al aid 
and promot ion of c api tal accumulat ion . Th is led to the development o f  a 
r i tual ised be l ie f , common to developed and developing country al ike , that 
Th ird Wor ld count r ies : 
wer e  e n t i t led to for e ign subs id i e s  to compensate them 
for the al leged ind ignity of long per iods of servitude 
( F i e ldhouse 1 9 6 6 : 3 79 ) . 
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THE R ITUALS OF  DECOLON I SATI ON 
Of the r ituals and gestures wh ich have been common to many Th ird World 
count r ies , the one wh ich probably had the g r eatest long-term impact was the 
rej ect ion of any v iews or cour ses of act ion as soc iated , however 
pe r iphe r ally ,  w ith coloni al i sm .  Correlated to a g reater or lesser ex tent 
with th i s  was a second important factor , Th ird World nat ional i sm .  Several 
subs id iary characte r i s t ic s  o f  the decolon i sat ion e r a  emerged as express ions 
of nat ional i st ant i-colon i al ism .  Among them we re a tendency for Th ird 
World leader s  to rely on emot ive rhetor ic r ather than on r elevant pol ic ies 
and prog r ammes for electoral s upport ;  a d i sproport ionate emphas i s  on 
' reve r se r ac i sm '  and race- r elated issues s uch as c it i zensh ip , control of 
the economy and the replacement of for e igner s with nat ionals in the 
wor kforce ; a pr eoccupat ion with the tr apping s  and v i s ible symbols of 
nat ional sovere ignty ; and a concentr at ion of financ ial and manpower 
resources on the macro- level aspects of the t r ansfer of power . One of 
these was the preparat ion of the independence const itut ion . 
Th e tendency for independence const itut ions to be conse rvat ive 
h ighl ights another important cha r acter ist ic ,  often g lossed over at the 
t ime : the widespr ead inexper ience of new nat ional leaders . As Nwabueze 
po ints out ( 1 973 : 3 0 3 ) , the colon ial approach d i scour aged co-operat ion 
be tween the g overnment and the governed , and new nat ionalist  leader s 
frequently were ignor ant of the intr icate mechan isms of the system they 
inher ited . Mo st were the refore acutely sens i t ive to possible cr i t ic i sm 
from the colon i al powe r , the bureauc r acy , the par l i ament ary opposit ion or 
the g ene r al pub l ic . One consequence of th i s  comb inat ion of inexper ience 
and sens i t iv ity was to swing away from the colon ial power where pos s ible in 
econom ic r e l at ionsh ips , and to seek needed expatr iate per sonnel from other 
countr ies . Many cases o f  nepot ism ,  electoral cor r upt ion , r ivalr ies for the 
role o f  spokesman for popular g r ievances ,  por k-bar rell ing and displacement 
of complaints ag ainst government onto the colon ial powe r can be seen as 
attempts to compensate for inexper ience . Another compensatory mechan i sm 
was the emphas i s  by new nat ional leade r s  on t r ad i t ional values and cultur e ,  
g rass- roots consultat ion and mas s par t ic ipat ion in dec is ion-mak ing . I n  
constitut ion-bu ild ing the inexper ience of new leade r s  often resulted i n  
heavy r e l iance o n  technical expe r t i se and models from elsewhere and in a 
re lat ive lack of concern for the long-term impl icat ions of const itut ional 
clauses . 
Whereas independence constitut ions usually were the product of 
collabor at ion between the colon ial powe r and the new nat ion , many 
decoloni sat ion r i tuals demonstr ated that the over- r id ing pr ior i ty after the 
t r ansfer of powe r was " to do always the oppos ite to what the colon ial 
powers had done" ( S t reeten 1 9 72 : 6 0 ) . I f  the r ac ist behav iour of colon ial 
offic ials was the most v i s ible aspect of colon ial r ule , the i r  replacement 
by nat ionals was the pr ior ity at i ndependence . Where colonial ism meant an 
administrat ive ol ig archy , decolon i sat ion was repr esented as a change to 
mass par t ic ipat ion , often with the introduc t ion of a mult ipl ic ity of 
ind igenous pol it ical org an i s at ions to control the bureaucracy . If  
colon ialism meant pr imary product ion and expo r ts , i ndependence came to 
stand for secondary produc t ion and import subs t itut ion ( see Streeten 
1 9 72 : 60 ) . Oppo s i t ion to colon ial promot ion of large- scale , capital 
intens ive or fore ign- investment-based development was expre ssed as support 
for  ind igenous modes of produc t ion , low-level technolog y ,  labour intens ive 
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pr oj ects and Schumache r ' s  " smal l is beaut iful"  ( 1 97 4 )  concept . Whe r e  the 
centr al isat ion of colon ial admini str at ion was the i ss ue , decentr a l i sat ion 
of pol i t ical or administrative author i ty was assumed to be the solut ion . 
Where the colon ial gover nment h ad imposed a for ced un ity on d i spar ate or 
antagon i s t ic g roups , sessession i st movements o ften emerged as a decolonis­
at ion problem . The tendency to r eg ard the maj or i ssues in a s imple b inary 
f r amewor k ,  and to subst i t ute val ue- j udgement antonyms for opt imal dec i s ion­
mak ing in the pr omot ion of r e forms , r esulted often in abr upt pendulum 
swing s in nat ional pol icy and development administration . In th i s  
s i tuat ion const itut ional change after independence frequently became a 
po l i t ic al impe r at ive , and const itut ional s t ab i l ity was seen as a concess ion 
to colon i al ism . 
THE PAC I F I C  S ITUATI ON 
By the t ime most Paci f ic states approached independence , the 
decolon i s at ion process was itself of a m ixed inhe r i tance . From Latin 
Amer ica , where mos t  countr ies wer e  decolon i sed in the ear ly n ineteenth 
cent ury,  came an emphas i s  on imper i al ist penetrat ion , structur al 
constraints , dependency and " the development of underdeve lopment" ( Fr ank 
1 96 9 , 1 970 ; Gr i f f i n  1 969 ; Furtado 1 9 70 ) . The next maj or r eg ion to 
decolon ise  was As ia , a century later , when c apital ist  expans ion had g iven 
way to the ' mor al supremacy ' approach o f  the Br it ish raj . From this per iod 
the main l eg acy was the concept of nat ional i sm based on ind igenous modes 
and values , and act ive or pass ive r e s i s tance to for e ign dominat ion . Th ese 
concepts wer e  developed in the decolon isat ion o f  Afr ican terr i tor ies in  the 
1 960 s ,  when d i seng agement was becoming a pol it ical and economic necess ity 
for most Weste r n  powe r s ; and the les sons of Afr ica were then t r ansfer red , 
larg ely by the colon ial powe r s , to the Pac i f ic . 
By the 1 9 70 s ,  however ,  most We ster n  power s  real ised that they would be 
condemned as a matter of pol it ical exped iency by the i r  ex-ter r itor ies , 
whether they h ad been harsh or protect ive r ulers and regardless of how 
g ene rous or conc i l i atory they wer e  in post- i ndependence r e lat ions . The 
increas i ng pol it ical pressure to be free o f  the ' t ag-end of empire ' was 
r e inforced by the e f fects of the 1 9 74 oil c r i s i s  on the g lobal economy and 
the s ubsequent econom ic r ecess ion . Many We stern countr ies faced problems 
of unemployment , inflat ion and po l i t ical instab i l ity at home , and were less  
pr epared than they had been to concede Th ird World asser t ions about 
colon ial mismanagement and the consequent " moral obl ig ations and 
re spon s ib i l i t ies wh ich fall on former We ster n  Co lonial powe r s "  (Harr ies 
et . al . 1 9 79 : 1 1 6 ) . The colon ial powe r s  in  the Pac i f ic became mor e  r igorous 
in the d e f i n i t ion and pur suit  o f  the ir  own interests in  r e l at ion to the i r  
terr itor ies . Th e Br it i sh Gover nment saw its  interests a s  b e s t  se rved by 
r apid d i seng agement , and its pol icy changed from allowi ng the dependent 
ter r itory to set the pace to act ive promot ion o f  independence . Fr ance , by 
compar i son , felt a need to retain a Pacif ic presence . Such factor s meant 
that the Pac i f ic countr ies wh ich approached independence in the 1 9 70s 
needed to eval uate the ir  opt ions with a d i f fe r ent pe r spect ive from that of 
countr ies wh ich decolonised in the ear l ie r  year s .  
In add it ion to the i r  temporal pos i t ion vis-a-vis most newly 
independent countr ies , the maj or i ty of Pac i f ic nat ions wer e  spat ially and 
structur ally in  a d i fferent s i tuat ion . Most wer e  small and , un l i ke mos t  of 
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the other small new nat ions , they were internally f r agmented and very 
i solated . In  pe r capita terms the cost s  of government were relat ively 
h igh , and governmental ab i l ity to d i spe r se its  services evenly was l imited . 
Cultur ally the Pac i f ic r eg ion d isplayed cons ider able heterogene i ty ;  few 
Pacif ic states had the strong un i fying forces wh ich nat ional r e l ig ion or 
pol i t ical ideology prov ided in other countr ies . Nat ional ism was no longer 
the dr iving force that i t  had been and , as Furn ivall perce ived in  the then 
Ne the r lands India  in the 1 93 0 s  ( 1 93 9 : 468 ) , in fact tended in plural 
soc iet ies to be d i s r upt ive o f  the social order . 
Possibly even more impor tant in re lat ion to const itut ional development 
was the s imple i ssue of scale . The pol i t ical and administr at ive systems 
introduced by the colon i al power s  i n  the Pac i f ic usually were ' scaled down ' 
ver s ions of systems or ig inally des igned for much larger states . They made 
l ittle or no conces s ion , apar t  from a numer ical reduc t ion , to the pecul iar 
str eng ths and weaknesses o f  small nat ions . The pe r sonal ised nature of many 
Pacif ic pol i t ies ( see Se lwyn 1 9 75 ; May and Tupoun iua 1 9 79 ) for example , 
g ave greater scope for informal checks and balances than in larger 
countr ies . Formal de f in it ion of r ights and responsibil it ies in th i s  
s i tuat ion o ften acted t o  the detr iment o f  the i n formal system , and allowed 
indiv iduals to exploi t  the system under the umbr ella of red- tape . 
S im ilar ly , the relat ively h igh mobi l ity of the small educated cadre between 
polit ics and administrat ion i n h ib i ted development of the deep c leavages in 
leg i slat ive-execut ive relat ions wh ich occur red in  some larger new states . 
Though th i s , conve r sely , v i t i ated pr ov i s ions for the separat ion of powers 
on wh ich the Westm inste r sys tem was based ( see S ingham 1 96 7 ) , most Pac i f ic 
const itut ions endor sed the separat ion of leg islat ive and execut ive powers . 
In t h i s  s i tuat ion improv i s at ions wh ich were administrat ively constr uct ive 
under Pacif ic cond it ions often were at var i ance with const itut ional 
c lauses , and ipso facto we re c lass i f ied as dev i ant or "bad "  administrat ion 
( see Mur r ay 1 98 1 ) . Much of the esprit de corps of sen ior Pac i f ic 
off i c i als , however ,  der ived from prec i sely such informal expe r t ise i n  
manipulat ion o f  a n  arcane sys tem . The r e sult w a s  that : 
i n  t r uth , i t  has not been for many decades ' the 
Br it i sh ' or ' the Fr ench ' or ' the Dutc h '  system of 
administrat ion ; i t  is now fundamentally the national 
system (Mo r i s  1 97 7 : 7 7 ) . 
Rig id adherence to constitut ional pr ov 1 s 1ons for impersonal ised Westm inster 
structures at t imes was detr imental to good government ; so that 
const itut ional amendment often was administrat ively as wel l  as pol it ically 
necessary after i ndependence . 
A f inal cons ider at ion in r e lat ion to scale i s  that , due to the ir  small 
s i ze , the m icro- states att r ac ted l it t le attent ion e i ther from the colon ial 
powe r s  o r  from mil it ant Th ird Wor ld nat ions at the pe ak of the dr ive for 
decolon i sat ion . By the t ime the i r  turn  h ad come to decolon i se ,  nat ional ist 
ant i-colon i a l ism - wh ich prev ious ly had been a valuable mechan i sm for the 
transfer of r e sour ces from the developed to the developing wor ld and wh ich 
had helped to establ i sh the r ight o f  new nat ional governments to r ule - h ad 
l imited effect iveness . Several of the popular ant i-colon i al r itual s ,  s uch 
as decentral isat ion , h ad become convent ional wi sdoms d i ssem inated to 
colon ial and post-colon ial governments al ike through internat ional networks 
and a id agenc ies . Th e r esult was that colon i al governments and ant i-
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colon ial nat ional i sts in the Pacif ic o ften promulgated e ssent i ally the s ame 
goals .  
DECOLON I SAT I ON AND CONSTI TUT I ON-BU I LD I NG I N  THE PAC I F I C  
In the Pacif ic , a s  elsewhere , d epa r t ing colon i al power s  a s  wel l  a s  new 
nat ional governments often concentr ated the i r  effor t s  dur ing decoloni sat ion 
on the v is ible symbols of the tr ansfer of powe r . Because oppos ing 
interests found mutual advantage and a start ing po int for conf l ict 
resolut ion i n  these symbol s ,  the cr iter ion o f  v i s ib i l ity tended to d ictate 
pr ior i t ies r ather than nat ional needs , where i nterpr etat ions we re more 
l i kely to be at var iance . Over the decolon i sat ion pe r iod th i s  emphas i s  on 
what we re pr edominantly macro- leve l concerns in ef fect r ever sed the late 
colon ial t r end towards an outward spr ead of moder n i sat ion . National 
attent ion and resour ces were d r awn back around the centre and the formal 
tr ansfer of powe r , frequently to the detr iment of pe r iphe r al commun it ies . 
One of the mos t v i s ible and centr al symbols of the formal separ at ion 
from co lon ial author ity throughout the decolon i sat ion e r a  has been the 
const itut ion . In  the Pac i f ic , however , the r i tual of const itut ion-bu i ld ing 
had a d i fferent r at ionale . Afr ican const itut ions of the 1 96 0 s , e . g . ,  o ften 
re flected the turbulence o f  the ir  decolon i sat ion exper ience . Re lat ively 
l ittle importance was ass igned to the spec i f ic c i rcumstances of the 
country,  and the constitut ion fr equently became pr imar i ly a mechan i sm to 
inh ibit or contain the breakdowns in law and order wh ich were ant ic ipated 
from ,  and o ften consequent on , r ampant nat ional ism .  The main problem in 
most Pac i f ic states was not instab i l ity , but the d i f f ic ulty of mob i l is ing 
popular s uppor t for r apid d iseng agement . Consequently an impor t ant element 
in Pac i f ic const itut ion-bu ild ing was the promot ion of a sense of nat ional 
ident ity . In some cases con s ider able t ime , effor t  and f inanc ial resources 
were expended to ach ieve max imum internal v i s ib i l ity and public s uppo r t  for 
the independence constitut ion . Papua New Gu inea ( PNG )  and K i r ibat i mounted 
maj or public relat ions or pol i t ical ed ucat ion campaigns to ensure that the 
const itut ion was recog n ised as ' home-g rown ' .  Whether an independence 
const itut ion in fact d id ,  or could , acc urately r e f lect the w i she s of 
communi t ies whose survival t r ad it ionally depended on small- scale autonomy 
was less important in the event th an the leg i t im i s i ng effect o f  popular 
consultat ion and , by impl icat ion , mass par t ic ipat ion . 
In any c ase , the communi t ies consulted usually bene f i t ted far less 
from the r i tual of cons t itut ion-build ing than the depar t ing colon ial power 
and the new nat ional government . F r equently consultat ion was a dev ice 
whereby pol it ic ians and government o f f ic ials who we re unw i l l i ng to commit 
themselves passed the re spon s ib i l ity for a d i f f ic ult or potent ially 
d iv i s ive dec is ion to v i l lag e r s . Even where the inten t ion was genu ine , the 
i n i t i at ive was e a s i ly abor ted by a lack of k nowledge among v illagers  about 
the issues or , as in the Solomon I slands ( S I )  and Vanuatu , by pol i t ical 
r ivalr ies .  Many v i llag e r s  doubted the i r  own capac i ty to make the opt imal 
dec i s ion on esote r ic const i tut ional matte r s ,  and we re r e l uctant to take a 
re spon s i b i l ity that they had al located to the i r  par l i amentar i an .  Moreover 
attendance at const itut ional consultat ion s , to wh ich v i l lager s at t imes 
were summoned from con s iderable d istances , were expens ive in  terms o f  t ime 
and occas ional ly even money or food facto r s ,  r arely t aken into account by 
government offic ials . The result was that ' g rass- roots consultat ion ' ,  
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whether a genuine invest igat ion or an ex post j ust i f icat ion for 
const i tut ional pr ov i s ions wh ich to all  pr act ical purposes had already been 
dec ided , was o ften r e sented by those whom it purpor ted to involve . 
At macro- leve l ,  the r itual of constitut ion-bu ild ing had more immed iate 
s ignif icance . New nat ional par l iaments fr equently saw it as an oppor tun ity 
to entrench the i r  pos it ion , to demonstr ate the validity of par ty or g roup 
pol ic ies , to constr ain po l it ical r ivals or to promote the i r  per sonal 
interests . In PNG , SI and Vanuatu in  turn , the form of the const itut ion 
became for some t ime the main focus of the s t r uggle for power between 
ind iv iduals and g roups who were contend ing for nat ional leader sh ip .  For 
example , the const itut ional prov 1 s 1on in S I  for a " Leader of the 
Independent Member s "  ( S I  1 9 78 : 1 78-79 ) , wh ich in  e ffect inst itut ionalised a 
tr ipart ite system of government (He r l ihy 1 979 ) , was a d i rect concess ion to 
the pol it ical influence of one par l i amentary g roup dur ing the const itut­
ional negot iat ions . In some cases s uch const itut ional man ipulat ion 
prolonged the l i fe of a weak , unpopular or m inor i ty government , so that the 
post- independence pe r iod was one of supe r f ic ially stab le government but of 
cons ide r able pol it ical tens ion . 
Poss ibly even more impor tant was the role of the constitut ion in 
d istanc ing the depart ing colon i al powe r from its e r s twh i le colony , and 
therefore f r om any ves t ig ial responsibil ity for a pos t-colon ial collapse of 
democr at ic norms . The independence const i tu t ion prov ided th i s  ' buffer 
effect ' in  several ways . F i r s t , as the par l i amentary debates in Br itain 
over S I  c it i zensh ip demonstr ated (Her  Maj esty ' s  Government , Hansard , May 
1 978 : 1 0 1 1 -2 8 ) , the constitut ion was documentary ev idence that the colon ial 
powe r had d ischarged its  r espons ib i l i t ies honour ably and in accordance with 
internat ional codes of conduct . In add it ion , it prov ided - as far as was 
con s i s tent w i th the ethic of non- intervention - for a pe r iod of stable 
government after independence . Th is was done by the separat ion of 
const i tut ional dec is ion-making from the normal format of Westm inster b inary 
debate , and the promotion of a un i f ied par l i amentary stance on the 
constitut ion ; by concess ions to the demands of the par l i ament wh ich would 
take the country through independence : by f inanc i al and techn ical 
ass istance to the government i n  power at independence : and , i t  could be 
argued , by mor e s ubtle means s uch as the j ud ic ious d istr ibut ion of coloni al 
honour s ,  awards and the new imped imenta of metropoli tan status and 
acceptance .  
Some Pacif ic constitut ions contained spec i f ic prov 1 s 1ons wh ich 
protected the po l i t ical interests of the tr ans i t ional government . 
Requ i r ements for more th an absol ute maj or ity s upport to pas s a vote of no 
confidence , for a cer tain n umbe r of s ig nator ies to such a mot ion , or the 
PNG r equ i r ement for nominat ion of the proposed successor to the Pr ime 
Minister in a mot ion of no con f idence , usually g ave the government the 
advantage . F i nally , most const itut ions made elabor ate prov i s ion for 
establ ished inst i tut ions , notably the publ ic serv ice , pol ice and j ud ic i ary,  
and ther eby v i t i ated post-colon i al attempts at structural reform . 
Implementat ion of r e formist pol ic ies was also hand icapped by the reluctance 
of the colon i al power to al low prov is ions wh ich we re potent ially 
content ious or wh ich could be inte rpr eted as unwar r anted colon ial 
intervent ion in post- i ndependence internal matte r s . Th is caused the 
omiss ion from some Pacif ic const itut ions of adequate g u idel ines on maj or 
pol icy iss ue s  o f  the decolon i sat ion pe r iod , notab ly decent r a l isat ion and 
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land r ights . These factors  meant that const i tut ion-build ing in the 
Pacif ic , on the whole , tended to r e inforce colon i al s t r uctur e s , to promote 
colon ial interests , and to place the onus for the lac k  of s ig n i f icant 
changes on the pos t- i ndependence nat ional government . 
CONSTI TUTI ONAL I SSUES AND RELATED R I TUALS 
By the 1 9 7 0 s  i t  had become g ener al ly accepted that the tr ansfer of 
power h ad to be completed by the adopt ion of a def inite constitution . I n  
PNG t h e  then Ch ief Mi n ister ' s  sugge st ion that I ndependence b e  car r ied 
through be for e the Const i tut ion was f inal i sed was overwhelm ing ly rej ected 
by h i s  otherwise deeply d iv ided P a r l i ament . None theless , const itut ion­
build ing was not the only maj or r itual of the Pac i f ic decolonisat ion 
expe r ience nor , pe rhaps , the mos t  s ig n i f icant in  the long term . As many 
Paci f ic po l i t ic i ans knew from the i r  colon ial expe r i ence , const itut ions 
could e a s i ly be changed by par l iamentary vote but economic cond i t ions , 
nat ional l iv ing standards and many other fac to r s  wh ich affected the i r  
po l i t ic al surv ival and effect ivenes s  could not . D u e  t o  t h e  h ighly 
cent r al i sed nature of much colon i al administration i n  the Pac i f ic ,  
const i tut iona l i sm at independence was s t i ll largely an imposed , macro- level 
concer n .  The h ighly pe r sonal i sed nature of many Pac i f ic sys tems meant that 
the abs t r act concept of const i tut ional pr imacy was only weakly inter nal i sed 
by the gene r al pub l ic , and often was s ubord inate to r espect for an 
author ity f igur e .  Pac i f ic pol i t ic i ans the refore tended to concentr ate on 
constitut ional prov 1s 1ons wh ich r e l ated to cur rently sens i t ive i ssues and 
d i r ectly or ind i rectly to the i r  e lector al c r ed ib i l i ty . As a result , the 
independence const i tut ion was not only a r i t ual itse l f ,  but r e f lected other 
maj or r ituals of the decolon i sat ion pe r iod . 
An important example i s  the development of a supposed ly un ique set of 
cultural characte r ist ic s , known as the ' Me lane s i an Way ' or the ' Paci f ic 
Way ' . Though th i s  term,  as or ig inally co ined by Ratu S i r  Kam isese Mar a  o f  
F i j i ,  emphas i sed t h e  d iver s i ty o f  t h e  r eg ion ( Cr ocombe et . al . 1 97 5 : 1 ) , its  
main  use  has  been as a stereotype of common cultur al themes in the 
promot ion of nat ional ident i ty .  I n  g ene r al , the concept postulates a 
comfortable level of non-monetary s ubs istence or a " pr im i t ive affluence " 
( F i sk 1 96 6 : 2 3 )  wh ich al lows v i llagers  to enter the modern s ector " from a 
po int a numbe r  of steps above the poverty l ine " ( F i sk 1 97 1 : 3 78 ) . Soc i al 
organ i sat ion and land ownersh ip are ideal ised as communal , co-operat ive and 
eg alitar ian .  Decis ion-mak ing for the soc iety is attr ibuted to a process o f  
consensus , in  wh ich cour tesy prevails  a n d  confrontat ions are m i n im i sed . 
Le ade r sh ip status is s a id to be us ually acqu i r ed by ind iv idual mer i t  and 
even where it is he r ed it ary it is s a id to be maintained by the s uccessful 
man ipulat ion o f  a networ k of soc ietal and fam i lial obl ig at ions , not only 
demonst r at ing supe r ior ach ievement but also a h igh deg ree of soc ial 
r espons ibil ity .  Weal th in  the mode l  is exh ib ited by g ift exchanges , 
d istr ibut ion of largesse and patr onage . Accumulat ion for ind iv idual gain  
i s  cons idered ant i-soc ial . Care for the young , secur i ty for t h e  aged and 
weak , and ass i stance when in need are theoret ically guar anteed by the 
one-talk sys tem , wh ich obl iges member s  of a communi ty or clan to r espond to 
anothe r ' s  r equest for help . The dom inant soc io-econom ic un it is assumed to 
be an inde f i n i tely ex tended family.  F i nally , the most romant ic ised element 
of the stereotype , is the be l ie f  that money is not necessar y .  
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O n e  problem w i t h  t h e  emphas i s  o n  s uch c ultural stereotype s ,  and with 
the incorporat ion of some of them in the const itut ion , i s  the 
r ig id i f icat ion of prev iously adaptable cultural mechan i sms . A common 
example is the role of chiefs in new Pac i f ic states . Ch iefs were often 
re luctant to seek e lect ion under a democr at ic system , but they were equal ly 
unwil l ing to be left out of macro- level government . In some Pacif ic 
countr ies , notab ly Tong a and ws , the chiefly system was so powerful that 
its incorporat ion i nto const itut ional a r r angements was unavoidable . As the 
recent debate over human r ights and the matai fr anch i se in WS demonstr ated , 
th i s  tended to r e sult in an ambiguous amalgam of t r ad i t ional and moder n  
precept s , w i th l it t le regard t o  the i r  long-term compat ib i l i ty .  Where more 
or thodox Westminster systems were adopted , d ifferent problems emerged . 
Ch ie fs usually held cons ide r able power over the r ur al vote and , in  
par t icular , over the access of a nat ional par l iamentary cand idate to the 
r ur al vote . Ve ry few nat ional par l iamentar ians could afford to ignore the 
wishes of the i r  local ch iefs . Weak leg islatures espec ially tended to 
concede to the ch iefs inst i tut iona l ised powe r s  wh ich often they were 
i l l-equipped to hold , w i th the result th at both a flex ible t r ad it ional 
system and a developing moder n  system wer e  set , at decolon i sat ion , in a 
t r ansit ional mode . 
The i ss ue of c ultur al ident ity i n  the Pac i f ic emerged at decolon is­
ation in many other ways . I t  was o ften a factor in the rhetor ic of ' blac k 
power ' g roups , in the rej ect ion of expatr iate miss ion involvement in 
prov i s ion o f  bas ic serv ices , i n  an upsurge of conce rn for land r ights , and 
in a :  
pro l i fe r at ion o f  spontaneous local movements d iffe r ing 
in or ig ins and spec i f ic obj ect ives , but shar ing a broad 
concer n  with the achievement of economic , soc i a l  and 
po l i t ical development through communal act ion (May 
1 978 : 1 85 ) . 
By the 1 97 0 s , however ,  very few local movements were in a pos it ion to 
compete with government bod ies in se r v ice or economic act iv i t ies , or to 
maintain the i r  momentum through exclus ively trad i t ional means . In some 
Pacif ic countr ies ed uc at ional standards suffered through the nat ional 
emphas i s  on cultural iden t ity . In PNG , S I , Vanuatu and K i r ibat i 
' culturally r elevant educ at ion ' often meant the subst itut ion of local 
culture for bas ic r ead ing , wr i t ing and n umeracy s k i lls , and the use of 
school ch i ldren as unpaid labour in  school food gardens . Vi llage r s  
complained t h a t  t h e  system was des igned t o  educate the ir  ch i ldren to be 
content with pover ty .  Many s aw the i r  ' cultur al rev ival ' e ither as a new 
government hobby w i th l ittle pract ical appl icat ion , or as a tac it admiss ion 
that the new nat ional government was unable to prov ide the benefits it had 
promised and was forced to fall back on prev iously d iscred i ted customs and 
values . Of ten the i nhe r ited leg al system was also unde rmined . Complaints 
about the i r r e levance o f  for e ig n  codes and regulat ions to trad i t ional 
culture , as wel l  as moder n  developmental needs - fr equently j ust i f ied - led 
to moves for law r e form at decolon i sat ion if not to a gene r a l  dec l ine in 
publ ic observance o f  leg al control s .  The collapse of fundamental 
pr inc iples of accountab i l i ty and f inanc ial probity in  many instances can be 
att r ibuted to the appar ent exonerat ion prov ided by decolon i s at ion rhetor ic 
for pr act ices wh ich wer e  in  de f i ance both of colon ial and of trad i t ional 
codes of conduc t .  
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Though nat ional i sm was a r e lat ively i n s ignif icant element in Pac i f ic 
const itut ion-build ing , it rece ived tac i t  r ecog n i t ion in two other h ighly 
v i s ible r i tuals of Pac i f ic decolon i sat ion : the local isat ion of publ ic 
se rv ice posts and the r ed i str ibut ion of wealth and power from for e ig ne r s  to 
nat ionals . As with the independence const i tut ion , the advantages acc r ued 
in both cases mainly to centr al e l ites , wh i le the costs we re d isper sed and 
fe ll heav i ly on the less developed areas . Due to the i r  lack of 
deve lopment , these usual ly r ece ived the less expe r ienced office r s  and 
suffered most from across-the- board f inanc i al str ingencies . In add it ion , 
the leade r s  to whom powe r was t r ansfer r ed came largely from modern e l ites . 
The i r  pe r cept ions of colon ialism tended to der ive from a re lat ively h igh 
leve l  o f  ed uc at ion , l eng thy and c lose contac t with colon ial enterpr ise , and 
overall developmental advantage . To th is  g roup , ant i-colon i al ism u sually 
meant r ec t i f icat ion of problems wh ich they ident i f ied from the i r  own 
exper ience , and wh ich tended to be problems of colon i al ' overdevelopment ' .  
Th is became ev ident in Me lanes ia in par t icular in r e lat ion to r evenue­
shar ing between Cent r al Gove rnment and the P r ovinces and to controls over 
for e ign investment . The r apid tr ansfer of s e r v ice businesses from for e ig n  
t o  ind igenous control , though an important - and v i s ible s ig n  of the 
tr ansfe r of powe r ,  fr equently left Pac i f ic communi t i e s  with a poorer 
service than they h ad rece ived from the i r  ' exploitat ive ' for e ig n  tr adesmen 
(see Ward and Pr octor 1 980 : 4 1 3 ) . One outcome of th i s  combinat ion of 
factors  was the pe rpe tuat ion of patterns of d i sadvantage wh ich pr evailed 
dur ing the colon i al per iod . In some cases the access of v illages to 
government s e r v ices decl ined mar kedly dur ing the decolon i sat ion pe r iod ,  and 
the i r  po s i t ion �is-a-vis the more developed areas became s ig n i f icantly 
wor se . Th is in  turn led to a s i tuat ion of " c umulat ive causat ion" (Myrdal 
1 9 57 : 1 3 ) and fur ther deter ior at ion i n  the pos i t ion of d isadvantaged g roups . 
CONCLUS I ON 
De spite concess ions to cultural ident ity and popular consultat ion , 
const itut ion-build ing in the Pac i f ic has been largely an e soter ic exercise 
for  a spec i f ic and pr imar i ly t r ans i t ional purpose . The forces wh ich shaped 
the independence const itut ion we re those that shaped the entire  decolon­
i sat ion expe r ience , and many of them wer e  g lobal in der ivat ion and scope . 
Though const itut ion-bu i ld ing was a maj or decolonisation r i tual , its 
s ignif icance was determined by othe r s uch r i tuals ,  by the chronolog ical 
context ,  and by the r e levance of the preva i l i ng decolon i sat ion r he tor ic for 
the act ual decolon i sat ion process . 
In some instance s  newly independent Pac i f ic countr ies  h ave been 
tr apped by the i r  own decolon i sat ion rhetor ic into a ' no wi n '  s it uat ion , i n  
wh ich t h e  expectat ions i t  aroused made t h e  pr omot ion of sub-opt imal 
measures  a pol i t ical necess ity.  A s ig n i f ic ant factor in  th is  was the 
emot ive nature of much o f  the rhetor ic , wh ich made i t  unanswerable in  terms 
of log ic and r i sky to oppose pol it ically . The r esult was that frequently 
r eal i s t ic reservat ions about the p r ac t icab i l ity o f  r it ual decolon isat ion 
prog r ammes wer e  not expr es sed or we r e  d iscounted as man i fe stat ions o f  
colon i a l  or nee-colon ial att itudes . 
One consequence of the deve lopmental d ilemma in wh ich many Th ird Wor ld 
countr ies  found themselves as a r e sult o f  the i r  expe r ience was a tendency 
to r e ly on exhor tat ion . Leys and Ma rr i s  po inted out : 
DECOLONISATION 
the means o ften becomes an end in i t se l f ;  people are 
urged to " work  harde r "  for the sake o f  " nat ional un i ty" 
or " prog r es s "  when the re seems to be no good ind iv idual 
mot ive for do ing so ; they are told to s ink the i r  
d i f ferences when these d i f fe rences concern scarce 
resour ces - s ay land - which the government cannot make 
plen t i f u l ;  they are urged to change the i r  hab i t s  or 
ideas because i t  wou ld be valuable to someone else i f  
they d id s o  ( 1 97 1 : 275 ) . 
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With the dec l ine o f  decoloni s at ion r ituals and rhetor ic , inter nal 
i s sues are now t a k i ng on a new s ig n i f icance . Governments are ident ifying 
some of the problems that were c reated by const itut ion-bui ld ing at a t ime 
when value s  wer e  ephemer al and often d ictated by the pe r sonal obj ect ives of 
ind ividuals in  temporary po s i t ions of powe r .  One o f  the most important 
quest ions many governments face today is the relat ionship between the 
government and the governed . It i s  now necessary to ask how many problems 
in newly i ndependent countr ies , usually ascr ibed to the pe r n 1c 1ous 
influence of colon i al i sm or neo-colon i a l ist c ap i t a l i sm ,  should in  fact be 
attr ibuted to bas ic struc tural and att i tudinal d i f fe rences between 
macro- level and micro- level . On these quest ions the l i te r ature prov ides 
few g uide l i nes , apar t  from the patron i s ing and ethnocentr ic assumpt ion of 
many convent ional development theor ists that development is  ach ieved 
through government ac tion ;  the equal ly pat ron i s ing and ethnocent r ic 
conclus ion o f  many i n  the r ad ic al school that the peoples of the Th ird 
Wor ld are no more than pass ive v ict ims in the i r  debasement by the forces of 
the developed wor ld ;  and the quest ionable leg al hypothes i s  that the 
answer s l ie in the relat ionsh ip between po l icy , the law and the 
const i tut ion . 

4. TECH N I CAL EXPE RTISE AND CULTURAL D I F F E R ENCES: TH E 
CONSU LTANT'S ROLE IN TH E PACI F I C  EXAM I N E D  
N .  Meller 
Li ttle hes itat ion has been detected in the will ingness of consultants 
to lend the i r  expe r t i se in  the a id of  drafting the constituent documents of 
the var ious P ac i f ic I s l and pol it ie s . Th is l ac k  of  reluctance appl ies not 
only to per sons hail ing from areas gover ned under formal constitut ions but 
also to those whose countr ies have long funct ioned without plac ing the 
out l ine of the i r  gover nmental s t r uc ture and bas ic convent ions within the 
constraints of a s ing le document . Coming as he does from an area wh ich has 
pioneered in the exercise of  r educ ing nat ional fundamental l aw to wr itten 
compass , the author suspects that some of his countrymen have cons ider ed 
themselves part icular ly qua l i f ied for ass ist ing in the del ivery of new 
const itut ions . Th is was ear ly ev idenced in  the Pac i f ic by the Hawa i i an 
Const i tut ion of 1 840 , d rawn up by the Ame r ican advise r s  of Kamehameha I I I , 
who came as c lose as they dared to mar r ying a r epubl ican sys tem of 
government to a monarchy , and in  Fij i a decade late r , when the Amer ican 
conf idant o f  Ratu Cakobau prepared a const i tut ion for the Bau Kingdom . 
Albe r t  Steinberger , who tr avel led to Samoa (WS )  as a ' spec ial agent ' of the 
Ame r ican St ate Depar tment was not alone in propos ing a resh aped Samoan 
Const itut ion , but some of h i s  solut ions ant ic ipated the prov is ions adopted 
near ly a century later in the present Cons t i tut ion of WS . 
In v iew of the the s i s  wh ich i s  to be developed in th i s  pape r , the 
author t r usts  that any smal l  par t  wh ich he may h ave played in a compar able 
enterpr ise d ur ing the latter half of  the twentieth century may char itably 
be as much attr ibuted to the i r re s i st ible pull of th is  nat ional ethos as to 
the expr ess ion of individual ego . 
Succ inctly put , the author s uggests that fundamental pol i t ical values 
are cultur e-bound , and only pe r sons cond it ioned by a par t icular culture are 
tr uly capable of par t ic ipating in pol icy dec is ions r espect ing the values 
wh ich are both to const itute the foundat ion and to prov ide the inter locking 
mechan isms for what i s  to be the Organic Law to se rve the pol ity o f  that 
culture . As a s tatement about val ue s  th is  is d i sarming ly s impl is t ic .  
Ac tually , wh at i t  s ubsume s i s  that the very form of expr ess ion as well as 
the content of  value is always c ulturally r elevant , as indeed is  all 
knowledge - i nclud i ng the r at ional processes for ar r iv ing at and order ing 
that knowledge and that ult imately r ecour se must be h ad to cultural 
meaning s  to determine the prope r  valences for the reach ing o f  dec is ions 
among competing value cho ices . Th is , then , se r ious ly quest ions the 
sal iency of the consultant , and reduces h i s  leg i t imate role to a very 
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nar row orbit  whenever h i s  cultur al antecedents are not those of the pol ity 
he i s  serv ing . 
One g eneral i llus t r at ion before explor ing the d imens ions of 
const i tut ional consultancy and con s ider ing the s ituat ions whe r e  such 
serv ice may be reg arded as appropr i ate : l awye r s  are t r a i ned to appr eciate 
that there are d i ffe rent systems of law ,  even if they become s k i l led in the 
pr act ice of only one . However , to the Au stral ian j ur i st who ventured into 
stateless Papua or New Gu ine a ,  devo id of any pol it ical s t r uctur e , 
adj ud ic at ing internal d i spute s , he was encounter ing cultures without l aw 
( see Be rndt and Lawr ence 1 9 7 1 : 3 ) . Tr ue ,  wh i le it was r ecog n i sed that 
var ious forms o f  l imited force ( f am ily fe uds and even gene r al i sed war fare)  
could dec ide matter s ,  these wer e  ' a- lega l ' phenomena .  However , wh i le 
Austr a l i a  was admin i ster ing both areas , at f ir st separ ate ly and then j oined 
in administrat ive un ion , ext r a- leg ally the ind igenous inhab itants were 
applying customary l aw among themse lves , as i s  today acknowledged in  both 
the mod i f ic a t ion of the Austral i an- i ntroduced j ur ispr udence and the 
establ ishment of loc al cour ts s t r uc tured to r e f lect these communal value s . 
To now s ay ,  as would Posp is i l  ( 1 9 7 1 : Ch . 4 ) that the r e  are level s  of law ,  
f a i l s  t o  remove the constr a i n i ng blinke r s  o f  the We stern- t r ained 
consultant . He comes into the Pac i f ic I s l and po l it ies equ ipped with h i s  
cultur al baggage assig n ing t o  the s t ate and i t s  gover n ing inst itut ions the 
h ighe s t  and controll ing funct ion , with in exter nally or internal ly imposed 
l imitat ions , and assume s the law so admin i stered to be impar t ial . To some 
of the Pac i f ic I s l ander s ,  other centres of author ity , s uch as the clan or 
family,  ar e c lothed with th is  cha r acter , wh ile the ir  l aw i s  per sonal ,  so 
that the par amount role of the state is but par t  of a We stern facade . 
For the s ake of analys i s ,  the wor k  of const itut ion-mak ing will be 
d iv ided here into process and produc t .  The former normally i s  conce ived o f  
in somewhat mechan ical terms , embodying a pr agmat ic ' r ight ' o r  ' wr ong ' way 
to proceed , and , as such , value- free , other than in an eng ineer ing sense of 
effic iency . ( Th is , of cour se , ignor es that ' pr agma t ic ' i s  a value- l aden 
concept ion . ) I n  fact , th is  convent ional wi sdom i s  e r roneous , not only in  
that process mate r ially helps shape product wh i le the potent ial product a 
priori influences the cour se of proce ss , but the very c ategor i sat ion i s  
al ien t o  those Pac i f ic cultures wh ich would r eg ard all such enterpr i se a s  
compr i s i ng a n  integ r al whole . Who acts may b e  ind ist ing ui shable from how 
he act s  or with what obj ect ive . Contemplate undertak ing const itut ion­
mak ing in the Tong a of today , a po l ity whose Fi nance Min i ster , Mahe 
Tupoun iua , at the r equest of K i ng Taufa ' hau , h as j ust subm itted h i s  
r e s ig nat ion after h e  h ad the teme r ity t o  inform the Monarch that the 
latter ' s  r equest for tr avel funds exceeded the s ums allotted in  the 
nat ional budget for that purpose . But be that as i t  may , the author h av i ng 
been cond it ioned by h i s  We stern t r a i n ing to th ink heur ist ically in the 
categor ies of process and produc t , has no qualms in  applying that t r a in ing 
to e ffor t s  d i r ected to analys ing the draft ing of P ac i f ic Is land 
const i tut ions . The obj ect ive will  be to demonstr ate the value context of 
that i nvolvement and how i t  may - i nnocently enough - f a i l  to co i nc ide or 
even conflict with those of Pac i f ic culture s . 
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PROCESS 
The exact point at wh ich the consultan t  may f i rst become eng aged will 
vary from po l ity to pol ity.  Does he adv ise on the cr iter ia for and method 
of select ion of the deleg ates who are to prepare , or at least , r at i fy the 
const itut ional dr aft? To pose the quest ion is but to phr ase the answer 
that any such par t ic ipat ion is loaded with pol ic y .  I t  i s  not d i f f icult to 
demonstr ate that the inclus ion of incumbent leg islator s may mater ially 
effect both convent ion process and product (see Me ller 1 9 7 1 : 1 38 et . seq . ) , 
but should the former concern the consultant? The exper ience in the 
Pac if ic I s l ands has not only been not to exclude leg islator s but in many 
cases to enl ist the serv ices of the ent i r e  leg islature s itt ing as a 
const ituent body in adopt ing the const itut ion - as in Papua New Gu inea 
(PNG) , although the House of As sembly sat as a Cons t ituent As sembly . 
Should the h ie r arch i al pol i t ical str ucture t r ad i t ional to much of the 
Pac i f ic be r ecognised by allocat ing place to the ch iefs? When the Br it i sh 
Gove rnment announced that all e ighteen unoff ic i al member s  of the F i j ian 
Leg islat ive Counc i l  would travel to London in 1 96 5  as const itut ional 
conferees , apparently th i s  included only two F i j i ans nominated by the 
Counc il of Ch ie fs , but ac tually the ent i r e  F i j i an component was composed 
e i ther of chiefs or of those who bore the endor sement of the Counc il of 
Ch iefs ( see Me ller and An thony · 1 968 : 9 7 et . seq . ) . A decade later , by 
amendment to the statutory enabl ing leg i slat ion for the Mic rones ian 
Const itut ional Convent ion of 1 9 75 (MCC) , the Micrones ian ch iefs were 
gr anted vot i ng r ights in the Convent ion after they had already been 
co-opted from each administrat ive d istr ict by the i r  fe llow chiefs . To th is 
ex post facto empowe rment may be tr aced the pivotal po s i t ion occupied by 
the Microne s ian chiefs in the Convent ion , and the ir  shor t- l ived ' walkout ' 1 
wh ich thr eatened to br ing the Convent ion to an abr upt c lose . It may be 
arg ued that in F i j i ,  g iven the colon ial contex t ,  there was no alternat ive 
but for the administer ing author i t ies in London to make some dec is ion , and 
they took a cour se they bel ieved would minim i se procedur al d i f f icult ies . 
But the latter case solely involved Mi crones i ans leg islating on the i r  
fellow Microne s i ans ' par t ic ipat ion . What would have equipped a non-Pac i f ic 
Islander with the cultural sen s i t iv ity and techn ical train ing to develop 
the expe r t ise suff ic ient to serve as consultant on th i s  type of i ssue other 
than in the most pedestr i an of ways? 
I f  it be asser ted that th i s  falls outs ide the scope of normal 
consultancy , what , then , about serv ing as adv iser on whether the con­
st itut ional deleg ates cer t i f ied as elected meet the statutory c r i ter ia? A 
purely tech n ical matter , s urely .  But in 1 9 74 the NitijeZa ( D i str ict 
Leg i slature)  and many o f  the iroij ( chiefs)  of the Marshall Islands 
D i str ict o f  the Tr ust Te r r itory (MI ) advocated a boycott of the 
cons t i tut ional convent ion elec t ions , so that only about 1 5  per cent of the 
reg istered voter s  repa i r ed to the polls . In each o f  four deleg ate 
d i str icts ( out of n ine) only one cand idate f i led for elect ion , and there 
were no cand idates at all in thr ee . Should the cand idates elected without 
contest be seated? We re the twenty ballots on wh ich the name of one 
Mar shal lese was wr i t ten , or the compar able e ight in  another deleg ate 
d i str ict , suf f ic ient to qual i fy these per sons to s i t  as const itut ional 
delegates , s ince they had rece ived the h ighest numbe r of votes tall ied in 
the ir  r espect ive deleg ate d istr icts? Recour se to the j ud ic i al opinions of 
other j ur isd ict ions in s imilar cases m ight have offered both leg al log ic 
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and pr ecedent , but only served to conceal the bas ic pol icy dec i s ion before 
the Convent ion : was the MI D i st r ict to be r epresented in the mold ing of a 
constitut ion for all Micrones i a ,  even i f  only by a m inor ity f ac t ion within 
the Di str ict? The Convent ion adopted the aff irmat ive cour se , ult imately 
only for the completed Feder ated S t ates of Microne s i a  ( FSM) Const itut ion to 
be overwhelming ly rej ected in  MI . 2 
Seem ing ly , what could be mor e  innocuous than profe r r ing adv ice on the 
place where the techn ical act ion of s itt ing down to draft the const i tut ion 
ought t ake place . But should mechan ical con s ider a t ions s uch as the 
adequacy of housing for Convent ion deleg ates and staff , or r e ady access to 
data sources and bas ic suppor t ser v ices take pr ecedence over the ethos of 
in-count r y  per formance of pol it ically so symbol ic an undertaking as the 
actual concept ion of a pol ity ' s  bas ic char te r ?  And what if  the only 
' log ical ' pl ace appears  to be an area  where the inhab i t ants by the i r  
des ignated r epresentat ives have already ind icated they d i s appr ove of be ing 
incorpor ated within the r ubr ic of any const itut ion wh ich m ight evolve , and 
may even be hos t i le to the ve ry const i tut ional exe r c i se occur r ing on the i r  
so il?  Precise ly that comb inat ion of c i rcumstances surrounded the hold ing 
of the 1 9 7 5  MCC on the is land of S a ipan in the Mar i anas D i st r ict . Prev ious 
to the meet ing of the Convent ion , a covenant call ing for Commonwealth 
status h ad been s igned by Mar ianas and Ame r ican negot iators  and was 
overwhelming ly r at if ied by the voter s  of the Mar i anas D i s tr ict . 3 However ,  
i t  yet r emained unknown whether the Un i ted States (US ) Cong r e ss would 
approve of th is  execut ive-negot iated Commonwealth Covenant . To the 
Micrones i an leader s  th is  uncer ta inty prov ided the determining element 
war r ant i ng the hold ing of the Convent ion on S a ipan , proceed ing on both the 
probab i l ity that the Ma r i anas deleg ates-e lect 4 would attend as insur ance 
ag ainst the r isk of unfavour able act ion in Wash ington and the pos s i b i l ity 
that the Di str ict ' s  people m ight even r at i fy the Cons t itut ion at some 
future d ate should the US Cong ress  r e j ect the proposed Commonwealth s tatus . 
Strong ly expr essed oppos i t ion in the Senate to the Covenant d id serve to 
man i fe s t  the soundness  of the appr a i s a l  by the leader s  of the i r  fe l low 
Microne s i ans , at least in so far as it saw the Mar i anas deleg ates-elect 
become involved in the day-to-day wor k  of the Convent ion . 5 About the only 
j ust i f i able contr ibut ion by a non-Microne s i an consult ant to th is  type of 
dec is ion was to r a ise caut ionary warn ing s  on the procedur al d i f f ic ult ies to 
be encountered in meet i ng the quor um and maj or ity requ i r ements enj o ined by 
the Convent ion ' s  enabling leg islat ion for t a k i ng act ion in plenary sess ion 
should the Mar i anas deleg ates absent themselve s . 
Eve n  the con f ig ur at ion to be used in seat ing the deleg ates on the 
floor of the convent ion hall involves concealed pol icy elements with 
potent ial Pac i f ic cultural antecedents beyond the ken of the expatr i ate 
consultant . I t  may be accepted as a concomitant o f  We s te r n i sat ion that 
j ust as the introduced leg islatures have ignored the formal t r apping s  of 
t r ad it ional law-mak ing , so may the even mor e  al ien implant of the 
constitut ional convent ion . The tulafale ( t al k i ng ch ief)  was not separ ated 
from ,  nor d id he purport to l imit h imsel f as spe a k i ng in  the name of h i s  
ali 'i  ( chief)  i n  the Samoan const i tut ional convent ions o f  the 1 9 50 s ;  
s im il a r ly i t  was not thought necessary by Microne s i ans to d i fferentiate the 
role of the naniken deleg ate from that of the namwarki of Ponape . � But as 
the deleg ates con s i s ted of both co-opted ch iefs and commoner s ,  wer e  the 
former to be g rouped apar t ,  or afforded any c r edenda mate r i al or 
procedur al - of status? Th is seem ing ly s upe r f ic i al matter potent ially h ad 
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l inkage with one of the most divis ive i ssues the Convent ion would face , 
that of whether the Const itut ion as it evolved would recognise and make 
prov is ion for the status of Micrones ia ' s  t r ad i t ional leader s .  When the 
deleg ates assembled informal ly for the wor kshop wh ich preceded the 
org an i s i ng of the Convent ion , they fai led to prov ide the staff with any 
instruct ions for mak ing seat ing arrangements . To the Western f r ame of mind 
wh ich assumes the need for or der ing phenomena to fac i l itate rat ional 
act ion , some seat ing con f ig ur at ion was requ i r ed to avo id complete 
confus ion . To the eng ineer controll ing the Convent ion ' s  public address 
system , and cuing the name of each speaker into the recorded debate , i t  was 
essent ial . In the attempt to reach a neutr al solut ion , s taff ass igned 
delegates to seats on a purely r andom bas is . 7  Upon re flect ion th is  
apparently innocuous dec is ion becomes the phys ical embodiment o f  the 
equal ity of ch ief and commoner ,  j ust as d id the or ig inal g r ant ing of vot ing 
r ights to the trad i t ional leader s  symbol ise the lack of leg al 
d i fferent iat ion . 8  
Al l prepa r at ions are not o f  phys ical accommod at ions wh ich occur be fore 
embar k i ng upon the proj ect of l imn ing a const itut ion . Also ant ic ipated i s  
the mode t o  b e  adopted in  agg regating and ag reeing upon the contents of the 
const i tuent document . From observat ion of the pr ocess in the Pac i f ic , the 
alternat ives fall between two poles , one char acter i sed by the wor k  of a 
convent ion start ing with the exam inat ion and reshaping of a draft , around 
wh ich for the most part all subsequent negot iat ions tur n .  The other pole 
has the deleg ate s assembl ing with a tabuZa rasa and , b it by b it , 
co-operat ively piecing together the contents of what becomes the completed 
const itut ional document , adopted or rej ected upon be ing s ubm itted for 
r at i f icat ion in the manner pr esc r ibed by law .  A s  the former frequently 
incorpor ates the pr act ice of employing a pre- convent ion g roup 9 to put 
togethe r the d r aft proposal for the ent ire convent ion , the process of 
accret ion observed in th is  preparatory stage may not d i ffer mater ially from 
that of a convent ion wor ki ng wi thout the lodes tone of any proposed draft to 
wh ich all dec is ion-mak ing is att r acted . 1 0 And it ought to be ment ioned in 
passing that for those convent ions nominally sett ing to wor k  without 
prel im inary d r afts before them , not only do many deleg ates br ing cons ider­
able precond it ion ing as to wh at const itutes the ' compleat ' const itut ion but 
they may also have the ass istance o f  pre-convent ion informal form­
ulat ions , 1 1  so that the ir  tablets are never tr uly b lank . 
In both polar categor ies of const itut ion-mak ing , and ir respect ive of 
par t icular var iat ions encountered , the expe r t  consultant has almost 
univer sally played a prominent role , one wh ich prompts cr it ical exam inat ion 
from the pe r spect ive of h i s  c ultur al competence so to serve . I t  matter s  
l ittle in  such analys i s  that the const itut ion o n  wh ich h e  adv ised is not 
autochthonous , but depend s  upon an admini ster ing nat ion ' s  breath ing l ife 
into the ex istence of the new pol ity , so that from the viewpo int of the 
g r ant ing country h i s  involvement is  essent i al as one of its nat ionals .  
From the incept ion o f  the new pol ity , to wh ich the document both attests 
and embell ishe s ,  h is adequacy i s  to be evaluated only by its own set of 
measures . Po l i t ically, of cour se , the ent ire matter is r e so lved both by 
the powe r leverage enj oyed by the admini ster ing nat ion in  its act of 
g r ant ing independence and by the deg ree of le� i t imacy enj oyed by the 
consultant-draftsman within the pol ity abor n i ng , 1 even though hail ing from 
the administer ing nation . 
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Const itut ional i llustrat ions inev i t ably tend to d r i f t  over into 
tr eatmen t  of produc t r ather than l im i t i ng themse lves solely to inqu i r y  into 
process , the s ubj ect under cons ider at ion . Never the less , examples of both 
polar categor ies of d r aft ing ought be introduced her e  to clar i fy the 
influence of consultat ion in th is  aspect of process . 
Almost s imultaneous ly two decades ago , the form of const i tut ion-mak i ng 
wh ich u t i l ises a pr e-convent ion g roup to pr epar e  advance d rafts occur r ed 
with in roughly the s ame cultur al ( but not pol it ical)  sett ing s  in adj o in ing 
po l i t ie s  whose capitols are separ ated by only about 7 7  miles of ocean . Of 
the 1 9 60  Const itut ion in  Ame r ic an Samoa , Ch ief Judge Mor row who was a 
member of that Amer ic an possess ion ' s  committee , along with the US-appo inted 
Attorney-Ge neral and seven Samoans , wrote : 
The At torney Gener al was s upposed to ass ist  in the 
draft ing , but he was too busy w ith h i s  r egular dut ies  
[ so]  that he d id not do any draft ing and attended only 
a very few meet ing s of the Committee . 
It was my pr act ice to wr ite out [ three or four 
sect ions at a t ime ] • • • • I took • • •  [ them]  befo r e  the 
Committee and they wer e  usually adopted verbat im after 
my expl anat ion o f  the sect ions . 
Fo r tunately , I h ad taught the course in Const itut ional 
law two or three t imes wh ile  I was dean of Dr ake 
Un ive r s ity Law School and was famil iar  with the 
prov i s ions of the Federal Const itut ion . Be ing an Iowa 
lawyer ,  I was fam i l i ar with the Const itut ion of Iowa 
( 1 974 : 2 5 ) . 
The dr aft const itut ion pr epar ed by the comm i ttee was then adopted by the 
Const itut ional Convent ion in the space of but four days and with only one 
change ( see ibid. : 26 ) . 
I n  ws , as r epor ted to an inqu ir ing Amer ican Senate Sub-Committee by 
its staff : 
The wor k i ng committee on sel f-gover nment commenced 
deliberat ions on the const itut ional problems involved 
in the t r an s it ion to independence early in 1 9 59 ; the 
convent ion wh ich met s ubsequent to the prepa r at ion of a 
const itut ional d r aft in Aug us t  1 960 ,  l abored almost 2 
1 /2 months before f inal i z i ng i t s  wor k .  S amoan and New 
Ze aland officials  had the ass i st ance of the i r  own tech­
n ical expe r ts . As a consequence , except for the 
pos s ible obj ect ion on the par t  of the tauZeZe 'a 
[ un t i t led Samoans ] who we r e  r epre sented at the 
convent ion only through the i r  matai [ t i tled Samoans] , 
g rounds for d issat isfact ion present in Amer ican S amoa 
are absent (Me ller 1 9 6 1 : 1 1 8 ) . 
The par t  played by the Samoan and New Zealand (NZ ) consultants in the 
drafting of the WS Const itut ion is desc r ibed at leng th in  the account of 
one of them , the late Professor J im Dav id son : 
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L i ke most pol i t ic al g roups , the Wor k i ng Committee was 
heav i ly dependent on profess ional ass istance in 
br ing ing i t s  exper ience to bear with prec i s ion on many 
of the problems that came before i t .  I t  needed help in 
the pr el iminary analys i s  of its  f ield of respons­
ibil ity , in the eluc idat ion of problems r a i sed in 
d isc uss ion , and in the f inal embod iment of its 
dec i s ions in constitut ional drafts and detailed 
recommendat ions . As Const itut ional Adviser , I was 
expected to prov ide a large par t  o f  that help , in 
cooper at ion with the Re search Secretary.  The relat ion­
sh ip to the comm ittee of the New Zealand Const i tut ional 
Adviser , c.c. A i kman , was more complex . At f i r st h is 
adv ice tended to be rece ived with c aut ion and some 
doubt . But , when the committee became s at isf ied that 
he spoke from per sonal conv ict ion and from knowledge of 
local c i rcumstances ,  and not as a mere spokesman for 
New Ze aland , it g ave h im its conf idence ; and , as a 
const itut ional lawyer of wide expe r ience , he was able 
to make a maj or contr ibut ion to its wor k  ( 1 96 7 : 357-58 ) . 
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Wh i le i t  would seem that Dav idson brought a wider acquaintance with 
wor ld exper ience in const i tut ional draft ing to h i s  task than d id h i s  
Amer ican counterpart across the water s ,  and probably a more sympathet ic 
under stand ing of Samoan cultural value s  as well , 1 3 never theless he 
apparently had l ittle toler ance for Samoan procedur al constr aints wh ich 
hold " that s i lence or equivocat ion is wisest wh i le s ig n i f icant d ifferences 
of opinion remain" ( ibid . : 35 8 ) . For the 1 960  Cons t itut ion , r ather than : 
the c alculated incompleteness of some of its [ the 1 9 54 
Convent ion ' s ] resolut ions • • •  i t  was necessary to reach 
dec i s ions in respect of these unreso lved problems 
( ibid. ) .  
In shor t ,  he emphas i sed the need for acceptable and c lear-cut dec i s ions , or 
to rephr ase th i s  within the the s i s  of th i s  paper , h i s  culturally­
cond it ioned precepts of how constitut ion-shaping ought to proceed and h i s  
requ i s ite of def init ive content took pr ecedence over ind igenous 
alternat ives more congen i al to at least some of the Samoan pr inc ipals .  
Beyond that , a s  Dav idson admitted i n  desc r ib ing the explanat ions he was 
cal led upon to fur n i sh to the full Convent ion on the proposed draft : 
Although the expl anat ions were factual , I d id not 
ent irely e schew on some occas ions - the role of 
advocate , s ince the rej ect ion of a key prov is ion would 
often have involved a far more r ad ical r ecast ing of the 
Const itut ion than member s  real i zed (ibid . : 386 ) . 
On ly the S amoan s  can say whether the i r  Const itut ion wou ld not be serv ing 
them better i f  at gestat ion s uch ' r ad ical recast ing ' h ad occur r red or if it 
had been wr i tten with g r eater constr uct ive ambig uity.  
The MCC o f  1 9 75  prov ides an illum inat ive ins ight into the process 
observed in the other polar form of const itut ion-wr iting ,  the piec ing 
together of the constituent contents without any pre- fabr icated draft . 
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Despite the avowed intent of the author and h i s  staff1 4  to r emain outs ide 
all determinat ions of const itut ional po l icy,  it is now h is bel ief that 
the i r  collect ive influence on process inev itably had a contr ary e ffect . 
The s ituat ion ex i stent in the Tr ust Te rr i tory j ust pr ior to the conven ing 
of the deleg ates counter- i nd icated any attempt to even l imning por t ions o f  
a model , r isky as was r ecog n i sed t o  be t h e  alter nat ive g amble of d r aft ing 
an entire  const itut ional document of a new pol ity with in an al lotted 
t ime- span of but n i nety calendar days . 1 5  Unce r tainty over attendance of 
some or all of the deleg ates from three of the s ix D i s tr icts of the Tr ust 
Te r r itory - threaten ing to foreclose the attaining of a quor um - per s i sted 
up to the very t ime all deleg ates assembled on S a ipan , wh i le the i r  
cont inued daily attendance r emained precar ious unt i l  the f inal moment when 
they aff ixed the i r  s ignatures to the completed const itut ional document . 
Under lying the whole const itut ional e f fort was the tens ion of near ly a 
decade of inconclus ive negot iat ions between Microne s i ans and US r epresent­
at ives over the unresolved future status of Microne s i a . The Cong ress  o f  
Microne s i a  in  call ing the Convent ion , sought t o  move t h e  status t a l k s  out 
of the ir  stalemate , but except in the Mar i anas , the Mic r one s i ans in  the 
Tr ust Te rr itory we re themselves d iv ided between the alter nat ives o f  see k i ng 
compl ete independence and becom ing an assoc iated state of the us . 1 6  Should 
the deleg ates f i r st address themselves to th i s  issue , based on the very 
sound ( We stern)  log ic that they could not shape a government unt i l  they had 
dec ided on the nature of the pol ity wh ich it was to serve , the whole l ife 
of the Convent ion could easily be consumed in debate on th i s  one matter 
alone . To overcome th is  obstacle , at the wor kshop wh ich preceded the 
Convent ion the author counsel led that l i ke c lay in the potte r ' s  hands the 
shape of future po l i t ical status would emerge as the powe r s  and structures 
of the new Microne s i an Gove rnment wer e  dec ided upon and the pol ity took 
shape . The favour able r ecept ion of th i s  s uggest ion was probably prem ised 
as much upon necess ity as upon its  compat ibil ity with the widespread 
Micrones ian tendency to tempor i se when confronted with matters of moment , 
relying upon the passage of t ime as an element of i tself to contr ibute to 
the ir  m i t ig at ion if not solut ion . 
One f inal matter , publ icly unvo iced , s ustained the dec i s ion to for ego 
a pre-convent ion draft : in under taking any s uch effor t ,  there was good 
probab i l ity e i ther that the Const itut ion would be captur ed in advance by 
spoke smen for the Pa lauan D i str ict , so that all debate in the Convent ion 
would thereafter be channelled in a pre-determined cour se , or at least that 
the Convent ion would be polar i sed before it had even reached the f ir st 
formal stage of organi sat ion . In fact , after the delegate s commenced 
meet ing , the Palauan deleg at ion attempted to ach ieve these very obj ect ives , 
init ially by announc ing seven " non-negot iable " demands , each mult iple in  
content ,  and shor tly thereafter present ing an ent i r e  const itut ional 
proposal incorpor at ing them . 1 7 The ' Palauan Ploy '  s ucceeded in  caus ing the 
deleg ates to t read war ily in  the var ious areas l abelled " non- negot iable" by 
that D i str ict ' s  deleg at ion . Although much of the lang uage f inally inc luded 
in the proposed FSM Cons t itut ion concords with - when not echo ing in hae� 
Verba - the content of the Palauan Cons t i t u t ion , c are ful analys i s  d iscloses 
that the thr ust of the Palauan demands was tur ned . 1 8 The approach of 
star t i ng un instr ucted and incrementally amass ing and we av ing const itut ional 
content into a cohes ive whole , complemented by the s t r uctur ing of the 
Convent ion wh ich was des igned to fac i l itate th is  obj ect ive , afforded far 
wider oppor tun ity for inter nal manoeuv r ing ,  and the reaching of a 
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Micrones i an consensus , than would have been perm itted had the Convent ion 
adopted the other polar s tyle of  const itut ion-drafting . 
The c r uc i al key to success in the use of the ' i ncremental style ' of 
const itut ion-wr iting ,  i f  th i s  polar type may be so labelled , l ies in the 
competence of the Convent ion ' s  committees , with most r espon s ib i l ity for 
spe c i f ic subj ect-matte r areas and at least one administrat ive committee 
charged with the technical chore of  br ing ing ever yth ing ag r eed upon in 
plenary sess ion together into a mean ing ful whole , i ncorporat ing a un ity of  
style , and all at least suff ic ient , techn ically , to thwart  future e f for t 
bent upon d i sc los i ng ambiguity or incong r uity.  The Microne s ian Convent ion 
ut i l i sed but f i ve s ubstant ive stand ing committees , and d iv ided among them 
was the ent i r e  r ange of subj ects wh ich a const i t ut ion m ight conce ivably 
tr eat . The i r  n umber was purpo se ly kept small in the format ive stage to 
focus the deleg ate s ' attent ion sharply on but a s ing le const itut ional 
segment wh ile s imultaneously seek i ng to minim i se the dysfunct ional 
attenuat ion wh ich occur s whe n  numerous committees with nar rowly-dr awn 
agendas clamour for the attent ion wh ich they der ive from the adopt ion of 
the ir  respect ive proposals .  As a result , the j ur isdict ion of some 
committees e ncompassed a number of topics only vag ue ly r elated . The Pub l ic 
Fi nance Commi ttee may be v iewed as an except ion , as its area of 
respon s ib i l ity was del iber ately shaped to permit it to t reat the very 
d i f f icult monetary i ss ue s  wh ich had slowly been erod ing the internal amity 
of the Tr ust Te rr i tory. Flying in the teeth of structur al- funct ional 
theory, to one maj or committee was deleg ated all r espon s ib i l ity for 
ident ifying the funct ions to be enjoined , allowed , or den ied government , as 
well as des ignat ion of the appropr iate level at wh ich each powe r would be 
lodged . To another was allotted the duty of sketch ing the ent ire 
governmental framewor k ,  both mandated and perm itted , wh ich would implement 
the Const itut ion ' s  empowerments and d ir ect ions . 
To the i n i t iate , it was apparent that th i s  unusual separat ion was 
del iber ately d e s ig ned to avo id all pr e- set par ameter s concealed in the 
r ules wh ich m ight constr ict the Convent ion ' s  freedom of act ion , j ust as the 
enabling leg is lat ion poss ibly unwitt ing ly had avo ided most of the 
phr aseology wh ich in other pol it ies has served as d irect ions pr e­
determin ing the cour se to be taken in const i tut ion-draf t i ng .1 9 Pres idential 
or par l iamentary system m ight be adopted , preference for s ing le or plur al 
execut ive r emained unfettered , etc . , e tc . And yet ,  in  suggest ing th is  
' neutr al ' con f ig ur at ion of committees , the author was j ust as cer tainly 
interj ect ing h i s  cultur al value s  as had the contr ibut ions of  the 
consultants to the Samoan con s t i tut ional e f for t ,  as prev iously noted . To 
deleg ates from a culture comfor table with hol ist ic forms of problem­
solv ing , the author had j ar r ing ly proposed the use of d i f fe r en t i at ion and 
spec ial isat ion to the same end . 
By plac ing the subj ects of c iv i l  l iber t ie s  as wel l  as customary and 
tr ad i t ional r ights under a s ing le committee ' s  j ur i sd ict ion , the f r ict ion 
engendered by the i r  inter face was potent ially conta ined through eng ineer ing 
the oppor tun ity for consensus- reach ing with i n  committee r ather than a i r ing 
the full g amut of th i s  fundamental d i s ag reement on the Convent ion f loor . 2 0  
Tr ad it ional leader s  from m id-Microne s i a ,  whose appropr i ate role by custom 
is  to seek community harmony through resolut ion of contend ing forces , we re 
placed in  the ' fo r e ig n ' posit ion of  champ ion ing not only the ir  own r ights 
but those of  chiefs throughout the Te r r i tory,  the latte r j ust because they 
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had t r ad it ional status . And consonant w i th the over-arch ing f r ame of the 
enabling leg islat ion , the author ' s  approach unden iably was b iased toward 
the fac i l itat ing of Te r r i tor ial un i ty ,  so he h ad counselled po stpon ing 
Convent ion cons ider at ion of the one d isput at ious const itut ional i ssue of 
wh ich pr act ically every c it i zen throughout the Te r r i tory was aware even if 
not wholly cog n i sant , that of future po l i t ical status . 
From the vantage po int of h inds ight , the author now quest ions the 
eth ics of h is inter j ection into the affai r s  of the MCC : 
I t  was the Microne s i ans , and they alone , who had to 
resolve the d imens ions of the i r  own nat iona l i ty ,  and 
the basic quest ions of whether and how they could 
br idge the i r  d ist inct ive d i f ferences to form a union 
The concepts I u sed - any concepts - for all I 
know , nar rowed or expanded those wh ich the i r  d ifferent 
cultures could have muster ed . The log ic I employed - I 
look bac k  now and wr yly smile at plac ing the deleg ates 
in a s ituat ion requ i r ing mutual ly exc lus ive , seriatim 
dec i s ions of ' ye s  or no , '  Ar i stote l ian log ic they 
unconsc iously abandoned for mor e  cultu r al ly compat ible 
modes as c r i t ical quest ions wer e  reached , 2 1  - was not 
necessar ily the ir s .  Even the pos i t ion of the d iver se 
Microne s i ans act i ng as one , the i r  very meet i ng to 
cons ider the prospect ,  was c ultur ally incong r uous 
(Me ller , for thcoming op . cit .  : Introd uc t ion) . 
Be fore qui t t ing the subj ect of process , one f inal matte r . The 
language for constitut ion-mak ing in most of the Pac i f ic I s l ands has not 
been that of the ind igenous inhab i tants but an exogenous tong ue . 
Inte rpr ete r s  may have fac i l it ated its use when all par t ic ipants were not 
s k i lled in that lang uage , and occas ionally a lingua. franca has been 
employed . Reg ardless , almost univer sally the lang uage of the last colon ial 
administration has been employed to concrete concur rence i n  f inal wr it ten 
form.  To the extent that the ind igenous lang uages have retained the i r  
v i r il i ty ,  and despite the b i l ing ual ( or fr equently , mult i l ing ual)  
capab i l i t ies o f  the deleg ates , the  dual  ( or even mult iple) l ang uage context 
has furnished ample oppor tun i ty for conceptual m isunder st and ing . As ide 
from the competence o f  a consultant to f unct ion adequately i n  the arena of 
al ien Pac if ic Island values , when he attempts to do so , he may be ent irely 
unaware of the communicat ion sl ippage occur r ing . Add ing further 
compl icat ion , all o f  th i s  const itut ional e ffor t  takes place within the 
r ubr ic o f  an introd uced leg al system wh ich ass igns to words a penumbr a of 
meani ng beyond the ken of almost all of the ind igenous i nhab itants , even 
those famil iar with the general usag e  of the language employed for 
dr aft ing . If ' murder ' is the taking of l ife with mal ice aforethought , what 
is a ' taking ' , and in PNG is a ' pay bac k ' k i l l ing with ' mal ice ' ?  In WS , 
for acts c lassed as cr iminal , does an ifoga ( ceremon i al apology) serve to 
expung e all sc iente r , o r  apply only to m i t igat ion , so that the process of 
cr iminal j ust ice cont inues to r un und isturbed? I n  shor t ,  the wider the net 
and the deeper the probe of inqu i r y  i nto the process o f  const itut ion­
mak i ng , the mor e  suspect becomes the assumed tr ansfe r ab i l i ty of the 
consultants ' expe r t ise . 
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PRODUCT 
Exam inat ion of const itut ion-mak ing to ident ify the spec i f ic sub­
stant ive contr ibut ions o f  the consultant opens up an intr igu ing area so 
broad in compass as to ex tend th i s  pape r far beyond its pe rmissible leng th .  
One s imple i llustr at ion : there would appear to be no obj ect ion to 
acquaint ing the pe r sons charg ed with responsibil ity for const itut ion-making 
with an under stand ing of how the t r ad it ional leader s  have formally been 
str uctured into the newly created governments of the var ious Pac ific 
Island s . Should the consult ant also include r e ference to the pol it ical 
str ategy observed in meet ing th is problem , as po int ing up the deft 
succ inctness o f  So lomons in s ide- stepping the issue2 c and contr ast ing it 
with the more elabor ate treatment to the same end in Micrones ia?2 3 But once 
beyond sketch ing the h istor ical decl ine of tr ad i t ional pol it ical power in 
the Pac i f ic ,  and the long-term tr end releg at ing t r ad i t ional leaders , at 
best , to symbol ic pos i t ions of author i ty ,  where next may the consultant 
venture? Almost any evaluat ion he may furn i sh of how well the var iants 
identif ied funct ion within the i r  respect ive pol i t ies will  bear the impr int 
of his own cultur al pe r spect ives of adequacy and not the i r s . And any 
advice he may tender gener ally on the prov i s ion the const itut ion-draft ing 
ought to make w i th respec t  to tr ad it ional ch iefs would be only lead ing h im 
fur ther into a substant ive area where h i s technical competence may prope r ly 
be reg arded w i th susp1c 1on . And should he next delve into spec i f ic 
treatment of c lasses of chiefs?2 4  A l l  th i s  merely serves to demonstr ate why 
a for ay into the subj ect of constitut ional pr oduct must be foregone in the 
interest of brevity .  
At th i s  po int the author f inds h imself a s  though ar rested i n  m id- a i r , 
much l i ke one of the arrows in Zeno ' s par adox , about wh ich it is poss ible 
to argue that once released from the bow it can never traver se the 
remaining half of the d istance necessary to h i t  its  target . I f  the wor k  of 
the consultant i s  always to remain culturally constrained , what se rvices 
may he pe r form outs ide his own soc iety without r unning foul of th is 
obj ect ion? Just  as through observat ion it can be proven that the ar row 
does fly its  full cour se , despite Zeno ' s  log ic ,  so can it be shown that 
there is a whole r ange of expe r t ise wh ich the consultant can defens ibly 
employ even though he serves in a cross-cult ur al s i tuat ion . Included would 
be all of the problem s ituat ions wh ich may ar ise from the inter face of one 
pol ity with another as they may be affected by the contents of a proposed 
const itut ion . The descr ipt ion and analys is of expe r ience and pr act ice 
elsewhere , even admitt ing the cultural boundar ies of any t axonom ic system , 
r etains u t i l ity to the extent it prov ides some orde r to external phenomena . 
Remain ing to the consultant is also the burdensome respons ib il ity for 
assur ing that knowledge of non- I s l and concepts is cor r ectly as v iewed 
from his per spect ive - t r ansfe r red across cultur al boundar ies . At the MCC , 
a deleg ate invoked the Mar x i an max im " from each accord ing to h is ab i l ity, 
to each accord ing to h is need " in suppor t of his oppo s i t ion to the Palauan 
deleg at ion ' s  demand that the costs of the proposed central government be 
equal ly shared by all of the proposed state s . Without quest ion the 
informed consultant would be qualif ied to ident ify th i s  as me re symbol 
man ipulat ion , empty of any suppor t ive ideology . 
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1The author d i sc usses 
prov i s ionally ent itled 
publ i shed shor tly.  
N.  MELLER 
NOTES 
the MCC of 1 9 7 5  in 
FareuJe l l Micronesia, 
detai l  
Fare 
in a manuscr ipt , 
We l l  wh ich is to be 
2 I t  should be added that the rej ect ion by MI of the FSM Const itut ion at 
the 1 9 78 pleb iscite was prem ised upon many factor s ,  and i s  not to be 
attr ibuted solely to the seat ing of the i r  deleg ates .  
378 . 9  per cent approval . Adding further compl icat ion to the s i t t ing 
dec i s ion , a cour t contest between claimants to the phys ical premises 
contr acted for the hold ing of the Convent ion daily thr eatened to bar the 
Convent ion deleg ates from fur ther access , and abr uptly to force the 
Convent ion to look for other quar ter s . Const i tut ing a law s u i t  be fore an 
Amer ican j ur ist , fol lowing the r ules of normal Amer ican j ur i spr udence , 
this aspect of the Micrones i an const itut ional effor t r epr esented one of 
the few instances where techn ical consult ing adv ice - this o f  a nar rowly 
leg al char acter could be tendered without r unning afoul of 
cross-cultur al pr esumpt iveness . 
4The Mar ianas ' deleg ates had publ icly announced that they would not 
par t ic ipate in the Convent ion if the Commonwealth Covenant were approved 
by the D i str ict vote r s  at the pleb isc ite . 
5The Nor ther n  Mar i anas never voted on the FSM Const i tut ion , as the 
submiss ion of the completed Cons t i tut ion to the people of the Trust 
Te r r i tory for r at i f icat ion was delayed by the H igh Commiss ione r for 
nearly three year s ,  by wh ich t ime the Nor thern Mar i anas had been removed 
from h i s  j ur i sd ict ion and placed under separate administration . Instead , 
a Constitut ion was d r awn up by a Nor thern Mar i anas convent ion , r at i f ied 
by the people of the Di str ict , and also cer t if ied by the US Pres ident . 
6 In each of the ' k ingdoms ' of Ponape the two par al lel l ines of chiefs are 
headed , r espect ively , by ncurMarki and naniken , with the latter speak ing 
for the former who t r ad i t ionally remained concealed from the public in 
formal setting s .  
7once the MCC was underway , the deleg ates voluntar i ly reg rouped themselves 
by deleg at ion , each g roup informally r e solv ing for i tsel f  the placement 
of i t s  chiefly members . However , the or ig inal seat ing cont inued to 
control the order of r oll-call throughout the Convent ion , and 
occas ionally cont r ibuted to deleg at ions spl itt ing the i r  votes under 
c i rcumstances where th i s  would pr obably not have occur red i f  the member s  
o f  a n  ent ire deleg at ion had been pol led separately. 
8 The amendment by the Cong ress of Micrones i a  of the enabl ing leg islat ion 
to a f ford vot ing r ights to the ch ie fly de leg ates may in fact h ave r educed 
the ir  influence , for the we ight of the ir  votes was now legally 
estab l i shed . As deleg ates without vote , the threat of the i r  boycott when 
crossed in the ir  demands would have been cloaked with g reater ambig u ity 
and probably we ightier s ignif ic ance in Micrones ian terms . 
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9The pre-convent ion g roup i s  somet imes d r awn from the body wh ich will 
serve as the constituent assembly, e . g . , the Const itut ional Pl ann ing 
Committee ( CPC) in PNG . At other t imes it is of wider compos i t ion , e . g . , 
the Spec ial Comm ittee of the Solomons Leg i s lat ive As sembly consist ing of 
leg is lator s ,  local counc i l  nom inees and nom inees of pr ivate 
org an isat ions . 
1 0But not always , as when the unoff ic ial member s  o f  the Fij i Leg islat ive 
Counc il , when repair ing to London in 1 96 5 ,  were prov ided with "a basic 
paper on ' const itut ional chang e ' pr epared by the Co lon i al Of f ice [ wh ich] 
pr esented alternat ive pr oposals in the var ious f ields , without gett ing 
down to any ver y  spec i f ic proposals , and set the f r ame for discuss ion" 
(Mel ler and Anthony 1 968 : 1 1 9 ) . 
1 1E . g . , Hawa i i ' s  Constitut ion , adopted in 1 9 50 , wh ich d id not become 
effect ive for near ly a decade thereafter , had been preceded by a d r aft 
proposed by a g roup assembled under the auspices o f  the Statehood 
Commiss ion in aid of Hawai i ' s statehood dr ive ( see Meller 1 97 1 : 1 7 ) .  
1 2In the case of the Solomons ( S I ) , i nvolv ing as i t  d id both the future 
relat ions between re located G i lber tese and Solomon I s l ander s  and the 
Br i t i sh sense of responsibil ity for the former , thr ee sets of cultural 
values wer e  inte r faced . To the task of adv i s ing on r esolut ion of such 
complex ity ,  it may be argued that g reater cultur al neut r al ity, even if  
not leg i t imacy , would have been brought by enl ist ing the serv ices of a 
non-Br itish nat ional from a th ird country.  
1 3See , e . g . , his  relat ion of ind igenous concept ion of gover nment to the 
change made by the preced ing WS Const i tut ional Convent ion of 1 954  in the 
lang uage governing the select ion and d irect ion of the Public Serv ice 
Commiss ioner ( ibid. : 326 ) . 
1 4The author of th i s  pape r acted both as consultant to the Convent ion and 
d irector of its  Re search and Dr aft ing Sect ion , the latter number ing in 
total some twenty- s ix d i f ferent pe r sons , although not all served 
s imult aneously . 
1 5 In add it ion , up to th i r ty days of r ecess could be taken by the Convent ion 
without the h i atus be ing charged aga inst the n inety day max imum . Th is 
amendment by the Congress o f  M icrone s i a  to the enabl ing leg islation was 
adopted on the impor tun ing of the author , and techn ically became leg ally 
effect ive only after the organ i s ing of the Convent ion . The prox imate 
cause for taking a recess of twenty-three days was not to afford a 
g reater t ime-span to the constitut ional effor t ,  but for the convenience 
of the Palauan deleg at ion whose head had announced its member s ' i ntent ion 
to leave the Convent ion hall in the m idst of its del ibe r at ions to eng age 
in a c r uc ial D istr ict Leg i s lature elect ion bac k home . 
1 6The adv isor y plebi sc ite held on 8 July 1 9 7 5 ,  a few days before the 
Convent ion met ,  because of a number of techn ical defects and po l it ical 
reasons , succeeded at best only in confi rming that in f ive of the s ix 
D i str icts , c loser relat ionsh ip with the US ( as in statehood , common­
we alth , or ter r i tor ial status) was not prefe r r ed .  
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1 7 Both non-negot iable demands and the "Palauan Cons t itut ion" were 
formulated on Sa ipan after the Convent ion got under way . The latter was 
promptly spl it , and par ts ass igned to var ious appropr iate committees for 
cons ider at ion along with al l other deleg ate proposals rece ived , much to 
the voiced chag r in of the deleg ates from Palau who cont inued to manoeuvre 
to have the ir  proposal brought on the Convent ion floor as a un i t  for 
debate . 
1 8 Undoubtedly , the fa i l ur e  of the Palauan 
obj ect ive to reduce the centr al gover nment 
except as pe rm itted by the new s tate s , 
contr ibuted to the defeat of the proposed 
Di str ict when it was voted upon i n  1 978 . 
deleg at ion to ach ieve its 
to near impotence internally , 
each with an equal voice , 
FSM Const itut ion in the Palau 
1 9See , e . g . , the instruc t ions to the S I  Const itut ional Committee accord ing 
to wh ich it was expected to include adv ice on the appo intment of a Head 
of State ; and the Execut ive (or  Cabinet)  ( S I  CCR 1 976 : App . 1 ,  2-3 ) • 
These instr uct ions at the very least po inted the preparatory comm ittee in 
the d ir ect ion o f  adopt ing a par l i amentary system , for in a pres ident ial 
form , the Head of State would not be d i fferent i ated nor wou ld there be 
need to cons ider the method of h i s  " appo intment" . 
2 0Although most chiefly deleg ates opted to become member s  o f  the Civil  
Liber ties Committee , the dynamics o f  the Convent ion never theless caused 
d i sag reement over the introduced-ve rsus- t r ad i t ional r ights- issue to e r upt 
on the Convent ion floor . 
2 1As towards the end of the Convent ion , with amendments back- logg ing , the 
Microne s i an deleg ates ignored the d ic tates of par l i amentary procedure 
wh ich r equi r ed them to cons ider and d i spose , separately , o f  one amendment 
after another .  Instead , r ef lect ive of t r ad it ional dec i s ion-mak ing , they 
d i scussed all related amendments s imultaneously , quickly e l im inated those 
cons idered untenable , considered the remai nder informally without 
attempt ing to l imit debate to any one , and then through consensus 
eventually nar rowed dec is ion down to the amendment f inally prevail ing . 
2 2 "Parl iament shall make prov i s ion for the gover nment of prov inces 
estab l ished under th i s  sect ion and consider the roZe of traditionaZ 
chiefs therein ( s . 1 1 4 ( 2 ) ) ( emphas is added ) . 
2 3Ar t icle v o f  the FSM Const i t ut ion is ent irely on "Tr ad i t ional Rights " ,  
with s . 3  empower ing the Cong ress to establ ish " when needed " a Ch amber of 
Ch iefs and declar ing that the Const i tut ion o f  e ach state hav i ng 
t r ad i t ional leader s " may prov ide for an act ive , funct ional role for 
them" . 
2 '+see Dav id son 
accommodat ion 
and tumua. 
( 1 96 7 )  for h i s  treatment of the two fautua, the 
of the four tama 'aiga, and t r uncat ing the role of the puZe 
5. THE I NTERNATIONAL L EGA L O R D E R  AND TH E DOM ESTIC 
LEGAL O R DE R :  TH E LAW O F  STATE SUCCESSION I N  THE 
PAC I F IC ISLAN D 
I .A. Shearer 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
The thes i s  of th i s  paper will  be that newly independent states are 
born into an ex ist ing inte rnat ional leg al order , and that th is order 
imposes certain constraints upon the freedom of nat ional dec i s ion-mak ing . 
It will be argued fur ther that nat ional sel f-dete rminat ion is not a 
pr inc iple opposed to , or at var iance with , the inter nat ional leg al order 
but is par t of that order . Doubts or d i sputes certa inly ex ist , however ,  
about the content of th i s  or that par t icular r ule o f  internat ional law ,  or 
th i s  or that inst i tut ion o f  the internat ional leg al system . An analys i s  of 
some of the mor e  impor tant o f  these will be the main obj ect of the paper . 
The Be lg ian j ur i st c .  de Vi ssche r espouses a pe ssimist ic v iew of the 
real ity of the max im ubi societas ibi jus : 
It is therefore pure i llus ion to expect from the mere 
ar r angement o f  inter-State relat ions the establishment 
of a commun ity order ; this can f ind a sol id foundat ion 
only i n  the development of the t r ue internat ional 
spi r it in men There wi ll be no internat ional 
commun i ty so long as the pol it ical ends o f  the State 
over shadow the h uman ends of powe r (see de Vi sscher 
1 96 8 )  • 
But m ight not the same be said even more cogently about every nat ional 
legal system? Until love t r i umphs , we shall continue to have murder , r ape , 
burg lary and all manner of ant i- soc ial act iv i ty as part of the real ity of 
l ife . Law never theless plays important restraining and l ibe rat ing roles in 
the domest ic as well as the internat ional order . 
Accept ing , then , that there i s  an internat ional leg al order into wh ich 
new s tates are bor n ,  are those s tates necessar ily bound by the norms and 
par t icular r ules of inter nat ional law in force at the t ime of the i r  b i r th ,  
and i n  the shape and content o f  wh ich they played no par t ?  The theoret ical 
debates o f  the 1 950s and 1 9 60s  ( see  Syatauw 1 96 1  and Henk in 1 9 68 ) , prompted 
in par t  by the pr ecedent of the Soviet Un ion ' s  re fusal to be bound by 
' react ionary norms ' of internat ional law after 1 9 1 7  ( see Tunk in 1 958 ) , now 
assume an a i r  of increasing pr ac t ical i r r e levance . For not on ly does the 
Th ird World now have the nume r ical streng th to ensure that the law creat ing 
processes reflect the i r  interests ( as e . g . , in the cur rent Un ited Nations 
(UN) Confe rence on the Law of the Sea) but the focus of the law i s  chang ing 
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away from issues of sover e ignty to is sues of co-ope r at ion . As the late 
Director of  the I n ternat ional Labour Of fice , Wilfr ed Je nks , has put i t : 
Th e emphas is  of the law i s  increas ing ly sh i f t ing from 
the formal structure of the r e lat ionsh ip between S t ates 
and the del im itat ion of the ir  j ur isd ict ion to the 
development of substant ive r ules on matte r s  of common 
concern v ital to the growth of an inter nat ional 
community and to the ind iv id ual well-be ing of the 
c i t i zens of its member State s . We shall also f ind that 
as a re sult of th i s  change of emphas i s  the subj ect­
matter of the law increas ing ly i nc ludes cross- front ier  
relat ionsh ips of  ind iv idual s ,  organ i zations and 
cor po r ate bod ies wh ich call for appropr iate legal 
r egulat ion on an inter nat ional bas i s  ( 1 95 8 : 1 7 ) .  
S i nce Jenks wrote , the most spectacular advance in  the content of  
internat ional law has occur r ed in the field of human r ights . 
NEW STATES AND CUSTOMARY I NTERNAT I ONAL LAW 
De spite the tr end r ightly pr ed icted by Je nks , the r e  are never theless 
some fund amental problems of  j ur i sd ict ional de l imitat ion st i l l  to be 
re solved . One of these , of par t icular concern to developed countr ies ,  i s  
the ex t r a-ter r itor ial r e ach o f  ant i-t r ust leg islat ion a s  i l lust r ated by the 
protec t ive and retaliatory act ion taken by Aust r a l i a  and other countr ies in 
the wake of the Westinghouse l i t igat ion in  the Un ited S t ates (US ) . Of  
conce r n  to deve loped and developing countr ies al ike i s  the resolut ion of 
j ur isd ict ional boundar ies in the sea and seabed . If the UN Th ird 
Confe r ence on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I I I )  succeeds in ove rcom ing the 
pr e sent impasse over the administr ation of the inter nat ional deep se abed 
area by i t s  deadl ine of 30 Apr i l  1 982 , then there will be an ag r eed 
Inter nat ional Convent ion on the Law of the Sea cod i fying a body o f  
pr inc iples by wh ich such j ur isd ict ional quest ions may b e  r e solved . I f  no 
convent ion r esults , the matter will  fall to be determined by the 
evolut ionary processes of  customar y inter nat ional law ( i . e . , the law 
brought about by the pr act ice of  the g r e a t  maj or i ty of states accompan ied 
by the conv ict ion th at it i s , or ought to be , the l aw) . 
Cu stomary inter nat ional law, al though pe rhaps mor e  l i kely in the long 
term to produce leg ally authent ic and cong r uent r ules , is too slow and 
unce r tain in the shor ter term to sat i s fy the needs of both s tate and 
pr ivate oper ators  for secur ity of tenure in the ir  explor at ion and 
exploi t at ion of the resources of the se a .  An ex ample of th is  uncer ta inty 
is  prov ided by compar ing the maj or i ty and minor i ty op1n 1ons of  the 
Inter nat ional Cour t o f  Just ice in  the ( Iceland ic ) Fisheries Jurisdiction 
Case ICJ Reps . 1 9 7 4 . The maj or ity opin ion , in holding that the un ilateral 
extens ion by Icel and i n  1 9 7 1  of i t s  c l a im to exc l us ive f i shery r ights o f f  
its coasts from twe lve to  5 0  m i les , was not  opposable to  the  Un ited K i ngdom 
(UK) by r e ason of the latte r ' s  h i stor ic r ights , ind ic ated c lear ly that such 
an exclus ive claim ( as d i st inct from a pre ferent i al claim) would be inval id 
un iver sally ;  moves towards a 2 0 0-mi le exc lus ive economic zone , then as now 
be ing pur s ued at the Law of the Sea Confe rence , we re ' proposals only ' and 
d id not inval idate ex ist ing norms of inter nat ional law .  The m inor ity 
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op1n 1on , subscr ibed to by j udges from some Lat in Amer ican and Th ird World 
countr ies , by contr ast , held that the opinio juris and pract ice , evidenced 
and prompted by the Law of the Sea Confe rence , had depr ived prev iously 
appl icable customary norms of the deg r ee of suppor t necessary to sustain 
them ; consequently i t  could not be held that Iceland ' s  claims were invalid 
erga omnes , only that they were inval id as ag ainst a country wh ich could 
rest its r ights on the d i f fer ent and und i sputed pr inc iple of h i stor ic 
r ights . 
The impl icat ions of the m inor ity op in ion are profound ; i f  th is v iew 
g ains acceptance it means that a customary r ule may collapse be fore another 
r ule clear ly supplants it . Newly independent states , or indeed any 
re lat ively cohes ive or numer ically s ig n i f icant g roup of state s ,  can ,  
through pract ice init ial ly contr ary t o  establi shed r u les o f  internat ional 
law, br ing about a collapse of those r ules . It may be that , in most 
instance s ,  the processes of f i l l ing the vac uum are ope r at i ng more or less 
contempor aneously, as in the supplant ing of the ' full , prompt and 
effect ive ' s tandard of compensat ion for expr opr iated for e ign prope r ty by 
the nat ional standard of the expr opr iat ing state ; but g aps will  rema in . 
For example , at the Law of the Sea Confer ence there is already an 
overwhelming consensus allowing states to reg ulate and l icense access to 
the resour ces of the i r  2 00-mi le economic zones , but no such consensus on 
h ighly m ig r atory spec ies such as tuna . The recent ar rest of an Ame r ican 
tuna f i sh ing boat in Papua New Gu ine a ( PNG ) wate r s ,  and the thr eatened 
retal iat ion ag a inst PNG under the mandator y  prov is ions of the US ' Magnuson ' 
Ac t of 1 9 76 i l lustr ates the problem .  Anothe r example is the determ inat ion 
of some developed countr ies not to al low a vacuum to occur in the law 
re lat ing to the deep se abed in the event of a collapse of pr esent 
negot iat ions towards an ag reed reg ime ; the us , the UK, Fr ance , West 
Ge rmany and ( very recently) the Soviet Un ion have all leg i slated to 
reg ulate and leg i t imate the i r  own ope r ator s  in the proposed ' I nter nat ional 
Area ' . 
THE NEW I NTERNAT I ONAL ECONOMI C  ORDER ( N I EO )  
The Ch ar ter of Econom ic Rights and Duties o f  States , 1 9 74 ( see 1 4  
International Legal Materials ( 1 97 5 ) 2 5 1 ) was prepared by UNCTAD and 
endor sed by the General As sembly of the UN . It was warmly suppor ted by the 
developing countr ie s ,  but opposed by Be lg i um ,  De nmar k ,  the Fede ral Republ ic 
of Ge rmany , Luxembourg , the UK and the US . Ten countr ies , includ ing 
Canad a ,  Fr ance and Japan abstained from the vot e .  With the se neg at ive 
votes and abstent ions , therefor e ,  the re is no l i kel ihood of the Char ter 
becoming customary inter nat ional law in the near future . 
The main propos it ion of the Ch ar ter ( c al led in popular usage ' the 
NIEO ' because of its  assoc i at ion with the General As sembly ' s  Declar at ion on 
the Establishment of a New Internat ional Economic Or der ) is contained in 
Ar t . 1 :  
Eve r y  State has the sover e ign and inal ienable r ight to 
choose its economic system as wel l  as its pol i t ical , 
soc i al and cultur al sys tems in accor dance with the wi ll 
of its people , without outs ide inter fe rence , coerc ion 
or threat in any form whatsoever . 
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Ar t icle 2 reaf f i rms the UN Re solut ion on Pe rmanent Sovere ignty over Natur al 
Re sources , 1 96 2 ,  by stat ing that each st ate has the free r ight to use and 
d ispose of its wealth , natural resources and economic act ivit ies , but goes 
on to assert that : 
Each State has the r ight • • •  ( c ) to nat ional i ze ,  
expropr iate or tr ansfer owner sh ip o f  for e ign prope r ty , 
in wh ich case appropriate compensat ion shouZd be pa id 
by the State adopt ing such measures , taking into 
account its relevant Zaws and reg ulat ions and al l 
circumstances that the State considers pertinent 
( emphas i s  added ) . 
Mo st capital-export ing count r ies opposed ( or at least absta ined from) 
these prov i s ions s ince they r epresented a r ad ical depar ture from the 
prev iously es tabl i shed standard of ' prompt adequate and e f fect ive 
compensat ion in accordance with internat ional law ' . The reference to 
' r elevant c i rcumstances ' was also feared to represent a v iew that neg at ive 
or even ' r ever se compensat ion ' might be claimed for past prof i t  taking or 
' economic imper ial ism ' . 
De spite the fai lur e of the Ch ar ter to r ece ive that deg ree of support 
from a suffic ient number and r ange o f  countr ies ( hav ing r eg ard to the 
interests affected) necessary to satisfy the cr iter ia laid down by the 
Internat ional Cour t of Just ice in the North Sea ContinentaZ she Zf Case 
( 1 969 ) for the emergence of a new norm of customary internat ional law ,  the 
Char ter has asp irat ional s ig n i f icance . Even in i t s  controverted par ts , 
such as those deal ing with expropr iat ion , · the Ch ar ter may have already 
succeeded in underm ining prev iously estab l i shed r ules , i n  the way ind icated 
by the m inor ity opin ion in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case ( see above ) . 
THE PR I NC I PLE OF NATI ONAL S ELF-DETERMI NAT I ON 
Self-determinat ion i s  refe r red to in Ar ts . 1  ( 2 )  and 5 5  of the UN 
Char te r as a ' pr inc iple ' ,  although i t  is not one of the pr inc iples 
enshr ined in Ar t . 2 .  An elabor at ion of th i s  pr inc iple i s  contained in the 
Gener al As sembly Declarat ion on Pr inc iples o f  Internat ional Law Conce rn ing 
Fr iend ly Re lat ions and Co-operat ion Among States in Accordance with the 
Ch ar ter of the UN of 24 Oc tober 1 9 70 . The Internat ional Cour t of Just ice , 
in its  adv isory opin ion in the Western Sahara Case ICJR Reps . , 1 9 74 , 1 2 , 
con f i rmed that the pr inc iple was one of internat ional law ,  at least in- so­
far as it re lated to pol it ical independence . 
For the reasons d i scussed ear l ier , i t  would be an extreme v iew of the 
pr inc iple of self-determ inat ion to assert that a newly independent s tate 
was not bound by any exist ing pr inc iple or r ule of internat ional law .  
Indeed , i f  sel f-determinat ion i s  itself a pr inc iple of internat ional law ,  
the re i s  a n  obv ious contrad ic t ion i n  such a v iew. The pr inc iple o f  
self-determ inat ion was , however ,  asser ted a s  t h e  maj or j ust i f icat ion of the 
Internat ional Law Commission ' s Dr aft Ar t ic les on State Succession in 
relat ion to Tr eat ies , of wh ich Ambass ador Bedj aou i  of Alge r ia was the 
r appor teur . Impelled by th i s  pr inc iple , the Commission proposed the 
general r ule that a new state should not be bound by any treaty appl ied 
pr ior to independence to its ter r itory by the administer ing power , by 
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r eason only of that previous appl icat ion . Th is is known as the ' clean­
slate doctr ine ' .  The doctr ine has plaus ib il ity as an aspect or consequence 
of se l f-determ inat ion , but not necessar i ly cog ency on close r exam inat ion . 
THE LAW OF STATE SUCC ESS I ON 
In order to cons ider the val id i ty of the ' c lean-slate doctr ine ' it is 
necessary to cons ider br iefly the doctr inal h istory of state success ion . 
In the ear ly per iod of inter nat ional law ,  dom inated by the class ical 
wr iters and the pr act ice of a hand ful of Europe an powers , state success ion 
was seen as resembl ing the domest ic law institution of success ion ; the 
burdens of te r r itory passed with the bene f its , and one sovere ign replaced 
another as the bearer of the r ights and obl igations attaching to the 
terr i tory in quest ion . Many obl igat ions of sovereigns , however ,  were 
reg arded as pe r sonal to that sover e ign r ather than attach ing to ter r itory 
( e . g . , treat ies of al l i ance) and would not automat ically pass to the new 
sovereign if a cess ion or conquest of the te r r i tory in quest ion occur red . 
The class ical law of state success ion thus came to deny inhe r i tance to 
purely per sonal obl ig at ions and r ights but to ins ist on inhe r i t ance of such 
ter r itor ial ly attached obl igat ions as boundary tr eat ies and treat ies 
establish ing t r ansit  r ights across te r r itory. Only the latter category of 
treaties was inher ited by the US from the UK in 1 776 , and the same doctr ine 
was accepted in the cases of the independence of the Span i sh Amer ican 
Emp ire in the 1 82 0 s . 
Already in the n ineteenth century doubts beg an to be expressed as to 
the ut i l ity of such a sharp d i st inct ion between ' per sonal ' and 
' d ispos i t ive ' or ' r eal ' t reat ies .  As treaties beg an to deal mor e and more 
with matte r s  of mutual co-oper at ion at the administrat ive level r ather than 
at the h ig h  pol i t ical level , the quest ion arose whether the se should 
automat ically d isappear on a change of sovere ignty . Tr eat ies of comme rce , 
ex trad i t ion of fug it ive cr im inals , recognit ion of tonnage cer t if icates , 
postal ar r angements and so on , wh i le in the formal sense ' personal ' were 
hardly pe r sonal in any other sense . The matte r came to a head in 1 9 3 1  with 
the independence of I r aq from the Br it i sh Mand ate , g r anted by the Le ague of 
Nations in 1 9 20 . Dur ing the pe r iod of the Mandate , Br itain was re sponsible 
for the external affairs  of Ir aq ,  includ ing the conc lus ion of all treat ies 
necessary to the we lfare of I r aq .  Should al l these treat ies ( other than 
those of a d i spos i t ive nature) suddenly lapse on the attainment of 
independence , leav ing a yawn ing g ap to be f i lled by the incom ing 
admin istrat ion? The Le ag ue of Nations thought not , and approved a formal 
t r ansfer of all internat ional r ights and obl igat ions , der iv ing from 
treat ies negot i ated by UK on beh alf of I r aq to the newly independent state 
of Ir aq .  Th is was the ancestor of the ' inhe r i t ance ag r eements ' wh ich the 
UK late r concluded with Indi a ,  Pak istan , Ceylon , Malays i a ,  Ghana and many 
other former colon ies on the i r  atta inment of independence . 
Of cour se it m ight be obj ected that I r aq i s  not necessar ily an apt 
pr ecedent for F i j i ,  K i r ibat i or Vanuatu .  I r aq was a te r r i tory under 
internat ional superv i s ion ; t reat ies wh ich wer e  appl ied to i t , l ike othe r 
acts of administrat ion , came under the sc r ut iny of the Pe rmanent Mandates 
Commiss ion and ult imately of the Leag ue itse l f .  More modern examples 
include Naur u ,  M icrone s i a  and PNG where the UN Tr usteesh ip Counc i l  played a 
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s im ilar role . Th ere was no such inte rnat ional sc r ut iny in the case of 
colon ies or protector ates , wh ich const ituted the former status o f  most 
newly independent states . Might not the treat ies appl ied to those 
ter r itor ies be rather for the bene fit  of the colon ial power than for the 
subj ect populat ion and the refore inv id ious or at least unwelcome in 
post- independence c i rcumstances? 
I t  was someth ing of a Furphy , put about by protagon i sts of the 
' c lean-slate doctr ine ' in the 1 9 60s , that the t reaty c upboards of former 
colon ies were r attl ing with skeletons from the bad old days , and that the 
pr act ice of full success ion encour aged ( but not enforced ) by the UK, Fr ench 
and other governments in re lat ion to the i r  former ter r i tor ies , was a 
neo-colon ialist plo t .  The cupboards are indeed much better stocked than in 
the days wh en the ' c lean- sl ate doctr ine ' too k  sh ape . Along with the tea , 
the Ame r ican colon i sts dumped some two or thr ee score of Br it i sh treat ies 
into Bo ston Harbor . The number of treaties that a Br it i sh colony 
approach ing independence in the 1 9 70s has is about 5 0 0 . On closer 
examinat ion it will be revealed that the b i l ateral treat ies available for 
inher itance embr ace such subj ects as tr ade , commod it ies , a i r  t r anspor t ,  
extr ad it ion , service o f  leg al documents , and v isa abo l i t ion . These 
treat ies ope r ate rec iprocal ly ,  and they have been found in pr act ice to be 
of continu ing bene fit  to the newly independent countr y .  To replace them 
l iterally over n ight ( wh ich the ' c lean-slate doctr ine ' would requ i r e )  is an 
imposs ible tas k .  Indeed , the main problem i n  pr act ice has often been to 
per suade th i r d  par t ies ( i . e . , the non-colon ial ist treaty par tne r )  to 
recognise the newly independent state as a successor to the t r eaty . 
Th e absurd ity of the ' neo- colon ialist ' j ibe is even more apparent in 
the i nstance of the many muZti ZateraZ instruments of a law-mak ing k ind that 
have prol ifer ated s i nce the late n i neteenth century, and espec ially s ince 
the establi shment of inter nat ional organisat ions . The treaties appl ied to 
colon ies included such ins t r uments as the Co nvent ions of the Internat ional 
Labour Organ isat ion , health convent ion s ,  the 1 966 Covenants on human 
r ights , the bas ic instr uments on inter nat ional c iv i l  av iat ion and sh ipp ing , 
and many hundreds of others . If all these too were to be reg arded as 
ceas ing from the moment the colon ial powe r ' s  flag was hauled down at 
midnight , the wor k  of decades would be undone . 
The tr uth of the mat ter is undoubtedly that obj ect ions to the 
pr esumpt ion of success ion have been based mor e  on pr ej ud ice or sent iment 
th an on mater ial ev idence . As Jenks put it ( 1 952 : 1 05 )  there we re some who 
viewed success ion to treaties as the badges o f  continuing servitude r ather 
than as the hall-marks o f  matur ity . A concer ted ef for t was made by the UN , 
the Spec ial ised Agenc ies and other inter nat ional org an isat ions from the 
late 1 9 5 0 s  onwards to encour age newly i ndependent states to make 
declarat ions of succe ss ion to the mul t i lateral convent ions wh ich they 
administered as soon as poss ible after independence day ,  and in such a form 
as to be ret roact ive to that day, so that no h i atus in the con t inuity o f  
these i n s t r umen ts would r e s ul t .  Many newly i ndepedent countr ies used the 
fac i l it ies of the UN Secr etary-General to c i rculate a general declarat ion 
of success ion , appl icable to b i lateral as we l l  as mult i- late r al treat ies , 
among all membe r states of the UN as an earnest express ion of the i r  
intent ion t o  ab ide by a l l  treat ies pend ing later ind ivid�al exam inat ion and 
con f i rmat ion , rev i s ion or term inat ion whe re des i r ed . These un i l ateral 
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declarat ions o f  success ion came to replace the b i lateral inher itance 
ag reements of the I r aq model . 
Wh i le the maj or ity of new states followed th i s  pattern , some d id not . 
Burma was the f i r s t  former Br it ish colony to adopt a ' c lean- slate 
approach ' ,  to be followed shor tly afte rwards by I s rael ( though the latter ' s  
c i rcums tances o f  independence wer e  except ional ) .  Alger ia broke the pattern 
for former Fr ench colon ies ( hence the poss ible s ignif icance of the 
per sonal it ies involved in the Inter nat ional Law Commiss ion ' s treatment of 
the subj ect in the 1 9 70s , see above) . 
In v iew of the strong pr eponder ance of pro- s uccess ion pr act ice among 
former colon ial te r r itor ies , it was surpr is ing that the Vi enna Convent ion 
on Success ion of States in re spect of Tr eat ies , pr epared by the 
Internat ional Law Commiss ion , and s igned in 1 9 78 , reve r ted to a 
' c lean- sl ate approach ' .  Admittedly the Convent ion had to add ress itself 
not only to the cases o f  independence from colon ial r ule , but also to cases 
of feder at ion and d ismemberment o f  federat ion s ,  secess ion and forms of 
par t ial success ion . These are beyond the scope of th i s  pape r .  But in 
taking a ' c lean-slate approach ' towards newly independent states , the 
Convent ion has appl ied the pr inc iple of se l f-determinat ion in a way that 
tends to defeat r ather than advance that pr inc iple . For a pr esumption of 
non- success ion tends to lead to a d i s r upt ion of the tr eaty relat ions th at 
are to the bene fit  of a newly independent state . A presumpt ion of 
success ion , on the other hand , would not have comprom i sed sel f­
determ inat ion even in the rare instances where a tr eaty thus succeeded to 
we re found to be not in the interests of the newly independent state 
because : ( 1 )  the treaty may be terminated in accordance with its 
terminat ion clause ; ( 2 )  s ince independence i s  now pl anned in advance , 
not ice of te rm inat ion can be g iven in advance of independence so th at the 
tr eaty will  come to an end before or at that t ime ; ( 3 )  even if there is no 
terminat ion c l ause ( as is the case with some very old treaties ) , the Vienna 
Convent ion on the Law of T r eat ies prov ides for te rm inat ion of such treat ies 
upon reasonable not ice . 
In any event , the impact of the Vi enna Convent ion on State Success ion , 
1 978 , is l i kely to be sl ight in pr act ical terms , s ince most former colon ial 
ter r i tor ies have ach ieved independence , and d isposed of the i r  tr eaty 
success ion ques t ions , pr ior to its ent ry into force . Even in cases of 
success ion ye t to be reg ulated ( e . g . , Vanuatu)  the Convent ion ac knowledges 
the effect iveness of uni late ral declarat ions o f  success ion in relation to 
multi lateral t reaties . 
I NTERNATI ONAL LAW AND TH E DOMESTI C  LEGAL ORDER 
I r respect ive o f  quest ions o f  state success ion , internat ional law forms 
par t  of the domest ic leg al order of newly independent states and may 
the refore be a determ inant of national act ion . In countr ies of the common 
law inher itance , customary international law applies with in the domestic 
leg al order unless inconsistent with the clear terms of a statute (see 
Polites v. The Commor!1J)ealth ( 1 94 5 )  70 CLR 6 0 ) . For some t ime it has been 
uncer tain whether , apar t  from statute , a cus tomar y r ule requi red express 
adopt ion j ud ic i ally ( and hence would become the subj ect of the r ule of 
stare deaisus ) , but the Engl ish Cou r t  of Appeal in Trendtex v. Central Bank 
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of Nigeria [ 1 97 7 )  QB 5 29 , has ind icated its preference for the 
' i ncorporat ion ' ove r the ' adopt ion ' theor y  of the relat ionsh ip between 
internat ional law and domes t ic law . Lord De nning MR in that case also 
expr essed the v iew that Engl ish courts should apply a newly emerged r ule of 
internat ional law notwithstand ing that ear l ier dec i s ions of h ig her courts 
( wh ich normally would be bind ing ) had appl ied a d i f ferent r ul e .  Although 
the House of Lords had an oppor tun i ty to do so in the case of I Congreso 
de l Partido [ 1 98 1 ) 2 Lloyds Reps . 367 , it d id not d i s sent from the r at io or 
d icta in Trendtex. It is thought that these propos it ions will  be found 
per suas ive by cour ts incl ined to look towa rds the Eng l i sh courts for 
author ity.  
Tr eat ies affect ing ind ivid ual r ights or dut ies do not form par t of the 
domestic leg al order in Br i t i sh const itut ional doctr ine unless implemented 
by statute ( see e . g . , Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for 
Ontario [ 1 93 7 )  AC 3 26 and Bradley v .  Commonwealth ( 1 97 5 )  1 28 CLR 5 5 7 ) . The 
d irect i ncorpor at ion of par t icular treaties by statute is compar at ively 
infrequent , but examples such as the Aust r al ian leg islat ion on cr imes i n  
relat ion t o  ai rcr aft and o n  r ac i al d iscr iminat ion may b e  c i ted . More 
fr equently treat ies are incorpor ated by way o f  subord inate leg islat ion 
( e . g . , the reg ulat ions made by the Austral i an Gove rnor-General promulgat ing 
ex trad i t ion treaties under the Extradition (Foreign States) Act ,  or by way 
of administrative order ( e . g . , v i s a  abol it ion agr eements) . The most common 
form of incorporat ion is by way of standard set t i ng ;  i . e . , a par t icular 
standard or obj ect ive i s  set by an internat ional treaty or recommendat ion 
wh ich is then incorpor ated with or wi thout mod if icat ion with in a larger 
leg islat ive des ign . There are too many examples to be set out he re ; 
r e fer ence should be made to James Cr awford ' s  i l l uminat ing art icle "The 
internat ional law standard in the statutes of Austr alia  and the U . K . " 
( 1 979 ) . 
An examinat ion of the rece ived statute law and local ord inances o f  
newly i ndependent countr ies in the Pac i f ic and el sewhere will reveal a 
pattern s im ilar to that of Australia  and the UK . The po int to be made i s  
that much inter nat ional law ,  whethe r der iv ing from custom or t reaty , 
surv ives independence as par t of the domes t ic leg al order . L i ke any other 
pa r t  of the leg al order it becomes subj ect to nat ional sel f-determinat ion 
as expr essed by statute ; but in leg is lat i ng contr ary to internat ional 
customary law or treat ies , the newly independent state must be consc ious of 
the consequences for the internat ional commun ity o f  wh ich i t  i s  par t .  
I n  th is last re spect , the pat ient analys i s  o f  each treaty , o r  g roup of 
treat ies , to wh ich i t  is des i red to succeed , mod i fy or terminate , has had 
an educat ive effect upon the ministers and civil  ser vants of newly 
independent countr ies . In Fij i ,  Tong a ,  PNG , Naur u and K i r ibat i , for 
example , the Cabinet has cons ide red each g roup of treat ies for success ion , 
and has ensured that al l relevant depar tments of gover nment have been 
consulted be fore a dec i s ion as to success ion has been taken . The impact on 
local leg i s lat ion is a l so taken i nto account . The r e s t r a ints of 
internat ional law thus come to be seen as a consequence o f  l iv ing in an 
inter nat ional commun ity with all the l iber at i ng poss i b i l i t ies that th i s  in 
turn opens up . 
6. THE FACTORS BEH I N D  TH E CONSTITUTIONAL 
A R RANGEMENTS I N  NAU R U  
K. McDowell 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
The island of Naur u became an independent r epubl ic on 3 1  January 1 9 68 . 
I t s  const it ut ional developments have rece ived less attent ion than those of 
mor e populous Pac i f ic countr ies ; ye t the ar r angements for th is small 
Pac i f ic i sland are r ich with int r ins ic interest . Th is paper attempts to 
explain those ar r angements by re ference to some of the h istor ical , 
pol it ical , econom ic and other factor s influenc ing moves towards 
Independence . 
H I STOR I CAL FACTORS 
Naur u was f i r s t  s ighted by Europeans in 1 79 8 . Under the Ang lo-German 
Convent ion of 1 8 86 the i s land fe ll within the Ge rman sphere of influence 
and from 1 888  unt i l  1 9 1 4  it was administered by Ge rmany as par t  of the 
Marshall I s l and (MI ) Gr oup . Dur ing th i s  pe r iod the value of Naur u ' s 
phosphate depo s i ts was d iscovered and the Pac if ic Phosphate Company was 
formed to explo it them . 
In November 1 9 1 4  the Ge rmans sur rendered Naur u to an Au str alian 
Exped it ionary Force and in 1 9 1 9  the Le ag ue of Nat ions confe rred a mandate 
over Naur u on the Br itish Emp i re . Br itain , Australia  and New Zealand (NZ ) 
dur ing the same year concluded an ag reement wh ich prov ided that the 
administration of the I s l and should be vested init ially in Austral i a .  The 
tr ipart ite agr eement also pr ov ided that the r ight , t i tle and interest in 
the phosphate deposits wh ich were purchased from the Pac i f ic Phosphate 
Company should be vested in and sold under the management of a board of 
three commiss ioners cal led the Br it ish Phosphate Commiss ione r s .  One 
Commiss ioner was appointed by each of the three Gove rnments . In 1 920 the 
terms of mandate were dr awn up and became ope r at ive from 1 7  November 1 9 20 . 
A s upplementary ag reement was conc luded in 1 923 between the three 
Governments formal is ing procedures for the leg is lat ive funct ions of the 
Admin istr ator . 
Dur ing Wor ld War I I ,  Nauru was occupied by the Japanese and 1 , 200 of 
the ind igenous populat ion were depor ted to T r uk Atoll in the Carol ine 
Island Group . In 1 9 4 5  the island was reoccupied by Australian forces , and 
a Tr usteeship was declared over the Te r r itory by the Un ited Nat ions (UN)  in 
1 947 . The Trusteeship Ag reement des ignated the Governments of Austral i a ,  
N Z  and the Un i ted K i ngdom ( U K )  a s  the Jo int Administer ing Author ity, with 
Austr al ia con t inuing to exerc ise full powe r s  of leg islat ion , administr at ion 
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and j ur isd ict ion in and over the Te rr i tory.  Austr alian administration 
cont inued unt i l  1 968  when on 3 1  January,  Naur u attained Independence . 
The h istor ical factor s show Naur u to be a pawn in Gr eat Power 
str uggles for dom inance in the Pac i f ic - a s imilar fate exper ienced by many 
of the Pac i f ic I s l and countr ies . Naur u ' s valuable r esource of phosphate 
made her a par t icul ar ly des i r able asset and her h istory o f  dom inance and 
success ive subj ug at ion to for e ign occupat ion inev itably cond i t ioned the 
ind igenous people towards a des ire for complete and unfettered independ­
ence . 
POL I T I CAL FACTORS 
Na ur u ' s  small s i ze ( e ight and one qua r ter square m i les)  
( her nearest ne ighbour is Ocean I s l and , some 1 90 m iles to 
important factor s in po l i t ical terms when poss ible future 
with he r former Admini ster ing Power s  were cons idered pr ior to 
and i solat ion 
the west)  were 
relat ionsh ips 
Independence . 
In the ear ly stages of d i scuss ions , Naur u had suggested a Tr eaty o f  
Fr iendsh ip with Australia  (UN Tr usteesh ip Counc i l  1 9 6 1 -62 : 3 2 ) : s h e  later 
favour ed complete Independence , without for ec los ing the possibil ity o f  such 
a Tr eaty , but stated that th i s  should be concluded , if at a l l ,  after 
independence was g r anted (Commonwealth Secretar i at 1 9 68 : 2 1 ) . Doubts were 
held by Austral i a ,  NZ and the UK as to the feas ibil ity o f  such a small and 
isolated commun ity conduc t i ng its own external affairs  and defence 
arr angements . 1 The thr ee Gove rnments consequently pr essed for some form of 
assoc iat ion with Austral ia .  They proposed that an Ac t should be passed by 
the Australian Pa r l i ament whereby Austral i a  would ass ume re sponsibil ity for 
Naur u ' s  external affa i r s  and de fence but would leave the const i tut ional 
ar r angements to be determined by the Naur uan people . Alternat ively, the 
Treaty o f  Fr iendsh ip arr angement could be made ensur ing that no other 
l imitat ion was pl aced on the powe r s  of the Naur uan Gove rnment . For 
example , external trade and the d i sposal of phosphate would not be included 
in the scope of the proposed Treaty and these matte r s  would be left in the 
hands o f  the Naur uans . 
Inev itably , in the cour se of d i scuss ions , the solut ions of the two 
Pac i f ic countr ies wh ich had become independent or self-gove r n ing pr ior to 
Naur u wer e  cons idered . Both countr ies had retained some l inks with the i r  
former colon ial power : i n  the case of Western Samoa ( WS ) , that l ink had 
taken the form of a Treaty of Fr iendsh ip w ith NZ : in the Cook Islands (CI ) 
self-government but not full Independence had been g r anted - w i thout 
d i scount ing the poss ib i l ity of full Independence in the future . Both these 
countr ies were larger in te rms of area and populat ion than Naur u and there 
appeared some j ust i f icat ion for the doubts held by Naur u ' s Admini ster ing 
Power s .  However ,  both countr ies were clear ly less v i able than Naur u in 
terms o f  econom ic se lf-suffic iency and Naur u ' s  spec i al pos i t ion had to be 
taken into accoun t .  Mo reover , Aus t r al i a ' s  ab i l ity to prov ide de fence for 
Naur u was to be quest ioned in v iew of her prev ious incapac ity to pr event 
the Japanese occupat ion and the Naur uan deportat ion to Truk dur ing Wor ld 
war I I .  And ,  as r eg ards external affa i r s , t ime had tended to demonstr ate 
that a larger country handl ing the external relat ions of a smaller country 
was not always proved successful . D i ff ic ult ies could appear even wi th 
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s tronger ethn ic and cultur al bonds than those ex i s t ing between t h e  peoples 
of Aust r al ia and Naur u .  
The e ffects o f  the two maj or features o f  Naur u caus ing concern to the 
Admin i ster ing Powe r s  her s i ze and i solat ion - have , to a large extent , 
been over come s ince Naur u ' s Independence . He r small s i ze has not l imited 
he r abil ity to conduc t ex ternal relat ions with larger nat ions of impor tance 
to Naur u and the comb ined e ffect of increased ind igenous educat ion and 
access to full pro f i ts and royalt ies of the phosphate industry have 
lessened d i f f icult ies wh ich m ight otherwise have been expe r ienced . The 
bar r iers of i solat ion have also been broken with the establishment of the 
Island ' s  A i r  Naur u - now connect ing the island to more than seventeen 
countr ies around the Pac i f ic and the Naur u Pac i f ic Sh ipping Line .  
Incr eased commun icat ion systems have also ass isted i n  th is r eg ard . With 
th i s  increased wealth Naur u has been able to take her place in the 
commun ity of n at ions and to wield an influence wh ich would not have been 
envisaged pr ior to Independence . 
ECONOM I C  FACTORS 
In Naur u ' s case , ther e  is some doubt whether the pr inc ipal r eason for 
the Administer ing Powe r s ' wish to retain responsibil ity was d ue to the 
Island ' s  natural economic wealth (Viv i an 1 9 68 : 1 5 1 -5 4 ) . The phosphate 
depos its , used in the produc t ion of superphosphate , was ( and i s )  impor tant 
to the farming commun i t ies o f  Australia  and NZ . The extent of the deposits 
in relat ion to the populat ion o f  Naur u - some 3 , 00 0  at 1 968  - made her a 
potentially wealthy country. 2 Cons iderable attent ion consequently was g iven 
to the future of the phosphate indus try dur ing the pre- independence 
negot i at ions . 
The essent ial quest ion was whether th is potent ial wealth d id indeed 
belong to the ind igenous populat ion of Naur u ,  or  to the external interests 
wh ich claimed owner ship o f  and wh ich managed the i ndustry.  
The Le ag ue of Nat ions Mandate had confer red wide powe r s  of 
administr at ion on the Br it i sh Emp ire and i t  was upon th is author ity that 
the agreement had been made between the Admin ister ing Power s  to vest the 
t it le in the deposits and " al l  land , building s ,  plant and equ ipment on the 
island used i n  connect ion with the wor k i ng of the depos its"  in the Br itish 
Phosphate Commiss ione r s . The Tr usteesh ip Ag reement , 3 s ubst ituted for the 
Mandate in 1 94 7  by the UN , d id not c i rcumscr ibe or restr ict the terms under 
wh ich the Commiss ione r s  had ope r ated . The Administe r ing Powe r s  bel ieved 
accord ingly that the Commiss ioner s  had leg i t imate r ights to the 
explo itat ion of the depos its : the compensat ion and royal ty payments were 
not seen to have been pa id out of leg al obl ig at ion but out of good wil l .  
The payments , therefore ,  were not requ i r ed to b e  related to the costs of 
product ion and the pr ice obtained for the phosphate , and we re stated to be 
related to the needs of the Naur uans who " l ived on coconuts , f ish and 
sunsh ine" (Er ic Wh ite 1 96 8 : 1 0 ) . The Br it i sh Phosphate Commiss ion was 
intended to be a non-prof i t-ma k ing org an isat ion and benefits , it was 
claimed , accr ued from the advantage of a g uar anteed mar ket at g uar anteed 
pr ices . Beh i nd all these arguments lay the gene r al arg ument that without 
the i nput of c apital and manager ial and technical sk i lls by the three 
Governments ( in par t icular , by Aust r al i a) the phosphate resources would 
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never h ave been developed as they wer e ,  and hence the Naur uans would not 
have enj oyed one of the h ighest l iv ing standards in the wor ld .  Moreover , 
it was pointed out that these benef its had been obtained for the Naur uans 
with l ittle recour se to the labour of the i nd igenous populat ion s ince , to a 
large extent , indentur ed labour from the G i lber t  ( now K i r ibat i )  and Ell ice 
( now Tuvalu) I s l ands and from Hong Kong had wor ked the mines (Var somy 
1 968 : 1 6 1 -6 6 ) . 
By the 1 960s , however , the Naur uans were wel l  aware that the i sland ' s  
phosphates were of h igh qual ity and ye t had been sold to Aust r al ian and NZ 
consumer s  at pr ices below those pr evail i ng on the wor ld mar ket .  The 
Naur uans arg ued that they had not r ece ived an equ itab le share o f  the ir  
her itage - from 1 9 22  to 1 9 5 5  they had r eceived 6 9 4 , 354  pounds in cash and 
in funds as ag ainst a total value of phosphate extr acted of near ly 
twenty-three m i l l ion pounds (Er ic Wh ite 1 9 64 : 508-3 4 ) . The i r  case was 
enhanced in 1 9 64 when Dr He len Hughes , an econom ic consultant , was able to 
show for the f i r st t ime that a wor ld pr ice in phosphate ex isted ( Hughes 
1 964 : 5 03-3 4 ) . After th is break-through the Naur uans eng aged fur ther 
profess ional adv ice to quest ion the leg al owner sh ip o f  the phosphate by the 
Br itish Phosphate Commiss ione r s .  Though it was d i f f icult to prove that the 
Commiss ioner s  d id not have leg al owne r sh ip so much doubt was cast on the 
quest ion that i t  never ag ain was a real issue . Tr i umph for the Naur uans 
came when the Br itish , Austral ian and NZ Governments admitted that Naur u ' s 
adviser s had proved that a wor ld phosphate pr ice ex isted . From then on the 
advisers sought to get for the Naur uans the d i ffe rence between actual 
product ion costs and the wor ld pr ice (Er ic Wh ite 1 9 6 8 : 23 ) . Some d if f icult 
negot i at ing sess ions were held in Canbe r r a  and in May 1 96 7  the Br it ish 
Phosphate Commiss ione r s  ag reed to hand over the industry to the Naur uans . 
An ag r eement was dr awn up in June whereby the Naur uans ag reed to purchase 
the assets of the Commiss ioner s  for twenty m i l l ion dollars over three 
year s .  
Th e v ictory for the Naur uans was impor tant , all the mor e so s i nce the 
d iscovery in the 1 9 50s that the l i fe of the phosphate deposits was l imited . 
There was , however , one outstand ing po int o f  content ion . Th is concerned 
whether it was the Admin ister ing Power s '  r esponsibil ity ( as claimed by the 
Naur uans) to rehab il itate lands mined pr ior to 1 July 1 9 67 from wh ich 
date the Naur uans obtained full net proceeds from the mining of the 
depos its and accord ing ly also acknowledged responsibil ity for the lands 
m ined after that date (see de Robur t 1 9 6 7 ) . The Admini ster ing Powe r s  d id 
not accept that it was the i r  responsibil ity to rehab i l itate those lands 
mined pr ior to the 1 July date . They claimed , on the bas i s  of an 
Au str al ian CSIRO Report , that full restorat ion of the land would be 
excess ively expens ive and uneconom ic . As an alte rnat ive , proposals we re 
made to resettle the Naur uans in Austral i a ,  NZ or UK . Var ious islands off 
the Austr al ian coast we re suggested in the ear ly 1 960s  but the Naur uans ' 
wish to retain full sovere ignty and control of any area proposed posed 
d i f f icult ies (see Tate 1 9 68 : 1 8 1 -82 , 1 86-88 ) . By 1 96 5  a stalemate had been 
reached , the Aus t r a l i an Gove rnment not ing that it would con t in ue to se ek 
land suitable for the Naur uans . 
By 1 9 67  the Naur uans had abandoned the idea of r esettlement although 
the subj ect cont inued to be placed on agendas of meet ing s for d iscuss ion . 
The important issue to the Naur uans by th i s  stage had become Independence : 
after that , outstand ing matter s  such as resettlement or r ehab i l itat ion 
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could b e  recons ider ed , q b u t  any fur ther d iscuss ion o n  those matters a t  that 
stage was l ikely to delay fur ther the gr ant ing of Independence and plans 
for const itut ional development . 
It is someth ing of a par adox that the industry wh ich had in fact 
prov ided the s t imulus for Independence became the compl icat ing factor in 
the obtain ing of that I ndependence and indeed served to d ivert attent ion 
from that goal . On the other hand the long battle for the owner ship of the 
industry and the related issues involved se rved to equip the Naur uans with 
negot iat i ng sk i ll s  and techn iques of self-government . 
TIME FACTOR 
The negotiat ions over the phosphate industry left l ittle t ime for the 
formal pr epar at ion and adopt ion of the Naur u Constitut ion . The Naur uans 
had pr essed for years for Independence by 3 1  January 1 9 6 8 ,  and th i s  had 
been sanct ioned by the UN as the latest date upon wh ich the Naur uans should 
be g r anted I ndependence . 
It was only in June 1 9 67 , however ,  after agr eement had been reached on 
the future control of the industry,  that ser ious thought was g iven to the 
fr am ing of the document wh ich would prov ide the governmental foundat ion for 
the new state . 
Proposals for the const itut ional and po l it ical changes were pre sented 
to the Administer ing Powe r s  in May of 1 967  ( dur ing the conc lud ing sess ions 
concern ing the phosphate industry) and these we re subsequently c ir culated 
in the UN Tr usteeship Counc i l .  The proposals , wh ich were acknowledged to 
be tentat ive only , included inter alia : 
that Naur u  should become a Republic;  
that the  form of government should be  based on  the Br it ish 
Parliamentary system , mod i f ied to suit local cond it ions ; 
that the Const itut ion should prov ide fundamental r ights , a 
Pres ident , an Execut ive , a Leg i slature , a Jud ic iary,  and a Public 
Serv ice ; 
that the execut ive power should be vested in the Pr esident and a 
Cabinet of Minister s ;  
that the Pres ident , who should be elected b y  the Leg islat ive 
As sembly , should per form the formal dut ies of a He ad of State , 
and also be the He ad of Execut ive Gove rnment ; h i s  role in 
execut ive government would be a d ual one - he should pe r form 
cer tain formal acts , such as assent ing to orders and reg ulat ions 
made by the Cabinet or a Mini ster in accordance with the powe rs 
deleg ated to them by law ;  he should also be the Ch ief Minister , 
select ing other Min i ster s and pr e s id ing over meet ing s of Cabinet ; 
and 
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that the other Min ister s ,  who should be three or four in numbe r , 
wou ld be selected from member s  of the Leg islat ive As sembly (UN 
Trusteesh ip Counc i l  1 9 67 : 1 4- 1 5 ) . 5 
The Admini ster ing Powe r s  r esponded with comments to the outl ine of 
government suggested but d id not announce that they we re prepar ed to "meet 
the Naur uan request for full and unqual i f ied independence " 6 unt i l  24 
Oc tober 1 9 67 . Two days later the Naur u I ndependence B i l l  was introduced 
into the Austr al ian House of Representat ives . No date for Independence was 
included in the B i l l  and the Ac t s imply st ated that a date would be f ixed 
by proclamat ion . On 1 November the Austral i an Senate was informed that 3 1  
January 1 968  had been ag reed upon as the date o f  Independence . 
On 1 0  Novembe r 1 967  the Naur u Independence B i l l  rece ived Royal As sent , 
br ing ing into ope r at ion the rema in ing prov is ions of the B i l l : these 
empowe red the Naur u Leg islat ive Counc il to establ ish a Constitut ional 
Convent ion " for the purpose of establ i sh ing a constitution for Naur u "  ( s . 4  
Nauru Independence Act ( Cth)  1 96 7 ) . The Cons t i tut ional Convent ion was 
elected in December and met for the f i r s t  t ime on 3 J anuary 1 968 . I t  
continued t o  mee t unt il  2 9  January 1 9 68  on wh ich date the f i r s t  
Constitut ion o f  Na ur u was adopted , to become operat ive o n  3 1  January .  Some 
par ts of th i s  Cons t i tut ion were adopted as the final form of the 
Cons t i tut ion of Naur u for ex ample those in Pt . I I r elat ing to the 
Fundamental Rights and Fr eedoms . Other par ts , because of the lack of t ime 
for formal cons ider at ion by the Convent ion , were adopted as prov is ional 
only - unt i l  May 1 9 68 . The prov is ional par ts included the power s  intended 
to vest in the Pres ident and the Cabinet and , in the inter im , these were 
exercised by a Counc i l  of State elected from the Naur u Leg islat ive 
As sembly .  
The elect ion o f  a Counc i l  o f  State repr e sents an unusual feature in 
the nature of const itut ional plann ing . However , i t  was a measure necessary 
if Independence was to be ach ieved by the required d ate ( impor tant to the 
Naur uans as th is was the twenty-second ann iver sary of the i r  homecoming from 
Truk)  and i f  the d if f icult ies of wor k ing a m in ister ial system of government 
be fore the re-org an isat ion of the administrative sys tem could be completed 
were to be avoided . 
Th at th i s  was an extremely t ight schedule was ev idenced by the 
nume rous dr aft t imetables of "Ar r angements for Independence on 3 1  January 
1 9 6 8 "  wh ich can be found among the unpubl ished pape r s  o f  Professor J . W .  
Dav idson , 7 t h e  Cons t i tut ional Adviser t o  t h e  Naur uans . The apparent 
reluctance of the Admin i ster ing Powe r s  to rel inqu i sh control over Naur u 
appears only to have been overcome by the wor ld support  for the Island ' s  
independence ( see below) but , ag ain , the g a i n ing of that support  in itself 
eroded t ime from the pr eparat ions as Naur uan deleg at ions flew to New Yor k  
t o  state the ir case before the UN . 
THE SAMOAN PRECEDENT 
Th e Constitut ion of Naur u is autochthonous , that i s , dev i sed and g iven 
to the ind igenous people of Naur u by the elected Naur uan representat ives . 
Th is was the intent of the pl anners for const i tut ional development in Naur u 
followi ng from the precedent of WS wh ich atta ined Independence s ix years 
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ear l ier . The clear advantage o f  an autochthonous const i tut ion was the 
assur ance that ever y  prov 1s 1on in the Const itut ion would rece ive spec i f ic 
approval by the ind igenous people and that , as a result , it would be 
reg arded as the ir  own and not as hav ing been imposed by an external 
author i ty .  The prospects of cont inued po l i t ical stab i l ity would be 
enhanced and it would be less l i kely that the Const itution would r equ ire 
substantial amendment in future year s .  The alternat ive , that the 
Administer ing Powe r s  pass leg i s lat ion con fe r r ing autonomy and dev is ing a 
Const itut ion for the people ( c f . the Australian Const itut ion) , was not 
v iewed with favour by the Naur uans . 
The claim to an autochthonous constitut ion in Naur u ' s  case could , 
however , be challenged . Due to the pressure of t ime , it was unavo idable 
that much of the dr aft ing had to be under taken in Canbe r r a  by 
representat ives and employees of the Australian Gover nment , and dec is ions 
wer e made without consultat ion with the Naur uans , although in the hope that 
the effect of these dec i s ions wou ld accord with Naur uan wishes . The fact 
that when the Naur uan Const i tut ional Convent ion was pr esented with a 
complete f i r st Cons t itut ion in January 1 9 68 , almost all of wh ich was 
adopted without s ubstant ial amendment , also lends suppor t to the argument 
that the Const itut ion cannot tr uly be reg arded as ' autochthonous ' . On the 
other hand it may be said that gene r al Naur uan ag reement with the document 
merely ind icated that the dec is ions made on the Naur uans behalf were 
cor rect in the pred ict ion that they would meet with the i r  wishes . 
Moreover , i t  cannot be assessed whe ther or not the Const itut ion would have 
been any mor e ' autochthonous ' in character had mor e t ime been available 
s ince leng thy d iscuss ions as to the e ffect of the prov i s ions presented to 
the Convent ion were requ i r ed . It may indeed be poss ible that a tr uly 
autochthonous constitut ion can be dev ised for a nat ion on the br ink of 
independence but , g ene r al ly ,  th i s  would f ir st entail  the educat ion in 
const itut ional law of the people concerned . 
However , in theoret ical te rms , it may never theless be said that the 
Constitution of Naur u is autochthonous - as far as c i rcumstances permitted . 
And in pr act ical terms also ,  the Constitution can be seen as autochthonous 
because , at the very least , it can be said that the method of procedure 
accorded with the wi shes of the Naur uan people . 
It should perhaps be ment ioned that no referendum was 
asce r tain the Naur uan v iewpo int on the issue of independence . 
the l ack of t ime was a factor wh ich contr ibuted to the om iss ion 
measure usually undertaken in the cour se of events lead ing to the 
of a country ' s  independence . But it may be assumed that , as there 
one d issent ing voice ascer ta inable , the g r ant ing of independence 
the approval of the maj or ity of the ind ig enous populat ion . 
THE EFFECT OF FORE IGN  EXPERT I SE 
held to 
Once more 
of th is 
g r anting 
was only 
met with 
That the f i r s t  Const itut ion adopted by the Const itut ional Convent ion 
was substantially d r afted in Canbe r r a  h ighlights the impor t ance of the 
fore ign per sonnel concerned with the dr awing-up of that f ir st dr aft . Two 
people war r ant par t icular note : Pr ofessor J . W .  Dav idson , the constitut­
ional adviser to the Naur uans , and M i ss Rowena Armstrong , a sol ic itor on 
the staff of the State of Victor i a ' s Parliamentary Counse l .  The latter was 
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seconded by the Aust r a l i an Gover nment to d r aft Naur u ' s Const itut ion ; her 
salary was to be paid by the Australian Gove rnment but she was to act for 
the Naur uans . 
Profe ssor Dav idson ' s  influence on the shape of the Naur u Cons t i tut ion 
was profound . H i s  bel ief in the republ ican ideal , for example ,  r esulted in 
Naur u adopt ing republ ican statehood . He was a man of cons iderable 
expe r ience in the Pac if ic having been c losely assoc iated with the 
const itut ional developments of both the I s l and countr ies wh ich had entered 
the arena of se l f-govenment/ i ndependence pr ior to Naur u .  Th is expe r ience 
was re flected in Naur u - and was an undoubted influence for the adher ence 
to the patterns of independence followed in ws . 
In Naur u ,  Professor Dav idson ' s  role was less constrained than it had 
been in h i s  pr ev ious island assoc iat ions where the presence of the 
Admin i ster ing Power repr esentat ives had been more strong ly felt . In ws , 
for example ,  much of the legal input into that nat ion ' s  Cons t i tut ion 
der ived from Dr Co lin A i kman who represented the NZ Gover nment from the 
ear ly stages of the d iscuss ions . By contr ast , the ass istance of Miss 
Armstrong was not formally approved by the Aust r a l i an Gover nment unt i l  1 4  
November 1 967  although she had been involved for some months pr ior to 
th i s  in an informal capac ity . 
The d ifference of year s '  to months '  wor k  on a const itut ion must 
reflect in the f inal pr oduc t .  I t  i s  not within the scope o f  this paper to 
compar e in detail  the cons t i tut ions in wh ich Pr ofessor Dav idson had been 
involved nor to comment upon the i r  style , except pe rhaps to note that 
Naur u ' s Const itut ion i s  cons ider ably shor ter and less deta iled than , for 
example ,  that of ws . But , much of the leng th and detail  in the latter 
Const i tut ion may be explained by the more complex soc ial structure and the 
ind iv idual char acter i s t ics of the ex ist ing tr ibal/po l i t ical inst itut ions . 
Naur u by contrast , as noted above , i s  smal l  in area and in populat ion , and 
he r soc ial str uc ture was ( and is )  cons ide r ab ly less strat i f ied , hence 
obv iat ing the need to take into account the detail of some t r ad i t ions wh ich 
are r e f lected , for instance , in the e lectoral prov 1s 1ons in the WS 
Const itut ion . Also , as a gene r al comment , a greater w i l l ingness to leave 
the wor k i ng out of detai l  to the par l i amentary for um r ather than to 
entrench prov i s ions in the const i tut ional document may be noted in the 
read i ng of the Naur u Const itut ion . Th is factor may i ndeed r e flect the t ime 
constr a int in the d r aft ing of the Cons t i t ut ion , but on the other hand , 
there is no ev idence to suggest that , even had no pressure of t ime been 
ev ident ,  the Naur u Cons t i tut ion would have evolved in a d i f fe rent form . 
Hence the lesser deta i l  may s imply r e flect an acknowledgement of the value 
of a compromised Br itish/Amer ican approach to const itut ional d r aft ing . 
Wh at can be stated with some certa inty is that the document finally 
adopted met with the full approval of the ind igenous r epr esentat ives ; and 
if the success of a constitut ional document can be measured by the amount 
of j ud ic ial rev iew , by l i t igat ion based upon i ts prov i s ions , or by the 
number of amendments passed to alter a cons t i tut ion , Naur u ' s document has 
stood the test o f  t ime . In the four teen years s ince the f inal document was 
adopted in May 1 9 68  there have been few quest ions r efer red to the Supr eme 
Cou r t  requesting an expl anat ion or inte rpr etat ion of the prov i s ions , only 
one c ase has been brought be fore the Cour t based on an Ar t icle in the 
Const itut ion , and no amendments have been made by the Leg i slatur e .  Th i s  i s  
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not to say o f  cour se that some d i f f icult quest ions will not ar ise in the 
future but in g eneral the problems expe r ienced with some const itut ions have 
not as yet been found to ex ist in Naur u ' s Const itut ion . 
THE I ND I GENOUS I NPUT 
The cal l ing- i n  of overseas expe r t ise in the cour se of const itut ional 
development i s , of cour se , not unusual . I t  i s  imperat ive for const itut­
ional success , however ,  that th is expe r t ise g u ides the f inal document into 
a shape wh ich is the produc t of the wi l l  of the people concerned . 
Pr ofessor Dav idson ' s  sens it ivity to Pac i f ic soc iet ies was we ll- su ited in 
th i s  respect that he and M i ss Armstrong wor ked in close consultat ion with 
the established ind igenous inst itut ions - the Naur u Local Government in the 
first  instance , and , at the later stage , the Cons t i tut ional Convent ion . 
These bod ies prov ided the authent ic expr ess ion of the will of the Naur uan 
people . 
The Local Government Counc i l  had strugg led s i nce its emergence out of 
the trad it ional Counc i l  of Ch iefs in 1 9 5 1  to asser t  real power and 
influence in the development of the I s l and but it was not unt il  1 9 66 with 
the inaug ur at ion of the Leg islat ive and Execut ive Councils that the 
ind igenous leaders could fully leave beh ind the fledg l ing stage . The Local 
Gove rnment Counc il was f i r st led by He ad Ch ief Timothy Detudamo who has 
been descr ibed as " the father of independence" because he was f i r st to 
r a ise the consc iousness of the Naur uan people to the abuses of the 
Eur opeans (Pet it-S k inner 1 9 8 1 : 4 5 ) . De tudamo d ied in 1 9 53 and Raymond 
Gadabu headed the Counc i l  unt i l  1 9 55  when Hammer DeRobur t was elected as 
the He ad Ch ief , a pos i t ion wh ich DeRobur t has held to the pr esent day .  
I t  is t o  DeRobur t that most o f  the wor k  towards Independence must be 
accred i ted . H i s  leadersh ip qual it ies and ded icat ion to wor k  have been 
widely acknowledged (see , e . g . , Dav idson 1 9 68 : 1 46 )  and , in 1 9 66 , led to h is 
award of the O . B . E .  
One o f  the unusual features i n  Naur u ' s development of her ind igenous 
voice is that although it was env isaged at one stage that some at least of 
the local gover nment funct ions would pass to the Administrat ion on the 
coming into ope r at ion of the Leg is lat ive Counc i l  - and th at the need for 
the Local Gove rnment Counc il m ight ult imately d isappear �ee Leg islat ive 
Counc il Debs . Vo l . 1 ,  No . 1 ,  3 1  January 1 9 66 , at 8 )  - only par t  of th i s  
concept was real i sed . 8 Even today two sys tems cont inue t o  oper ate the 
Local Gove rnment Counc il , and , the Government of the Republ ic of Naur u .  
Their  funct ions today are , for the most par t ,  conducted i n  d ifferent but 
complementary f i elds of endeavour ; i n  some areas , however , the funct ions 
merge and over lap - for example , in tr anspor tat ion : the Naur u Sh ipping 
Line is controlled by the Local Government Counc i l ;  A i r  Naur u ,  on the 
other hand , falls with in the Government j ur i sd ict ion . In investments and 
in f inanc ial matters mak i ng prov 1s 1on for the future of the Naur uan 
commun i ty ,  both bod ies are involved . Moreover , Hammer de Robur t as well as 
hold ing the pos i t ion of He ad Ch ief of the Local Government Counc il , is also 
Pres ident of the Gove rnment of the Republic , and , as Pres ident , i s  also 
He ad of State . 9 Most of the lead ing Counc i l lor s are Member s  of Par liament 
and , for the most par t ,  are also member s  of the Cabinet . 
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Th is overlapping of o f f ic ial pe r sonnel is not surpr 1 s 1ng in v iew of 
Naur u ' s s i ze and populat ion . What i s  surpr i s ing ,  perhaps , in v iew of the 
small populat ion and area , is that two s tr uctures of gover nment 1 0  have 
continued to co-ex ist . The checks and balances exer c ised by the one upon 
the other do , however ,  hold advantages for th i s  small commun ity and , if for 
th is reason only , i t  would be unl ikely that the Naur u Local Gover nment 
Counc i l  would be absorbed into the Gove rnment structur e .  
THE ROLE O F  THE UN ITED NAT I ONS 
Undoubtedly the wor ld c l imate of opin ion away from colon ial ism towards 
the r ecog n i t ion of the r ights o f  dependent countr ies to dec ide the i r  
pol it ical futures ass i sted in the const itut ional development of Naur u .  The 
f inal factor to be taken into account here i s , according ly ,  the influent ial 
and at t imes dominat ing role of the UN and its assoc iated org ans . 
In 1 94 5 , Ar t . 7 6 (b )  of the UN Ch arter had laid down , as a bas ic 
obj ect ive of tr usteesh ip systems : 
Pr og ress ive development towards sel f-government or 
independence as may be appropr i ate to the par t icular 
c i rcumstances o f  each Te r r i tory,  and its peoples , and 
the fr eely expr essed wi shes of the peoples conce rned , 
and as may be prov ided by the terms of each Tr usteeship 
Ag reement • • •  
The Naur u Tr usteesh ip Ag reement of 1 Novembe r 1 94 7  reaffirmed in its 
Ar t . 5 ( 2 )  (c )  that the Admini ster ing Author i ty would : 
assure the inhabitants of the Te rr itory as may be 
appropr iate to the par t icular c i rcumstances of the 
Te r r itory and its people a prog ress ively incr easing 
share in the administr at ion and other serv ices of the 
Te rr i tory ,  and take all appropr i ate measures with a 
v iew to the pol it ical advancement of the inhab itants in 
accordance with Ar t ic le 76 ( b) of the Ch arter (Ar t . 5 
( 2 )  (c) ) .  
But by 1 962  there was l ittle ev idence sat i s factory to the UN 
Tr usteesh ip Counc il that these unde rtaking s  were be ing ful f i l led as r apidly 
as m ight be expected . Th e UN v i s i t ing miss ion th at year d i r ected " urgent 
attent ion " to the problem of the " uncertain and indeed alarming future 
fac ing the island because of the deplet ion of the phosphate resources " ,  and 
recommended that " from now on" the Naur uan people should be g iven full 
par t ic ipat ion in the ir  own government and in all dec is ions of the Br it ish 
Phosph ate Commiss ioner s  • • •  wh ich affect Naur uan i nte rests " . The miss ion 
also expr essed the be l ie f  that " i t should be poss ible to formulate and 
dec ide upon detai led plans for the future and to be ready to put them into 
effect within a year from now" �ee UN Vi s i t ing Miss ion 1 9 62 ) . 
To a cer tain extent , the v i s i t ing m i s s ion ' s r ecommendat ions r e flected 
the wor ld opinion wh ich had found express ion in the 1 960  Gene r al As sembly 
Re so l ut ion 1 5 1 4  (XV) wh ich conta ined the Declar at ion on the Gr ant ing of 
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Independence to Co lonial Countr ies and peoples ; 
Declar at ion had stated : 
Chapter 5 of the 
Immed i ate steps shall be t aken , in trust and on 
sel f-govern ing te r r itor ies or all other terr i tor ies 
wh ich have not yet attained independence , to tr ansfer 
all power s  to the peoples of those te r r i tor ies , without 
any cond it ions or reservat ions , in accordance with 
the i r  freely expr essed will and des i r e , without any 
d i s t inct ion as to r ace , c reed or colour , in order to 
enable them to enj oy complete i ndependence and fr eedom . 
In 1 960 t he ' Spec i al Committee of 24 ' ( Spec i al Commi ttee on the 
S i tuat ion with Regard to the Implementat ion of the Declarat ion on the 
Grant ing of Independence to Co lon i al Countr ies and Peoples ' )  wh ich had 
been the organ of the Ge neral As sembly deal ing with colonialism s ince 1 96 1  
- g ave i t s  opi n ion that the Declarat ion appl ied fully to the smaller 
ter r i tor ies , i nclud ing those in the Pac i f ic r eg ion .  In 1 96 5 , the General 
As sembly r equested the Committee to: 
pay par t icular attent ion to the small ter r itor ies , and 
to recommend to the General Assembly the most 
appropr iate ways , as wel l  as the steps to be taken , to 
enable the populat ion of these terr itor ies to exerc i se 
fully the ir r ight to sel f-dete rm inat ion and independ­
ence (UN Gene r al As sembly Re solut ion 2 1 05 (XX) 1 96 5 ) . 
A r ev iew of small te r r i tor ies was under taken by the Committee and on 20  
December 1 966  the General As sembly reaffirmed : 
the inal ienable r ight of the people of Naur u to 
sel f-government and independence 
and , fur ther , r ecommended that : 
the Admin i s ter ing Au thor ity should f ix the ear l iest 
poss ible date , but not later than 3 1  J anuary 1 968 , for 
the i ndependence o f  the Naur uan people in accordance 
with the i r  fr eely expr essed wi shes (UN General As sembly 
Re solut ion 2 22 6 (XXI ) ) .  
In 1 967 , the Re search Committee o f  the Board of Tr ustees of the UN 
Inst i tute for Tr ain ing and Re search (UNITAR) also produced a report on the 
"Status and Pr oblems of Ve ry Small States and Te r r i tor ies" . The report 
drew attent ion to the pl ight o f  small countr ies and inter alia , r econ fi rmed 
the UN commitment to assist  requests for se l f-determ inat ion ; i t  emphas ised 
once mor e the part the UN had ,  s ince i t s  incept ion , played in support ing 
these ter r itor ies . By th i s  t ime , too , e i�ht of the eleven Tr ust 
Te rr i tor ies o f  the UN h ad gained i ndependence . 1 
I t  was a small step then 
(XXI I )  of 1 9  December 1 967  
Admin ister ing Author ity : 
to the General Assembly Re solut ion 2 3 4 7  
wh ich reso lved , that , i n  ag reement with the 
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the Tr usteesh ip Ag reement for the Terr i tory of Naur u 
approved by the General As sembly on 1 November 1 9 47  
shall cease to be in for ce upon the access ion o f  Naur u 
to independence on 3 1  January 1 96 8 . 
NOTES 
1See , for ex ample , Senator M . C .  Cormack in Senate Debs . 1 5  Oc tober 1 96 4 , 
at 2 0 1 4 .  
2Even by 1 9 66 per capita income was est imated to be i n  excess o f  $US 1 , 800  
h ig her than that for Au st r al i a ,  and one of the h ighest in  the wor ld 
( see Current Notes on International Affairs ( 1 96 7 )  3 8 : 549 , 5 5 2 ) . 
3 Ar t ic le 6 ,  Ag reement between Gove rnments of UK , NZ and Austr al i a ,  2 July 
1 9 1 9  (see Nauru Island Agreement Act ( Cmth) 1 9 1 9 ) . 
4The i ntent to renew the call for suppor t for Naur u ' s rehab i l itat ion was 
repeated in 1 9 73 ( see Australian Foreign Affairs Record ( 1 973 ) 4 4 : 1 1 7- 1 2 1  
at p .  1 20 )  • 
5The st atement from wh ich these proposals are taken cons iders in some 
det a i l  the Leg islat ive As sembly, the J ud ic i ary , and the Public Serv ice . 
Wi th reg ard to the Jud ic i ary,  a hope was expressed that appeals from the 
Supr eme Court of Naur u wou ld l ie to the H igh Cour t of Austral i a .  See , 
now , Nauru (High Court Appea ls) Act (Cmth) 1 9 7 6 .  
6See Mini ster for Terr itor ies , Hon .  C . E .  Barnes , H .  o f  Reps . Debs . 2 4  
Oc tobe r 1 96 7 ,  2 1 6 0 -6 1 . 
7 Profe ssor Dav idson had intended wr it ing about Naur u ' s Independence in a 
work s im ilar to h i s  book , Samoa, mo Samoa, in wh ich he details the events 
lead ing to the Independence o f  WS and h is role in  the f r aming o f  that 
Cons t i tut ion . His formal involvement in the framing of the Naur u  
Const itution dates from 1 1  May when h e  was retained by the Naur uans as 
the i r  Const itut ional Advise r . (See Maude 1 973 : 5-9 ) . 
8Some for ty Counc i l  employees we re t r ansfer red to the Repub l ic ' s  Works  
Depar tment on 1 July 1 968 . In add i t ion , equipment used by the Local 
Gover nment wor ks force we re handed over to the Government Works  
Depar tment . These ar r angements t r ansferred the respons ib i l i ty for 
Naur uan housing to the Gover nment , a funct ion pr ev iously per formed by the 
Local Gove rnment Counc i l  ( S k inner 1 9 76 : 1 07 ) . 
9 The Naur uans cons ide r ed that , because of the smal l  s i ze of the country,  
i t  was unde s i r able to create two separate o f f ices where the duties o f  
both could b e  pe r formed b y  o n e  pe r son ; see Rowena Armstrong , " The 
Cont itut ion of the Independent Republ ic of Naur u " , Parliamentarian 
4 9 : 2 59-6 1 at p . 260 . 
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1 0The problem of the separat ion of powe r s  and overlapping j ur isdict ions is 
" further confused by the con t inu ing administrative powe rs o f  the Naur u 
Phosphate Corporat ion , another statutory corporat ion of Naur u "  ( Conne ll 
1 9 74 : 9 ) . 
1 1For a full rev iew of UN decolon ial isat ion effor ts , see Un ited Nations 
Inst i tute for Tr ain ing and Re search , the Rese arch Committee of the Board 
of Tr ustees , F i r s t  Sess ion , 1 0- 1 1 July 1 967 , Geneva . Report on the 
"Status and Problems of Ve ry Small States and Te r r i tor ies" . RC/I/B ,  
pp . 1 3-20 . 

7. CONSTITUTIONAL D EVE LOPMENTS IN THE COOK I SLAN DS 
C.C. Aikman 
AN ASSOCI ATED STATE 
The Un i ted Nat ions (UN) r esolut ion (General As sembly Re solut ion 1 54 1  
(XV) ) ,  wh ich set out the c ircumstances in wh ich non- self-governing 
terr itor ies m ight be said to have reached a full measure of 
sel f-government , prov ided three alter nat ive s :  eme rgence as a sover e ign 
independent state : i nteg r at ion with an ex ist ing independent state : or 
free assoc i at ion with an independent state . The Cook Islands (CI ) was the 
first ter r itory to take advantage of the third al ternat ive , and chose free 
assoc iat ion with New Zealand (NZ ) . The procedure followed in assuming that 
status , wh ich involved UN par t ic ipat ion , was care fully des igned to 
establish that CI was in fact exerc i s ing a free cho ice . Thus it prov ided 
that the cho ice should be made at a moment of not ional independence and 
that CI should be free to assume full independence in the futur e should it 
so chose ( see Ai kman et al . 1 96 3 ) . 
Th is backg round br ing s  out two po ints that have been centr al to more 
recent deve lopments .  Fi rst , NZ d id ensure at the t ime that there was 
effect ive tr ansfer of ' all  powe r s  to the peoples '  of CI , including the 
g r ant of full leg i slat ive competence . Second , despite th is tr ansfer , the 
UN d id not regard the free assoc iat ion as amount i ng to full independence . 
Th us the UN r esolut ion recognising that CI was no longer a non- self­
govern ing terr itory went on to reaff irm : 
the respons ibil ity of the Un ited Nat ions • • •  to ass ist 
the people o f  the Cook Is lands i n  the eventual 
ach ievement of full independence , i f  they so wish at a 
future date (Ge ner al As sembly Re solut ion 2064 (XX) ) .  
The or ig i nal text of the CI Constitut ion was set out as a schedule to 
an Ac t of the NZ Par l i ament , the Cook Is lands Constitution Act ( 1 96 4 ) . 
Sect ion 4 s tates that the Constitut ion i s  to be the supr eme law of CI . 
Sect ion 5 pr ov ides :  
Noth ing i n  th i s  Ac t or i n  the Const itut ion shall affect 
the respons ib i l it ies of He r Maj esty the Queen in r ight 
of New Zealand for the external affa i r s  and de fence of 
the Cook Island s ,  those respons ibi l it ies to be d i s­
charged after consultat ion by the Pr ime Mini ster of New 
Ze aland with the Pr em ier of the Cook Is land s .  
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Under s . 6  Cook Islander s  who were already NZ c it i zens r etained the i r  
c i t i zensh ip .  
Fo r the purpose o f  the present d iscuss ion , the fol lowing were 
s ign i f icant prov i s ions in the or ig inal Const itut ion : 
( 1 )  Ar t . 2 :  "He r  Maj esty the Queen in r ight of New Zealand shall be 
the He ad of State of the Cook Islands" ; 
( 2 )  Ar t . 3 ( 1 ) e stablished the po s i t ion of a High Commiss ione r of C I  
who shall b e  " the representat ive o f  He r Maj esty t h e  Queen i n  the Cook 
Islands "  and also " the repr esentat ive of the Gove rnment of New Zealand in 
the Cook Islands" . The High Commiss ioner was to be appo inted by the NZ 
Gover nor-Ge ner al , act i ng on the adv ice of a NZ Minister , after consultat ion 
with the Pr em ier of CI (Ar t . 3 ( 2 ) ) .  The H igh Commiss ioner in the 
per formance of h i s  funct ions as the representat ive of the Queen was to act 
on the adv ice of CI Min i ster s  (Ar t . S ) ; 
( 3 ) Ar t . 1 2 ( 1 ) vested the execut ive a uthor ity of CI i n  He r Maj e sty the 
Queen in r ight of NZ . I t  m ight be exer c ised on behalf of He r Maj esty by 
the High Commiss ioner ( Ar t . 1 2 ( 2 ) ) ;  
( 4 )  Ar t . 1 3 ( 1 ) e stabli shed the pos i t ion of Premier of CI and prov ided 
that Cabinet was to have general d irect ion and control of the execut ive 
government of C I ; 
( 5 )  Ar t . 2 7  established the Leg i slat ive Assembly o f  CI ; 
( 6 ) Ar t . 4 6 r etained the power of the NZ Par l i ament to pass 
leg islat ion for CI and Ar t . 8 8 author i sed the NZ Governor-Gener al to make 
reg ulat ions for CI in each case at the request and wi th the consent of CI ; 
( 7 ) There was a High Cour t of CI , pr e s ided over by a Ch ief Judge 
(Ar ts . 4 7  and 4 8 )  with a r ight of appeal to the NZ Supreme Cour t ;  
( 8 )  Under Ar ts . S S and S 6  appeals could i n  some c i rcumstances l ie from 
the Land Cour t of CI to Judges of the NZ Maor i Land Cour t ;  
( 9 ) Under Ar t . 7 1  the NZ Aud it Of fice was the aud i tor of CI accounts . 
The effect of some of the above prov is ions of the Cook Islands 
Constitution Act ( 1 96 4 )  and of the Const itut ion i tself was to maintain 
leg al t ies between NZ and CI . Ce rtain of them , l ike reliance for appeals 
on the NZ Supreme Cour t ,  we re cont inued pur ely as a matter of convenience 
because of the l imited resource s ,  includ ing the small numbe r of qual if ied 
per sonnel ,  avai lable in CI . There we re also important econom ic t ies . At 
the t ime free assoc iat ion was establ ished NZ g ave s ig n i f icant unde r tak i ng s  
in the areas of tr ade and aid - NZ would cont inue t o  g ive f inanc i al a i d  to 
er and er products would be fr ee of the NZ constraints of import l icen s i ng 
and customs duty (NZ Ministry of Fore ign Af fa i r s  1 9 80 ) . 
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A SEPARATE I DENTI TY FOR THE COOK I SLANDS : 
CONSTI TUTI ON AMENDMENT ( N0 . 9 )  ACT ( 1980-8 1 ) 
The pre sent paper is ma inly concer ned with the incr eas ing concern of 
the CI Gover nment to e stablish a separ ate ident i ty ,  short  of full 
indepe ndence , i n  the inter nat ional commun ity.  With th i s  in mind changes of 
a cosmet ic char acter were made by the CI Leg islat ive As sembly in  the 
Constitution Amendment ·  (No . 9)  Act ( 1 980- 8 1 ) .  Thus the Premier of CI has 
assumed the des ignat ion "Pr ime Minister " ;  the Leg islat ive Assembly of CI 
is now the Parliament of CI ; the Ch ie f Judge of the High Court has become 
the Ch ie f Justice of CI ; the H igh Court  of CI has been g iven j ur i sd ict ion 
and power s  in  relat ion to land former ly held by the Land Cour t ,  and all 
appeals from the High Cour t are to go to a new Court o f  Appeal of CI . 
Ar t icles 4 6  and 8 8 ,  r elat ing to NZ l eg is lat ion and reg ulat ions , have been 
repealed and replaced by a new Ar t . 4 6 under wh ich no Ac t of the NZ 
Par l iament is to extend to CI as par t of the law of CI unless prov ided by 
Ac t of Par l i ament of CI . 
These changes were j ust i f ied by the CI M i n i ster of Just ice in a press 
statement made at the t ime of the introd uc t ion of the Const itut ion 
Amendment (No . 9 )  B i l l .  He expl ained that CI h ad had d i f f ic ulty in the 
internat ional arena in per suad ing other states that CI was a fully 
sover e ign countr y :  
St ates having doubts about the status of the Cook 
I s lands have po inted to what they have termed as 
vest iges of the Co lon ial System wh ich they cons ider are 
s t i l l  pr esent in the Const itut ion . 
AN OVERSEAS CONSTI TU ENCY 
There i s  a large commun ity of Cook Islander s  l iv ing in  NZ and the i r  
status in CI e lect ions h a s  been a per s i stent source of d i spute . The 
constitut ional cr i s i s  fol lowing the 1 9 78 e lect ion arose from the use by the 
Albert  Henry Government of publ ic money to fly in  CI voter s  from NZ . Now , 
the Constitution Amendment (No . 9)  Act,  in the cour se of a reallocat ion of 
constituenc ies ,  make s an interesting innovat ion . It creates an add it ional 
over seas constituency in respect of "The islands compr i s i ng New Zealand and 
all other areas outs ide the Cook I s lands"  (Ar t . 2 7 ) . The e lect ion of the 
add it ional member is to be by postal or spec ial vote or by vote cast at a 
poll ing booth wh ich is l i ke ly to be in NZ and the qual i f icat ions of 
elector s in the const itue ncy are set out in the Amendment ( Ar ts . 2 8 and 
2 8b) . Th is development r a ised interesting quest ions as to the propr iety of 
NZ c it i zens who r e s ide in NZ vot i ng in both CI and NZ e lect ions . The NZ 
author it ies examined the issues with some care , but in  the event took no 
firm act ion to d i scour age CI from proceed ing with its  new const ituency . 
A S EPARATE I DENTI TY FOR THE COOK I S LANDS : THE QUEEN ' S  R EPRESENTATIVE  
Many par allels can b e  found in Commonwealth h istory for the 
d ifficul t ies that have ar isen over the pos i t ion of He ad of State in CI . 
The const itut ional adv isers respons ible for the 1 9 64 CI Const itut ion were 
aware of the d if f icult ies that would ar ise from the dec is ion to g ive a dual 
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role to the H igh Commiss ioner , that of be ing a const itut ional He ad of 
State , acting on the adv ice of CI M i n i ster s ,  and that of r epresentat ive of 
the NZ Government - they had the exper ience o f  Gover nor s of Br it ish 
colon ies as they moved into Dom in ion s tatus to warn them ( see A i kman et 
aZ.  1 96 3 : 1 1 ) . 
Th e d ual system per s isted unt i l  1 9 75 , when the NZ author i t ies and the 
Pr emier , S i r  Albe r t  Henr y ,  d ec ided that it was t ime for a chang e .  However ,  
the CI Gover nment d id not have the two- th i rds maj or ity necessary for the 
constitut ional amendment involved , and the Democrat ic Par ty of Dr Torn Dav i s  
was unwill ing t o  ag ree t o  the amendment . T h e  two Gove rnments ,  ther e fore ,  
had recour se to the prov is ion i n  the Const itut ion under wh ich , i n  the 
absence of the appo intment of a High Commiss ioner or a Deputy High 
Commiss ioner , the Ch ief Judge of the High Court per formed the funct ions o f  
the H i g h  Commiss ioner . It was agreed that a newly appo inted Ch ief Judge , 
Ch ief Judge Donne , should become Ac ting High Commiss ioner and assume the 
funct ions of the repr esentat ive of He r Maj esty the Queen . The NZ 
Gover nment would appo int its own representat ive . Ch ie f Judge ( now Ch ie f 
Justice S i r  Gaven Donne ) has successfully carr i ed out the funct ions of both 
Ac t ing H igh Commiss ioner and Ch ie f Justice up to the pr esent - a term of 
off ice that saw h im deal success fully with an e lectoral pet i t ion in  wh ich a 
find ing of e lector al malpr act ice led , after the 1 9 78 e lect ion , to the 
replacement of S i r  Albe r t  Henr y ' s CI Party Government by a Gover nment led 
by Dr Dav i s  ( now S i r  Thomas Dav i s ) 1 (see Crocornbe et aZ . 1 9 79 ; Hancock 
1 9 79 ) . The new Government had the two- th i rd s  maj or i ty in the Leg islat ive 
As sembly that would enable them to amend the Cons t i tut ion . 
The Const itut ion Amendment (No . 1 0 ) B i l l  wh ich passed through its th ird 
read ing on 2 4  Ma rch 1 9 82 w i l l  replace Ar t . 3  of the Const itut ion relat i ng to 
the appo intment of the High Commiss ioner by a new Ar t . 3 r elat ing to the 
appointment of the Queen ' s  Representat ive : 
There shal l be a repr esentat ive of He r Maj esty the 
Queen in the Cook Island s ,  to be known as the Queen ' s  
Representat ive . 
( 2 )  The Queen ' s  Representat ive shal l be appo inted by 
He r Maj esty the Queen , and shall hold off ice for a 
per iod of three ye ar s ,  and may from t ime to t ime be 
reappo inted . 
Apart from the new des ignat ion and restr icted funct ions of the 
appo intee , the new Ar t icle embod ies thr ee changes : 
( 1 ) Th e Queen ' s  Representat ive is to be appointed by He r Maj esty the 
Queen , whereas the High Commiss ione r was appo inted by the NZ Gover nor­
Gene r al ; 
( 2 ) There is no ind icat ion as to whether it is the Pr ime Mi n ister of 
CI or the Pr ime Mi n i ster o f  NZ , o r  both , who proffer advice to the Queen , 
whereas the H igh Commiss ioner was appo inted on the recommendat ion of a NZ 
Minister , after consultat ion with the Pr emier ( now Pr ime Ministe r )  of CI . 
The constitut ional status of Cl would seem to requ i r e  that the appo intment 
should be made on the adv ice of the Pr ime Mini ster of CI ; but s i nce , by 
v i r tue o f  Ar t . 2  i t  is He r Maj esty the Queen in r ight of NZ who i s  the He ad 
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of State in CI , the quest ion ar i ses as to the par t to be played by the NZ 
Governor-Ge neral and h is adv ise r s . 
( 3 )  The appo intment of the Queen ' s  Represe ntat ive is made for a term 
of thr ee ye ar s an anomaly in the case of an appo intment made by the 
Queen . 
It has been announced that S i r  Gaven Donne is to become the f i r st 
Queen ' s  Repr e sentat ive in CI and that he is to be replaced as Ch ief Just ice 
by a retir ing NZ Judge o f  the Supr eme Cour t , Mr Justice Spe ight . 
FREE ASSOC IAT I ON - A DEVE LOP I NG RELAT I ONSH I P  
The spec ial relat ionship o f  free assoc iat ion between NZ and CI was 
un ique when it was established in 1 9 64 . The actual nature of the 
relat ionsh ip had yet to be wor ked out ; and it was to be expected that it 
would be a deve loping re lat ionship as the CI people and the ir Governments 
assumed the respons ib i l i t ies and real i sed the potent ial it ies of self­
government . When quest ions were raised in 1 9 73 ove r cer tain of the 
pol ic ies be ing followed by the CI Government the NZ Pr ime Minister , Norman 
K i r k , i n i t i ated an exchange of letters with the Prem ier of CI , Albe rt 
He nry,  wh ich can still be regarded as sett ing out the essent ial aspects of 
the relat ionsh ip . Mr Kirk emphas i sed that : 
in the v iew of the New Zealand Gove rnment the re are no 
legal fe tters  of any k i nd upon the freedom of the Cook 
I s l ands ,  wh ich make the i r  own laws and control the i r  
own Const itut ion • • • •  the relat ionsh ip between o u r  two 
countr ies has been s imply one of partner sh ip , freely 
entered into and freely maintained . The Cook Islands 
Constitution Ac t ,  and the Constitut ion itself , prov ide 
g uarantees and g u idel ines for the conduct of th i s  
par tner sh ip ;  b u t  in the final analys i s  everyth ing 
turns on the will of each of our countr ies to make the 
arr angement wor k  ( Appendices to the Journal of the [NZ ]  
House of Representatives 1 9 73 ) . 
The Pr ime Mini ster po inted out that , although NZ had a statutory 
responsib i l i ty for the external affa i r s  and defence of CI , i t  was intended 
that CI should be free to pur sue the i r  own pol ic ies and inte rests - as they 
were do ing in the Pac i f ic . Mr K i rk went on to recall that the people of Cl 
were NZ c it i zens and that they owed alleg iance to He r Maj esty the Queen in 
r ight of NZ , and recognised the Queen in her NZ c apac i ty as the ir Head of 
St ate . He cont inued : 
For the reasons I h ave already i nd icated , the bond of 
c i t i zensh ip does entail a degree of New Zealand 
involvement in Cook Islands affai r s .  Th is is r e f lected 
in the scale of New Zealand ' s  r e sponse to your 
countr y ' s mater ial need s ;  but it also creates an 
expectat ion that the Cook Islands will uphold , in the ir 
laws and po l ic ies a standard of val ues gener ally 
acceptable to New Ze alanders . 
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I t  seems to my Government that th i s  is the heart of the 
matter . The spec ial relat ionsh ip between the Cook 
Islands and New Zealand is on both s ides a vol untary 
arr angement wh ich depends upon shared interests and 
shared sympath ies . In par t icular , i t  calls for 
understand i ng on New Zeal and ' s  par t  of the Cook 
I s l and s '  natural des i r e  to lead a l i fe of the i r  own , 
and for equal under stand ing on the Cook I s l ands ' par t 
of New Zealand ' s  determinat ion to safeg uard the values 
on wh ich its c it i zensh ip i s  based ( ibid. ) . 
The appl icat ion of the pr inc iples set out in the 1 9 73 Exchange o f  
Le tte r s  t o  aspects o f  the spec i al relat ionsh ip h a s  continued t o  b e  wor ked 
out . Th is has been par t icular ly so in re sponse to the enthus i asms of 
member s  o f  the Gove rnment of S i r  Thomas Dav is .  One area o f  interest that 
h ighl ights the nature of the spec ial relat ionship is the des i r e  of the CI 
Government to assume increas ing respons ib i l it ies i n  the area of external 
affa i r s . 
EXTERNAL AFFA I RS 
In the ear ly stages following sel f-government the CI Government was 
content to al low NZ to handle its external affa ir s ;  but i n  Albert  He nry CI 
had an act ive , ambi t ious and , i t  must be sa id ,  char i smat ic Premier who soon 
establ ished that he had a contr ibut ion to make to reg ional po l i t ics in the 
Pac i f ic .  He became an influent ial f igure in the meet ing s  of the South 
Pac i f ic Conference and laid the g roundwor k for the admiss ion of CI as an 
assoc iate member of the South Pac i f ic Comm i ss ion in 1 9 78 and a full 
par t ic ipat ing government , along with independent states l i ke F i j i and 
Western Samoa in 1 980 . Albe r t  Henry was one of three Pac i f ic Islands 
leaders  who took an init iat ive in estab l ishing the South Pac i f ic For um . CI 
became a full member of the Forum and has s ince been adm itted as a par ty in 
its own r ight to the Ag reement establish ing the South Pac i f ic Bureau for 
Economic Co-operat ion (SPEC) ( Ap i a ,  1 7  Apr i l  1 9 73  NZTS 1 9 73 : No . 1 8 ) , the 
Convent ion on the South Pac i f ic Forum F i sher ies Agency (Honiara , 6 July 
1 9 79 NZTS 1 9 79 : No . 6 ) , the Memor andum of Under stand i ng on the Estab l ishment 
of the Pac i f ic Forum L i ne L im i ted , and the South Pac i f ic Reg ional Tr ade and 
Economic Co-oper at ion Ag reement (SPARTECA) (Dept . of Tr ade and Industry 
Wel l ing ton July 1 9 80 ) . CI became a party to the four last-ment ioned 
r eg ional agr eements in its capac ity as a member of the South Pac if ic Forum .  
I t  i s  relevant that i n  the abo r t ive d iscuss ions o n  a draft Convent ion 
estab l i sh ing a South Pac i f ic Reg ional F i she r ies Organ i sat ion , of wh ich the 
us , the UK , Fr ance , Ch ile and pos s ibly other metropol itan power s  were 
expected to become member s ,  i t  was r ecog n i sed that any member of the Forum 2 
r egardless of its  status would be able to s ign the Convent ion ( see Ai kman 
1 9 8 1 ) . In the s t i l l  wider sphere of the Th ird UN Conference on the Law of 
the Sea the NZ delegat ion succeeded i n  hav i ng the v iews o f  the C I  
Gover nment placed before t h e  Confe r ence , and t h e  f i nal Convent ion i s  
expected t o  have a prov 1s1on that w i l l  enable CI and N i ue t o  become full 
par t i es to the Convent ion . 
CI is an assoc iate member of the Economic and Soc ial Counc il for As ia 
and the Pac i f ic (ESCAP ) and became a member of the As ian Development Bank 
in 1 9 6 5 . More recently CI s ig ned a bilateral mar i t ime boundary 
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del imitat ion treaty with the U S  and a f i shing ag reement with t h e  Republ ic 
of Korea . 
Whatever may have been the or ig inal intent ion of s . 5  of the Cook 
Is lands Constitution Act ( 1 96 4 ) , the NZ Government has taken the v iew - and 
made th i s  gene r al ly known - that the CI Government is competent to take the 
execut ive and leg islat ive act ion requ ired to enter into internat ional 
obl ig at ions on behal f of CI . NZ concedes , however , that capac ity at 
internat ional law depends on recog n i t ion and that CI c an enter into 
internat ional obl igat ions only i f  other par ty or par t ies to the proposed 
obl igat ion are prepared to recognise that CI has the necessary attr ibute of 
sovere ignty to enter into the obl igat ion . Should such r ecog n i t ion not be 
for thcoming NZ has the competence by v i rtue of the execut ive author ity of 
He r Maj esty the Queen in r ight of NZ - also the He ad of State of CI to 
enter into the obl igat ion on behal f o f  CI . It would never theless be 
necessary for the CI Par l iament to take any leg i s lat ive act ion that might 
be requ ired to implement that obl igat ion . It has been suggested that in 
such case the NZ Government is ac t i ng as the deleg ate of the CI Government . 
Th is may be the case as between NZ and CI , but not as between NZ and the 
other contr ac t ing par ty or par t ies - in that case the NZ Execut ive is alone 
the respons ible cont r acting party . 
The i ssues we have been cons ider ing were thoroughly canvassed when the 
Dav is Government appl ied to the Afr ican , Car ibbean and Pac i f ic Group of 
States (ACP Gr oup) to be pe rmitted to accede to the Lome II Convent ion . 
The ACP Committee of Ambassador s referred the matter to an Ad Hoe Wor k i ng 
Gr oup on CI . 3 Under Ar t . 1 86 of the Convent ion admiss ion can be g r anted to 
states whose econom ic str ucture and product ion ar e comparable with those of 
the ACP State s . NZ handed a statement to the Lome Counc i l  Secr etar iat in 
wh ich it expl ained the internat ional pos i t ion of CI . The statement po inted 
out that CI is not a colony or a dependent ter r i tory . Nor is it a 
sovere ign independent state as that concept is t r ad i t ionally under stood in 
internat ional law .  
I t  fal ls into a spec i al character of wh ich the Cook s 
and N i ue are pe rhaps the only member s .  It is an 
assoc iated state with full control over its  own dest iny 
in matters relat ing to both domest ic and exter nal 
affa i r s  • • • •  All leg i slat ive and execut ive powe rs 
[ s ic ]  • • •  i s  vested excl us ively in the Government of 
the Cook Islands and the exercise by the New Zealand 
Government of any responsibilit ies in fore ign affairs 
or defence must be preceded by full consultat ion with 
the Cook I sland s .  
In i t s  o wn  r epr esentat ions CI placed par t icular emphas i s  o n  the changes 
that had been made in the Constitution Amendment (No . 9) Act and we re to be 
made in Constitution Act (No . 10)  as conf irming the ir autonomous status . 
Never theless , the Wor k ing Gr oup dec ided that admiss ion under Ar t . 1 86 was 
open only to independent states : 
The Cook Islands does not enjoy s uch a status and is 
not ac knowledged by the Un i ted Nat ions as an independ­
ent state or acceptable as a Member of the Un i ted 
Nat ions . 
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The Gr oup acknowledged that Cl deserved full sympathy as a developing 
country,  confronted with ser ious econom ic problems and with economic 
str ucture and product ion compar able to those of ACP States . I t , therefore , 
cons idered the pos s ib i l ity of recommend ing Cl access ion as a spec ial case . 
He re the Gr oup c ame up ag a inst apprehens ions of a precedent that would open 
the door to other countr ies whose cases we re not ident ical but had common 
char acter istic s  with those of Cl . The conc lus ion was , therefore , that on a 
str ict leg al bas i s ,  access ion could not be recommended . The Gr oup , 
therefore ,  r epor ted that the dec i s ion should be pol it ical and that the ACP 
Counc il of Min i sters m ight wish to consult the C l  r epresentat ive and 
M i niste r s  of the Pac i f ic Gr oup of States who had suppor ted Cl admiss ion and 
who att ach g reat importance to the conso l idat ion of the pos i t ion already 
occupied by Cl within the economic g rouping s  of the Pac i f ic .  
As was to be expected i n  the l ight o f  th is Repor t ,  the ACP M i n i ster i al 
Council was not pr epared to accept the inv i tat ion to take a pol it ical 
dec is ion . The C l  appl icat ion was re fused with the r ider that the Comm ittee 
of Ambassadors  should talk to the Commun ity about improv ing co-operat ion 
between Cl and the Lome member s  shor t of actual membe r sh ip . 
Th is dec is ion has , of cour se , wider impl icat ions than access ion to the 
Lome Convent ion . The Wor k i ng Gr oup accepted that Cl as an assoc iated State 
is not recog n i sed as an indepe ndent State by the UN . I t  i s , therefore , 
unl ike ly that the UN Secretar i at will  accept the Cl as a par ty to 
convent ions of wh ich the Secretary-Ge neral is the depos i t i ng author i ty ,  
unless Gener al As sembly approval , e i ther spec i f ic t o  a part icular case or 
of gene r al appl icat ion , i s  f ir st obta ined . Ag a inst th is would need to be 
placed success in having Cl and N i ue accepted as par t ies to the Convent ion 
on the Law of the Se a .  
S o  f a r  a s  b ilateral inte rnat ional obl ig at ions ar e concerned the leg al 
pos it ion is rel at ively straightforward . The Cl Government has the leg al 
competence to enter into relat ions with other states as inte rnat ional 
ent ities  that recog n i se that competence . There i s , however , the over­
r id ing obl igat ion , flowing from the spec ial relat ionsh ip , to consult NZ in 
the f i r st instance , and to have reg ard to her po l ic ie s  and inte rests . That 
is the pr ice of the maintenance of the spec ial r elat ionsh ip . 
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NZ must also have regard to the pos i t ion of CI when enter ing into 
inter nat ional obl igations s i nce she shares with Cl ( and N i ue )  the same 
inte rnat ional leg al per sonal i ty .  In the case of b i l ateral ag reements 
ente red into by NZ the pos it ion i s  r e lat ively straightforward - the par t ie s  
can ag r ee o n  the ter r itor ial ent i t ies t o  wh ich the ag reement appl ies - but 
NZ i s  under an obl ig at ion to consult in appropr i ate cases . 
Mult ilateral treaties and conventions , however ,  pr esent mor e  problems . 
Where there is the trad i t ional type of ter r i tor ial appl icat ion c lause under 
wh ich the contract ing state can e i the r extend the instrument to a 
par t icular country or exclude it , the pos i t ion of Cl c an theoret ically be 
met .  The need to take advantage o f  such a clause does , howeve r ,  o ffend the 
Cl c la im that it has the competence to enter into internat ional obl ig at ions 
on its own behalf and could be regarded as prej ud ic ing that claim .  The 
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i ssue arose recently when CI w ished to become a par ty to the Internat ional 
Coffee Ag reement r a t i f ied by NZ in November 1 9 76  (London , 3 December 1 9 75 
NZTS 1 976 : No . 3 1 ) . The Cl  Government was reluctant to take advantage of a 
ter r itor ial appl icat ion clause , conta ined in Ar t . 6 4 ,  but eventually 
accepted a compromise formula under wh ich the UN Secretary-Gener al was 
advi sed that : 
i n  accordance with the spec i al r elat ionsh ip between New 
Ze aland and the Cook Island s ,  the Government of the 
Cook Is land s ,  wh ich has execut ive competence to 
implement treaties in the Cook Is lands , has r equested 
that the Ag reement should apply in the Cook Islands . 
Accord ing ly ,  the Internat ional Coffee Ag reement 1 9 76 
s hould be reg arded as be ing in for ce in the Cook 
I s l ands from the date of rece ipt of th i s  not i f icat ion . 
The UN l ater adv ised that the Ag reement had been appl ied to er with effect 
from 2 0  August 1 9 8 1 . 
The s i t uat ion is mor e  complex in reg ard to instruments that do not 
contain a ter r itor i al app l icat ion clause . Under Ar t . 29 of the Vienna 
Convent ion on the Law of Treat ies (Vi enna , 23 May 1 9 69 Append ices to the 
Jour nals of the House of Reps 1 9 72 : A . 8 . ) , in the absence of such a clause 
the s ignature of a treaty by a state extends the appl icat ion of that treaty 
to the ter r itor ies for whose internat ional relat ions that state i s  
respons ible unless the tr eaty i s  mani festly incapable of that extens ion . 
The UK , in respect of the assoc iated States of the West Indies , has made a 
gener al statement to the effect that in future any treaty act ion not 
spec ifying a par t icular assoc iated S t ate is not to apply to that State . 
Apparently , no obj ect ion has been r a i sed to the UK declarat ion on the bas i s  
of inconsistency w i th the Vi enna Convent ion r ule . Th is approach is not ,  
however , a n  att r act ive solut ion to the e r  problem .  F i r st , assoc iated 
States of the West Indies do not have full leg i slat ive competence and CI 
would not w i sh its  pos i t ion to be ass imilated to that o f  the West Indies 
States . Second , the act ion to apply an instr ument would have to be taken 
by NZ - and not CI i tself . Th ird , a general declar at ion would halt the 
process by wh ich CI i s  establ ish ing pr ecedents under wh ich it is becoming a 
par ty to internat ional obl igat ions in its  own r ight . 
He re aga in there is a recent precedent for the adopt ion of a 
comprom ise approach . The NZ I n st r ument of Acceptance of the GATT S ubs id ies 
Code , dated 7 September 1 98 1 , i ncluded the followi ng reservat ion : 
AND WHEREAS in accordance with the spec ial relat ion­
sh ips wh ich ex ist between New Zeal and and the Cook 
Islands and between New Zeal and and N i ue ,  there have 
been consultat ions r eg ard ing the Ag reement between the 
Government o f  New Zealand and the Government of the 
Cook I s l ands and between the Gove rnment of New Zealand 
and the Government of N i ue ,  
AND WHEREAS pur suant to Ar t ic le 1 9  ( 2 ) ( d )  of the 
Ag reement the acceptance of the Government of New 
Zealand shall not extend the appl icat ion of the 
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pr ov is ions of the Ag reement to the Cook Islands and 
N i ue • • • •  
As suming that the formula adopted in  respect o f  the Inter nat ional 
Coffee Ag reement and the GATI' Subs id ies Code is acceptable to other 
contrac t i ng par t ies to internat ional ag reements ,  the NZ Gover nment s t i l l  
faces the need t o  consult the CI Government before accept ing obl ig at ions 
under s uch ag reements . The word ing " accept ing obl ig at ions " is used 
adv isedly s i nce the NZ Gover nment may feel d i sposed to s ig n  a part icular 
convent ion , subj ect to r at i f icat ion , before it has heard the views of the 
CI Gove r nment . The alternat ive may be to lose the opportun i ty of s igning 
the convent ion and be faced with no way of g 1v 1 ng support  to the 
obl igat ions of the convent ion other than access ion , with the concomitant 
need for leg i slat ion . In the case of an instr ument wh ich has a bear ing on 
CI and has no te rr i tor ial appl icat ion clause , the NZ Gover nment cannot 
proceed to r at if icat ion or access ion wi thout obtain ing the v iews of the C l  
Government and sat isfying i tself that C I  has enac ted any necessary 
leg is lat ion . The prospect is a forb idd ing one . The need to obtain a 
dec is ion from the CI ( and N i ue )  Gover nment and to ensur e in appropr iate 
cases that leg i slat ive act ion has been taken before the NZ Gover nment 
itself can take act ion is l ikely to lead to fr ustr at ing delays . The 
adv isory serv ices and back-up to the leg islat ive process in CI and N i ue are 
so ex iguous that the procedures could break down under the i r  own we ight . 
NOTES 
1In  July 1 9 79 Albe r t  He nry was conv icted on charges o f  conspi r acy to 
defr aud the Crown . Later , He r Maj esty the Queen str ipped h im of his KBE .  
2Pressure in  the Pac if ic for a more flex ible approach o n  the status o f  
terr i tor ies that have not yet acquired f u l l  independence was shown b y  a 
prov i s ion in the draft under wh ich a ter r i tory with in the reg ion would 
have been author ised to s ign the Convent ion and to assume r ights and 
obl igat ions unde r it , by the government of the state wh ich was 
internat ional ly respons ible for that ter r itory . It would not have been 
necessary for the metropol itan state concerned to become a par ty i t se l f .  
To meet the mor e t r ad it ional approach , there was another prov is ion under 
wh ich states s igning the Convent ion would des ig nate the i r  ter r itor ies 
within the reg ion , not enab led to s ign i n  the i r  own r ight , to wh ich the 
Convent ion was to apply . Te rr itor ies so des ignated would have become 
full member s  of the Conference of the Organisat ion . 
3For the following see the Report of the Gr oup ( ACP/1 99/8 1 Rev . 1 ,  Br ussels 
2 4  March 1 9 8 1 ) . 
8. TH E CONSTITUTIONS OF N I U E  AND TH E MARSHAL L  ISLAN DS: 
COMMON TRAITS AND PO INTS OF D I F F E R ENCE 
A. Quentin-Baxter 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
The Const itut ions of N i ue and the Mar shall I s lands (MI } i nv i te 
compar ison , because those respons ible for the i r  development chose i n  each 
case to draw upon the same reservoi r  of cons t itut ional pr inc iple and 
exper ience and to some extent r e l ied upon the same adv iser s . 1 Th is 
continuity occur red because some of the leade r s  in MI , a par t  of the Tr ust 
Ter r itory o f  the Pac i f ic I s l ands administered by the Un ited States (US } , 
were consc ious that the par l i amentary system of government was already 
wor k i ng we l l  in  the former Tr ust Te rr i tory of Naur u ,  and in  other is land 
countr ies of the Pac if ic ,  prev iously unde r  Br it i sh , Austral ian or New 
Ze aland (NZ }  administration . There was a fee l ing that th is system might be 
one of the keys wh ich wou ld adm it MI to a s imilar status of independence or 
self-gover nment . 
At the most supe r f ic i al leve l ,  there  are s imi lar i t ies between the two 
Cons t i t ut ions because , in de al ing with the same needs and problems , it was 
natural to d r aw on a precedent wh ich was famil iar and had already been 
tr ied out in pr act ice . There is , however , a more fundamental bas is on 
wh ich to compare the course of cons t i tut ion-mak i ng in N i ue and MI . In 
both , the goal was self-government , in free assoc iat ion with the former 
administer ing author ity,  a status wh ich N i ue has s ince ach ieved ( Niue 
Constitution Act ( 1 974 ) (NZ } } .  In MI a Constitution for sel f-government is 
now in force ; but the f inal chapter on the future relat ionsh ip between MI 
and the US h as s t i l l  to be wr itte n . 2 
The focus of th i s  paper is on the nature of the two Const i tut ions 
( Niue Constitution Act ( 1 974 ) (NZ } in  force from 1 9  Oc tobe r 1 974 ; MI 
Cons t i tut ion adopted by the Const i tut ional Convent ion on 2 1  December 1 9 78 
and in force from 1 May 1 9 79 ) . The s imul t aneous proce ss o f  wo r k i ng out the 
details  of a relat ionsh ip o f  free assoc i at ion , and , in the case of MI , of 
dec id ing whe ther to become self-gover n i ng as a separate ent ity or in 
federat ion w i th other i sland groups in  Microne s i a , will be descr ibed only 
to the extent that i t  played a par t  in shaping const itut ional development . 
On the other hand , the concepts of sel f-government and free assoc iat ion 
are , in a sense , oppos ites wh ich have to be reconc i led ; and the ir 
inter-r elat ionsh ip will be dealt with in the conc lud ing sect ion . 
The story of const i tut ion-making in each country revolved around ways 
of overcoming people ' s  fears about the consequences of self-government . 
As sur ances were r equi r ed that democrat ic inst itut ions wou ld take suffic ient 
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account of the t r ad it ional org an isat ion of soc iety and would at the same 
t ime maintain the impor ted guarantees on wh ich people had also come to 
depend . Although the form and content of e ach Const itution and the 
procedures fol lowed to put it in place , r e f lect d i ffer ences in  cultur e ,  
geog r aphy , h i story and hopes for the futur e , the Const itutions a s  a whole , 
and the re lat ionsh ips of free assoc i at ion on wh ich each is pr ed icated g ive 
to the people of N i ue and MI a const itut ional and internat ional status , 
that , i n  all impor tant respects , seems l ik e ly to be the s ame . 
Ni ue is a s i ng le i s land of upl i fted co r al , moder ately large by Pac i f ic 
standar d s .  I t s  annexat ion by NZ i n  1 90 1  made its  people Br i t i sh s ubj ects , 
and in due t ime , NZ c it i zens , w i th the r ight to enter and l ive in NZ . 
Or ig inally annexed as par t  of the Cook I s lands ( C I ) , with wh ich its people 
had no c ulture or h i s tor ical t ies , N i ue was soon administered �epar ately , 
but under a system of law and government developed i n  the f i r s t  instance 
for CI and appl ied to N i ue as a matter of cour se . The f i r s t  assert ion of a 
separ ate N i uean interest occur red in Oc tober 1 96 3  when the people of N i ue 
rej ected a comm itment wh ich Cl h ad accepted , to move , i n  accordance with a 
predete rmined t ime table , towards the goal of sel f-government . N i ue 
accepted sel f-gove rnment " in pr inc iple " only , and wished to wor k  towards 
that pos s ible goal at its own pace (see Ch apman 1 9 76 : 1 3- 1 4 ) . Le ss ready 
than the people of CI to expr ess confidence in the i r  ab i l i ty to manag e 
the ir own affair s ,  the N i ueans requ i r ed a pract ical demonstr at ion that NZ 
control could be relaxed without d iminish ing e ither the inter nal safeguards 
o f  the external suppor t on wh ich N i ue had come to depend . In  par t ,  th i s  
demonst r at ion was prov ided through the exer c ise of prog r e s s ive i nstalments 
of representat ive and re spons ible government . By 1 9 70 , the elected 
Leg is lat ive As sembly was r eady to t ake the i n i t iat ive in appoint ing a 
const itutional adv iser . H i s  repor t  concluded that the next step was to 
reassure the people that they would not be asked to g ive up any of the i r  
three m a i n  requ i r ements of const itut ional development . These we re : t o  
keep the i r  N Z  c it i zensh ip a n d  r ight of access t o  NZ ; to b e  sure o f  
cont inued f inanc ial and administrat ive support  from NZ ; and yet to ach ieve 
substant ial control o f  the affairs  o f  the i r  own i s land . The f inal cho ice 
of future status should be made when the people of N i ue had tr ied out in 
pr act ice the a r r angements they would then be approv ing or r e j ect ing . 
Accord ingly , at the As sembly ' s  r equest ,  the NZ Gover nment confe rred on 
the Execut ive Committee of the As sembly , as of r ight , and in full 
conformi ty with the pr inc iple o f  collect ive re spons ib il i ty ,  the execut ive 
powers wh ich i t  had already been exerc i s i ng by deleg at ion from the Re s ident 
Commiss ioner ( Niue Act ( 1 966 ) (NZ )  ss . 5-1 4 ,  as repealed and subs t i tuted by 
Niue Amendment Act ( 1 97 1  (NZ) s . 3 ) . Th is , and other constitut ional 
developments wh ich left the unused leg i s l at ive author ity of the NZ 
Par l iament as the only res idual control , brought the people of N i ue as 
close as poss ible to the actual expe r i ence o f  sel f-government . The v i s i t  
in 1 9 72 of a U N  m i ss ion aroused great interest and added fur ther s t imulus 
( see Ch apman 1 9 76 : 50-5 7 ) .3 By the end o f  1 9 72 , the N i ue I s land As sembly 
was ready to inform the NZ Gove r nment of the wish of the Government and 
people of N i ue to achieve , in 1 9 74 , the status of sel f-gover nment in free 
assoc iat ion with NZ and to ask that a const itut ion be drafted for 
cons ider at ion by the As sembly. 
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I n  contr ast to the compactness of N i ue ,  MI are a widely scattered 
g roup of twenty-n ine cor al atolls and five low-lying coral islands with a 
total land area of about 1 80 square k i lometres . Ag ain in contrast to N i ue ,  
they have known a success ion o f  fore ign r uler s . In 1 88 5 , they were annexed 
by the German Empire . On the outbreak of World War I ,  Japan took 
possess ion of the g roup ,  along with the Carol ine and Northern Mar i ana 
I s lands , and was subsequently g r anted a Le ague of Nations Mandate . At the 
end of Wor ld War I I ,  in wh ich the three g roups had been won back by US 
forces , they were placed under UN Tr usteesh ip , w i th the US as th� 
administer ing author ity,  and were des ignated a str ateg ic area (TIAS 1 66 5  
( 1 94 7 ) ; 8  UNTS 1 89 ) . Th is status d id not , however , qua l i fy the d uty to 
promote con s t i tut ional development (UN Char te r : Ar t . 8 3 ,  par a . 2 ) . With 
administrat ion of the Tr ust Te r r i tory centred upon the office of the H igh 
Commiss ione r , it was natural that the adm in ister ing author ity should th ink 
in te rms of Terr itory-wide , as wel l  as local ins t i tut ions . Indeed , UN 
doctr ine laid upon it an obl igat ion to do so ( UN 1 9 73 : par a . 5 26 ) . It was 
natur al , too , that institutions for sel f-gove rnment should be developed on 
the same pr inc iple of the separat ion of powers wh ich an imated the US 
Constitution itse l f .  Ye t ,  as a v i s i t ing UN m i ss ion po inted out , the 
separat ion of the leg i slature and the execut ive r uled out any form of 
un if ied pol it ical development by wh ich elected r epresentat ives could 
acquire  expe r ience of both the leg islat ive and execut ive br anches of 
government ( UN 1 964 : par as . 1 96-98 ) . Even when a Microne s i an was appo inted 
to a pos i t ion of author ity in the terr i tor i al or a d i str ict administrat ion , 
he necessar i ly r emained re spons ible to the H igh Commiss ioner , not to an 
elected leg islature . Accord ingly,  the pr imary emphas i s  was placed on the 
development of the leg islat ive br anch o f  government . In 1 96 5 , the f i rst 
elect ive Cong ress o f  Microne s i a  was convened to carry out leg i slat ive 
respons ib i l i t ies for the whole Te rr i tory ( Dept . of the Inter ior Order 
No . 2 882 of 28 September 1 964 ) . D i str ict Leg i slatures were also establ i shed 
(3 Trust Territory Code s . 2 ) . Of these , the MI D i str ict Leg is lature ( known 
as the NitijeZa (MI Code 1 9 75 : App. A ) ) was one of the f i rst to become a 
forum in wh ich the people of a par t icular administrat ive d istr ict could 
focus on the i r  i nd iv idual aspirat ions for the futur e .  
O n  the bas i s  of past expe r ience , the U S  m ight have expected that the 
peoples of the Trust Te rr i tory,  inv i ted to cons ider the i r  future status , 
would choose to str eng then the i r  l inks r ather than weaken them . Th is might 
well have been the outcome i f  the only choice lay between independence and 
integ r at ion . The UN , however ,  with the example of CI in mind , drew 
attent ion to the opt ion of free assoc iat ion as a means whereby the people 
of Microne s i a  could co-exist along s ide a larger state without absorption 
(UN 1 96 4 : par as . 297-3 0 2 ) .  4 
It soon became clear that only the Northern Mar i anas , attr acted by 
what they s aw as the advantag es of Guam ' s s i tuat ion , wi shed to place 
themselves under US sovere ignty (see Pub .  L. No . 9 4-2 4 1 ,  90 S t at . 263  
( 1 976 ) ) .  The f ive d i str icts of the Caroline I slands and MI prefer red to 
pur sue the alter nat ive of sel f-government in free as soc iat ion with the US . 
Th is was an obj ect ive wh ich seemed l ikely to prov ide a means of satisfying 
US secur ity interests as wel l  as the Micrones i an interest in be ing assured 
of cont inuing US f inanc i al suppor t .  Accord i ng ly ,  e ffor ts we re made to 
promote a feder al const itut ion for sel f-government , and negot i at ions for a 
compact of free assoc iat ion were conducted on a Ter r i tory-wide bas i s . In 
MI , a maj or i ty of those in pos i t ions o f  leade r sh ip had beg un to feel that 
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thei r  future relat ionsh ip with the US s hould not depend on negotiat ions 
conducted only by a body on wh ich all of th e d i str icts were r epresented . 
The des i re to pur sue the i r  future separ ately from the rest of Microne s i a  
was born o f  two dom inat ing influences .  F i r s t , ther e  were no trad i t ional 
t ies to the peoples of the Carol ines who spoke d i f ferent lang uages and were 
culturally d i s t inct . In the second place , the people of MI , more than 
those of any other g roup in Micrones i a ,  had expe r ienced both the advantages 
and d i s advantages o f  an int imate involvement in US use of the Tr ust 
Te rr itory for the development of str ateg ic weapons . If the Marshal lese 
people had to pay the pr ice , they also wanted to have a controll ing voice 
in the d i spos i t ion of the benef its . In other s ituat ions , th i s  seeming ly 
self ish interest m ight have g iven way to st ronger cons iderat ions of mutual 
advantage and commi tment to a shared ident ity;  but , added to the bar r ie r s  
of d istance and d if fe rences in lang uage and culture , the re was a feel ing 
that MI was be ing asked to prov ide a subs idy for the other g roups in 
Microne s i a ,  and were the reby rel iev ing the admin i s ter ing author ity , at 
least in par t ,  o f  its own duty to pr ov ide a full measure of economic 
ass istance to the people of those g roups . 
In 1 973 , the Nitije Za set up i t s  own polit ical Stat us Comm iss ion ( MI 
Code 1 975 : 6 1 ) drawn large ly from its e l ected Member s  and the Marshal ls ' 
deleg at ion to the Cong ress of Micrones i a .  By July 1 977 , the Comm i ss ion had 
won for i tsel f the r ight to par t ic ipate in " two- t ier " negot iat ions with the 
administer ing author ity on the future of M icrones i a .  To strengthen the 
hand of the Commiss ion in the se negot iat ions , and to prov ide a cred ible 
alter nat ive to approval o f  the proposed federal const itut ion on wh ich a 
referendum was s t i ll to be held ,5 the Nitije la also convened a 
const itut ional convent ion to d r aft a separ ate MI Const i tut ion , ( f ir st 
convened on 8 Aug ust 1 9 77 after elect ion pur suant to D i str ict Law 23-3 2-2 
of 3 0  Aug ust 1 9 76 ) . In th i s  way , MI too had reached the point of 
const it ut ion-making . 
THE CONSTI TUTI ON-MAK ING PROCESS 
In N i ue ,  the main for um for cons t i tut ional d i scuss ions was the N i ue 
I s land As sembly wh ich , s ince 1 96 0 , had been composed of Member s  e lected to 
represent each of the four teen v i l lages in wh ich N i ue ' s  soci al organisat ion 
is based . In the i r  f ir s t  d i scuss ions with the constitut ional advi se r , the 
Member s  of the As sembly had stressed that any new s teps must depend on the 
wi shes of the N i uean people themselves .  The adv i ser s aw h is task as 
helping to clar i fy the people ' s  wishe s , and suggest ing how those wishes 
could best be car r ied out ( see Quent in-Baxter 1 97 1 ) . 
As t ime went on , the Member s  of the As sembly, and , in par t icular , of 
its Committee on Const itut ional Development , took more of the 
respons ib i l i ty for consult ing the people and init i at ing r equests to the NZ 
Government for fur ther instalments o f  s e l f-government , and , f inally , for 
the preparat ion o f  the Consti tut ion i t sel f .  
By force o f  c i rcums tance s , the actual dr aft ing had t o  be done outs ide 
N i ue ,  but a continuous process o f  consultat ion with the Execut ive Comm ittee 
was ma inta ined . The mak ing of the Consti tut ion involved not only the 
Government and people of N i ue ,  but also the NZ Government . There we re 
several reasons for th i s .  In the f i r s t  place , as the adm in ister ing 
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author ity ,  NZ saw itself as hav i ng a cont i nuing respons ib i l ity to 
contr ibute to constitut ion-maki ng in N i ue up to the moment when an act of 
se lf-determ inat ion would take place . In the second place , the Government 
and people of N i ue we re seek i ng a relat ionship of free assoc iat ion . Th is 
had involved d i rect governmental negot iat ions and assur ances , the results 
of wh ich were to be embod ied in an Act of the NZ Pa r l i ament that would also 
g ive to the Const i tut ion the force of law .  In t h e  th ird place , the people 
of N i ue wi shed to remain NZ c it i zens . Th is created a general NZ interest 
in the const itut ional arr angements wh ich would govern the l ives of those 
c i t i zens of N i uean or ig in - numbe r ing more than the populat ion of N i ue 
who had chosen to make the i r  homes in NZ . F inal ly , i t  was proposed that 
N i ue should cont inue to use the services of certain NZ governmental 
inst itut ions on an agency bas i s .  There was , therefore , an input from the 
NZ s ide , as well as from the Gove rnment and people of N i ue .  I t  was , of 
cour se , always clear that the latter would have the last word;  but the 
leg islat ion promoted in the NZ Parl iament to g ive e f fect to sel f-government 
wou ld constitute the commitment wh ich was prerequ i s ite to N i ue ' s f inal 
dec is ion in a referendum .  
I n  MI , a comb inat ion o f  forces saw the ent ire const itut ion-mak ing 
process undertaken and completed without act ive par t ic ipat ion by the 
admini ster ing author ity . In par t ,  th i s  was the result of a ph i losoph ical 
approach stemming from the US exper ience : people should be al lowed to g ive 
themse lves the i r  own const i tut ions . In par t ,  it stemmed from the fact that 
when a Const i t ut ional Convent ion f i r s t  met ,  it d id so in oppos it ion to the 
offic ial pol icy that the pol it ical un ity o f  the whole of Microne s ia should 
be mainta ined . It lost only g radually i ts ant i-estab l i shment char acter , 
and attracted some f i nanc ial support from the US author i t ies . Even then , 
because the agenc ies r esponsible for t e r r i tor ial administrat ion had not 
been involved e i ther in the constitut ion-mak ing process or in the 
negot iat ion of future status , it was d i ff icult for them to real ise that the 
t ime had come to t a i lor the i r  own act ions largely by refer ence to the 
wishes of the new Governments . 
Th e MI Const itut ional Convent ion cons isted of for ty-e ight deleg ates 
represent ing a s ignif icantly wider spectrum of Marshal lese soc iety than 
would have res ulted from call ing only on member s  of the MI deleg at ion to 
the Cong ress of Mircone s i a  and on member s  of the Nitijela .  Both these 
groups we re r epresented , as were the t r ad i t ional leaders , the iro�J . The 
Convention delegates also included an ' owner ' from the atoll of L i k iep 
where the heads of famil ies descended from two Europeans who had settled 
there had come to have a status cor respond ing to t r ad it ional leaders . 
There we re also th i r ty-thr ee deleg ates specially elected from twenty-four 
delegate d i str icts compr i s ing the whole of MI . At the f i r st sess ion ( from 
Aug ust to Oc tober 1 9 77 ) the delegates put for ward proposals , sometimes 
merely as a bas i s  for d i scuss ion wi thout pe r sonal commitment , but in other 
cases as a r e f lect ion of deeply held v iews on such matte r s  as local 
government or land r ights . The Convent ion se t up committees , includ ing one 
on convent ion , procedure and j ur i sd ict ion , wh ich came to be known as the 
CPJ Committee and wh ich ac ted as a stee r ing comm ittee . 
Dur ing the second sess ion ( convened in Febr uary 1 9 78 ) the CPJ 
Committee put forward proposals for inc lus ion in a s ing le text wh ich 
represented a developing consensus among most , though not all , delegates . 
By the end of the sess ion , a more or less complete , though s t i l l  rathe r 
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rough , d r aft of a Const itut ion had been prod uced wh ich could be used as a 
bas i s  for d i scuss ion with the people as a whole . In the interval before 
the th ird sess ion ( 1 5  Novembe r to 2 1  Decembe r 1 9 78 ) Convent ion Corrun ittees 
held extens ive public hear ing s .  In response to the v i ews expressed , and 
also to improve its leg al e f f icacy, the dr aft tex t was further ref ined . 
The Const itut ion was f inally adopted with the support of all but two of the 
for ty-e ight deleg ates . As with the N i ue Const i tut ion , i t  was to come into 
force only after it had been approved by a maj or ity of the people in  a 
referend um (Ar t . XIV , s . 6 ) . 
In MI , the role of the const itut ional experts had been somewhat 
d i f fer ent from that in N i ue .  Th ere , the const itut ional advi se r , on the 
bas is of h i s  d i scuss ions with al l concerned , had h imself made proposals to 
the N i ue Island As sembly and had been involved on its  behalf  in 
negotiat ions with the NZ author i t ies . I n  MI , the lawye rs adv i sed de leg ates 
who we re put t i ng forwa rd the i r  own proposal s ,  and later produced revi sed 
drafts at the request of the Convent ion Corrun i ttees . In the proceeding s  of 
the Convent ion i t self , the outs ide experts took no par t ,  except to respond 
to quest ions put by the delegates when the Convent ion was meeting e i ther in  
se lect committee or , as i t  d id for most o f  the second and th ird sess ions , 
in commi ttee of the whole . Th is meant that deleg ates in favour of 
part icular proposal s ,  includ ing , as t ime went on , the dr aft Cons t i tu t ion as 
a whole , had to introduce and de fend the i r  pr oposals on the f loor . In th i s  
way , t h e  pol i t ical leader s absorbed the details  and nuances of the system 
of government they were developing , a pr eparat ion wh ich helped to take the 
place of the exper ience g a ined by the N i uean leaders who had been able to 
try out most elements of the i r  system in advance . Although , in both N i ue 
and MI , the const itut ional adv isers had , at t imes , to be conc i l i ator s 
between oppos ing po ints of v i ew and to ident i fy common ground , i t  was never 
the i r  role , in  any d i alogue with the people or the i r  representat ives , to 
act as advocates for a part icular solut ion , and they had sometimes to 
dec l ine inv itat ions to expr e ss the ir own v iews on wh at dec i s ion should be 
made . 
Th e account of const itut ion-making would not be complete without 
re ference to two elements wh ich enabled the people to make a reasonably 
knowledgeable dec i s ion about the i r  future system of government . Th e f i r st 
was the broadcas t ing of the whole of the proceed ing s  o f  the N i ue I s land 
As sembly and of the MI Const itut ional Convent ion . The second was the 
substan t i al effort made by the people themselves to under stand and debate 
the cho ices to be made ( see UN 1 9 72 : par a . 2 7 1 ; Ch apman 1 9 76 : 5 3-54 for 
cont rasting assessments of the e f f icacy of pol it ical educat ion in  N i ue ;  UN 
1 9 79 : paras . 1 54 ,  1 7 1 -77  for an evaluat ion of the opportun it ies to study the 
draft Const itut ion ava ilable to the people of MI ) . 
In a referendum held on 3 September 1 9 74 , in the presence of a UN 
observer team , the Cons t itut ion of N i ue was adopted by a vote of 8 8 7  in  
favour to 4 6 9  ag ainst . The r e ferendum in MI  was held on 1 March 1 979 , also 
in the pre sence of a UN v i s i t i ng miss ion , and the Constitution was adopted 
by 5 , 6 70 votes in favour to 3 , 2 1 0 ag ainst . 
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THE CHOICE  OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
In N i ue ,  the hard dec is ion was whether to become self-gove rn ing . It 
was expl ic i t  that , having t r ied out the par l i amentary system of government 
inher ited from NZ , before mak ing that dec i s ion , the Const i tut ion of 
self-gove r n i ng N i ue would embody that system without substantial chang e .  
The converse was t r ue o f  MI . There was l ittle d i sagreement that i f  MI d id 
not become se l f-gover n i ng i n  federat ion with the other Micronesian States , 
it should do so on its  own , but the cho ice of governmental system on wh ich 
a const itut ion for sel f-gover nment should be based was the largest issue to 
face the Const i tut ional Convent ion . At the f i r s t  sess ion , the de leg ates 
wi shed to con s ider alternat ive systems of government on the bas is o f  actual 
dr afts o f  a const i tut ion , r ather than a theor et ical presentat ion of the i r  
m a i n  features . They had before them three mutually exclus ive outl ines , one 
embodying the par l i amentary sys tem , one the pr es ident ial sys tem , and the 
th ird  combining leg islat ive and executive powe rs in a s ing le elected body 
modelled on a typical local gover nment counc i l . The dec i s ion to proceed on 
the bas is of the par liamentary system was recommended by the CPJ Committee 
wh ich expl ained the reasons for its cho ice in  the fol lowing terms : 
Surpr is ing as it may seem ,  the main reason is that th is 
system i s  c losest to the actual pol i t ical expe r i ence of 
the Marshall I s lands people .  Althoug h ,  for the last 30  
year s ,  they have been governed under a system based on 
the separate phys ical ident i ty of the leg islat ive and 
execut ive br anches of gove rnment , the democrat ically 
e lected representat ives of the people h ave served only 
in the leg islat ive br anch . The Marsh all I s land s have 
never been governed under a sys tem where  the head of 
the executive br anch , al so ,  was democrat ically elected . 
There has been no exper ience in ach iev ing the necessary 
spi r i t  of pol it ical comprom ise wh ich must modi fy the 
inev itable sense of compe t i t ion between the two 
br anches ,  when each is separ ately elected . Events in 
some ne ighbour ing countr ies with a pr e s ident ial sys tem 
of gover nment show c lear ly that th is spi r i t of 
comprom ise i s  even mor e  d i f f icult to find when the 
elected leg i slat ive br anch has a much longer h i story 
and more pol i t ical exper ience th an an elected ch ief 
execut ive . I t  must be said , the r e fore , that , i n  spite 
of the i r  fam i l i a r i ty w i th the theory ,  noth ing in the 
act ual pol i t ical exper i ence o f  the Marshall Is lands up 
t i l l  now par t icular ly equips the people to l ive unde r 
the pres ident ial system of government , to make it wor k  
well . 
In contrast , they already have cons iderable expe r i ence 
of look ing to the people who have emerged as leader s in 
the e lected leg islatures whether the Cong ress of 
Microne s i a  or the N i tij ela as the i r  e ffect ive 
spokesme n ,  e i ther for or ag ainst par t icular cour ses of 
act ion . In some case s ,  the people concerned are 
member s  or off icers o f  statutory author i t ies ; but 
the i r  real author ity comes from the fact that most of 
them are people who have been elected to represent 
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their  own d istr icts in the leg islat ive br anch of 
government ( quoted in UN 1 9 79 : par a . 1 64 ) . 
Subsequent asse rt ions that the par l iamentary system of government was less 
expens ive th an the pres ident ial one ( see UN 1 9 79 : par a . 1 63 )  were , perhaps , a 
r at ional isat ion , though it was t r ue that , under the par l iamentary system , 
the member s  of the Cabinet would be able , and indeed requ i r ed , to funct ion 
at the same t ime as leg i slator s .  The opposit ion to cho ice of a 
par l iamentary sys tem was , in the main , symptomat ic of opposit ion to 
separat ion from the rest of Microne s i a ;  but , r easonably enough , people 
asked whether the par l i amentary system depar ted from the pr inc iple of the 
separat ion o f  powe rs and thus fai led to prov ide adequate checks and 
balances . In answer to th i s  quest ion , the CPJ Comrnittee explained that , 
under the par l iamentary system , the separ at ion was less complete than under 
the pr es ident ial system but both made the same d i st inct ion between the 
leg islat ive , execut ive and j ud ic ial funct ions of government and ent r usted 
those funct ions to d i fferent bod ies . The main checks and balances would be 
regular elect ions , the power of the Nitije'la to pass a vote of no 
con f idence in the Cabinet , the power of the Pres ident to d i ssolve the 
NitijeZa and call for a new gene ral elect ion and the power to call in 
quest ion be fore i ndependent cour ts the val id i ty of governmental act ions , 
part icular ly by reference to the B i l l  of R ights (see UN 1 9 79 : par as . 1 66 ,  
1 67 ) . 
Once the dec i s ion had been taken to d r aft the Const it ut ion on the 
bas i s  of the par l i amentary sys tem , the next quest ion was to ident ify the 
funct ions of the Head of State . The not ion that he m ight exerc i se cer tain 
reserve powe r s ,  but that he should otherwise act on adv ice was so fore ign 
to Mar shal lese exper ience that it str uc k  no respons ive chord . On th i s  
po int , t h e  Cons t itut ion of Naur u prov ided t h e  model ( Ar ts . 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 ) . The 
MI Pres ident serves both as the He ad of State and the Head of Government 
( Ar t . V ,  s s . 3 ,  4 )  but has no powers , formal or otherwi se , vested in h im in 
the former capac ity . 
The Const i tut ion of N i ue had , in th is re spect , also dr awn insp i r at ion 
from Naur u .  The pos it ion was , however , a l ittle more compl icated because 
He r Maj esty the Queen in r ight of New Zealand continues to be the He ad of 
State of N i ue ( s ince N i ue con t inues to be part of the realm of NZ ) and has 
to be r epresented there . He re , a lesson was dr awn from exper ience in CI , 
where the Const itut ion has made prov 1 s 1on for the off ice of a H igh 
Commiss ioner who would be the representat ive of both the Queen and the NZ 
Government ( Ar t . 3 ( 1 ) ) .  From the beg inn ing , th i s  d ual role g ave r i se to 
pr oblems , espec ially as the Const itut ion , wh i le impos ing on the H igh 
Commiss ioner in h i s  capac ity as the Queen ' s  r epresentat ive a gene r al d uty 
to act on adv ice ( Ar t . 5 )  also vested per sonal d iscret ions in h im 
(Ar ts . 1 3 ( 2 ) , 1 4 ,  1 9 , 2 4 ,  2 5 ,  3 7 ( 3 ) , 4 4 ) . In order to avo id a s imi lar 
s i tuat ion in N i ue ,  the Cons t i tut ion , l ike that of Naur u ,  was made 
sel f- r egulat ing (Ar ts . 4 ( 2 ) , 7 ,  22 ( 1 ) ,  2 6 )  avoiding the need to vest 
pe r sonal d i scret ions in the r epresentat ive o f  the He ad o f  S t ate whose role 
could therefore be almost ent i rely ce remon ial . For th i s  reason , it was 
poss ible to prov ide that the NZ Governor-General should be the 
representat ive of He r Maj esty the Queen in relat ion to N i ue ( Ar t . 1 ) . 
Naturally ,  in th i s  capac ity , he exerc ises only such func t ions and power s  as 
are g iven to h im under the law of N i ue ;  and in all cases he acts on the 
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advice , not of NZ Minister s ,  but of the N i ue Cabinet (see , e . g . ; 
Ar t . 4 5 ( 1 ) ) .  
THE EXECUT I V E  
Both the N i ue and M I  Cons t i tut ions prov ide for the elect ion o f  the 
He ad of Gover nment ( the P r emier in N i ue and the Pres ident in M I )  by the 
Leg islature from among its Member s  (N i ue Ar ts . 2 ( 1 ) , 4 :  MI Ar t . V ,  ss . 2 ( 1 ) ,  
3 ( 2 ) ) .  Such an elect ion must be held after eve ry general e lect ion (N i ue 
Art . 4 ( 2 ) : MI Ar t . V ,  s . 3 ( 3 ) ) and there i s  prov 1 s 1on to ensure that the 
Premier or Pres ident does not t ake or retain o f f ice unless he has in h is 
Cabinet a full complement of Ministers (N i ue Ar ts . 5 ,  7 ( 2 ) , 7 ( 3 ) : MI Ar t . V ,  
ss . 4 ,  8 ( 2 ) , 8 ( 3 ) ) .  In both Cons t i tut ions , execut ive power is that of the 
Cabinet , whose member s  are collect ively respons ible to the Leg is lature 
(N i ue Ar ts . 2 ( 2 ) , 3 ( 1 ) :  MI Ar t . V ,  s . 1  ( 1 ) ) .  Th is means , f i rst  of al l ,  that 
the power i s , as a matter of law ,  that of the g roup r ather than of one man , 
as it is under the pres ident ial system . Second ly , there i s  the not ion of 
the cohes ivene ss of the g roup , wh ich i s  the only guar antee , under the 
par l i amentary system, of reasonably stable government . In the absence of 
well-developed par t ies , the not ion o f  stand ing or fall ing together awakens 
no nat ural r esponse . On the other hand , per sonal loyalt ies tend to be 
strong , and the re was no re ason to th ink that th is aspect of Cabinet 
Government would not take root . Th irdly , the concept of collect ive 
responsibil ity to the leg islature evoke s a fur the r set of constitut ional 
convent ions relating to the consequences of deleg at ing execut ive 
respons ib i l ity to ind iv idual ministers , the extent to wh ich the leg islature 
should intervene to red istr ibute or otherwise circumscr ibe executive 
powe r s , and the effect of any such intervent ion on the pr inc iple of 
collect ive r espons i b i l ity.  I t  was fe lt that the cod if icat ion of these 
convent ions in MI would be the most he lpful way of adapt ing the 
par l i amentary model to a US contex t ,  so that , in a l imiting s ituat ion , the 
cour ts m ight be able to f ind ,  in the prov i s ions of the Cons t itut ion itse l f ,  
a means o f  determ ining the boundar ies between the leg islat ive and executive 
function s .  Accord ing ly , the Cons t i tut ion contains a prov i s ion wh ich see ks 
to state expl ic itly the essent ial dual ity of the par l i amentary sys tem . 
Ar t icle V ,  s . 1  ( 2 ) prov ides : 
Subj ect to law ,  the Cabinet may exerc ise element s of 
its execut ive author i ty d irectly , or through its 
ind iv idual member s ,  and through other officers 
respons ible to the Cabinet :  but ne i ther the prov is ions 
of any such law ,  nor any deleg at ion of elements of the 
Cabi net ' s  execut ive author ity shal l have the effect of 
d im inish ing the respons ibil ity of the Cabinet and each 
of its  membe r s  to the N i t ij ela for the d irect ion and 
implementat ion of execut ive pol ic ies . 
In the MI Const i tut ion the re is also a non- l im i t ing descr ipt ion of the 
content of execut ive author ity ( Ar t . V ,  s . 1 ( 3 ) ) .  The purpose was par tly to 
make up for the lack of any actual exper ience of execut ive government , and 
partly to overcome doubts wh ich might have ar i sen from the d i f ferences in 
law and pr act ice relat ing to the funct ions and powers of the execut ive 
under the Westminster and US systems . In some cases , the Mar shal lese 
wi shed to retain the d iv i s ion between execut ive and leg islat ive 
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r espons ib i l ity found in the US Cons t i t ut ion . Th us , no tr eaty may be 
finally accepted and no ambassador or othe r head of d iplomatic m iss ion may 
be appo inted without the approval of the Nitije"la ( Ar t . V ,  s . 1 ( 3 )  (d ) ) .  
Even in  N i ue ,  the re had been reason to set out spec i f ically some 
elements of the execut ive funct ion . In the days when executive 
responsibil i ty was f i r st be ing pr act ised , it was thr eatened by out-of-date 
prov 1 s 1ons and vestiges of pr act ice wh ich seemed to g ive NZ Mini ster s and 
offic i als a controll ing voice in such matte rs as the determinat ion of 
educat ion pol icy and its  implementat ion through the allocat ion of f inance 
and teaching staff . Wh i le these cont inued to be c i rcumscr ibed by the 
l imits of NZ f inanc ial a i d ,  it was important to ind icate that the 
pr ior i t ies should be set by the Gove rnment of N i ue ( see Quent in-Baxter 
1 9 7 1 : par as . 50 ,  5 1 ) . 
As a rem inder to the Cabinet of its  own duties , as we ll as a 
cont inuing rem inde r to NZ of the nature of self-government , the N i ue 
Cons t i tut ion prov ides that the Cabinet shall be responsible for maintain ing 
heal th , educat ion and other soc i al serv ices in N i ue (Ar t . 6 1 ) . These 
prov is ions are par allelled in the MI Const itut ion ( Ar t . V ,  s . 1 ( 3 )  ( g ) , ( h ) , 
( i ) ) wh ich emphas ises also the notion that the enj oyment of health care , 
educat ion and access to leg al se rvices are ind iv idual r ights worthy of 
protec t ion under the Bill of Rights ( Ar t . i i ,  s . 1 5 ) . 
The result is th at , in N i ue ,  only the pol it ical process mon i tors the 
Cabine t ' s  determ inat ion of what it cons ide r s  necessary to prov ide a 
reasonable standard of l iv ing for the people of N i ue .  In MI , the courts 
also have been g iven a gene r al overv iew o f  the exercise of aspects of th i s  
funct ion , b u t  in terms that d o  n o t  inv ite them t o  inte rvene deeply in  
budgetary processes . 
Both Constitutions make prov is ion for the Leg i slature to pass a vote 
of no conf idence in the Cabinet . Th at of N i ue cod i f ies the c lass ical 
pr inc iples . A pos i t ive mot ion of conf idence may be moved by a Member of 
the Government , and a mot ion of no conf idence may be moved by any 
bac kbencher :  but the quest ion of conf idence must be r a i sed spec i f ically ,  
and only after pr ior not ice ( Ar t . 6 ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) ) .  I t  i s  not poss ible , except 
ind irectly ,  to treat a part icular i ssue as one of conf idence : and 
the refore no const itut ional consequences flow from the defeat of the 
Cabine t on such an issue . A Premier defeated on a mot ion of conf idence is 
deemed to have tendered his r e s ig nat ion , but he has always the r ight to 
appeal to the e lectorate by as k i ng for the d i sso lut ion of the Leg islat ive 
As semb ly ( Ar t . 6 ( 3 ) ) .  To pr event th i s  prov is ion be ing used to defeat the 
wishes of the vote rs as expr essed in a g ener al elect ion , the r ight to 
request a d i ssolut ion does not ar ise unt i l  after the As sembly has 
del ibe r ately commited itse l f  to a Premier and his Cabinet . On the other 
hand , the P r emier has no r ight to improve his pol it ical s ituat ion by 
cal l ing for an early gene r al elect ion : but he has the opt ion of 
determining the ac tual date of d issolut ion wi th i n  the last three months of 
the l i fe o f  the As sembly (Ar t . 26 ( 1 )  (b) ) .  The only other c i rcumstance in  
wh ich the As sembly will not r un i t s  full three-year term i s  the case where , 
after two attempts , the As sembly has fai led to elect a Pr em ier who i s  able 
to take off ice along with the requi s i te n umber of othe r member s  o f  the 
Cabine t . In such a case , the As sembly is automat ically d issolved , and 
another gene r al elect ion is r equ i r ed to be held ( Ar t . 26 ( 1 ) (d) ) .  In every 
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case of a d i s solut ion , the cont inuity o f  government is ma int a i ned by 
requ i r ing the Pr em ier and othe r member s  of the Cabinet to remain in off ice 
unt i l  the i r  successor s are appo inted ( Ar t . 3 ( 2 ) ) .  
The main elements of these prov 1s1ons also appear in  the MI 
Const i tut ion (Ar t . IV ,  s s . 1 2 ,  1 3 ;  Ar t . V ,  ss . 2 ( 2 ) , 4 ,  7 ) . Understandably , 
however , no aspect of the pa r l iamentary system g ave the member s  of the 
Cons t i tut ional Convent ion more d i ff iculty than the concept of a premature 
d i ssolut ion o f  the Leg islature , accustomed as they were to the e lect ion of 
leg islator s who would serve for a f ixed term. Even the not ion that , 
following a premature d i ssolut ion , a general  elect ion and a sess ion of the 
NitijeZa m ight need to be he ld at a t ime of year other than the usual one 
gave r ise to a certain amount of conce rn . More fundamentally ,  there was a 
fee l ing that , i f  a President defeated by a vote of no conf idence had the 
r ight to appeal to the elector ate , he would ce r ta inly do so , reg ardless of 
his prospects of success , or of the inconvenience and expense to wh ich he 
would subj ect other cand idates and the country as a whole . Eventually , the 
Convent ion delegates dec ided that there  should be prov 1s1on for the 
premature d i sso lut ion of the NitijeZa , at the opt ion of the Pr es ident , only 
if  it should become clear , after the adopt ion of two votes of no con f idence 
followed on e ach occas ion by an unsuccessful attempt to e lect a new 
President , that the NitijeZa would ne i ther support the incumbent Pr es ident 
and his Cabinet nor elect another Pr es ident in his place (Ar t . IV ,  
s . 1 3 ( 1 )  ( a ) ) .  In the M I  cultur al c l imate where  i t  i s  c ustomary t o  hold i n  
respect those in author ity , a vote of n o  conf idence was not seen as part o f  
the normal funct ion ing of the Leg islatur e .  I t  was thought o f  a s  a measure 
of last resor t to protect the Leg i slatur e ,  and through it , the people , 
ag ainst poss ib le tyr anny on the par t  of the Cabine t . 
THE L EG I SLATUR E  
Longer  expe r ience of the leg i slat ive br anch o f  government put both the 
N i ueans and the Marshal lese on more famil iar g r ound ; but in settl ing its 
detai ls , geog r aph ical and cultural d i f ferences requi red different 
solut ions . 
In N i ue ,  wh ich had long lost its  or ig inal chiefly system , there was no 
reason to cons ider anything but a un icameral leg islatur e .  NZ exper ience 
had not encour aged any bel ie f  in  the ut i l ity of a second chamber in a 
un itary state , wi thout other elements in soci ety wh ich m ight prov ide a 
d i fferent bas i s  of r epresent at ion . 
MI also dec ided to perpetuate the un icameral Nitije Za ,  wh ich was 
already funct ion ing in  the D i str ict ; but th i s  was not an outcome wh ich 
could be taken for g r anted . The dec is ion accorded with a general , though 
not un iversal , acceptance of the idea that MI should not be a federal 
state . The attachment to inst itut ions o f  local government i s ,  however , 
very strong . The Cons t i tut ion recog n ises in an unusual , though not 
ent irely novel way , that the people of every populated atoll or island have 
the r ight to a system of local government ( Ar t . IX ,  s . 1 ( 1 ) ) .  I t  i s  impl ied 
that , if such a sys tem of local government is not g iven under the law 
emanat ing from the centr al gover nment , the people may g ive themselves such 
a system , pur suant to the customary ,  and , it may be argued , the common law, 
both o f  wh ich form par t of MI law (I Trust Ter>r>itory Code ss . 1 02 ,  1 0 3 ;  see 
108 A. QUENTIN-BAXTER 
also Robe r t s-Wray 1 966 : 1 53-57 ) . Never theless , the d iv is ion of author ity 
between local and central government i s  a matter for pol it ical r ather than 
j ud ic i al determinat ion ( Ar t . IX , s . 2 } and there was no d i spos i t ion to create 
a bicame ral leg islature in wh ich the var ious atolls and i s l ands wou ld have 
been r epresented on a bas i s  of equal ity , as well as on a bas i s  of 
populat ion . To the extent that there  was any suppor t  for a second chambe r , 
it was seen as a way of g iv ing a suitable status and funct ion to the 
h ighest r ank ing g roup of t r ad i t ional leader s ,  the iroijtaplap. In the 
Di str ict Leg islatur e ,  e ight seats out of twenty-four we re reserved for 
those leaders ( Ch ar ter of the MI Nitijela ( 1 96 8 )  s s . 2 ,  3 ) . The f i r s t  
quest ion was whe ther th i s  pr i v i leged po s i t ion should b e  pe rpetuated , o r  
whe the r any voter should have the r ight t o  b e  elected t o  any seat in the 
Nitije ta ,  on a bas i s  o f  equal ity . The maj or ity o f  deleg ates favoured the 
latter solut ion , prov ided a place of honour could be found , w i th in the 
Const i tut ion , for the t r ad i t ional leader s .  Few deleg ates favoured the 
creat ion of a House of Ir oij wh ich would share the t ax ing and spend i ng 
powe r s  of a fully repr esentat ive lowe r house . They were , however , r eady to 
g ive a Counc i l  of I r oij an adv isory role , includ ing the r ight to call for 
the r econs iderat ion of any b i l l  wh ich h ad been adopted on the th ird 
read ing , other than an appropr iat ion b i l l  ( Ar t . I I I , s . 2 } . An enormous 
amount of t ime and e f for t went into settl ing the a r r angements for 
member sh ip of the Counc i l  of Iroij , tak i ng account of custom and t r ad i t ion 
( Ar t . I I I , s . 1  ( 2 ) - (8 ) ) .  Even so , seve ral o f  the iriojlap lap real i s ing where 
pol i t ical power would res ide , have s ince pr eferred to enter the e lectoral 
contest for a seat in the Nitijela r ather than claim a seat in the Counc i l  
of I r o i j . 
As to the composit ion of the Leg is lature , i t  was settled doctr ine 
that , in N i ue ,  every v i llage , and in MI , every inhab i ted atoll or island 
should be separately r epresented (N i ue Ar t . 1 6 ( 2 )  (b}  ( i ) ; MI Ar t . IV, 
s . 2 ( 1 ) ) ,  even though , in some cases , the populat ion was so small that the 
pr inc iple of equal representat ion was severely breached . In each 
Cons t i tut ion , an attempt was made to counte r to some extent the ef fect o f  
the d i spar i ty o f  the number of vote r s  in t h e  var ious elector al d istr icts . 
In N i ue ,  s ix " common-roll" seats were created , so that every elector , in 
add it ion to vot i ng for a s ing le cand idate for his own v i l lage con s t ituency , 
had the r ight to vote for s ix cand idates stand ing for e lect ion in a 
constituency compr is ing the ent ire is land ( Ar t . 1 6 ( 2 )  (b)  ( i i} } .  The 
intent ion was that , in th i s  way , the total member sh ip of the Leg islat ive 
As sembly wou ld be more repr esentat ive of the people as a whole , 
oppor t un i t ies for elect ion would be g iven to people who , perhaps , could not 
hope to win elect ion within the i r  own v i l lages , and the As sembly would 
develop mor e  of a nat ional outlook (see Quent in-Baxter 1 9 74 : para . 2 5 } . 
In MI , the deleg ates g ave the more populous atolls mult iple 
repr esentat ion ( Ar t . IV,  s . 2 ( 1 ) ) .  They also g ave a cho ice of vot i ng e i ther 
on the bas i s  of res idence or on the bas i s  o f  the possess ion of land r ights 
in a par t icular atoll (Ar t . IV ,  s . 3 ( 3 ) ) .  The expectat ion was that voters  
l iv ing in the larger commun i t ies , b u t  possess ing land r ights i n  smaller 
ones , m ight reg i ster in the atoll or i s l and where the i r  votes would count 
mor e .  A s  many Marshallese have land r ights i n  a numbe r o f  d i fferent atolls 
and i slands , the scope for a red istr ibut ion of voters i n  th i s  way is qu i te 
large . To control abuse s ,  s uch as swamping a par t icular e lector al d i str ict 
in ant ic ipat ion of an elect ion or b i-elect ion , the Const itut ion expr essly 
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r ecog n i ses the power o f  the Nitijela to make laws presc r ib ing the mechan i sm 
for mak ing a change of voter reg istrat ion ( ibid . ) . 
Each Constitution embod ies the pr inc iple that , i f  the Leg is lature 
reappor t ions the elector al d i str icts , any such r eappo intment shall reduce , 
r ather than increase , the d i spar i ty in the number of voter s  in each 
d i str ict (N i ue Ar t . 1 6 ( 3 ) , prov iso ( c ) ; MI Ar t . IV ,  s . 2 ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) ) .  In MI , 
the Nitijela has the duty of cons ider ing the quest ion of reappor t ionment at 
intervals o f  not less than ten ye ars ( Ar t . IV ,  s . 2 ( 6 ) ) .  
In N i ue ,  g eog r aphy pe rmits the As sembly to meet at shor t not ice and 
for shor t pe r iods ; and the Pr em ier has the r ight to convene the Assembly 
at any t ime ( Ar t . 2 2 ( 1 ) ) .  In MI , there was a des i re to maintain the 
pr act ice of meet i ng in reg ular sess ion on a f i xed date , but the Pres ident 
may convene a spec ial sess ion ( Ar t . IV, s . 1 0 ( 1 ) , ( 4 ) ) .  In both countr ies , 
the Leg i s lature must meet whenever the e lect ion of a Head of Government i s  
requ i r ed (N i ue Ar t . 4 ( 2 ) ; MI  Ar t . IV ,  s . 1 0 ( 2 ) ) and , i f  t h e  Leg islatur e has 
not met for some t ime , a m inor i ty o f  the backbench member s  may requ ire a 
meeting ( N i ue Ar t . 22 ( 1 ) ;  MI Ar t . IV , s . 1 0 ( 3 ) ) .  
In a c losely-knit  commun ity , with inhe r ited concepts o f  loyalty and 
d i sloyalty to those in author i ty ,  one of the h ardest d istinct ions for the 
maj or i ty and minor i ty a l i ke is that between po l i t ical oppo s i t ion on the one 
hand and , on the othe r , s upport for the inst i tutions wh ich pe rmit that 
oppos i t ion to be organi sed and voiced . In r ecog n i t ion of th i s , the MI 
Cons t i tut ion requires  the Rules of the N i tij e la to ensure th at there is an 
oppor tun i ty for all po ints of v iew r epresented there to be fai r ly heard 
(Ar t . IV, s . 1 5 ( 2 ) ) .  The Speaker , whose role had to change from that of 
pol it ical leader of the maj or ity to pres id ing o f f icer only , i s  respons ible 
for ensur ing that o f f ic i al bus iness is car r ied out in compl iance with the 
Cons t i t ut ion and the Rules , and is r equired to exercise h i s  funct ions 
impar t i ally ( Ar t . IV,  s . 8 ( 2 ) ) .  Because under each Constitution the 
Speaker ' s  funct ions i nclude a number of formal act ions ev idenc ing or 
implement ing const itut ional mechan i sms ( N i ue Ar ts . 4  ( 2 )  (b ) , 5 ,  7 ( 1 ) ,  ( 2 ) , 
8 ( 1 ) , 9 ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) , 22 ( 1 ) ,  2 6 ,  3 4 ( 1 ) (b) , 3 5 ( 1 ) (c) ; MI Ar t . I I I , s . 3 ( 4 ) , ( 9 ) ; 
Ar t . IV, s s . 6 ( 1 ) (c ) , 1 0 ( 2 ) ( 3 ) , 2 1 ( 1 ) (b ) ; Ar t , . v ,  ss . 4 ( 1 ) ,  ( 2 ) , 6 ( 1 ) ,  ( 2 ) , 
8 ( 2 ) , 9 ( 1 ) ,  ( 2 ) ; Ar t . XI , ss . 3 ,  4 ( 1 ) , ( 7 ) , 5 )  the re are prov is ions to 
ensure that , i n  the absence of the Speake r , someone i s  always available to 
d i scharge the funct ions of the off ice (N i ue Ar t . 20 ( 7 ) , ( 8 ) , ( 9 ) ; MI 
Ar t .  IV, s .  8 ( 3 )  , ( 4 )  , ( 5 )  ) • 
Again on the theme of impar t ial ity , both Constitutions r ecogn ise that 
the leg islat ive br anch o f  government may h ave d i f f iculty in deal ing 
j ud ic ially w i th the r ights of ind iv idual leg i slators  and vote r s ,  and of 
member s  o f  the pub l ic who are al leged to have acted in contempt of the 
Leg is lature . In each countr y ,  these quest ions are requ i r ed to be dealt 
with by the cour ts (N i ue Ar t . 24 ( 5 ) , Assembly Ordinanae ( 1 966 ) s . 90 ;  MI 
Ar t . IV ,  s s . 9 ,  1 5 ( 1 2 ) ) .  
At the s ame t ime , both Cons t i tut ions embody the common law pr inc iple 
that the cour ts may not call into quest ion the inter nal proceed ing s  of the 
Leg islature (N i ue s . 24 ( 1 ) ;  MI Ar t . IV ,  s . 1 6 ( 1 ) ) .  Under both , it is left to 
the cour ts to draw the f ine l ine between non- inter ference with the 
leg islat ive b r anch of government and the ir  r ight to determine whether an 
instrument purport ing to be a leg islat ive Ac t has indeed that char acter 
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( this  i s  the effect of the phr ase " duly g iven by the Speake r "  in N i �  
Ar t . 24 ( 1 ) and M I  Ar t . IV, s . 1 6 ( 1 ) ) .  
THE JUD I C IARY 
N i ue and MI we re faced by the same concerns and problems in mak ing 
prov is ion in the i r  Constitut ions for a j ud ic ial sys tem . I n  the f i r st 
place , how could such a sys tem be establ ished , without undue r e l i ance on 
out s iders , and with g uar antees of the competence and independence of 
j udges ,  in  a small country with , for the t ime being , almost no 
leg ally-trained people among st its own populat ion? In the second place , 
there was a felt need to make special prov i s ion for the determ inat ion , in a 
knowledgeable for um ,  of r ights pe r tain ing to land . 
N i ue was ab le to pe rpetuate , in large measure , ex ist ing arr angements 
wh ich inst itut ional i sed the ass i stance o f  NZ cour ts , e ither by r equ i r ing 
the cour t itself to funct ion also as a N i uean cour t ,  or by mak ing its 
j udges available to serve as member s  o f  a N i uean cour t .  Thus , wh i le the 
H igh Cour t o f  N i ue i s  established under the Cons t i tut ion as a court of 
r ecord with unl imited j ur isd ict ion ( Ar t . 3 7 )  there is a r ight o f  appeal from 
the H igh Cour t to the NZ Court of Appeal ( Ar t . 5 1 ) ( applying , n atur al ly ,  the 
law o f  N i ue )  • 
Th e MI cour t system, on the other hand , is self-contained , compr is ing 
a H igh Cour t o f  gene r al j ur isd ict ion (Ar t . VI ,  s . 3 ( 1 ) )  from wh ich there i s  a 
r ight of appeal to a Supr eme Court (Ar t . VI , s . 2 ) . Unlike many courts of 
appellate j ur isd ict ion , the S upr eme Court i s  to consist  of a s ing le j udge , 
the Ch ief Just ice of the Supr eme Cour t ,  unless and unt il  the Nitije la makes 
prov i s ion by Ac t for add i t ional j udge s  of the Supr eme Court ( ibid. ) .  
Correspond ing prov is ions e st ablish both the MI High Court and the H igh 
Cour t of N i ue ,  e ach of wh ich may compr ise only a Ch ief Just ice (N i ue 
Ar t . 3 8 ( 1 ) :  MI Ar t .VI , s . 3 ( 1 ) ) .  
Th is element of flex ib il ity in  the cour t s t r ucture was a f i r st step in  
coming to gr ips with the pr act ical d i f f icult ies . A second step was to 
avo id spec i fying in the Const itut ion a need for leg al train i ng or 
exper ience as a qua l i f icat ion for j ud ic ial off ice (N i ue Ar t . 3 8 ( 2 ) : MI  
Ar t .VI , s . 1 ( 4 ) ) .  The th ird  s tep was to make a reasonable compromi se 
between two compet ing cons iderat ions : the str eng thening of j ud ic i al 
independence by prov id i ng for secur ity o f  tenure and the need to be able to 
draw ,  a t  l e a s t  in  t h e  immed iate future , o n  t h e  serv ices o f  leg ally-tra ined 
non-c it i zens . Under the N i ue Const itut ion , the comprom ise involves a 
choice between substant ive appo intment , w i th the r ight to hold office unt i l  
the age of s ixty-e ight ( Ar t . 46 ( 1 ) )  o r  temporary appo intment for a term o f  
not more than one year (Ar t . 4 7 ) . The same k ind o f  cho ice i s  pe rmitted by 
the MI Constitution , except that only a pe r son who is not an MI c it i zen may 
be appo inted for a spec i f ied term. If a c i t i zen is appo inted a j udge , he 
holds o f f ice , dur ing good behaviour , unt il  he reaches the ag e of 
seventy-two (Ar t . VI ,  s . 1 ( 4 ) ) .  Each Constitution conta ins prov is ions 
l imit ing the g rounds on wh ich a j udge may be removed from office (N i ue 
Ar t . 4 9 :  MI Ar t . VI , s . 1  ( 8 ) ) and prov id ing for the f ix ing of j ud ic i al 
salar ies by Ac t ( N i ue Ar t . SO :  MI Ar t . VI ,  s . 1  (7 ) ) .  
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The N i ue Constitution vests the substantive power to make j ud ic i al 
appointment in the Cabinet ( Ar t . 45 )  but in MI , the Cabinet must act in 
accordance w i th the recommendat ions of the Jud ic i al Serv ice Comm iss ion 
( Ar t . VI , s . 1  ( 4 ) ) ( compr i s ing the Ch ief Just ice , the Attor ney-General and an 
MI c it i zen appointed by the Cabinet (Ar t . VI , s . 5 ( 1 ) ) ) . Jud ic ial appo int-
ments also require  the approval of the Nitije Za ( Ar t . VI , s . 1 ( 4 ) ) .  
Under both Cons t i tut ions , prov is ion i s  made for a spec ial cour t hav ing 
j ur i sd ict ion to determine quest ions concerning the t itle to land and 
related quest ions governed by the customary law .  In N i ue ,  it was a matter 
of mak ing prov 1 s 1on in  the Cons t i tut ion for two cour ts wh ich had been 
funct ion ing for many year s - the Land Cour t ( Ar t . 4 0 )  and the Land Appellate 
Court ( Ar t . 4 3 )  and the main prov is ions o f  the ex isting law we re followed 
without be ing cal led in quest ion . In contrast to the s ituat ion in N i ue ,  in  
MI there  had not bee n ,  at least in the per iod of the Tr usteesh ip , any 
spec ial cour t to deal with matte r s  r e l at ing to land . An assessor m ight s i t  
with a j udge pr e s id ing i n  t h e  Tr ial Division o f  the H igh Cour t ,  t o  advise 
h im in r eg ard to the local law and custom ( 5  Tr>ust Terri tory Code s . 3 5 3 )  
but there was c lear ly a wide-spr ead fee l ing that dec is ions in  land matters 
had not always taken full account of the nuances of the appl icable 
customary l aw .  The deleg ates therefore wi shed to establish a Tr ad it ional 
Rights Cour t .  As the Convent ion d id not have at its  d i sposal the t ime and 
knowl edge to deal de f in i t ive ly with all aspects of the compos it ion and 
funct ion ing of such a cour t ,  the Constitution sets out a framework with in 
wh ich they may be determined by Ac t ,  and , pend i ng that , by the High Cour t .  
The Trad it ional Rights Cour t cons ists o f  panels o f  three o r  more j udges 
fair ly r epr esent ing the d i fferent c lasses of MI land r ights . It does not 
have or ig inal j ur isd ict ion but a par ty to a proceed ing in another court may 
invoke j ur isdict ion as of r ight . The determinat ion by the Tr ad i t ional 
Rights Cour t is referred bac k  to the or ig inat ing cour t ,  where it must be 
g iven substant ial we ight , but i t  is not to be deemed bind ing unless the 
or ig inat ing cour t concludes that j ust ice so r equ ires (Ar t .VI , s . 4 ) . 
Despite the pr ov i s ion for the max imum involvement in the 
administrat ion of j ust ice of N i ue ans and Marshallese who may not have leg al 
tr ain ing , both countr ies wi l l ,  for the t ime be ing , have to rely to some 
ex tent on the serv ices , as counsel or j udges , of lawye rs from other 
j ur isd ict ions . Th is w i l l  call for a spec ial e f fo r t  on the par t of those 
laywer s  to get ins ide the s k i n  of the relevant Const itution and leg al 
system , and to remember that it must be al lowed to oper ate in its own 
soc ial and cultur al set t i ng . Spec i f ically, th is may requ i r e  of the 
NZ-tr ained l awyer the un fami l i ar task of we igh ing leg i slat ive or execut ive 
act ion ag a inst the requ i rements of a Constitut ion wh ich is supr eme law .  
US-trained l awyers a r e  thoroughly famil iar with the techn iques involved ; 
but they i n  turn may be tempted to rely too heav i ly on the ir own 
j ur i spr udence and soc ial c l imate . On the other h and , the r e ad iness of us 
cour ts to look at the leg islat ive h istory as an a id to interpretat ion is a 
precedent wh ich almost certainly w i l l  be fol lowed , at least in MI , with 
benef ic ial results . 
The MI Const itut ion conta ins d irect ives wh ich express the need to 
ach ieve a cor rect balance among poss ibly compet i ng influences on j ud ic i al 
behaviour . It requires a cour t ,  in  i nte rpr e t ing and applying the 
Const itut ion , to look to the dec i s ions of cour ts of other countr ies hav ing 
const itut ions s imilar , in the re levant r espect , to MI . It is not , however ,  
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bound by any such dec i s ion and in followi ng i t , a court  shal l adapt it to 
MI need s ,  taking into account the Const itut ion as a whole and the 
c i rcumstances in the country from t ime to t ime . The Cons t i tut ion fur ther 
requ i r e s  that , in  all cases , its prov is ions shall be constr ued to ach ieve 
the a ims of fair  and democr at ic government , in the l ight of reason and 
expe r ie nce (Ar t . I ,  s . 3 ) . Th ere are no such express d irect ives in  the 
N i ue an Cons t i t ut ion . Equal ly , however ,  in  interpret ing that instrument and 
the gover n i ng Niue Constitution Aat , the r e  is need to focus on the ir 
spec ial purpose and status i n  the law o f  N i ue .  The i r  interpr etat ion will 
almost certainly call for a wider frame of r e ference than that wh ich might 
ord inar ily c ircumscr ibe , under NZ l aw ,  a dec is ion on a que st ion of 
statutory interpretat ion . 
TH E PROTECT I ON OF HUMAN R I GHTS , COMMUN I TY VALUES AND R I GHTS TO LAND 
On the fr amework pr ov ided by the three br anches o f  gove rnment , the two 
Cons t i t ut ions build the i r  own str uctures to protect ind iv idual r ights and 
to pr ese rve and str eng then the values of the community . 
In MI , th i r ty ye ars ' exposure to US administrat ion and educat ion , the 
ex istence of a B i l l  of Rights in  the TPust TePPitory Code ( ss . 1 - 1 4 )  and the 
invocat ion of the Ame r ican B i ll of Rights in the US cour ts to protect 
impor tant commun ity values in MI ( e . g . , act ions i n i t iated in an e f for t to 
halt nuclear weapons testing )  put beyond a shadow of doubt the inclus ion of 
a B i l l  of Rights in the Cons t i tut ion and the role of the courts in  
enforc ing i t . The only que st ion was the te rms in wh ich i t  should be 
fr amed . Op in ion polar ised between word- for-word adherence to the 
unqual i f ied assurances apparently confe r red by the US B ill of Rights and a 
more caut ious formulat ion wh ich would reflect two cons iderat ions . The 
f i r st was that , in  the US , the r ights so br iefly formulated had been 
ex tens ively interpreted by the cour ts to adapt them to chang ing cond i t ion s ,  
and t o  str i ke a bal ance between the compe t i ng r ights o f  ind iv iduals , and 
between ind iv idual r ights and the co llec t iv i ty of r ights embod i ed in the 
state . The second flowed from the f i r st :  an anx iety that the r ights 
developed and the balances str uc k  in  the US m ight be imposed on the very 
d ifferent MI soc iety in  ways wh ich m ight d amage its funct ion ing or even 
threaten its  cont inued ex i stence . In r esponse to the latter po int of v iew , 
a draft was introduced at the second sess ion of the Convent ion ind icat ing 
the restr ict ions wh ich other cod i f iers  had pl aced upon part icular r ights in  
order to take account of the r ights of othe r s .  The dr aft drew on such 
sour ces as the European Convent ion on Human Rights and the B i l l  of Rights 
in the WS Const i tut ion . When people in  MI s aw that , in  g ener al , th i s  draft 
fa i led to pr escr ibe the tests by wh ich the reasonableness of permitted 
restr ict ions m ight be j udged , they r eacted sharply . I t  became c lear that 
the US B i l l  of Rights should serve as the mode l .  
The result , i n  the Cons t i t ut ion f inal ly adopted , i s  a cat alogue of 
pos it ive g uar antees , r epe a t ing , spe l l ing out and supplement i ng the f am i l i ar 
succ inct assur ances of the US B i ll of Rights , and set t i ng out the cr iter ia 
by wh ich the cour ts are to j udge in  a part icular case the reasonableness of 
pe rmitted categor ies of restr ict ions on the i r  exerc i se . These cr iter i a ,  
based o n  dec is ions of the US Supr eme Cou r t  but adapted to MI cond i t ions , 
have the effect of mak ing unlawful any restr ict ion that does not fulfil  the 
cond it ions laid down . In  cod ifying and adapt ing to the d i fferent 
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cond i t ions o f  a d ifferent soc iety h i story ' s  best- known and most influent ial 
constitut ional g uar antees of ind iv idual l iber t ies , the MI B i ll of Rights 
breaks new g round . On th i s  account , it should have considerable 
pr ecedental value . 
By way of cont r ast , the N i ue Cons t i tut ion , proceed ing on the D iceyan 
v iew that the r ight to ind iv idual fr eedom is inherent in the ord inary law 
of the land , deal t with the possibil ity that changes in the law made by 
statute m ight impinge on th i s  fr eedom . Be fore changes were made , both the 
Leg is lature and the publ ic should have access to spec ialised adv ice . 
Although ther e  was no inc l inat ion to g ive the H igh Cour t a j ud ic i al role in 
con s ider ing the effects o f  leg islat ion , the re seemed every reason to call 
on the Ch ief Just ice to make his expe r t i se available in an adv isory 
capac ity . Accord ingly,  before proceed ing on a b i l l  deal ing with the 
const itut ion and j ur i sd ict ion of the cour ts , the substance and procedur al 
aspects of the cr im inal law and ques t ions of per sonal status , he must be 
g iven an opportun i ty to make comments on the leg al ,  const itut ional and 
policy issue s r a i sed by the b i l l . In order to g ive h im the oppor tun ity of 
pr eserv ing his j ud ic i al role i n  pos s ible future l it igation , he i s , however ,  
g iven unrestr icted freedom i n  dec iding whether and to what extent he should 
re spond ( Ar ts . 3 1 , 5 5 ) . 
The techn iques used in e ach Const itut ion to protect ind iv idual r ights 
were also i nvoked to pr otect community values . That must already have 
become apparent from r efe rences to the MI B ill of Rights prov i s ions deal ing 
with such matter s  as health , educat ion and leg al serv ices ( see above ) • The 
mechan i sm of requ i r ing a formal inqu i ry and published report as a 
pr el iminary to leg islat ion was also used in both Cons t i tut ions in other 
contexts where i ssues of pub l ic sens i t iv i ty were l i kely to ar i se . These 
included , in N i ue ,  changes in the law relat ing to the management of the 
public se r v ice ( Ar t . 3 2 ) : in MI , the enactment of leg islat ion presc r ib ing 
the qual i f ic at ions of j udges ( Ar t . IV,  s . 20 ) : and ,  in both countr ies , the 
mak i ng of the mandatory leg i slat ive prov 1s1on fix ing the levels of 
remune r at ion of the ho lder s  of h igh of fice (N i ue Ar t . 2 5 :  MI Ar t . IV, s . 1 9 ) . 
The same techniques were also used in both countr ies to g ive 
cons t i tut ional protect ion to the r ights to land . In each case it was 
recognised that the Leg islature m ight need to pass laws affect ing land 
r ights . In N i ue ,  the obj ect ive was l ikely to be prov is ion for the use of 
land left idle by its owners when they took advantage of the open door to 
NZ . In MI , there was a felt need for leg i slat ive cod i f icat ion and 
development of the customary law ( Ar t . X ,  s . 2 ( 1 ) ) .  In both places , 
safeguards were desired .  In N i ue ,  a Comm i ss ion of Inqu i r y  must report 
before the As sembly proceeds on any b i l l  relat ing to land quest ions 
( Ar t . 3 3 ) . In MI , a j oint committee of the Counc i l  of I roij and the 
Nitijela must be g iven a reasonable opportun i ty to make a s im ilar report 
( Ar t . X ,  s . 2 ( 3 ) ) .  There , also , the customary law duty to consult 
representat ives o f  al l classes o f  owner s before mak ing any d i spos it ion of 
land became a constitutional requ irement ( Ar t . X ,  s . 1  ( 2 ) ) .  F inal ly ,  the 
B i ll o f  Rights came to the aid of the customary law by dras t ically 
cur tail ing the power of eminent domai n .  Ar t icle I I ,  s . 5 ,  protecting 
prope r ty from con f i scat ion , places str ingent restr ict ions on any tak ing of 
land for publ ic use and prov ides that if  l and i s  taken , the bas i s  of 
compensat ion i s  to be sought i n  the value of land in Marshal lese soc iety 
and not in the i r relevant Western concept of fair market value . 
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Conver se ly ,  the customary law ,  enshr in ing a h ier arch ical system of land 
r ights , had to be protected from att ac k  under a B i l l  of Rights g uarantee ing 
to all pe r sons equal ity under the law (Ar t . X ,  s . 1  ( 1 ) .  
THE PUBL I C  SERV I C E  AND I TS S EN I OR OFFI CERS 
In N i ue ,  the compos i t ion and role of the Public Serv ice Commiss ion 
(PSC) and the bas i s  o f  employment in the publ ic service went to the heart 
of anx ieties about a future in wh ich NZ ' s  controll ing hand would be 
removed . In the pe r iod before sel f-gover nment , the publ ic serv ice , wh ich 
offered almost the only opportun i ty for salar ied employment , was under the 
control of the NZ State Serv ices Commiss ion ( SSC) • There was deep 
attachment to the pr inc iple that public serv ice appo intments , promot ions 
and g r ad ing s should be made independently of any pol i t ical influence . The 
f i r s t  pos i t ion of membe rs of the N i ue publ ic serv ice was to ins ist on 
maintenance of the SSC ' s  role ( see N i ue CCD 1 9 72 : par a . 1 5 ) . Never theless , 
desp ite amendments to the l aw r equ i r ing i t  to account to the Gover nment of 
N i ue for its  overall management and salary pol ic ies ( Niue Act ( 1 96 6 )  (NZ )  
s . 664  a s  repealed and substituted Niue Amendment Aat ( 1 97 1 ) (NZ ) s . 1 2 ) this 
body had not , in the per iod be fore sel f-government , responded fully to its  
dual r esponsibil it ies . 
When the Cons t i tut ion was dra fted , it was dec ided that , as an 
encour agement to g r eater awareness of the importance of the public serv ice 
to N i ue ' s  econom ic and soc ial development , a N i ue PSC should be created . 
Th is body compr ises the Ch ai rman and one other member of the NZ SSC and , 
although the th ird per son is r equi red to be a pe r son hav ing special 
knowledge of N i ue ,  that pe r son is also appo inted by the SSC ( Ar t . 6 4 ) . 
Th us , in response to the wi she s of the people of N i ue ,  the re i s  s t i l l  total 
outs ide control of the N i ue PSC ,  and almost total ident i ty w i th the NZ 
body . The Cons t i tut ion g uarantees that all appo intments to the N i uean 
service shall be made by or on the author ity of the Commiss ion , wh ich i s  
requ i r ed t o  act independently in mak ing a l l  dec i s ions about ind iv idual 
employees ( Ar t . 6 9 ) . 
The at t itude of people in MI towards the independence of the pub lic 
serv ice was a l i ttle more amb ivalent . Wh ile independence was guaranteed 
under Tr ust Te rr i tory administration ( 6 1  Trust Territory Code) there we re 
some who , in an atmosphe re more keenly par t is an than that in N i ue ,  pe rhaps 
looked forward to the day when they would be free to follow the d i stant 
example of Washing ton and , at least in some deg ree , d istr ibute spo il s  
amongst those who had supported the v ictors in a n  electoral contest . 
Never theless , no vo ice was r a i sed in the Cons t i t u t ional Convent ion to 
d issent from a proposal that the MI pub l ic serv ice should be independent , 
under the control of a thr ee-member Commiss ion , with much the s ame , or even 
mor e  assur ances that it would act on an independent and non-d isc r iminatory 
bas is than those wh ich wou ld apply in N i ue ( Ar t .VII , s s . 1 ,  5,  1 0 ,  1 1 ) . 
Much w i l l  depend on the cho ice of member s  o f  the PSC , at least two of 
whom must be MI c it i zens , and on the extent to wh ich they are able to wor k  
free o f  pol it ical and other pr essures . I n  sum ,  the mechanism i s  available 
to maintain freedom from pol i t ical patronage in MI if that i s  felt to be 
des irable . At the same t ime , membe r s  of the Cabinet are ent i tled to be 
adv ised by senior publ ic servants whose loyalty to the Government in off ice 
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i s  not in quest ion . It will  be for the people themselves to dec ide how far 
they wish to exercise the se l f- r estr a ints on wh ich the independence of the 
public serv ice ultimately depends . 
Li ke those of other Pac i f ic countr ies , both Cons t i tut ions prov ide for 
the off ice and co-ord i nat ing role of the senior offic ial of the public 
serv ice - in N iue , a Secretary to the Government ( Ar t . 6 3 )  and in MI , a 
Ch ief Secretary ( Ar t . VI I , s . 2 ) . In N i ue ,  the e s tablishment of th is post 
was seen as an essen t i al element in continu ing to d i scharge the 
administrat ive and adv i sory r esponsib i l it ies former ly vested in the 
Resident Commiss ioner . It would ensure e f f ic iency and overall 
co-ordinat ion of var ious spheres o f  government act iv i ty and rel ieve the 
Cabinet and ind iv idual Ministers of any involvement in day-to-day 
admini strat ion . At the same t ime , the Secretary to the Government would 
exerc ise , and encourage depa r tmental heads to exercise , an adv isory role in 
the formulat ion of pol icy by i nd iv idual Mini ster s and by the Cab inet (N i ue 
CCD 1 9 72 : par a . 1 4 ) . To enable h im to d i scharge th i s  las t-ment ioned 
respon s ib i l ity , i nnovat ive prov 1s 1ons fac il itate h i s  attendance at meeting s  
of the Cabinet ( Ar t . 1 2 ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) ) .  
In MI , where the D i str ict Admin i strator had full re sponsibil ity for 
the execut ive br anch of d i str ict government up to the moment when the 
Cons t i tu t ion came into force , and the re was no pr act ical exper ience of the 
wor k i ng of the Cabinet sys tem , there seemed every reason to include 
cor respond ing prov is ions , and to ex tend them by confer r ing s im i lar r ights 
and respon s ib i l it ies on two othe r senior o f f ic i als , the At torney-General 
and the Secr etary of Fi nance ( Ar t . V ,  s . 1 0 ( 4 ) , ( 5 ) ) .  The At tor ney-General , 
act ing indepe ndently of any pol it ical d i rect ion , is required to adv i se the 
Government and its  member s  on leg al matters and to be respons ible for 
instituting , conducting or d i scont inu ing proceed ing s  for offences . 
Re flecting the d uty laid upon the execut ive br anch of the US Gover nment , he 
is also respons ible for " see ing to i t  that the laws are faithfully 
executed " ( Ar t .VI I ,  s . 3 ) . He i s  g iven s t and ing , act ing in the name of the 
people of MI , to br i ng any v iolat ion of the Const i tut ion be fore the cour ts 
( Ar t . I ,  s . 4 ) . On the Secretary o f  F i nance rests the duties o f  prepar ing 
the publ ic accounts and adv i s i ng the Minister of F i nance on all matter s  
per tain ing t o  the budget ( Ar t .VI I , s . 4 ) . These dut ies reflect the 
f inanc ial respons ib i l i t ies of the Cabine t  under the par l iamentary system . 
He re the Const itut ion b i t  hardest into establ ished pr act ices . The 
NitijeZa was accustomed to playing some par t  in scrut i n i s ing the D i str ict 
Administrat ion ' s  proposals for the expend i ture of us g rant funds , but no 
correspond ing budgetary mechan i sm had evolved in relat ion to local revenue 
wh ich was at the d ispos it ion of the Nitijela .  Indiv idual members 
introduced appropr iat ion b i lls for purposes to wh ich they attached 
importance , and they were somet imes able to demonstr ate that they h ad been 
instrumental in obtain ing tang ible benef its for the i r  const i tuents . 
In these c ircums tances ,  ther e  was a f i r st react ion of shock to the 
not ion that , under the par l iamentary system , no proposal for taxat ion or 
expend iture could be al lowed to proceed without the bac k ing of a member of 
the Cabinet ( Ar t .VI I I , s . 2 ) . Developed or ig inally as a means of exercising 
minister ial control over the monarch ' s  r equests for supply , the pr inc iple 
can be taken for g r anted when the par l i amentary sys tem oper ates on a str ict 
party bas i s .  But when pol it ical al leg iances are inchoate or sh i f t ing ,  the 
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f inanc ial r esponsibil ity of the Cabinet is the only way in wh ich the 
Government i s  able to present to the Leg islature a coherent f inanc i al 
po l icy . Th is carr ies with i t  an ident i f iable respon s ib i l i ty not only to 
the Leg islature but also to the elector ate . For that reason , as the 
Convent ion delegates came to real ise , the play of pol it ical forces , w i th in 
the r anks of the Gove rnment ' s  suppor ters as wel l  as those of its  opponents , 
would s t i l l  affect the f inanc i al proposal s  put forward and adopted . 
C I T I ZENSH I P  
I n  the prov is ion made for c i t i zensh i p ,  N i ue and M I  had each to 
exercise the i r  basic dec i s ions about the r elat ionsh ip they des i r ed to have 
with the former administer ing author i ty .  The retent ion of NZ c it i zensh ip 
by the people of N i ue is prov ided for ( Niue Constitution Aat ( 1 974 ) s . 5 ) . 
In the law of N i ue ,  th i s  prov is ion forms part of the Cons t i tut ion and may 
be amended only by the most str ingent of the procedures for amendment 
( Ar t . 3 5 ( 1 ) (b)  ( i ) ) .  In NZ l aw ,  i t  i s  on the s ame foot ing as any other Ac t 
of Par l i ament , but i t  represents also a solemn assur ance to the Government 
and people of N i ue by the NZ Government . 
The people of MI , hav ing rej ected the idea of US c it i zensh ip , had to 
make prov 1s 1on for a c it i zensh ip of the i r  own . The f ir st step was to 
dec ide wh ich Tr ust Te rr i tory c i t i zens should become MI c it i zens on the 
entry into force of the Const itut ion . Surpr i s ing ly ,  the administer i ng 
author ity took no interest in th is quest ion , and each Microne s i an ent i ty 
dec ided for itself who should acqu ire  its  c i t i zensh ip . I t  i s  not 
imposs ible , therefor e ,  that cases of statelessness may ar i se . The second 
question was to sett le the bas is on wh ich c it zensh ip would be acqui r ed by 
ch ildren born after the entry i nto for ce of the Cons t itut ion . The 
Convent ion deleg ates were clear that , in both contex ts , c it i zensh ip should 
go , and only go , with r ights to land . They therefore rej ected the 
pr inc iple o f  ius soli, appl ied in US law ,  and followed the pr inc iple of ius 
sanguinis ,  wi thout l imit ing its appl icat ion to success ive gene r at ions born 
outs ide MI (Ar t . XI ,  s . 1 ) . Th is approach was c lear ly incons i stent with any 
general outlawing of d ual c i t i zensh ip , but , as it may be inconvenient that 
pe rsons who have los t all touch with MI w i l l  neverthe less be c i t i zens by 
b i r th , as well as c i t i zens of another country , the law may impose the 
requ i r ement of e lect ion in such cases ( Ar t . XI , s . 3 ) . Persons not 
automat ically becoming c i t i zens but hav i ng a real connect ion with MI may 
become c i t i zens by r eg i str at ion ( Ar t . XI ,  s . 2 ) . 
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTI TUTI ONS 
The N i ue Cons t i tut ion , der iv ing its  legal force from an NZ Ac t of 
Parliament , i s  in the Br it ish Cormnonwealth t r ad i t ion of const i tut ion-mak i ng 
for former dependent te r r i tor ies . Although NZ had fostered the exercise of 
autochthony i n  the forme r Trust Terr i to r y  of WS , i t  was not i nappropr i ate 
that the N i ue Cons t i tut ion , l ike that o f  C I , should be created without any 
break in leg al cont inuity . The goal was not Independence but a form of 
free assoc iat ion involv ing the maintenance of a const i tut ional link . 
Nevertheless , by recog n 1s 1ng that N i ue should be self-governing and that 
the Const i tut ion should be the supreme law o f  N i ue ,  the NZ Par l i ament put 
i t  beyond its own powe rs to alter the Cons t i tut ion , or make other changes 
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i n  the law o f  N i ue .  Under the Const itut ion , the Leg islat ive Assembly is 
the only body with the power to make , or in  the case of const itut ional 
amendments , to i n i t iate , s uch changes { Niue Constitution Act ( 1 974 ) (NZ ) 
s s . 3 ,  4 ( 1 ) ,  B :  Ar ts . 2 8 ,  3 5 , 36 ) . 
By a d i ffe rent route , a s im ilar s i tuat ion was reached in the law of 
MI . The people there wanted to make a break w i th the past . Therefore , i n  
keeping with U S  exper ience and legal doctr i ne , they wi shed t o  g ive 
themselves the i r  own Constitution , wh ich would der ive its  force solely from 
its adopt ion by the representat ives of the people meet ing in const itut ional 
convent ion , and its subsequent approval by a maj or i ty of the people in a 
referendum . The steps taken unde r US l aw to recog n ise the Cons t i tu t ion d id 
not purport to confer on i t  the force of law ( Secretar ial Order No . 303 9 ) . 
Thus the US offic ial s  acknowledged its inherent author i ty :  but they had 
more d i ff iculty i n  accept ing the impl icat ions o f  its  status as the supreme 
law of MI (Ar t . I ,  s . 1 ) . 
Wi th the real i sat ion that the Constitution would come into force 
before the terminat ion of the Tr usteesh ip , and wish i ng to protect its  
supremacy , the Convent ion deleg ates had included a mechan i sm for the 
mod i f icat ion of the Const i tution dur ing the per iod that the Tr usteesh ip 
Ag reement con t inued to be par t  of MI law (Ar t . XI I I , s . 4 ) . Although the US 
author it ies asser ted that they reta ined leg al author ity to make these 
mod i f icat ions by v irtue o f  US law as i t  appl ied to the Tr ust Terr itory, i t  
was not e a s y  t o  controvert t h e  argument that , i f  t h e  Cons t i tut ion had any 
valid i ty at al l ,  it had the e f fect of creat ing a separ ate MI leg al sys tem . 
At leng th ,  i t  was ag reed that i n  accordance with the procedure l a id down in 
the Cons t i tut ion , an Ac t of the NitijeZa would r ecogn ise the mod i f icat ions 
set out in a Secretar ial Order (Public Law 26-23-2 ( 1 979 ) s . 3  as 
supplemented by Re solut ion No . 7 ,  c l . 6 of the MI Const i tut ional Convent ion 
Tr ans i t ion Conunittee ( 3 0 Apr il  1 9 79 ) ) .  Th at Order would itself conf i rm the 
NitijeZa Ac t ( Secretar ial Order No . 303 9 ) . Th is procedure preserved intact 
the pr inc iple that the Cons t i tut ion may be amended only by the procedures 
laid down in the Cons t i tution itsel f .  
I n  cons ider ing these procedur es , i t  was necessary ,  in  both N i ue and 
MI , to take account of the impor tance wh ich people attached even to 
quest ions of detail in each Const i tut ion . In both cases , people wi shed to 
have assur ances about the way the i r  institutions of government would 
actually wor k .  The MI Cons t i tut ional Conve·nt ion made a consc ious dec is ion 
not to leave large quest ions of government structure or process unsettled , 
or to make too much depend on act ion by the Nitije Za in the f i rst few years 
of sel f-government . There was the refore a des i re to make the det ails as 
we ll as the broad pr inc iples , relat ively hard to change . In N i ue ,  any 
amendments , and in MI , all but maj or amendments , may be proposed by b ill in 
the Leg islature . The b i l l  must be passed on second and th ird read ing s  by a 
two- thirds major ity,  with an interval of three months between the two 
read ing s  to al low t ime for informed publ ic debate . Except in the case of 
maj or amendments , the b i l l  will come into force when i t  has been approved 
by a maj or ity of voter s  in a referendum (N i ue Ar t . 3 5 :  MI Ar t . XI I ,  s . 3 ) . 
In N i ue ,  maj or amendments compr i se any alterat ions to the prov isions 
of the Niue Constitution Act conce rning the bas is of sel f-government in 
free assoc iat ion with NZ , to the mak i ng of appo intments to the public 
serv ice and to the amendment procedure itse l f .  Amendment of those 
118 A. QUENTIN-BAXTER 
prov is ions r equ i res approval by a two-thirds maj or ity in the referendum 
( Ar t . 3 5 ) . 
In MI , the re was a strong feel ing that the bas ic pr inc iples of the 
Cons t itut ion should be alterable only by a procedure demonstr at ing even 
more c learly than those followed in estab l i sh ing the Const itut ion that the 
people we re in favour of chang e . Consequently , the concept o f  maj or 
amendments was g iven a wide amb i t  ( Ar t . XI I ,  s . 2 ) . Such amendments must be 
approved by a spec ially convened const itut ional convent ion and approved by 
a two- th i rds maj or ity in a refe rendum .  There are prov 1s 1ons for the 
conveni ng of such a convent ion e ither by Act of the Nitijela approved on 
second and th ird r ead ing s  by a two- th irds maj or ity or as a result of a 
popular i n i t i at ive wh ich must i tself be the subj ect of a re ferendum . In 
e ither case , the convent ion i s  restr icted to a con s ideration of proposals 
for amendment not i f ied in the pub l ic pet i t ion or the empower i ng Ac t 
( Ar t . XI I ,  s . 4 ) . 
I t  would have to be said that the Cons t itut ions of both countr ies are 
the refore r ather r ig id ;  but th is was the only bas i s  on wh ich people we re 
pr epared to commi t  themselves to government by the i r  own pol i t ical leaders 
accompan ied by , or pr epar ing the way for , a change i n  the i r  r elat ionsh ip 
with the admini ster ing author ity . 
THE RELATIONSH I P  OF FREE ASSOC I AT I ON W I TH THE FORMER 
ADMI N I STER I NG AUTHOR I TY 
It is outs ide the scope of th i s  paper to set out in detai l  the nature 
and e f fect of the relat ionsh ip of free assoc iat ion wh ich N i ue already has 
with NZ i and wh ich MI i s  contemplat ing with the US ( see n . 2 ) . There i s ,  
however , some value in iden t i fyi ng the boundary l ines wh ich are or will be 
fixed by the Constitutions of the two assoc iated States and by the 
const itut ional law of the former admini ster ing author i ty .  Outs ide these 
l im its , norms of inte rnat ional law will  tend to govern re lat ionsh ips . 
The star t ing po int is the un l im ited const itut ional capac i ty wh ich each 
Cons t i t u t ion confe r s  on the execut ive and leg islat ive br anches of 
government . No g ap in the leg al sys tem pr events them from ente r i ng into 
t r ansact ions with other states . The MI Const itut ion r e fe r s  expressly to 
the respon s ib i l ity of the Cabinet for conduct i ng for e ign affa i r s  (Ar t . V ,  
s . 1 ( 3 )  (d) ) .  The same re sponsibil ity i s  impl ic i t  i n  the prov is ion wh ich 
empower s  the N i ue Cabinet to exerc ise on behalf of the Queen the execut ive 
author i ty of N i ue ( Ar t . 2 ( 2 ) ) .  Each Cons t i tu t ion confers plenary 
leg i sl at ive powe rs (N i ue Ar t . 2 8 ;  MI  Ar t . IV, s . 1 )  and contemplates the i r  
u s e  to implement treat ies ( Niue Constitution Aat ( 1 974 ) (NZ ) s . 8 ;  MI  
Ar  t . V ,  s • 1 ( 4 ) ) • 
Th is propos it ion leads on to the nex t : the powers confer red 
Government are exclus ive . Ne ithe r Const i tu t ion g ives to the 
admini ster ing autho r i ty any execut ive or leg islat ive competence in 
of e ither assoc iated State . In th i s  contex t ,  i t  i s  necessary to 
care fully the e f fect of s . 6  of the Niue Constitution Aat :  
Noth ing in th i s  Ac t or in the Const i tut ion shall af fect 
the re spons ib i l i t ies of He r Maj esty the Queen in r ight 
on each 
forme r 
respect 
ex am ine 
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of New Zealand for the external affairs  and de fence of 
N i ue .  
Many th ing s  have , a t  t imes ,  been read into th i s  prov 1 s 1on wh ich f i r st 
appeared in the CI Constitution Act of 1 9 64  ( s . 5 ) . Although some 
leg islators  apparently bel ieved then that it d id impose unspec if ied 
l imitat ions on the author ity of C I , a careful analys is ind icates that i t  
d id n o t  have t h a t  effect . In relat ion to N i ue ,  s . 6  acknowledges that in 
the f i r st place , the free assoc iat ion of N i ue with NZ i nvolves a 
constitut ional l ink . Both countr ies owe al leg iance to the Queen in r ight 
of New Zealand and form par t o f  a s ing le realm .  Th is was a prerequ is i te to 
an arr angement under wh ich the people of N i ue would remain NZ c it i zens 
( Niue Constitution Act ( 1 97 4 )  (NZ )  s . 5 ) . Read in conj unct ion with 
Parliament ' s  declarat ion that "Ni ue shall be sel f-govern ing "  (ibid . : s . 3 )  
s . 6  was a reminder that the NZ Government would s t i l l  have the 
const i tut ional author i ty to act for the realm as a whole , i nclud ing N i ue ,  
i n  matter s  o f  external affairs  and defence . For that purpose alone , the 
prov i s ion was scarcely necessary . Its main obj ect ive is to g ive an 
assur ance to the Government of N i ue of NZ ass i stance in the f ields 
ment ioned , in terms wh ich embody the not ions both of pos i t ive 
respons ib i l i t ies and of powe r s  held in t r ust . A later sect ion of the Niue 
Constitution Act ( s . 8 )  requires  NZ ' s  respons ib i l i t ies to be exe rc ised only 
after consultat ion between the two Governments .  
The need for NZ ass i stance d id not ar i se s imply from N i ue ' s lack of 
the pr act ic al means to under t ake responsibil i ty for all aspects of its  own 
internat ional relations .  At the t ime when the concept o f  free assoc iat ion 
was f i r s t  evolv ing , the expectat ion was that NZ and its assoc iated States 
would cons t i t ute a s i ng le i n ternat ional per sonal i ty wh ich m ight somet ime s 
need to be eng aged in the interests and on behalf of an assoc iated State . 
In th i s  idea l ies the real impact of s . 6 .  On the other h and , the fact that 
NZ would s t i l l  be able to act i nternat ionally for N i ue was not seen as 
present ing any imped iment to the development of N i ue ' s  own internat ional 
per sonal i ty .  N i ue is free to have deal ing s  with other member s  of the 
internat ional community to the full extent that they are wi l l i ng to have 
deal ing s  with N i ue .  Sect ion 6 does not impose any const itut ional 
l im i tat ion on the executive and leg islat ive powers conferred on N i ue by its 
own Const itution i n  the f ields o f  external affa i r s  and defence . Nor i s  i t  
a reflect ion of any ag reement between the two Governments that the 
Government of N i ue will  refrain from exerc i s ing its leg al powers . The most 
that can be s a id to ar ise from the r elat ionsh ip o f  free assoc iat ion i s  a 
commitment on the par t  of both Governments to consult each other before 
act ing i n  ways wh ich may affect the interests o f  the othe r , r emember ing 
always that i f  e i ther should feel that the conduc t  of the other i s  
incompat ible with t h e  cont inuat ion o f  t h e  relat ionsh ip , i t  i s  free t o  br ing 
that relat ionsh ip to an end (N i ue ,  by const itut ional amendment in 
accordance w i th Ar t . 3 5 and see n . 2 ) . 
F i nally , s . 6  doe s  not g ive the NZ Parl i ament 
leg islat ive or  execut ive powe r with in N i ue to car ry out 
the latter ' s  behalf i n  relat ion to external affairs  
Constitution Act ( 1 97 4 )  (NZ ) s . 8 ) . Again , i t  i s  
associ at ion that N i ue will  honour those comm i tments 
pol ic ies and , if necessary, by leg i slat ive act ion . 
or Government any 
commitments made on 
or defence (Niue 
impl icit in free 
in its execut ive 
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When the governments of other states make an engagement with N i ue 
intended to have e ffect at internat ional law, they contr ibute to a g rowing 
body of pract ice tend ing towards the recog n i t ion in inter nat ional law of 
the inter nat ional pe r sonal ity of a se lf-governing , freely assoc iated state . 
The recently adopted Law of the Sea Convent ion demonstr ates the will ingne ss 
of the internat ional commun i ty to ac knowledge in  te rms that self­
gover nment ,  establish ing const itut ional competence over matters dealt with 
in an inter nat ional instr ument , should be accompan ied by r ecog n i t ion of the 
capac ity to become a party to that instrument . ( Both N i ue and MI , even 
be for e the terminat ion of the Trusteesh ip Ag reement , will be ent itled to 
s ign and rat i fy or to accede to the Convent ion) • The terms of the draft 
Compact of Fr ee As soc iat ion between the US and each of the self-gove r n ing 
States in Microne s i a  suggest that the tr end is l i kely to acceler ate . 
There is expr ess recog n i t ion of the capac ity of the Micrones ian 
Governments to conduct for e ign affairs  (Dr aft Compact ss . 1 2 1 - 1 2 4 ) , and it 
is clearly the expectat ion that they will do so , subj ect only to the i r  
commitments of forebear ance in matters bear ing o n  defence and secur ity for 
wh ich the US Gover nment has " ful l author ity and re spons ib il ity" . The 
" author ity and responsibil ity" seem , however , to involve assistance , 
operat ing r ights and the " opt ion to for eclose acce ss" ( ibid. : s s . 3 1 1 -3 1 6 ) 
and cannot in themselves be taken as an ind icat ion that the US will  retain 
a cont inuing capac ity to speak inter nat ionally for MI i n  these or any othe r 
areas . On the other hand , the provis ion concerning the e ffect of both past 
and future defence tr eaties and internat ional secur ity ar r angements 
( ibid. : s . 3 3 1 ) does suggest that here , at least , US commitments made after 
consultation may continue to b ind the Micrones ian State s .  Th is pos s ib i l ity 
seems also to be contemplated under a prov is ion wh ich recognises th at the 
US Gover nment may " ass ist or act on behalf of" the Micrones ian State s ,  but 
the subsequent denial of re sponsibi l i ty to th ird states " unless expressly 
ag reed " suggests that this ass istance is l ikely to be g iven mostly on an 
agency bas is ( ibid. : s . 1 24 ) . 
I t  can be said with cer tainty that the relat ionsh ip with the US 
c reated by the dr aft Compact doe s not involve any cont inuing const itut ional 
lin k .  Fr ee assoc iat ion i s  the product solely of an ag r eement wh ich 
r ecog n ises that the Micrones ian States are self-gover n i ng ( ibid . : pr e arnble , 
s . 1 1 1 ) . No US i nst itut ion or author ity is g iven in any Mic rones ian State 
any power wh ich purports to supe rcede or over-r ide the powe r s  of gover nment 
confer red by its own Const itut ion . In  MI , as in N i ue ,  the se lf-contained , 
exclus ive powe r s  and author ity confe r red by a Const i tut ion that is supr eme 
law prov ide a safeg uard that everyth ing done within an assoc iated State as 
a result of the r ights and obl ig at ions flowing from free assoc iat ion is the 
product of its own voluntary ag r eement , implemented , whe r e  r equ i r ed ,  by 
prov is ions in the dome s t ic law made by its own leg islat ive org ans . 
I t  will be for inter nat ional law to measur e the e ffect of the Compact 
prov 1s 1ons on the internat ional per sonal ity of MI and on that of the US i n  
relat ion t o  MI . I n the i r  case also , as in t h e  case o f  N i ue ,  d evelopments 
in pract ice will be relevant . He re , i t  is impor tant that internat ional law 
should expand to f i l l  the g aps left when const i tut ional competence 
contracts . Th is proposit ion has r elevance in two contexts . If the 
respon s ib i l ity of the parent state for the internat ional r elat ions of the 
assoc i ated state is l imited , it would be a travesty if that state were not 
able to enter , in its own r ight , into as wide a r ange of internat ional 
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relat ionships as is compat ible with free assoc iat ion . The d r aft Compact 
shows clear ly a contract ion of US r espon s ib i l ity for the internat ional 
relat ions o f  the Microne sian States . Such a contract ion may well occur in 
the case of N i ue also , despite the ma intenance of alleg iance to a common 
sovereign . Th is is illustr ated by the development of the internat ional 
personal it ies o f  the sel f-governing Dominions o f  the Br it ish Commonwealth 
long be fore the d iv i s ib i l i ty of the Cr own , or indeed the autonomy of the ir 
own leg al systems , was fully r ecognised . 
Pr act ice with in the Br it ish Commonwe alth al so suggests that when the 
constitut ional l inks between the par tne r s  in a free assoc iat ion are non­
ex i stent or the i r  s ignif icance is d iminishing , inter nat ional law will take 
the place of the former domestic law remed ies and relat ionsh ips . In the 
pe r iod before Wor ld Wa r I I ,  the self-governing Dom inions saw themselves as 
having a fully developed internat ional pe r sonal ity, but they d id not th ink 
of the ir relat ions with one another as be ing governed by the norms of 
inter nat ional law. Ove r a pe r iod , var ious e lements contr ibuted to the 
wither ing of th is inter se doatrine, as it was known , and , in the post-war 
per iod , the Commonwealth countr ies have regarded the i r  contractual 
commitments to one another as internat ional treaty relat ionsh ips . 
There is ev idence of a s imilar development in the re lat ions between NZ 
and its freely assoc iated States ( e . g . , a civil  av iat ion ag reement entered 
into by the Government of NZ and Cl in 1 9 68 ) . Th e par tner Gove rnments make 
agreements wh ich are ind ist inguishable in form from treat ies , and do not 
appear to be intended for enforcement under the domes t ic law or in the 
cour ts of e ither of the par t ies . Much more expl ic itly , the terms of the 
dr aft Compact show that the par t ies des ire the pr inc iples of internat ional 
law to be appl ied in determin ing quest ions about the ir relat ionsh ip 
( s s . 1 52 ,  3 1 1 ( c ) , 4 24 (d ) ) .  
The r ight to claim the protect ion of internat ional law pr inc iples is 
an impor tant safeguard for assoc i ated states . Wi th in the ir own legal 
systems , the i r  const itut ions can protect them , but this is not so in the 
leg al system of the parent state . In that context , an assoc iated St ate 
like N i ue faces the poss ibil ity that the doctr ine of the sovere ignty of 
Pa r l i ament m ight be seen as cutt ing across the g r ant of se lf-government . 
An assoc iated State l ike MI i s  at r isk  in a d i fferent way . When 
Congressional approval has been g iven , the Compact will be par t of US 
domes t ic law and may be interpreted and appl ied by its cour t s . At the same 
t ime , other protect ions former ly afforded by the law of that country , 
espec ially the B i l l  of Rights , will be , to a larg e extent , withdr awn . I t  
is essent ial that the new re lat ionship of f r e e  assoc iat ion i s  not thought 
of as operating in a kind of no-man ' s- land whe re no wr it run s ,  under e i ther 
const itut ional or internat ional law. The ult imate safeg uard , the r ight to 
move at any t ime to full Independence , inter nat ional law already guar antees 
( see , e . g . , UN Ge neral As sembly Re sulut ions 1 5 1 4 (XV) ; 1 5 4 1 (XV) ( 1 96 0 )  re 
the decolon i sat ion of Cl ) . He re the Cons t itut ions have a suppor t i ng role , 
because they are in all respect as ready to serve the needs of independence 
as those of free assoc iat ion . In conclus ion , one can suggest an answer to 
the quest ion : "Wh at d isting u i shes a freely assoc iated state from an 
independent state? " No t ,  i t  seems , the ex istence of a const i tut ional l ink 
between the par tner s ,  and not necessar i ly the inclus ion of the assoc iated 
state with in the internat ional leg al per sonal ity of the state with wh ich it 
is assoc iated . The elements are , it is subm itted , f i rst , an ag reement 
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between the two gov e r nments wh ich involve s ,  pe rhaps , a g re at e r  deg r ee of 
commitment on the one h and and of forebe a r ance on the other than i s  usual 
in r e l at ion s be tween indepe ndent state s . For the r e s t , free a s soc iat ion is 
not r eg ar ded as a f fect ing the r e l at ionsh ips of the assoc i ated state with 
the outs ide wo r ld ,  wh e r e  i t s  pos i t ion seems l i ke ly to be ass im i l ated mor e  
and mor e  t o  that of a n  independent state . Fr ee assoc i a t ion i s  the hal lmar k 
of a spec i al r e l at ionsh ip betwee n the pa r t ne r s .  Eve n  though inter nat ional 
law s t and ards may apply,  they are s t i l l  not " fo r e ig n " , one to the othe r . 
Th ere i s  a subj ect ive , qual i t at ive e lement , as we l l  as a quant i t at ive 
e lement ,  i n  the r e lat ionsh i p .  Th e mutual for ebear ance needed to make a 
r e l at ionship of free assoc iat ion wo r k  r equ i r e s  a bas i s  of sh ared value s . 
Fo r N i ue and MI , the future depend s on the depth of the shar ing and how 
long i t  is sustained . 
NOTES 
1 In 1 9 70 ,  Pr ofes sor R . Q .  Quent in-Baxter (Victor i a  Un ive r s i ty of 
Wel l ing ton ) wa s appo inted as con s t i t u t ional adv i s e r  to the N i ue I s l and 
As semb ly and r e t a i ned th i s  pos i t ion unt i l  after the N i ue Const i t ut ion had 
ente r ed into force in Oc tobe r 1 9 74 . He was ass i sted by h i s  wi fe , the 
autho r of this pape r .  In 1 9 77 , Pr ofe s so r  and Mr s Quent in-Bax t e r  we r e  
asked t o  adv i se t h e  MI Const i t ut ional Convent ion . T h e  forme r w a s  able 
on ly to g ive a s s i st ance f rom t ime to t ime , but the latter was appo i nted 
Counsel to the Convent ion and wo r ked with it thr oughout its th r ee 
se s s ions . As it wa s always c lear that a con s t i t ut ion founded in a leg a l  
sys tem inhe r ited from t h e  U S  s hould not be dr afted wi thout t h e  help o f  a n  
Ame r i can const i t ut ional lawye r ,  Pr ofe s sor Laur ence Tr ibe ( Ha rvard 
Un ive r s i ty) wa s ,  i n  1 9 78 , appo inted as a consultant and r eque sted to 
r ev iew the d r a f t  Co nst i t ut ion as a whole , paying spec i al attent ion to 
those prov is ion s deal ing w i th the j ud ic i a r y  and the B i l l  of Rights . 
2A Compact of Fr ee As soc i at ion between the US Gove r nment and the 
Gove r nment of Palau , MI and the Fe de r ated S t ates of Microne s i a  ( FSM) was 
i n i t i al led by the US and MI d eleg at ions in Hawa i i  on 1 4  January 1 9 8 0 , and 
was s ig ned on behal f of the Gove rnmen ts of those two coun t r i e s  on 3 0  May 
1 9 8 2 . It is to come into e f fect on the t e rm inat ion of the T r u steeship 
Ag reement after approval by each Gove r nment in accordance w i th its 
const i t ut ional processes , fo l lowi ng in the case of MI , approval by the 
maj or ity of votes cast in a pleb i sc i te .  
3Fo r the repo r t  o f  the UN v i s i t ing m i s s ion to N i ue see UN Gene r al As sembly 
Docs . A/AC 1 09 /L .  8 1 0  Rev . 1 :  A/AC 1 09 /L .  8 1 0 /Add . 1 .  
4 c I  and N i ue have been the on ly former non- self-gove r n i ng Te r r i tor i e s  to 
become se l f-gove r n i ng in fr ee as soc i at ion with the forme r adm i n i ster i ng 
autho r ity , in r e spect of wh ich the UN h as r ecog n i sed , s ince the adopt ion 
of Ge ner al As sembly Re so l ut ions 1 5 1 4  (XV)  and 1 5 4 1  (XV) in 1 9 6 0 , the fact 
of decolon i sat ion . 
5The r e fe r end um on the FSM d r a f t  Const i t ut ion was held on 1 2  July 1 9 7 8 . 
Of the MI votes c ast , 6 , 2 1 7 ( 6 1 . 5 per cent) we r e  ag a i n s t  the Cons t i t ut ion 
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and 3 , 8 88  ( 3 8 . 5 p e r  cent)  were in favour o f  it . For t h e  report of the UN 
v i s i t ing miss ion to observe the referendum see Of fic ial Records of the 
Tr usteesh ip Counc i l  4 6th Se ss . , Supp . No . 2  (T/ 1 7 9 5 ) . 
6The ag reement between the people of N i ue and the Government of NZ 
concern ing the i r  relat ionship of free assoc i at ion is to be found in and 
between the few l ines of the Niue Constitution Aat ( 1 9 74 ) (NZ ) . The NZ 
Pa r l iament has the powe r to repeal at any t ime all or any of these 
prov i s ions , but it would be a breach of fa ith to do so , as long as N i ue 
wi shed to cont inue the relat ionsh ip and was playing its part . Fo r a 
further g loss on the nature of the relat ionsh ip ,  see also the exchange of 
letter s between the NZ Pr ime Minister and the Cl Premier repr inted in 
Appendices to the Journals of the House of RepPesentatives (NZ) Paper 
A . 1 0 ( 1 9 73 ) . 

9. CONST ITUT ION-MAKING IN TUVALU AND K I R I BATI 
D.J. Murray 
In Br it i sh dependenc ies the t r ad i t ion has been for the government of 
the dependency to formulate its independence const itut ion dur ing a process 
of g r adual con s t itut ional development . Th rough success ive stages 
relat ively l im i ted changes are made in the ex ist ing const itut ion so 
ach iev ing an ordered t r ans i t ion from a government under colon ial control to 
one under local control . The t r ansit ion is increas ing ly arr anged in a 
manner that is dec ided by elected representat ives in the Co lony - with the 
leg islature proposing or endor s i ng changes and the execut ive concur r i ng .  
The Br it ish Government wh ile retain ing formal author ity for the 
constitut ion has come to treat its obl ig at ions as be ing to sat isfy itself 
that th i s  tr ansformat ion of the const itut ion has the support o f  the Colony 
Government , that the elector s have the oppor tun i ty to take par t  in an 
elect ion in wh ich the te rms for becoming independent are before them , and 
that the constitution conforms br oadly to accepted pr inc iples of 
const itut ional government . 
In the G i lber t  I s l ands and Tuvalu Colon ies , there we re interest ing 
attempts at innovating in the way the Independence Constitutions were 
fash ioned . In both colon ies effor t was made to depar t from a procedure 
under wh ich , through incremental adj ustments , the colon ial const itut ion 
would be t r ans formed into a convent ional ' We stm inster model ' constitution . 
It was an expl ic it aim that , by following d i f ferent procedur es , 
const itut ions m ight be fash ioned wh ich were bette r suited to the 
circums tances of the colon ies . 
The idea of innovat ing in the proced ur e for fash ion ing the 
const itut ion , and poss ibly in i t s  content also , der ived in the f i rst  place 
from John Smi th , the Governor of the G i lber t  and E l l ice I s lands Co lony in 
the m id- 1 9 7 0 s  who became also the f i r st Governor of the G i lber t  I slands 
Co lony after the separat ion of the E l l ice I s l and s in 1 9 7 5  a s  the Colony of 
Tuvalu . H i s  th inking was influenced by four fac tor s .  F i rst , there was h is 
own ear l ier exper ience as a colon i al o f f ic ial in N iger ia where he had 
par t ic ipated in the pr epar at ions for fash ion ing a const itut ion to r eplace 
the " Richards Const itut ion" of 1 946 . Th is had involved conduc t ing 
wide- r ang ing consultat ions both to awaken po l i t ical awareness and so as to 
secure g u idance on what the publ ic des i r ed . In N iger i a  off ic i als rej ected 
the idea that a committee could " return from the clouds with the pe r fect 
constitut ion to last for ever , wr itten on tablets of stone " ( Foot 
1 9 64 : 1 05 ) . In stead a compl icated l ist of const i tut ional quest ions was 
widely d istr ibuted , and , after d i scuss ion in d iv i s ional and prov inc ial 
meet ing s and nat ive author i t ies , a Ge ner al Confe rence approved a dr aft of 
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what became known as the "Macpher son Const itut ion" . Th i s  was , as S i r  Hugh 
Foot c laimed , " the most amb i t ious plan for pub l ic consultat ion ever 
undertaken in any colon ial te rr i tory" ( ibid. ) . S ig n i f icant ly i t  took 
control over the prepar at ion of a new const itut ion away from the 
Leg islat ive Counc i l ,  and al lowed for power ful po l i t ical forces - includ ing 
the ch iefs and nat ive author it ies in Northern N iger i a  - to be assoc i ated in 
fash ion ing a new constitution . 
A s econd factor in John Sm i th ' s  th ink i ng was that ne i ther the G i lber t  
I s lands nor Tuvalu had had a n  extended exper ience of government in a form 
that served as a pr ecur sor of const itut ional government on the ' We stminster 
model ' .  The G i lber t  and El lice I s l ands Co lony had on ly been placed on the 
standard B r it ish colon ial tr aml ines in 1 9 7 1 -72 . H i ther to ,  the Colony had 
been a d ist inct te r r i tor i al ent i ty in law but governmentally it was not a 
un i t . Thus it had lacked its own separ ate leg islature : the H igh 
Commiss ioner for the Western Pacif ic constituted the leg islature , and i t  
was only i n  1 96 3  that the Re sident Comm i ss ioner in the G i lberts  had 
acquired a leg islat ive author i ty concur rent with the H igh Comm i ss ione r . 
S im i lar ly in the 1 960s  the Co lony s t i l l  came within the j ur isd ict ion of the 
We stern Pacif ic Court and d id not have a separ ate j ud ic ial system . At th is 
stage th inking remained , as the 1 96 5  Co lon i al Of fice Confe rence on the 
future of Br ita in ' s  dependenc ies had been expl ic i t , that the G i lber t  and 
El lice I s land Co lony could not be expected to proceed to Independence . 
On ly w i th the 1 9 70 Const itut ion and its amendment in 1 97 1  to prov ide for a 
Governor to replace the Res ident Cormniss ioner on the abol i t ion of the 
Western Pacif ic H igh Commiss ion , d id the G i lber t  and E l l ice I s land Colony 
acqui r e  a convent ional execut ive counc il , w i th an elected Ch ief Minister 
and a leg is lat ive counc il with an elected maj or ity;  and the Colony only 
acqu i r ed a separate H igh Cour t in 1 9 75 . When the G i lber t I s l ands and 
Ellice I slands were separated in 1 9 7 5 , ther efore , the i r  expe r ience of the 
inst itut ions for the central government of the Colony wh ich had formed the 
bas is elsewhere for adj ustment to s u i t  an independence constitution was a 
recent one . 
A third fac tor influenc ing the Governor of the G i lber t s  was hes i tat ion 
about the appropr iateness of the We stm inster model of const itut ion for the 
G i lber t s  and Tuvalu .  There were a ser ies of doubts about the mode l .  One 
doubt arose from the par t icular dependence in the Westm inster model on an 
independent j ud icature as an instr ument for safeg uar d i ng cons t i tu t ional 
government . Interpret ing al ien prov 1s 1ons , adj ud icat ing d i sputes and 
enforc ing r ules on the government presupposed not only independent cour ts 
but a bar and the means for secur ing access to the courts and i t  appeared 
unr e a l i s t ic to env isage such inst itut ions emerg i ng in a way that prov ided 
necess ary support for a Westm inster model const itut ion . (Even if there 
we re l awye rs in pr ivate pract ice in Ta rawa how wer e  c it i zens in the L i ne 
I slands , dependent for contact with Tarawa on r ad io telephone and the 
occas ional government sh ip , to secure acce ss to them? ) There was doubt 
also about the centr al is ing effect o f  the mode l and the r e l i ance on 
bureauc r at ic administration and the overhead model of democr acy , 
par t icular ly when in the early year s it appeared that the e f fect would be 
to place far too much control in the hands of senior officials , many o f  
whom were expatr iates without the educ at ion or expe r ience t o  restr ict 
themselves to a subord inate but educat ive role . There was fur the r  
hes itat ion about t h e  ope r at ion of checks and balances between inst itut ions 
in a small soc iety , the effect iveness o f  ins t i tut ions l ike a body in 
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imitat ion of Parliament when it had a member sh ip of e ight or a dozen,  and 
the cost of maintain ing the panoply of inst itut ions on a real istic scale 
when the resources of the two colon ies were so l im ited . 
It was also ,  however ,  that to adopt the al ien We stm inster model m i ssed 
the oppor tun i ty of br ing ing to the support of constitut ional government 
features in the culture and soc iety of the G i lber t  I s l ands and Tuvalu both 
of wh ich , o nce they h ad been separ ated into separate colon ies , had a 
cons iderab le deg r ee of c ultural un ity - each hav ing a common lang uage for 
instance . The Gover nor r ecogni sed the streng th of local t r ad it ions and 
systems and it seemed to h im cr uc ial to try to br ing these into the 
const itut ional sett lement . 
F i nally a factor in the th inking related to the pol it ical s i tuat ion in 
the m id- 1 970s . The Governor had doubts about the support wh ich the e lected 
Government on South Tarawa commanded par t icular ly in the outer i s lands and 
he saw d ang e r s  in leav ing to the Government and As sembly the task of 
pr epar ing the Independence Const itut ion . In  the outer islands there was 
already a tens ion between the recently introduced elected local government 
counc i l s ,  and the v il lage mee t i ng s ,  and in  the latter there was a 
part icular d i str ust of the Gover nment in South Tarawa . The pol icy moreover 
of the elected Mini ster s in the Colony Gover nment of establish ing a 
m i l i tary defence for ce par t ly r eflected strains in the relat ions of e lected 
Government and the pub l ic - d i f f icult ies with organ ised labour was one 
reason for the Gover nment to see k  a mil itary force - and th i s  was further 
add ing to the d i st r ust shown to the central Gover nment . What cou ld be 
foreseen was not only that the elec ted Government would formulate 
cons t i tu t ional proposals wh ich lacked wide public support but that the 
elector ate could d iv ide even more expl ic itly on rel ig ious denom inat ional 
l ines and , as a result , for there  to be a g rowing demand to cont inue 
colon ial r ule . If the Co lony was pushed i nto Independence in th i s  
s ituat ion there was the prospect of a government wi th restr icted 
denominat ional support relying on increas ing repress ion to maintain its  
author ity . 
The Gover nor therefore saw cons iderab le mer i t  in opening to wide 
pub l ic d isc uss ion the issue of what form the Independence Const itution 
should have ( and focus attent ion away from the issue of whethe r the 
G i lberts  should indeed become independent ) .  
In  Tuvalu the Queen ' s  Commiss ioner shared much the s ame th ink ing as 
the Gover nor of the G i lbe r ts ( where he had been Deputy Gover nor ) .  I n  
Tuval u ,  however ,  t h e  elected Ch ief Minister prov ided a n  independent 
encour agement to innovatory th inking about the form of an independence 
const itut ion . In response to the Commiss ione r ' s  address to the f i r st 
meet ing of the Tuvalu House of Assembly in Octobe r 1 9 75 in wh ich the 
Commi ss ioner drew attent ion to the need to plan for Independence , the Ch ief 
Minister presented h im with a paper formally stat i ng the des ire of h i s  
Government to g ain I ndependence o n  1 s t Oc tober 1 9 77 and at the s ame t ime 
sett ing out in substantial detail the nature o f  the des i red Const itut ion 
for an independent Tuval u .  He also proposed a method by wh ich the 
Const itut ion should be establ ished on an autochthonous bas i s . The Ch ief 
Minister had wor ked for some year s in  Naur u  and the proposals were closely 
model led on the Const itut ion of Naur u , but also showed a c lear concern to 
develop a const itut ion and mach inery of government adapted to the 
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c ircumstances of Tuval u .  The proposal was that 
const itut ional convent ion to formulat e  and adopt the 
from the expe r ience of Naur u .  
the re should b e  a 
const itut ion der ived 
Wi th such th inking about how to proceed 
constitutions it is wor th out l i ning the 
te r r i tor ies . 
in fash ion i ng independence 
processes fol lowed in the two 
* * * * * * 
In the G i lberts  the Gover nor sec ured the will ing co-operat ion of the 
elected ministers and the As sembly for wide- r ang ing d i sc uss ions and 
consultat ions wh ich culm inated in a Cons t i t ut ional Convent ion in 1 977 . The 
d i sc uss ions began a year earl ier in  March 1 9 76 w i th a ser ies of sem inars i n  
Tarawa wh ich were attended a t  the pe r sonal inv itat ion o f  the Gover nor by 
lead ing f ig ures in G i lber tese soc iety . At the end o f  a week ' s  d iscuss ion 
the d if ferent sem inar g roups presented reports  in a gene r al meet ing . These 
reports and the d i scuss ion influenced the preparat ion of a l ist of 
quest ions wh ich the Governor c i rculated in  Engl ish and G i lber tese through­
out the Terr i tory.  D i scuss ion was encour aged in other ways - involving for 
instance talks on Radio Tarawa and the de spatch o f  teams to all the i slands 
organised by the Un ivers ity o f  the South P ac i f ic Extens ion Centre . 
In Apr i l  1 97 7  w i th the ag reement of the Counc i l  of Ministe r s ,  the 
Governor convened a cons t i tut ional convent ion . Legally it was a purely 
adv i sory body and the membe rs were the re ag ain by inv itat ion of the 
Governor . It was a large g ather ing - 1 69 persons - and compr ised all the 
senior elected and appo inted G i lbe r tese off ice-holder s  in the G i lber t  
Is lands Government and governmental org an i sat ions , r epresentat ives o f  every 
nat ional organisat ion and r epr esentat ives from all i slands and island 
associations . All expatr iate o f f ic ial s , even the Attorney-Gener al , were 
excluded . At the insistence of the Convent ion the quest ions widely 
c irculated by the Governor we re used as the agenda for the meet ing , and in 
three weeks o f  d i scuss ion the Convent ion formulated proposals on the maj or 
features of a const itut ion . In it ially d iscuss ion was dom inated by the 
Unimane or elde r s  from the islands but , us ing the procedures of a 
t r ad it ional Maneaba mee t i ng , the re was a coalescence between d i fferent 
member s  and g roups , and the importance of ach iev ing a consensus was 
ev ident . 
Although the Convent ion was an adv isory body meet i ng to ass ist the 
Gover nment it establ ished for itself a moral  author i ty as the voice of the 
G i lber tese people as a whole . Not only were its proposals the bas i s  for 
further d i scuss ion but th is d iscuss ion reflected an expressed a im of 
interpr et ing what the Convent ion wanted , and , where there was a departure 
from wh at was proposed , s ig n i f icant e fforts  were made by Minister s and 
othe r  m embe r s  of the As sembly al i ke to expl a i n  and j us t i fy the change s .  
The subsequent d i sc uss ion o f  the Const itution took place i n  a way that 
was c us tomary to Br it ish dependenc ies . The proposals of the Const i tut ional 
Convent ion we re rece ived by the House of As sembly and r efer red to a select 
committee of al l the member s  ( includ ing the Attorney-General  as a member of 
the As sembly ex officio) . In July 1 9 77 , the Comm ittee recommended var ious 
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e laborat ions and certain amendments , includ i ng several des igned to i ncrease 
the power of the central Government . Thus the Committee by a maj or i ty 
r ej ected a proposal that leg i slat ion should normally be enacted using a 
procedur e under wh ich the f i r st read ing ( the second or main considerat ion 
in many leg i slatures)  of a b i l l  was to be taken at one meet ing and the 
committee s t ag e  at the next meet ing to fac i l itate consultat ion with the 
public ,  part icular ly in the outer i s land s .  I t  also rej ected the proposal 
that there should be any l im i t  on the number of terms wh ich a President 
could serve ( see G i lbe r t  Islands Const itut ional Commi ttee 1 97 7 ) . The 
Commi ttee ' s  r ecommendat ions were adopted by the As sembly . Accord ing to 
normal pr act ice the UK Government requir ed a g eneral elect ion to test both 
the j udgement that the Colony should go forward to Independence and that 
th is should be on the bas i s  of the proposed Cons t it u t ion . The e lect ion was 
held in Febr uary 1 978 . The fresh House then reso lved that the 
recommendations of the Const itut ional Convent ion for the e lect ion of a 
Pres ident shou ld apply to the e lect ion of the Ch ief Minister , and a Ch ief 
Minister , Ie rem i a  Taba i , was elected nat ional ly .  The House of As sembly 
then passed a resolut ion seek i ng Independence , and , on the proposal of the 
Government , rev iewed the select committees ' recommendat ions for the 
Cons t i tu t ion .  S ign i f icantly i t  r ever sed certain dec is ions o f  the pr ev ious 
year to vary a proposal of the Const itut ional Convent ion wh ich would have 
streng thened the central Government ag ainst the elector ate . Thus the 
prov 1s1on for cons ider ing proposed leg i slat ion in success ive meet ing s  of 
the Maneaba was restored and l ikewi se a l im i t  on the number of terms wh ich 
a Pres ident could serve . 
The recommendat ions on the Const itut ion were subsequently elabor ated 
in a form suitable for cons iderat ion at a constitut ional conference in 
London . At th i s  conference , on the proposal of the G i lber t  I s lands 
Government , a chapter was added des igned to safeg uard the interests of 
Banabans , whe ther res ident on Banaba or on Rabi I s l and in Fij i .  Altogether 
the proposal s of the G i lbe r t  I s lands Government we re approved by the 
Conference w i th only l im i ted changes ( see G i lber t  I slands Cons t i tut ional 
Conference 1 978 ) . The subsequent drafting was under taken i n  London . It 
involved substant ial e l abor at ion and many dec i s ions on consequent details  
were taken by the Counc i l  of Minister s .  The result ing Constitution was 
approved , w ithout amendment be ing proposed , by the House of As sembly in May 
1 9 79 . In the normal Br it ish way it appeared as a schedule to the K i r ibati 
Independence Order wh ich was made in June 1 9 79 . 
I t  is not my intent ion to summar ise the prov is ions contained in the 
const itut ional instr ument . I shall , howeve r ,  comment br iefly on ce rtain 
features wh ich r e flect the procedur e used to fash ion the Const itut ion . The 
Cons t i tut ional Convent ion came to occupy the central place in the process ,  
and i n  i t  those assoc iated with the central  government confronted 
ind ivid uals of stand ing outs ide gover nment . The Unimane - or e lders - in 
par t icular expr essed a d i str ust of central government and a concern to keep 
government respons ive to the publ ic and subj ect to control . Some of the 
str i k ing innovat ions , r eg arded from the per spect ive of the t r ad it ions for 
Br it i sh independence const itut ions , r eflect these conce rns of the 
Convent ion . F i rst the re are cer tain prov i s ions r e lat ing to the off ice of 
Pres ident the Be re t itent i .  The Const itut ion prov ides for a Naur u-style 
Pr esident in that the o f f ice combines the role of head of state with 
cha irman of the Cabinet . As in Naur u  - but unl i ke the Pres idents in othe r 
former Br it i sh dependenc ies - the Pres ident has no immun ity in Law;  he is 
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answer ab le to the cour ts and i s  r emoved from off ice i f  g u ilty o f  offences 
and sentenced to st ipulated pun i shment s .  Un iquely the Pres ident i s  elected 
nat ionally accord ing to a method that involves the elected Maneaba ( House 
of As sembly) serv ing as the nom inat ing body in select ing from its own 
member s  cand idates for elect ion in the Pr es ident ial elect ion . Aga in ,  in a 
manne r outs ide prev ious Br it i sh t r ad i t ion there i s  an absolute l im i t  of 
three terms to the pe r iod any one pe r son can serve as President . Fur the r , 
i f  defeated on a mot ion of no conf idence the Pres ident ceases to hold 
off ice dur ing the ensuing elect ion pe r iod and a Counc i l  of State car r ies 
out h i s  f unct ions thus depr iving h im of the control of the mach ine ry of 
executive government dur ing the ensu ing e lect ion . 
Secondly the electorate is streng thened in relat ion to the 
leg i s latur e .  Member s  are elected using a two stag e  alter nat ive vote 
electo r al system for const ituenc ies wh ich , outs ide Tarawa , const itute a 
whole island . (Th e  detai led prov i s ions for e lect ions are contained not in  
the Const i tut ion but i n  the Elect ions Ordinance ) . Member s  are then subj ect 
to the recall . Fur ther , leg islat ion other than urgent b i lls is r equi red to 
be referred out for cons iderat ion in the const ituenc ies between two 
meet ing s  of the Maneaba . 
There are two other s ig n i f icant features that are wor th ment ion ing . 
The establishment of any mil itary for ce is st ipulated as r equ i r ing an 
amendment o f  the Cons t i tut ion , and cannot be ach ieved under ord inary 
leg islat ion . Th e Const itut ion i s  also requi red to be in  the ver nacular as 
well as Engl ish a prov i s ion wh ich i s  un ique in the independence 
const i tut ions of former Br it ish dependenc ies . 
There are also what some m ight see as g aps in the Const itut ion wh ich 
s imilarly reflect an interest of the Convent ion in  l im i ting government . I 
will  ment ion two , the absence of a ce remon ial head of state a 
Governor-Ge neral r eflects a rej ect ion of the expense of a f ig ure head ; 
and the absence of an ombudsman results from a d istrust of a central ised 
dev ice for inqu ir ing into g r ievances , when it was seen as the j ob of the 
elected member who has to answer locally - on pa in of be ing recalled - for 
h i s  effect iveness in see k i ng the redr ess o f  g r ievances . 
* * * * * * 
In Tuvalu the process for formul at ing the Const itut ion tur ned out to 
be s ig n i f icantly d i ffer ent from that in the G i lbe r ts . The central feature 
of the process r e f lected the Ch ie f Minister ' s  e f forts to retain per sonal 
control over the formulat ion o f  the Constitution . Attempts made by the 
Queen ' s  Commiss ioner to encourage wider d i scuss ion of the Constitution we re 
taken to be attempts at undermini ng the Ch ief M i ni ster ' s  pos i t ion . 
The publ ic d iscuss ion of const itut ional opt ions beg an i n  Tuvalu in  
November 1 9 76 with three sem inars held on d i ffe r ent i slands . The sem inar s  
we re a r r anged b y  the Queen ' s  Commiss ioner with the ag reement o f  the Ch ief 
Minister and the d i scuss ions were focused on the ideas wh ich the Ch ief 
Minister had outl ined in his own conf ident ial pape r wh ich set out ideas on 
an i ndependence cons t i tut ion . The Ch ief Min ister insisted on cha i r ing the 
d iscuss ions on the headquar ter s  island of Funafut i ,  and spoke over the 
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r ad io to warn the Ch ur ch 
sem inar was conducted - to 
quest ions . 
As sembly meet ing on Va itupu - where another 
r e frain from involv ing itself in polit ical 
Thereafter d i scuss ion was arr anged under the d irect control of the 
Government and House of As sembly . In December 1 9 76 the House appo inted a 
Committee of all the e lected member s  under the Ch ie f Mini s ter to " formulate 
v iews on the Const itut ional pr ov i s ions" . The Committee used a l ist of 
quest ions s imilar to those c i rculated in the G i lbe r t  I s lands but toured the 
islands themselves seek i ng the publ ic ' s  v iews on these quest ions in one-day 
meet ing s .  The Comm ittee then produced its r epor t  in Febr uary 1 977  wh ich 
was adopted in May 1 9 77 ( see Tuvalu Const itut ional Comm ittee 1 97 7 ) . A 
gene r al elec t ion was held . The new As sembly con f i rmed its acceptance of 
the Cons t i tut ional Committee ' s  report  subj ect to any amendments to be taken 
at the next meet ing of the House . The report  as amended was then used as 
the Government ' s  proposals for an independence constitut ion presented at a 
Const itut ional Confer ence in London in Febr uary 1 9 78 . The proposals as 
ag reed in the Confe rence formed the bas i s  for the dr aft const itut ion and 
th i s  was approved by the Tuvalu House of As sembly in May 1 978  (see Un ited 
K i ngdom 1 97 8 ) . 
Th is st atement of chronology does not reveal anyth ing about the 
genesis  of ideas . In the development of th inking the init ial sem inar s ,  
unl ike those i n  the G i lberts , h ad no s ig n i f icance : s imilarly the tour of 
all the i slands by the Comm ittee of the As sembly was interest ing only for 
its lac k  of s ignif icance . Much of the d i scuss ion in meet i ng s  on tour was 
of matters  unconnected with the Const itut ion - why there we re weev ils in 
the flour , for instance . On ly one quest ion relat ing to the future 
Constitution was cons idered in the meet ing s  on a l l  the i s lands and that was 
the f ir s t  r e lat ing to the head of state . Op in ion on th i s  was d iv ided but 
the maj or ity o f  meet ing s favour ed a Naur u form of Pres ident . 
Ye t although styled ' A  Repor t  of a Committee to ascertain the views of 
Tuvaluans on the const itut ional prov is ions best s u i ted to an independent 
Tuvalu ' ,  the recommendat ions r e flect more obv ious ly the po l i t ical 
sel f- interest of the Comm ittee membe r s . The quest ion wh ich the Commi ttee 
treated as centr al was whe ther to have a convent ional ' We stm inster model '  
const itut ion . The Committee , l ike the As sembly , was d iv ided 4 -4 ( in the 
House of As sembly the Government depended on ex officio votes for its 
maj or i ty) , but the Committee had been estab l i shed without the quest ion 
be ing c lar i f ied of i t s  status , so it was unclear whether the Ch ief Mini ster 
as Ch ai rman of the Comm ittee h ad both an or ig inal and cast ing vote or 
s imply a cast i ng vote . On legal adv ice , the Comm ittee adopted the latter 
r u le leav i ng the four oppos i t ion member s  with a maj or i ty i n  the Committee . 
They we re ab le as a re sult to impose a ' We stminster mode l '  constitut ion in 
a largely t r ad i t ional form . 
The opposit ion member s  in adopt ing th i s  model were par t icular ly 
concerned to pr ov ide for a Governor-General and to g ive h im unconvent ional 
powe r s .  There were two reasons for th i s . F i r s t , there was the aim of 
us ing the off ice to pr ov ide a counterbalance to the Ch ie f Minister . I t  was 
proposed that the Governor-General " prov ide a valuable safeg uard ag a inst 
poss ible abuse of powe r "  ( Tuvalu 1 9 77 : 2 . 2 ) , and i t  was proposed that he 
should have the author ity to appo int to seve r al s ig n i f icant off ices 
j udges and mag istr ates , the Chairman and membe r s  o f  the Pub l ic Se rv ice 
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Commiss ion , and the Ch ief o f  Po l ice - and author ity also in other matter s  
where independence was j ust i f ied . The second reason for des i r ing th i s  
off i c e  der ives from the per sonal s ituat ion of the lead ing f igure among the 
oppo s i t ion membe r s . Th is member had been e l ected with a maj or ity of two in 
the prev ious e lect ion , and , with a new stronger cand idate expected to stand 
ag ainst h im in the next elect ion , the pos t  of Governor-General was seen as 
one into wh ich the l i ke ly opponent m ight be d r awn , so leav ing the leader of 
the oppos i t ion with a better chance of be i ng r e-e lected . 
Subsequently the Ch ief Minister managed to r emove from the proposed 
off ice of Gover nor-Gener al the independent powe rs r ecommended .  By th i s  
stage he had however , r ecogn i sed the value o f  such a pr est igous pos i t ion so 
long as it was in real ity in h i s  own patronage , and so long as the post had 
no powe r s . He d id not , therefore , seek to abo l i sh the off ice . The 
occas ion for remov ing the Governor-General ' s  powe rs was the preparat ion of 
the Government ' s  pos i t ion pape r for the London Cons t i tut ional Conference . 
On the g rounds that adv ice was needed on how to pr epare a pos i t ion paper in 
a form appropr iate for a leg al draftsman , the Government ar r anged to 
r ece ive advice from a further leg al adv iser in the Commonwealth 
Secretar iat . Meet ing with h im when the House of As sembly was not s itting ,  
and i n  the absence o f  the four oppos i t ion membe r s , and with the act ive 
encour agement of a leg al adv iser who was quite unfam i l i ar e i ther with local 
cond it ions or the bac kg round , the Gove rnment arr anged for the proposal s 
relat ing to the Governor-General to be restated in a trad it ional form . He 
was to retain the formal powe rs ass igned to h im but it was prov ided that 
these were to be exe rci sed on the adv ice of the Pr ime Minister . The 
oppos i t ion member s  subsequently challenged the reformulat ion in Tuvalu and 
afterward s ,  having secur ed no change , also at the London Confe rence , but 
the Br it i sh Government delegat ion , g u ided by the we ight o f  t r ad i t ion in the 
formulat ion of ' We stm inster model ' const itut ions , took the Ch ief Minister ' s  
s ide . The Independence Cons t itut ion emerg ed , the refore , with prov is ions 
relat ing to the Governor-General wh ich were character i s t ic of such 
const it u t ions . 
I quote th is as one example - a par t icular ly impor tant one of the 
way the main features and detai led prov 1s 1ons of the Independence 
Const i t ut ion were the produc t  of inter nal pol i t ics among the small g roup o f  
member s  o f  t h e  As sembly. Much else - t h e  number o f  membe rs o f  t h e  As sembly 
and the electoral sys tem , the method of select ing the Speaker , the 
appo intment of secretar ies to ministr ies , to ment ion examples - was 
dec ided , wholly understandab ly ,  in the l ight of the immed iate sel f- interest 
of the member s  o f  the As sembly . They , and the Government , h ad ach ieved 
pos it ions of powe r in a Cons t i tu t ion that presaged a full ' We stminster 
model ' const itut ion and changes made were des igned to safeg uard or 
streng then themselves . 
* * * * * * 
The Independence Const itut ions of K i r ibat i and Tuval u are 
s ignif icantly d i f fer ent and these reflect i n  par t  the processes adopted in 
fash ion i ng them . The d i ffer ences m ight in f act have been mor e  con s iderab le 
because in the G i lbe r ts it had been intended to explore certain somewhat 
d i fferent prov i s ions as the draft ing of the const itut ional instrument 
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proceeded � and t o  d o  mor e  t o  develop a wider public under st and ing of the 
Const i tut ion and commitment to i t . The depar tur e of John Sm ith as Governor 
in 1 9 78 , however ,  h ad produced a s ign i f icantly d ifferent c l imate . The 
Attor ney-General was able thereafter mor e  openly to obstruct the adopt ion 
of i nnovatory features - he con s istently opposed , for instance , the idea 
that the Const itut ion should appear in an I-K i r ibat i ver s ion , even though 
as in Western Samoa in case of d i spute the Engl i sh ver s ion was to be used -
and there was cont inuing conf l ict over such obstruct iveness and the 
attempts to increase substantially the power of the At tor ney-General in the 
Const itut ion . The unm inuted ag r eement reached in the London Const itut ional 
Conference that the new Governor , as an o f f ic ial with special exper ience of 
f inance , wou ld ass ist w i th revis ing prov is ions in the chapter on Finance 
in par t icular so as to safeg uard the substant ial r eserves built  up from the 
receipt of r oyalt ies on phosphate mining - d id not r esult in attent ion to 
these prov i s ions . As a result the f inanc ial prov is ions in the Const itut ion 
conformed to a t r ad i t ional pattern .  They rested on assumpt ions - suc h ,  for 
instance , as a pr imary r e l i ance on t axat ion for fund ing government 
activities - not altogether appropr iate to the c ir cumstances of K i r ibat i 
and contained s ig n i f icant g aps and l imitat ions when it came to manag ing the 
reserve . 
The Const itut ion also g athered a substant ial col lect ion of marg inally 
signif icant prov 1s 1ons on the pens ion law and the Cour t of Appeal for 
instance - and so became an elabor ate and extended document where the 
Const itut ional Convent ion had sought one that was short and s imple l ike 
that of Naur u .  In par t  th i s  was because by includ ing them in the 
Const itut ion the G i lbe r t  Islands Gover nment could draw on the exper t 
draftsmen ava ilable in the Fo re ign and Commonwealth Of fice in London , and 
par tly because , by inc lud ing prov is ions in the Const itut ion , they became 
law in K i r ibat i without hav ing to be enacted by the House of As sembly . 
Pe rhaps most impor tantly in the months lead ing up to Independence 
wi thout the act ive support  of the Governor or the co-ope r at ion of the 
Attorney-Gene r al l ittle was done to promote a wide interest in the 
Const itut ion . Formally the Cons t itut ion belonged to the schedule of 
respons ib i l it ies o f  the Governor and the Attor ney-Gener al but the 
Attorney-General took no act ion to develop a knowledge in the soc iety of 
the content of the Const itut ion , nor to encour ag e  a commi tment to i t . The 
Ch ief Minister was left having to c ircumvent the Attor ney-General in 
ar r ang ing for an I-K i r ibat i vers ion of the Const itut ion . In the 
prepar at ions for Independence and the ceremonies mark ing it in Western 
Samoa much attent ion was focused on the Cons t i tut ion , but th i s  was not so 
in K i r ibat i .  
The th inking wh ich lay beh ind the processes used to fash ion a 
const itut ion for K i r ibat i r ested on the assessment that in that country 
const itut ional government would depend on a wide knowledge of the 
Cons t itut ion and on people hav ing the incl inat ion and oppor tun ity to ensure 
that government ope rated accord ing to the Const itut ion . Whether the 
preparat ions wh ich led to the Cons t i tut ional Convent ion , the Convent ion 
itself and the arr angements built  into the Const itut ion ach ieved th i s ,  only 
those famil iar with K i r ibat i after Independence are in a pos i t ion to 
comment on . 
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In Tuvalu plann ing star ted with s im i lar amb i t ions , but , as followed , 
the processes used for fash ion ing the Const itution served to record s imply 
the bas ic r ules accord ing to wh ich those w i th powe r already expressed the 
intent ion of playing the pol it ical g ame . 
1 0. HAWAI I 'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF H E R ITAG E 
R IGHTS 
R. Brown 
The quest ion I wi sh to address ar i ses not only in Hawa i i : that is how 
to deal with the claims of nat ive c i t i zens who see k restorat ion and 
protect ion of the i r  ' tr ad it ional ' or ' her itage ' r ights . In recent ye ars a 
renaissance of sor ts has occur red where ' or ig inal ' i nhabitants ( or the ir 
descendants)  a re emerg ing as a force to be reckoned with as they demand 
resur rect ion and protect ion of cultural values and often compensat ion 
( repar at ions) for broken promises of the past . 
Tens ion has always ex isted in soc iety between t r ad it ional and 
contempor ary v alues and approaches .  I t  occur s i n  famil ies when a ch ild 
breaks from the v alues held by h i s or her parents and it occurs l i kewise 
with in countr ies where ' prog ress ' often d i splaces older approaches and 
trad i t ions . No-one doubts that ' prog ress ' has many good s ides but the sad 
tr uth is that the new government j obs as well as the profitable real estate 
development on the beaches c an k i ll off a f i sh ing trad i t ion as eas i ly as a 
cavalry charge on the inhab it ants . 
What happens to nat ive r ights as a state r ushes into the twenty- f ir st 
century? Ar e they integ r ated with the rest of soc iety and in the process , 
destroyed or releg ated to qua int but plast ic tour ist attract ions ; or are 
these r ights protected? And if  they are to be protected , by wh at means? 
Hawai i ,  l ike New Zealand (NZ ) , has chosen to deal with the needs of its 
nat ive c i t i zens , but Hawai i has chosen to protect the se her itage r ights 
through constitutional means and it is that story I wish to tel l .  
However let m e  pr eface i t  b y  not ing that though the re i s  a common area 
for d i scuss ion that br ing s  us together for th i s  wor kshop - that of 
const itut ional developments in the Pacif ic I s land s - there is not ,  I am 
sure , a common constitut ional solut ion to the issue s  fac ing these 
countr ies . So it  is  w i th some emphas is that I tell you I am speak ing as an 
observer and not as an advocate as I descr ibe to you Hawai i ' s  cho ice of 
protect ing its  c it i zens ' ' tr ad i t ional r ights ' through const itut ional means . 
HAWAI I :  H I STORI CAL PERSPECT I V E  
The story of the Hawa i i ans ' d isplaced c ul tur al her itage i s  not unl ike 
that o f  other Pac i f ic Islands . we stern explore r s  and ear ly settlers 
' d iscovered ' the Hawa i i an K i ngdom - though with nat ives already l iv ing on 
the i r  new d i scovery ( Kuykendall 1 93 8 ) . Wh ile Hawa i i an sovere ignty 
prevai led for some decades it soon became apparent to the new business 
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inte rests that for economic r easons the country would fare better under an 
increas ing ly c lose r elat ionsh ip w ith the Un ited S t ates (US) . Eventually 
the I s l ands ' monarchy was overthrown and Hawa i i  became f i r s t  a US t er r i tory 
and then a state ( Fuchs 1 96 1 ) .  
Parallell ing these pol it ical events was o f  course econom ic development 
and an increas ing number of new res idents ( Schmitt 1 968 ) . New laws and 
po l ic ie s  were evolv ing under We ste rn influence , chang ing land ownersh ip 
r ights from commonly held land to fee s imple ( Ch inen 1 9 78 ) , but somehow not 
many Hawai ians became landowner s  and eventually much l and was owned by the 
US Government wh ich by s tatutory mandate was to manage i t  ( though the 
revenue s  from the use we re to be used for the bene f i t  of Hawa i i ans : 3 0  
Stat . 7 5 0 , s . 9 1  ( 1 89 8 ) )- . Th is r ight o f  nat ive Hawa i i ans was made more 
spec i f ic in 1 92 0  by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act ( 4 2  Stat . 1 08 ( 1 92 1 ) )  
and by the Admissions Aat o f  1 95 9  (Pub . L. 8 6- 3 , 7 3  Stat . 4  s . 5  ( f ) and 
embod ied in the Hawa i i an Const itut ion Ar t . 1 2 , s . 1 )  where over 200 , 000 acres 
of l and were placed in t r ust for Hawa i i ans with the purpose of 
' rehab i l itat i ng ' them th rough a return to a farming l i fe style . 
Thus the scenar io into the 1 960s  is complete :  a culture was 
d i scovered , d isplaced by be ing exploited or ignored and then 
' r ehab i l itated ' by spec ial bene f i t  prog r ams . Howeve r ,  it was not long 
after th i s  po int that nat ive Hawai i ans beg an to demand more than j ust the 
r ight to sell plas t ic cr afts on Wa i k i k i . 
These demands were made by a g rowing number of pol i t ically 
soph i s t icated and act ive g roups with broad-based support includ ing many 
non-nat ive Hawai ians (Ka Wai OZa 0 Oha , Vol . 1 ,  No . 1 : 1  ( S ummer , 1 98 1 ) ) .  
Cyn ics at the t ime noted that though j ust ice m ight requ i re suppo r t  of 
nat ive r ights , at the same t ime i t  was not bad for the bus i ness o f  tour i sm 
too . Though boards and commiss ions we re established and tr usts created to 
help nat ive Hawa i i ans , most we re appo inted by non-Hawa i i ans and there was 
s t i l l  a feel ing by nat ive Hawa i i ans that the i r  interests we re not 
adequately r epr esented . 
HER I TAGE RIGHTS GRANTED CONSTI TUTI ONAL PROTECT I ON 
The pr essure increased unt i l  at the 1 978  Hawa i i  Const itut ional 
Convent ion (see Me ller and Kosaki 1 980 ) an ' Hawa i i an affairs  package ' was 
presented wh ich cal led for among other th i ng s : 
1 .  the establishment of the Of fice of Hawa i i an Af fa i r s  
(OHA) that would b e  a cent r al condu i t  for money and 
prog r ams that would bene f i t  al l Hawa i i ans , administered 
by a board composed o f  and elected by Hawa i i ans ( now 
Ar t . 1 2 , s s . 5 ,  6 ) : 
2 .  the protect ion of r ights " customar i ly and t r ad i t ional ly 
exercised for sub s i stence , c ultur al and rel ig ious 
purposes"  ( now Ar t .  1 2 , s .  7 ) : and 
3 .  the g r ant ing of increased fund i ng and an increased 
share of publ ic lands to be held in t r ust for Hawa i i ans 
( now Ar t . 1 0 ,  s . 4 ) . 
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Add i t ional mandates included that publ ic educat ional inst itut ions include a 
prog r am promoting Hawa i ian culture ( now Ar t . 1 0 ,  s . 4 ) , r ecognit ion of 
Hawa i ian as an o f f ic i al lang uag e , the add it ion of a state motto , and 
safeguards to pr otect Hawa i i ' s  agr icultural and ocean env i ronments 
( ibid. : 256  f n . 9 ) . The amendments were approved by the voters and the 
veh icle for ' rehab i l itat ing ' nat ive Hawa i i ans was in place . 
HOW THE OFF I CE OF HAWAI IAN AFFA I RS I S  WORKI NG 
The purpose of OHA i s  to pr omote the betterment of cond it ions of 
Hawa i i ans . It seeks to meet th i s  obj ect ive by ass_ess ing the impact of 
government dec i s ions on Hawai i ans and act ing as advocate for the ir 
interests . Th is has been g iven an impetus by increased fund ing for the 
agency . In 1 980  the leg i slatur e by statute designated that 20 per cent of 
the public land tr ust funds be set as ide for OHA (Haw. Rev .  Stat . , 
s . 1 0- 1 3 . 5  ( 1 98 1 ) )  and the leg i slature also appropr iated $ 4 1 5 , 000 for 1 98 1  
t o  1 982 ( a  two- fold increase from the ye ar be fore )  (see Hawai i OHA 1 98 1 : 7 ) . 
The Board of OHA i s  compr i sed of n ine pe r sons and oper ates separately 
and independently from the Gove rnment . It has the author ity to acquire or 
d i spose of prope r ty and contr act with any ent i ty it wishes in conducting 
its bus iness (Haw. Rev . Stat.  s . 1 0-4 ( 1 98 1 ) ) .  Pr esently its leg al work i s  
pe r formed b y  t h e  Nat ive Hawa i ian Legal Corporat ion , a n  independent 
organ i sat ion funded from feder al moneys . In its short  tenure it has 
sought : to obtain leg i slat ive approv al of a comprehens ive cultur al plan : 
to l imit conveyanc ing of certain lands and to acquire  others : to cr eate a 
new t r ust fund to be used by OHA for se r v ices to Hawa i i ans of less than 5 0  
per cent Hawa i i an b loodl ine :  and to set up a revolv ing loan fund to ass ist 
Hawa i i an entrepreneur s .  I t  i s  a lso see k ing to promote h ig h  standards for 
Hawa i i an culture as a resource for the State of Hawai i .  Toward that end it 
has suppor ted a tour ist t ax whose revenue would be used to re imburse the 
Hawa i i an community for ye ars of ' explo itat ion and overcommercial i zation ' by 
the v i s i tor i ndustry.  For ex ample plas t ic le i s  and ' Hawa i i an cr afts ' made 
in Ta iwan h ave in OHA ' s  v iew d i spar aged the t r ad it ional cultur al offer ings 
by ' true ' H awa i i ans . I n  the publ ic schools i t  i s  seek ing to expand the 
schools ' Hawa i i an cur r iculum and cr eate an Hawai i an Educat ion Commiss ion to 
moni tor the S t ate ' s  development in that area (see Ka. Wai Ola 0 Oha , Vol . 2 ,  
No . 1 : 6-7 (Winte r , 1 982 ) ) .  
I SSUES THAT CONTI NU E  TO L I NGER 
In assess i ng how OHA is wor ki ng i t  i s  only fair  to also ask how we ll 
it i s  wor k i ng .  I s sues that cont inue to l inge r  include : whether so much 
money should be channelled to one g roup based on its he r itag e :  whethe r 
there i s  any f a i r  de f in i t ion as to who is a ' Nat ive Hawa i ian ' :  and what is 
meant by ' tr ad it ional and customary r ights ' that are to be protected . 
As to the fundamental issue of whether a g r oup should be separ ated for 
special treatment , the easy answer is that a public j udgment was made by 
the Hawai i an Cons t i tut ional Convent ion de leg ates and subsequently by the 
vote r s ' r at i f icat ion . 
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A mor e d i f f icult i ssue deals with who i s  a ' Native Hawai ian ' .  
Or ig inally the Cons t i t ut ion prov ided a de f init ion mak ing e l ig ible for 
bene f i ts those who were at least one-h alf Hawa i i an .  But d ue to an inval id 
ratif icat ion i t  was struc k  down pur suant to a l aws u i t  (Kahalekai v. Doi 
( 1 979 ) 6 0  Haw . 3 2 5 ) wh ich left the present constitut ional def i n it ion as " the 
descendants of nat ive Hawa i i ans who inhab ited the Hawa i i an Islands pr ior to 
1 778 " ( Ar t . 1 2 ,  s . 7 )  as the bene f ic iar ies . However ,  sub sequent implement ing 
leg islat ion followed the de f in i t ion of e a r l ier Hawai ian laws and defined 
' Native Hawa i i ans ' as those w i th 50 per cent Hawai ian b lood and ' Hawa i i ans ' 
as the descendants with a lesser percentag e  ( and with d i fferent 
ent i t lements ) : Ha:uJ. Rev .  Stat. , s . 1 0-2 ( 4 )  ( 1 9 8 1 ) .  Ye t ,  there remains a 
pr act ical po l it ical problem for the future as those Hawa i i ans with less 
than 50 pe r cent b loodline fee l  they also are ent it led to fully par t ic ipate 
in  the bene f i ts . Th is potent i al controversy explains OHA ' s  interest in 
obtai n ing spec ial fund ing for Hawai ians o f  less than 50 per cent Hawa i i an 
b loodl ine . 
As to what constitutes a ' trad i t ional and customary r ight ' that matter 
was left largely for future i nterpretat ion and negot iat ion . OHA i s  see k i ng 
several interest ing interpr etat ions . In add i t ion to " access r ights to 
pub l ic lands for hunt ing , f i sh ing ,  worsh ipping , and g ather ing "  (Ka Wai Ola 
0 Oha , Vol . 2 ,  No . 1 : 1  fn . 8  (Winter ,  1 982 ) ) and stronge r  enforcement of s tate 
reg ulat ions affec t i ng those areas , i t  also has proposed that r eg ulat ions be 
establ ished on the t r ad it ional kapu system to ensure proper use , and 
enforce that by a konohiki system ( where i n  pe r sons are named as ch ief 
caretake r s  o f  cer tain ar eas o f  land) to ensure that trad i t ional land use 
areas are prope r ly managed ( ibid : see also Levy 1 97 5 ) . 
As any urban land use planner knows , each new d evelopment faces a 
var iety of hurdles be fore construct ion even beg ins : but wh at we are now 
see ing in Hawai i is an open con frontat ion between ' progress ' and 
' t rad i t ion ' . The t r ad i t ional ists will  now march into cour t not only with 
the i r  zon ing ord inances but also with a const itut ional mandate wh ich may 
alter the outcome that would have resu lted had the bat tles been fought 
instead on the be aches , oppos ing ' prog ress ' with a t r ad i t ional ist 
' nostalg ic sent imental ity ' r athe r than with the const itut ional sword . 
Fr ankly though , so far in Hawai i it has not helped in small sk i rm i shes 
where ' squatte r s '  exe r t ing t r ad it ional r ights were forced off publ ic lands 
by statutes , but new cases on the hor i zon in connect ion with road s  wh ich 
are be i ng planned through spec ial nat ive Hawa i ian lands may soon prov ide 
the cour ts with a prope r  test case , i n  wh ich the following leg al i ssues are 
l i kely to ar i se . 
L EGAL I SSUES 
F i rst , is it unfa i r , or , under the US Const itut ion , a den i al of equal 
protec t ion , to g r ant bene f i ts to one g roup of c i t i zens but not othe r s , 
espec ially on the bas i s  o f  r ace or ancestry? The US Supr eme Cour t , wh ile 
normally str i k i ng down such ind iv id ious d iscr iminat ion , has carved out an 
except ion for nat ive Amer icans ( see, e . g .  Morton v .  Mancari ( 1 97 4 )  4 1 7  US 
5 3 5 ) . For example , Amer ican Indians were pe rmitted to r ece ive spec ial 
government prefe rences and benef its because of the i r  spe c i al place in  
Amer ican h i story as be ing the countr y ' s or ig inal inhab i tants as well as the 
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v ict ims o f  government m i sconduc t .  The Supr eme Cour t stated par t of its 
rat ionale as follows : 
the Un i ted States overcame the Ind ians and took 
possess ion of the i r  lands , somet imes by force , leav ing 
them an uneducated , he lpless and dependent people , 
need ing protect ion ag ainst the selfishness of other s  
and the i r  own improv idence . Of necess ity , the Un ited 
S t ates assumed the duty of fur n i sh ing that protect ion , 
and with it the author ity to do all that was r equi red 
to per form that obl igat ion and to prepare the Indians 
to take the i r  place as independent , qual i f ied membe rs 
of the modern body pol it ic (Board of County 
Commissioners v .  Seber ( 1 94 3 )  3 1 8  us 7 05 ) . 
Th us we see again  the famil iar scenar io of d i splac ing a culture and then 
' rehab i l itat ing ' i t .  
An issue re lated t o  the fai rness o r  equal treatment issue is whether 
i f  one g roup i s  ent i t led to spec ial treatment , why not others? In the US 
' othe r s ' have included the nat ive Alaskan,  and Cong ress and the courts have 
found the i r  pl ight to be s im ilar and have upheld compar able spec ial 
treatment ( see Fuller 1 9 76 ) . A r easonable quest ion can be asked : where 
does the j ust i f icat ion for special treatment end? I t  i s  c lear that only a 
country ' s part icular h i story can prov ide the answer as to whether and how 
many d isplaced cultures occur red and requ i re rehab i l itat ion . 
Closely connected with the Amer ican I ndians ' v ictor ies has been the 
h istor ic fact that old treaties ex isted between them ( as sovereigns)  and 
the US , wh ich contained prom ises that were subsequently broken . Th is not 
only buttres sed the conclus ion that spec ial pr eferences we re needed to undo 
the effects of neg lect and mistreatment , but also opened the possibil ity 
that due to the breach o f  past promises reparations we re leg ally r equi red 
( see , e . g . , Blond in 1 98 1 ) .  Amer ican cour ts have upheld such claims in 
numerous cases (see , e . g . , US v. Sioux Nation of Indians ( 1 980 ) 1 00 s Ct 
27 1 6  for a cour t-ordered settlement valued at $ 1 34 mill ion) wh ich have thus 
establ ished a pr ecedent for othe r s  who wish not only to have the i r  
d i splaced culture rehab i l it ated but also want the return o f  land and/or the 
payment of large amounts of money to help compensate for the i r  loss . 
Whether other Pac i f ic Islands have s im i lar h i stor ic s i tuat ions I leave 
to you to dec ide . It is certain , however ,  that even if they ex i st , the 
Hawai ian approach of protecting her i tage r ights of nat ive inhab i tants by 
constitut ional means is but one i l lustr at ion , one alternat ive , of what can 
be done with c r eat ive const itut ional development . 

1 1 .  F E D E RA L  CONSTITUTIONS THAT NEVER W E R E :  'NAG R IAM EL'  
IN THE N EW H EBR I DES AND TH E 'WESTERN BR EAKAWAY 
MOVEMENT' IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS 
P. Larmour 
Most of the chapters in th i s  volume deal with the Const itut ions 
adopted by Pacif ic island ter r itor ies as they became independent , or 
entered into ' free assoc iat ion ' with metropolitan countr ies . With the 
except ion of Tong a ' s , the Cons t i tut ions are products of a process of 
decolon isat ion . Many o f  the i r  prov is ions r eflect the par t icular h istor ical 
and po l i t ic al c i rcumstances in wh ich they were drafted . Some prov1s 1ons 
may be hard to under stand if these c i rcumstances are not reconstr uc ted and 
taken into account . The Const i tut ions embody the outcomes of domestic 
polit ical processes , negot i at ions with metropol itan governments ,  and 
d i scuss ions w i th fore ign consultants .  
Dur ing the pol it ical process o f  constitut ion-mak i ng ,  alternat ives may 
be rej ected , s uppr essed , or otherwi se fail to get on the agenda . The 
following chapter descr ibes and compar es two such unsuccessful alter­
nat ives : a series of amendments to the Solomon Islands ( S I )  Cons t i tution , 
proposed by the leaders of the ' We stern Breakaway Movement ' in 1 978 ; and a 
se r ies of alternat ive const itut ions dr afted fo r the Nagr iamel Movement in  
the New Hebr ides , wh ich became Vanuatu in  1 980 . 
The Const itut ions that S I  and Vanuatu adopted at I ndependence included 
prov is ions prom i s i ng devolut ion of power : to prov inces in the former ; and 
to reg ions i n  the latter . Tr an s i t ional prov is ions in the SI Const itut ion 
renamed ex ist ing local government councils ' prov inc ial assembl ies ' , and in 
Vanuatu requ i r ed the e lect ion of r eg ional assembl ies for Santo and Tanna 
before Independence . In  both countr ies Review Corruni ttees were e stablished 
be fore Independence to make recommendat ions about the way the const itut­
ional prom ises of devolut ion should be implemented . 
Nevertheless , S I  and Vanuatu both became independent in the m idst of a 
separat ist c r 1 s 1 s .  Early i n  1 978 , the S I  Local Government Counc i l  for 
Western D i str ict resolved that it "may poss ibly declare eventual un ilateral 
independence" i f  it we re not granted ' state government ' status . The 
Counc i l  r e fused to organ i se celebrat ions for I ndependence Day on 7 July 
1 978 ; i t  cont i nued to fly the Br it i sh flag ;  and extra pol ice were flown 
in following a scuffle i n  the streets o f  G i zo over an attempt to r aise the 
new nat ional flag .  
I n  January 1 980 
separate Independence 
New Hebr ides as the 
J irruny Stephens ' N ag r i amel Movement declared the 
of Santo and par ts of the Northern D i str ict of the 
' Vemarana Federat ion ' .  At the end of May , the 
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Movemen t ' s  supporters occupied the d istr ict capital , Lug anv ille , wrecked 
government build ing s and k idnapped the D i str ict Commiss ione r . The Centr al 
Gove rnment evacuated its c iv i l  servants from Luganv il le , and declared a 
blockade of Santo . Ne ighbour ing S I  j oined the b lockade by cutt i ng a i r l ine 
and telex l inks w i th Santo . 
In both countr ies separat ist thr eats or declarat ions were pr eceded or 
followed by proposals to amend , or r eplace , the Constitutions that we re 
about to be adopted with alternat ives des igned to accommodate separatist 
pr essure within a mor e  ' fede r al ' or ' confederal ' str ucture of government . 
Nagr iamel had begun to propose independence const i tut ions long before 
the detai led negot iat ions w i th i n  the New Hebr ides and with the metropo l i tan 
governments that led to d r afting of the Vanuatu Cons t i tut ion . At least 
three vers ions were produced : constitut ions for a group of federat ions 
within a confeder at ion of ' Natakaro ' ( 1 97 8 ) ; a more elabor ate , and 
r at ional i sed , ' Cons t itut ion o f  the Nagr i ame l Fede r at ion ' ,  published in book 
form in the Un ited States (US)  and called Blueprint for a New Nation ( Doorn 
1 9 79 ) ; and a const itut ion for a ' Repub l ic of Vemaran a ' , attached to a 
prospectus posted to bus inessmen i n  V i la and Santo at the t ime Nag r i amel 
supporters forc ibly occupied Luganv i lle . 
Le ader s o f  the ' We stern B r eakaway Movement '  proposed amendments r ather 
than complete const itut ional alternat ives . They would have subst ituted the 
two clauses in  s . 1 1 4 of the SI Constitut ion deal ing with prov inc i al 
government with 6 1  c lauses that spe l t  out in detail the structure of 
government w i th in the prov ince and its  powers in  re lat ion to the nat ional 
government . The f i nal const itut ional conference held in London i n  
Septembe r 1 977  had ag reed that the S I  Const itut ion would prov ide gener ally 
for prov inc ial government , but that the details  would be wor ked out after 
Parl i ament had cons idered the report o f  a rev iew committee to be 
established be fore Independence . Sect ion 1 1 4 prov ided s imply that : 
( 1 ) So lomon Islands shall be d iv ided into prov ince s , 
the n umber and boundar ies of wh ich shall be 
prescr ibed by Parliament after cons ider i ng the 
adv ice of the Cons t i tuency Boundar ies Commiss ion . 
( 2 )  P a r l i ament shall make prov i s ion for the government 
of the prov inces e st abl i shed under th is sect ion , 
and cons ider the role of t r ad i t ional ch iefs 
the r e in . 
The add it ional clauses proposed by the leader s  of the ' Western 
Breakaway Movement ' r eproduced many o f  the prov is ions of the rest of the 
Cons t itut ion , but appl ied them to prov inc i al governments as well as the 
nat ional government . There were prov i s ions for prov inci a l  governor s ,  chief 
mini ster s ,  cab i nets and electoral commiss ions . The env isaged prov inc i al 
constitutions dupl icated and rested within the nat ional cons t i t u t ion , 
r ather than subsist ing in a par alle l , complementary, relat ionsh ip with i t . 
In the event , the amendments and alte r nat ives were not adopted . I n  S I  
they we re cons idered b y  a Review Committee wh ich made i t s  r epo r t  t o  the 
Government some t ime after Independence , when po l i t ical c ircumstances had 
changed . Wh i le accept ing many of the Committee ' s  r ecommendations , the 
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Government d id not accept that they should be implemented by const itut ional 
amendment . I n  Vanuatu ,  the Nag r i amel Movement that had proposed the 
alternat ive constitutions was defeated by m i l itary force and its leaders 
ar rested . 
The rest of this chapter considers the Western and Nag r iamel 
Const itut ions- that-neve r-were in the following terms : the i r  claims to 
' federalism ' ; the i r  concept ions of the role of the state in development ; 
the i r  land tenure prov i s ions ; and the role of consultants in the i r  
dr aft ing . I h ave chosen these four heading s  because they suggest 
compar i sons w i th the Const itut ions that were adopted in both countr ies , or 
in other Pac i f ic Island s , and because they r aise problems and issues 
cons idered by other contr ibutors to th is volume . 
* * * * * * 
Cl a i ms to ' federa l i sm ' 
In both S I  and Vanuatu the suggested amendments or alternat ives were 
descr ibed by the i r  advocates as ' federal ' .  Nagr i amel was to be a 
" feder at ion o f  settlements"  ( Doorn 1 979 : 7 ) . In S I  i t  was : 
e nv isaged that the des ired structure of the Prov inc ial 
Gove rnment for the We st should be one wh ich follows , 
with dras t ic mod i f icat ions , Federal pr inc iples and 
systems of government ( S I  1 9 78 : 4 ) . 
They set out the powe rs and funct ions o f  the government of the whole 
terr i tory,  and the governments o f  geog r aph ically def ined un its within the 
ter r itory :  ' settlements ' in Nag r i ame l ,  and ' prov i nces '  in S I . 
The only nom inally feder al Cons t i tu t ion currently adopted in the 
Pac i f ic I s l ands is that of the Feder ated S t ates of Microne s i a  ( FSM) -
though there is an h istor ical precedent in the Cook I slands (Cl ) wh ich we re 
governed as a feder at ion between 1 89 1  and 1 90 0 , before annexat ion by New 
Ze aland (NZ)  (Gilson 1 980 ) • There are h ints and echoes of federal ism 
elsewhere : in Palau ' s Cons t itut ion , wh ich renames the colon ial munic ipal­
i t ies " states "  (Ar t . XV,  s . 6 ) , or in the reforms proposed by a Commiss ion on 
Local Government in K i rabat i in 1 980 . Gh ai  and Isana ( 1 978b) have 
d iscussed the ex tent to wh ich the PNG Const itut ion can be character ised as 
feder al , and Ron May ' s pape r ( elsewhere in th is volume) notes some growing 
' fede ral tendenc ies ' in PNG . 
In 1 982 the S I  Government appointed a commi ttee to rev iew the nat ional 
Const i t ut ion , and i nc luded among its terms o f  refer e nce that i t  should 
" recommend for the people a Federal system of government" � Solomon Star, 
3 0 . 7 . 82 ) , Federal alternat ives have also been proposed for New Caledoni a ,  
a s  a way o f  accomodating the i n terests o f  the Te rr i tory ' s  d iffe rent r ac ial 
groups . 
' Federa l i sm '  i s  an elus ive , i f  pol it ically potent term . In a pape r 
produced for the Cons t i tut ional Pl anni ng Committee ( CPC) in Vanuatu , Yash 
Gha i  argued that the term be set as ide in favour of a case-by-case 
del ineat ion of the relat ive powers and funct ions of cent ral and local 
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governments (Gh ai 1 979 ) . A pol it ical sc ientist , Duchachek ( 1 970 ) , offe r s  
seven ' yardst icks ' for feder al ism . 1 Measured ag ainst them the ' We stern 
Amendments ' emerge as more clear ly ' federal ' than the ' N ag r i amel 
Constitutions ' :  ' prov inces ' in S I  would have been g r anted a say i n  
constitutional amendments ( Ar t . 1 1 4 AAD and Yardstick 4 ) : and protected 
aga inst e l iminat ion of the i r  ident ity (Ar t . 1 1 4 B and Yards t ick 5 ) . Ne ither 
would ' sett lements ' have had protect ion in Nag r i amel . 
Among the Cons t i tut ions adopted by Pac i f ic I s lands , FSM ' s  score s  
h ighest on Duchachek ' s  yardst icks mee t i ng a l l  b u t  t h e  requ i rement f o r  equal 
representat ion of the un its in an upper house : FSM is unicameral , although 
some seats are apport ioned equally between the states (Ar t . IX ,  s . 8  and 
Yardstick 6 ) . However ,  sever al nom inally un itary consti tut ions score on 
one yardstick :  protect ion of the un its against e l im inat ion of the i r  
ident ity . K i r ibat i ' s  Const itut ion protects Banaba , as does Vanuatu ' s  i n  
i t s  entrenchment o f  r eg ional governments f o r  Tanna a n d  Santo , and Marshall 
I sland s (MI ) g ives each atoll the r ight to a local government . 
In some ways i t  is surpr is ing that federal ism is not more pe rvas ive in 
the Pac i f ic .  Fede r at ions we re a classic method o f  decolon isat ion i n  Afr ica 
and the Caribbean . But by the 1 970s , the t r ac k  record of these 
post-colon ial federat ions d id not look good (see Hicks 1 9 78 ) . Br itain,  at 
least , seems to have made a consc ious dec i s ion , in a review o f  its po l icy 
towards dependent terr i tor ies made i n  1 973 , ag a inst encour ag ing federat ion . 
Even where feder al ism was proposed in Microne s i a  it was r e j ected by two of 
the s ix d istr icts i t  was offered to . I n  1 978 Palau and MI r ej ected the 
draft FSM Cons t itut ion and pr efe r r ed to go the ir own way . Cont inuing aid 
commitments , ' free assoc iat ion ' ,  and r eg ional insti tut ions l ike the 
Un iver s i ty o f  the South Pac i f ic ,  the South Pac i f ic Conun iss ion and the FoY"Wn 
[ Sh ipping ]  Line, have become funct ional al ternat ives to federal i sm .  
The ear l ier Nagr i amel ver s ions went further than federalism to propose 
a th ird  level of ' con federal ' government , though the d i ffe rence between 
' federal ' and ' confederal ' was not c lear ly wor ked out : the ' feder al ' 
Const i tu t ions of 1 978  are pr actically ident ical to the ' confeder al ' 
ver s ion . 
The ' Nagr iamel Const itut ions ' are less preoccupied than the ' We stern 
Amendment s '  with a d iv i s ion o f  powe r s  between levels o f  government . The 
' Western Amendments ' see k  to entr ench leg islat ive and f inanc ial autonomy of 
prov inc i al governments ag ainst the centre .  ' Settlements ' ,  as s uch , i n  the 
Nag r i amel Cons t i tut ions are g r anted no pa rt icular autonomy in relat ion to 
the federal gover nment . They have a k i nd of general competence to make 
' r eg ulat ions ' that are more reminiscent of ' by- laws ' made by local 
governments than ' laws ' made by states s upreme in the i r  own spher e .  The 
thr ust of the ' N ag r i amel Cons t i tut ions ' is the protect ion of ind iv iduals 
ag ainst the government , r ather than the protect ion of one level of 
government ag ainst another . I n  the US t erms in wh ich the ' Nagr iamel 
Cons t i tu t ions ' are d r afted , they are less concer ned with ' s tates r ights ' 
than wi th ind iv idual r ights , part icularly in the econom ic f ield . 
The ' Nag r iamel Const i tut ions ' are an odd mixture of r ight wing 
l ibertar ian i sm and trad it ional paroch ial i sm .  The federal government was 
not to " eng age in , or  g ive support to , any sor t of wealth red istr ibut ion " 
(Doorn 1 9 79 : 2 9 ) , nor to make any laws " that would abr idge , or tend to 
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abr idg e , the i nd iv iduals r ights o f  self defence" ( ibid. : 26 )  and it was 
" never [ to] levy t axes" ( ibid. : 28 ) . In addi t ion , and of per sonal relevance 
to J immy Stephens , each ind iv id ual was to h ave " the r ight to mar ry as many 
per sons of whatever sex des ir ed" ( ibid. : 1 3 ) . 
Wh i le the power s  of the federal governments we re r ig htly c ircum­
scr ibed , the prov is ions for the government of ' settlements ' seem wide open 
to a petty author i tar ian i sm r eminiscent of i nd ir ect colon i al r ule . Each 
settlement , con s i s t i ng of at least 2 , 500 people , was to be governed by a 
board , with w ide powe rs to make ' reg ulat ions ' ( Ar t . VI I I ) .  The chai rman of 
the board was to be called "The Ch ief" , and was "cons idered to be the 
wi sest man" ( ibid. : 39 ) . The 1 978 and 1 980 vers ions of the ' Nagr iamel 
Const itut ions ' we re endor sed ' approved by all Nag r i amel 1 5  I slands custom 
ch iefs ' and s igned by J immy Stephens . 
* * * * * * 
The rol e of the s ta te i n  devel opment 
Peter Sack argues e lsewhere i n  th is volume that one of the twin 
pi llars o f  ' cons t i tut ional i sm '  in the Pacif ic I s lands i s  the promise that 
the s tate w i l l  prov ide ' development ' .  If so , the promise is rarely 
expl ic i t , except pe rhaps in the prov is ions of the Palau Const itut ion wh ich 
require  the Government to promote the nat ional economy and prov ide free or 
subs id ised health and educat ion serv ices ( Ar t . VI ) . The promise i s  
cont inuous with post-war colonial ideology , expr essed par t icular ly in the 
South Pac i f ic Commiss ion , where it had a conse rvat ive corollary : pol i t ical 
independence m ight not be g r anted unt i l  ' development ' had taken place . Ye t 
it has somet imes been resisted by the i ndependent governments . In SI , for 
example , the Mamolon i Gover nment elected in August 1 98 1  i n i t i al ly declared 
its intent ion to d i smantle some of the apparatus of state intervent ion , 
e . g . , the Government Shar eholding Agency . Other island governments , in 
K i r ib at i ,  N i ue and PNG a re showing increased interest in ' h iv i ng off ' 
government services to pr ivate enterpr ise . 
Wh i le in most Pac if ic countr ies the s tate takes an act ive , but 
somet imes amb ivalent , role in development , the ' Nag r iamel Const i tut ions ' 
offer an a lternat ive ideology . The role of the state is r igorously 
c ircumscr ibed . Sect ion 3 of Ar t .VI I I  of the 1 978 Fede r al Const itut ion , 
e . g . , prov ides that : 
The • • •  Feder at ion may prov ide for essent ial government 
serv ices such as ag reements for telecommunicat ions with 
other nat ions . The government shall have no power to 
ope r ate or own such services i tself .  
Such prov is ion m ight outlaw the post and telecommun icat ions serv ice 
prov ided through a s tatutory corporat ion by the PNG Government , or through 
j oint ventures , l ike Soltel in S I ,  HebPitel in Vanuatu , and Fintel in F i j i .  
Yet the Ve rmar ana Development Corporat ion , to whose prospectus the f inal 
ver s ion of the ' Nag r i amel Const itut ions ' was appended , was funct ionally 
equ ivalent to the k i nd of ' publ ic enterpr ise ' the Cons t i tut ion sought to 
proscr ibe . I t  was supposed to improve telecommun icat ions , to buy sh ips and 
aircraft , to lease land , to set up a bank and r un a postal serv ice . Th is 
monol ith ic agency would have been respons ible to its  shareholders r athe r 
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than a local Mi nister or leg islature and would ' at least in the beg inn i ng ' 
be based offshore in Panama.  
The ' We ster n  Amendments ' , however , show no s ign o f  d isag reement with 
the SI Const itut ion on the role of the s tate in development . Sect ion 1 1 4 
AAA , for example , prov ides that : 
the public land of each province , and the land , t imbe r , 
wood , natural resources and fresh water of each 
prov ince shall vest in the Governor General of Solomon 
Is lands in r ight o f ,  and for the bene f i t  of , each such 
prov ince . 
The role of the state as an agent and intermed iary i n  the development 
of natural resources was accepted wi thout hes i tat ion ; the only quest ion 
was whether it should be the centr al state based in Hon i ar a ,  or a state 
based in G i zo , the capital o f  western Province . 
La nd tenure prov i s i ons  
For both S I  and Vanuatu land pol icy was a 
I ndependence and both the ' Western Amendments ' 
Cons t i tut ions ' contain land tenure prov i s ions .  
cr i t ical 
and the 
i ssue at 
' Nagr i amel 
The Cons t i tu t ions that SI and Vanuatu adopted each contain prov is ions 
for the return of land al ienated dur ing the colon i al per iod . S I ' s  
prov i s ions retrospect ively j ust i f ied a conver s ion of foreig n-owned 
freeholds into government leaseholds that had taken place a year be fore . 
There is also prov is ion for the valuat ion of al ienated land , but no 
leg islat ion has yet been enacted to implement it . Vanuatu ' s  Const itut ion 
is more r ad ical : s . 7 1 , of itse l f ,  returned all alienated land to its 
custom owners . Wh ile leg islat ion was r equired to implement the prov is ions 
in  the SI Cons t itut ion , and was not fully enacted , the prov is ions of the 
Vanuatu Const itution were treated as self-enacting : leg islat ion was only 
requ ired to deal with the i r  consequences ( see Larmour for thcoming ;  and 
F i ng leton i n  th i s  volume) • 
' Control of land ' was one of the ' s ix po ints ' the Western Counc i l  
wanted met b y  t h e  Central Gover nment be fore i ndependence . Land in  the 
Western Prov ince was r elat ively heav i ly alien ated . In what was then the 
New Hebr ides , J immy Stephens ' N ag r i amel Movement had beg un a squatter 
settlement on Santo in  1 96 8  to resist  land c le ar ances by European settlers 
(see Sope 1 9 76 ) . 
Wh i le on Santo the land i ssue was one between European settlers and 
Me lanes ians , in We stern So lomons i t  was between Me lanes ians and the Central 
Government over the future of land owned by the Central Gover nment , 
part icularly on Ko lombang ara I sland and in New Georg i a .  The amendment s to 
the S I  Const itut ion proposed by We stern leaders vested ' public land ' i n  the 
prov inc i al governments . 
The refe rences to land in the ' Nag r i amel Cons t i t u t ions ' are more 
ind irect and conservat ive than the prov is ions o f  the Vanuatu Cons t i t u t ion . 
The 1 978  'Nag r i amel Constitution ' refe r s  to land in three contexts : i n  a 
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gene r al way i n  the declarat ion of r ights , wh ich include " acqui r ing and 
possess ing prope r ty" ( I I ,  s . 1 ) ;  as exc luded from the j ur i sd ict ion of local 
cour ts (VI I ,  s . 7 ( b) ) ;  and , more interest ing l y ,  as the sole source of 
f inance for the federal government : 
Al l expenses for f i nanc ing all governmental act iv i t ies 
shall be funded by leas ing • • •  Fede r at ion Custom land to 
any pe r son or ent ity that the As sembly may determine is 
sui table , and upon such terms as the leg islature may 
determine ( X , s . 3 ) . 
The Blueprint for a New Nation makes s im i lar , but more extens ive , 
references to land as ind iv idual prope rty . Absolute individual ownersh ip 
is qual if ied only by the prov is ions o f  an ' Env i ronment Law ' , wh ich would 
deal with r ights to wate r f lowing across land , and with r ights of way and 
pollut ion ( XXVI I I ) . There is also prov is ion for ' stak ing a claim '  to land 
( I ,  s . 4 2 )  wh ich is unfor tunately r eminiscent of colonial ' waste land ' 
doctr ines i n  S I .  The chapter deal ing with the feder al budget , pe rhaps more 
real ist ical ly than the 1 9 78 ver s ion ,  includes source s of federal f inance 
add it ional to leas ing land , part icular ly lotter ies . 
The 1 980  Vemar ana Const itut ion , however ,  h as the most pol i t ically­
interest ing land prov 1s 1ons . It is almost ident ical to the 1 9 78 federal  
Cons t i tut ion , except that four sect ions were added to Ar t . I I (Declarat ion 
of Rights ) , and that the sect ion deal ing with federal finance includes the 
add it ional sources proposed in Blueprint for a New Nation . The ( new) s . 1 6  
in Ar t . I I prov ides : 
The r ight to ownersh ip of land by any i nd iv iduals or 
any othe r pr ivate ent i t ies i s  r ecog n i sed . Such owners 
shal l ,  i n  tur n ,  also recogn ise the ownersh ip of land by 
Custom Law . 
The equ ivocat ion of s . 1 6  r eflects the d i fferent interests of the 
Nag r i ame l ' s  Melanes i an and non-Me lanes i an suppor ter s .  Stephens ' movement 
had become a Me lanes ian front for var ious non-Me lanes ian interests : mainly 
Fr ench planter s , Po lynes ian m ig r ants , m ixed- r ace people l ike Stephens 
h imse l f , and Amer ican land speculator s .  The intent of s . 1 6  becomes clearer 
if  compared with the ' land ' prov is ions o f  the Vanuatu Const itut ion , agreed 
to late in the pr ev ious year : 
7 1 . All land in the Republic belong s to the ind igenous 
custom owner s ,  and the i r  descendants . 
7 2 .  The r ules of c ustom shall form the bas i s  of 
onwe r sh ip and use of l and in the Repub l ic .  
Under the Vanuatu Const itut ion , Nag r i amel ' s  non-Me lanes ian supporter s ,  
and poss ibly even Me lane s i ans who were not ' custom owner s '  s tood to lose 
t itles to land . The f inal ' Nagr i arne l  Cons t i tut ion ' offered an alternat ive , 
dual , system of l and tenur e ,  famil iar in other parts of the Pacif ic . 
T i tles to already al ienated land would not be affected by Independence , but 
further acqu i s i t ion would be by lease from the custom owner s .  SI  u sed th i s  
approach i n  deal ing w i t h  t h e  land r ights o f  G i lbe r tese settler s :  the i r  
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ex ist ing freehold r ights would be unaffected , but they could only acquire  
more land on lease ( eee Bobai 1 979 ) . 
The rol e of consu l tants 
A number of the chapte r s  in th is volume have been wr itten by people 
who , usually as fore igner s ,  were par t ic ipants in the process of nat ional 
constitu tion-mak ing .  Some of the issues r a i sed concern profess ional eth ics 
and act iv i sm ,  othe r s  the problems of cross-cultur al commun icat ion , and the 
par adox of for e igne r s  ass ist ing in the product ion of a ' home grown ' 
con s t itut ion . 
The ' We ste rn Amendments ' and the ' N ag r i amel Const itut ions ' offer two 
extreme cases of constitut ional consultancy . The f irst  were d r afted by a 
QC in Sydney on a br ief from a de leg at ion sent to Aust r a l i a  ear ly in 1 978 
by leaders and suppor ter s o f  the ' Western Breakaway Movement ' .  The 
deleg at ion knew what it wanted , and wanted i t  expressed in leg al form . The 
legal consultant ' s  role was pur ely techn ical , and paid for in the normal 
way that a cl ient pays for legal adv ice , w i th money r a i sed in the western 
D i str ict ( see Premdas and Larmour : for thcoming ) . 
The consultancy wor k  done for Nag r i ame l was quite the oppo s i te : 
act ivist , advocatory ,  manipulat ive , h ighly ideolog ical and funded from 
abroad . The Phoenix Corporat ion of Amste rdam and Reno , Nevad a ,  prov ided 
lawyers , funds and a rad io stat ion to promote Nag r i ame l .  Never the less , 
fore ign man ipulat ion was pr esented as somehow ' home grown ' . Michael 
Ol iver , defend ing the role of the Phoen ix Corporat ion , offe red a k i nd of 
parody o f  the role of fore ign consultants i n  the const i tu t ional planning 
committees in S I , Vanuatu and el sewhere in the Pac i f ic I s lands : 
My fr iend Tom Eck ,  a Lawye r ,  ag reed to tr avel to the 
New Hebr ides . He spent two weeks talk ing with 20 
ch iefs and other prom inent pe r sons to develop and 
alte rnat ive const itut ion for all of the New Hebr ides 
( letter to The Eaonomist , London , 1 3/9/1 980 ) . 
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Federal ' Yardst ick s ' 
( adapted from Duchache k  ( 1 970 ) ) 
They can be summar i sed as follows : 
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1 .  Does the cent r al government have exclus ive control over for e ign 
affai r s? 
2 .  Ar e the un its pr evented from seced ing ?  
3 .  Does the centr al government act d ir ectly on c i t i zens? 
4 .  Do the un its have a say i n  const itut ional amendments deal ing with 
themselves? 
5 .  Ar e the un its protected ag ainst e l im inat ion o f  the i r  ident i ty? 
6 .  I s  there equal r epresentat ion o f  the un its i n  an upper house? 
7 .  Ar e there two se ts o f  cour ts? 
8 .  Does the supreme cour t deal with r elat ions between the centre and the 
un its? 
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Confederal 
Natakaro 1 978 : 
Federal 
a} Banks -
Torres and Tanna 
1 978 : 
b} N ag r i amel 1 979 : 
c} Vemarana 1 980 : 
Settlement 
Nag r i amel 1 979 : 
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APPENDIX 2 
PHOENIX/NAGRIAMEL/VEMARANA 1 978-80 
fore ign affa ir s ,  defence , prov is ion of essent ial 
government funct ions ( e . g . , telecommun icat ions} ,  but 
" no power to oper ate or own such serv ices i tself " . 
as for confederat ion plus the r ight to j oin or withdraw 
from confederat ion . 
c it i zensh ip , banking ( but not the issue 
lotter ies , compan ies , env ironment ,  
measures , a i rplane , veh icle and shipping 
( all subj ect to the Restr ict ions on 
Government in Part IV} 
of cur rency} , 
we ights and 
reg istr at ion 
the Federal 
ident ical to Banks-Torres and Tanna const i tu t ions of 
1 978 , except for add i t ions to Ar ticle I I  (Declarat ion 
of Rights} . Art icle X ,  ( Federat ion F i nance } , and a new 
Ar ticle X I I I  ( I n it ial E lect ions}  
' reg ulat ions that are 
moral ity , health and 
r unning sett lement ' .  
essent ial for law and order , 
for the maintenance of a smooth 
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APPENDIX 3 
'WESTERN AMENDMENTS ' TO SOLOMON ISLANDS CONSTITUTION 1 9 78  
National 
Concur rent 
Prov inc i al 
( unlisted) 
impos i t ion of t axes , r ates and duties . 
sale and lease of public land ; management and development 
of all land ; compul sory acqu i s i t ion of land ; mining and 
prospect ing , on land and in ter r i tor ial waters of the 
prov ince ; water management ; f ish i ng with in terr i tor ial 
waters o f  the prov ince ; immig rat ion into the prov ince ; 
prov inc ial bor rowing and bank ing . 
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NOTE 
1They c an be summar ised as follows : ( 1 )  Does the central government have 
exclus ive control over fore ign affa i r s? ( 2 )  Are the un its prevented from 
seced ing? ( 3 )  Does the cent r al government act d irectly on c it i zens? ( 4 )  
Do the un its have a say i n  const itut ional amendments deal ing with 
themselves? ( 5 )  Are the un its protected ag a inst e l iminat ion of thei r  
iden t i ty? ( 6 ) I s  there equal representat ion o f  the un its i n  a n  uppe r 
house? ( 7 ) Ar e there two sets of cour ts? ( 8 )  Does the supr eme cour t 
deal w ith relat ions between the centre and the un its?  
1 2. LEGISLATUR ES IN SOM E PAC I F IC CONSTITUTIONS 
C.J. Lynch 
I NTRODUCTORY 
Ove r recent year s a number of small Pac i f ic countr ies have acqui red 
new cons t i t u t ions , e i ther on independence or , in the case of the " ent it ies" 
of the US- admin istered Trust Te rr i tory of the Paci f ic Is lands , by adopt ing 
const itut ions that in form are independence ones ( s ubj ect to transitory 
prov is ions ) . These const i tut ions exh ibit resemblances and d i fferences that 
ar e not on ly interest ing in  themselves , but should be of more general 
interest to anyone concer ned with smal ler countr ies of the Pac ific and with 
Aust r a l ia ' s  relat ions with them , or with const itut ion-making and 
par l i amentary and cons t i tut ional mat ters generally .  Th is paper looks at 
ce rtain of the const itut ions from the po int of v iew of the leg islatures and 
related mat te r s .  
Th e paper deals pr imar ily with the leg islatures a s  inst itut ions , and 
with the i r  structures as set out in the const i t ut ions and the l imitat ions 
placed on them by the constitut ions : how they oper ate with in the 
constitut ional fr amework is a d i fferent matter , in  some ways a more 
impor t ant one , but the theme i s  const itut ional law and not pol i t ical 
sc ience ( thus , my approach is the conver se of that taken by Wolf-Ph ill ips 
1 9 72 : 7 ) : the dynam ic aspec t o f  a cons t i tut ion i s  cond it ioned to some 
extent by the stat ic one , and they necessar i ly interac t .  
I have also l imited the study t o  the formal constitut ional documents ,  
on the bas i s  that they cont ain the prov i s ions that were a t  the t ime 
cons idered to be of the g r eatest leg al or pol i t ical importance and of the 
most pe rmanent nature . Th is has led me to exclude , for example , the 
Organ ic Laws in Papua New Gu ine a ( PNG ) • 
THE LEG I SLATURES GENERALLY 
In th i s  sect ion , I d i scuss d i fferences r ather than re semblances ,  using 
as a standard a leg islature that ( 1 ) i s  unicameral , and ( 2 )  has a s i ng le 
class of member s ,  who are ( 3 )  e lected from s ing le-member cons t ituenc ies ( 4 )  
o n  the bas is o f  a un iver sal , c it i zen , adult fr anch ise , the vot i ng age be ing 
e ighteen ( wh ich is common to all except Naur u ,  whe re the age is twenty 
(Ar t . 2 9 ) , and We stern Samoa (WS )  where qual i f icat ions for elector s ar e to 
be pre scr ibed by Ac t (Ar t . 4 4 ( 3 ) ) .  Fur ther , although there may be some 
spec ial qua l i f icat ions for , or d i squal if icat ions from ,  membe r sh ip ( such as 
res idence , i nsolvency , insanity,  be ing under sen tence for an offence , etc . )  
the general qual if icat ion i s  much the same as for the fr anch ise : such 
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spec ial prov i s ions vary almost in a r andom manner ,  as if they depended 
ma inly on prev ious dependency a r r angements and on the pe r sonal v i ews of the 
fr amers  of the const itut ions ( or those of the i r  adv iser s ) . 
An impor tant aspect of the fr anch ise i s  the secr ecy of the ballot , 
prescr ibed in Vanuatu , the Ma rshall I s lands (MI ) , and the Fede r ated States 
of Micronesia  ( FSM) • The pr act ical problem i s  that i f  a ballot i s  
l iteral ly secret , bl ind , i l l iterate or otherwise hand icapped people may be 
d i senfr anchi sed by a wr itten bal lot-pape r ( though there are alter nat ives) , 
so that the be tter answer is e i ther to s ay noth ing , or e lse to adopt the 
PNG approach of r equ i r i ng the e lector al law to make prov is ion for 
" safe-guard ing the integr i ty o f  e l ect ions" ( s . 1 26 ( 7 ) ) .  
On ly Be lau has a b icameral leg islature . However ,  K i r ibat i ,  PNG , FSM 
and WS e ach have spec ial classes of member s .  
I n  K i r ibat i ,  there  are three spec i al c lasses . F i rstly , the Attor ney­
General is a publ ic off icer but is ex offiaio a ful l ,  vot ing membe r ( see 
below) . Secondly ,  when the pr es ident , who is elected from among the 
member s  of the leg islature by the nat ional elector ate ( see be low) 
r epre sents a s ing le-member const ituency , an add it ional member is e lected 
for that constituency ( s . 5 3 ( 3 ) ) .  Th irdly , to accommodate the d i f f icult 
problem of the secess ion ist Banabans who , wh i le be ing I-K i r ibat i ,  are 
almost all res ident on Rabi I sland in F i j i ( where they were re-settled in  
1 94 5 )  a spec ial Banahan membe r i s  nominated by the Banahan Rabi Counc i l  
( see K i r ibat i Ch . IX for the "Banahan" prov is ions gener ally) . Th is 
exper iment ( it is due for rev iew in  1 9 82 ) is a very spec i al case , but may 
be wor th cons ide r i ng as a means of represent ing at least a homogeneous 
g roup mor e-or- less pe rmanently res ident abroad but retain ing land r ights 
and other attachments at home . 
PNG has prov is ions for two spec ial c lasses . F i rstly,  the Par l i ament 
may appoint , by a two- thirds ab solute maj or i ty vote , not more than three 
" nom inated member s "  ( ss . 1 0 1 ( 1 ) (c) , 1 02 ) . Th is prov is ion has not been used , 
and was I think des igned to r eassure the conservat ive element that there 
would be room for representat ion e i ther o f  spec ial ind iv iduals or interest 
g roups . Secondly , the r e  are membe rs for " prov inc ial electorate s "  ( s . 1 0 1 ( 1 ) 
( b ) ) ,  to g ive representat ion of the sem i-autonomous prov inces :  i n  fact , 
th i s  is largely an adaptat ion to d i ffer ent purposes of the pre- independence 
schemes of " spec ial" and later " r eg ional"  e lectorates , o r ig inally des igned 
for r ac ial repre sentat ion and late r made subj ect to educat ional 
qual i f icat ions . 
The PNG prov is ion for prov inc ial representat ion is taken further in  
FSM , wh ich prov ides for a federal system in  a un icameral leg islature by 
allott ing a spec ial seat to e ach st ate and by al lowi ng each state to 
apport ion its own ord inary seats (Ar t . IX ,  ss . 8 ,  1 0 ) , and also ( see be low) 
by g iv i ng ex tr aord inary vot ing r ights to state blocs ( Ar t. I X ,  s . 20 ) . In  
add i t ion , a state may set as ide one of i ts ord inary seats for a trad it ional 
leader e lected in accordance with statute , the state seats be i ng reduced 
and re-appor t ioned accord ing ly (Ar t . IX ,  s . 1 1 ) . 
WS prov ides for three 
" te r r i tor ial const itue nc ie s "  
member e lected from each o f  
k inds of member s :  member s  elected from 
( a  matai ( ch ie f )  fr anch ise ) ; one add it ional 
such four o f  those const ituenc ies as are 
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prescr ibed by Ac t :  a number of member s  calculated o n  a formula s e t  out i n  
the Cons t itut ion b y  " those per sons who se names appear o n  the ind iv idual 
voter s '  rol l "  - that i s , those who are not membe rs o f  an aiga ( trad it ional 
group)  (Ar t . 44  ( 2 ) , Sch . 2 ) . 1 
Mult i-member const ituenc ies are spec i f ically prov ided or al lowed for 
in Naur u ,  Tuval u ,  K i r ibat i and MI , and to the ex tent noted above in WS 
( though Vanuatu and Be lau leave the matter ope n ,  and it is a matter of 
inference that constituenc ies are s i ngle-member in FSM) . Ther e is l i ttle 
doubt that th is i s  a good ar r angement for small is lands countr ies with 
relat ively g reat concentr at ions of populat ions in areas that are too small ,  
o r  othe rwise unsui ted , for d iv i s ion : a s  the K i r ibat i example shows 
ind i r ectly , it can also help with the recur rent problem of how a nat ional 
leader sh ip whose duties tr anscend const i tuency ones can be comb ined with 
acceptable constituency leader sh ip . 
Except for the matai fr anch i se in WS and for the Banaban prov 1s 1on in 
K i r ibat i that a Banaban who i s  a non-c i t i zen i s  ent itled to reg ister as an 
elector on Banaba on the same bas is as a c i t i zen , the re are no spec ial 
fr anchi se prov i s ions . G iven the streng th o f  cus tom and the t r ad it ional 
soc ial structure in most of these countr ies it is a l i ttle surpr is ing that 
only in FSM , and that ind irectly ,  is there any prov is ion for representat ion 
of the t r ad it ional leadersh ip ( though no doubt it ope r ates beh ind the 
scene s) . Th is is per haps expl icable by a r ather uncr it ical acceptance of 
Weste rn pol i t ical values by the more in fluent ial of the framers of 
const itut ions and the i r  adv iser s .  Even in MI , where the iroij ( chiefly) 
system r emains strong and iroij we re repr esented in the leg islatures from 
1 949  to 1 9 79 e ither by a separ ate House of Iroij  or through reserved seats , 
and where  there is con s ider able popular pre ssur e  for the recog n i t ion of the 
trad it ional leader sh ip in local government , the re i s  no spec ial prov is ion 
for the t r ad i t ional leader s  ( though as will be seen below ,  trad i t ional 
influence is accommodated in other ways ) . 
In relat ion to e l ig ib il ity for member sh ip of the leg islature there is 
li ttle to add . In Naur u ,  a cand idate must be twenty years of age ( the 
vot ing age ) : in So lomon I s l ands ( S I ) , Tuvalu , K i r ibat i and MI 21 and in 
PNG , Be lau and Vanuat u 25 . In PNG , in add it ion , reflect ing the interest 
taken in the local nature of the re spons ib i l i t ies of a membe r ,  a cand idate 
must have been born in the constituency or have res ided there cont inuously 
for two ye ar s .  Pe rhaps because of the pr est ige attaching to ag e in parts 
of Microne s i a ,  in FSM a cand idate must b e  a t  least 30 , and a s  we l l ,  must 
have been a c i t i zen for f i fteen ye ar s and have been res ident in h i s  state 
for f ive years ( Ar t . IX,  s . 9 ) . The tendency of such prov is ions to produce a 
conservat ive , t r ad i t ion-or iented and state-or iented central leg islature is 
obv ious , and i t  is r e levant that these requ i r ements are str icter than those 
in the former Cong r e ss of Microne s i a ,  where  the ag e of 2 5 , f ive year s '  
c it i zensh ip and one ye ar s '  res idence i n  the D i str ict ( the pr esent state) 
we re prescr ibed ( Secretar ial Order (of the US Secr etary of the Inter ior ) 
2 9 1 8 ,  Pt . I II , s . 6 ) , and that Be lau reta ined much of the prev ious 
requirements ( Ar t . IX ,  s . 6 ) . 
A matter that was not refer red to at the commencement of th i s  sect ion 
is the for um for dec id ing quest ions of e l ig ib i l i ty for membersh ip .  Here 
there i s  a stra ight- forward spl i t  between the Westm inster-or iented 
constitutions ( includ ing MI ) and the Wash i ng ton-or iented ones : in the 
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former , they are matters for the courts , whe reas in the latter , they are 
matte r s  for the Hou se concer ned . Po lit ically the d i f fe rence i s  impor tant , 
and related to it is the fact that the Wash ing ton-or iented constitutions 
( and forme r ly the Ch ar ter of the MI Nitijela) allow a House to expel a 
member ( by a two- th irds maj or ity vote , or th ree-quarte r s  in the MI 
NitijeZa) wh ile the We stminster-or iented ones,  do not ( although in  PNG a 
member may be d i smi ssed by the appropr iate indepe ndent tr ibunal for an 
offence ag ainst the Leader sh ip Code ( s . 1 04 ( 2 ) (h ) ) .  
There are also prov i s ions in K i r ibat i and Be lau for the recall of a 
member by the e lector ate , wh ich are d iscussed below . 
All in al l ,  leav ing out of accoun t the d i fferences between 
par l iament ary-execut ive and pres ident i al-execut ive sys tems , the re does not 
seem to be much rhyme or re ason to many o f  the var iat ions shown in  th i s  
sect ion , and o n e  is forced t o  conc lude that per sonal prefer ences and 
id iosyncr ac ies played a g r eat part in them . None the less , the mere 
ex istence of such d i ffe rences is s ig n i f icant not only to the student of 
const itut ions but also ,  and mor e par t icular ly , to the make rs and rev i se r s  
of const i tut ions . 
LAW-MAKI NG 
Th e mak ing o f  laws is usually reg arded as the pr inc ipal constitut ional 
funct ion of a leg islature . Four main aspects are d i scussed here : the 
formulas con fe r r ing the funct ion ; the form of laws and the requ i r ements of 
law-mak ing ;  assent and veto ; and other l im itat ions and controls ( d i rect 
or ind i rect ) . I have also included a note on law-mak i ng by popular 
init iat ive in Belau . Const itut ional amendment is dealt with below. 
Leg is lat ive power is usually con fe r r ed by the use of var i at ions on two 
standard formulas : 
The leg is lature may make laws for the peace , order and 
good government of the country;  
wh ich i s  the " Eng l i sh "  formul a ,  and the more "Ame r ican " : 
The leg islat ive author ity is vested in the leg islatur e .  
The problem with the f i r st type o f  formula i s  that it i s  based on 
Eng l i sh usage and impl ic i t  under stand i ng s ,  and is largely f ict ional or 
pr og r ammat ic wi thout appe ar ing so : the intent ion is that the power be 
exercised in that way , but whethe r a law w i l l  ach ieve the purpose is for 
the leg i slature alone to dec ide - but that is not wh at is said . PNG u ses a 
s imilar formul a ,  add ing a r e fer ence to " the we l fare of the People " ,  but at 
least c l ar i f ies it somewhat by prov id ing that a law c annot be chal lenged in 
a cour t on the g ro und that i t  doe s  not pass the test ( s . 1 09 ( 1 ) , ( 3 ) ) .  
The second type o f  formula i s  used in  MI , FSM and Be lau , and is a 
l it t le doubtful because it tend s to s uggest a str ict doctr ine of the 
separat ion of powe r s  ( though MI attempts to avo id th i s  by a prov 1s 1on - i n  
itse l f  not altogether clear - allowing t h e  deleg at ion o f  t h e  law-mak ing 
power ( Ar t . IV , s . 1 ( 2 )  (b) ) ) .  
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WS avo ids such problems : 
Pa r l i ament may make laws for the whole or any part of 
We stern Samoa and laws hav ing effect outs ide as well as 
within We stern Samoa (Ar t . 4 3 ) . 
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Th is i s  not j ust playing with words :  there  i s  no g uar antee in the 
Pac i f ic that a constitut ion will be interpreted or appl ied by per sons who 
know or accept the unstated assumptions of i t s  fr amers . I f  the fr amers of 
a const i t ut ion know prec i sely what they mean , the r e  i s  ne i ther need for nor 
bene f i t  in the use of a ' hallowed ' formula.  
Turn ing to the form of laws , PNG , WS , Vanuatu and Naur u  use the s imple 
word " law" wh i le the other s  spec ify "Bi ll "  or " Act" . There is l ittle to 
the point except that the more spec i f ic reference may avoid such a 
s i t uat ion as occur red ear ly in MI where both leg i slat ive and non­
l eg i slat ive instruments were made by und i f ferent iated " Re solut ions"  ( see MI 
Code ( 1 97 5 ) , c l . 6 5 ) . A r el ated po int may , however , be impor tant : SI , 
Be lau and FSM ( and former ly MI ) set out in the i r  Const itut ions a spec i f ic 
enacting formula ,  the s ignif icance of wh ich is that a b i l l  may be " k illed" 
by the om iss ion of the formula ,  and I understand that , for example ,  in the 
Idaho Leg i slature , amendment for th i s  purpose is used as a pol i t ical ploy . 
As in all dr aft ing matte r s , the a im should be s impl ic ity and d irectness . 
FSM goes fur ther in presc r ib ing form : a b i l l  may embr ace but one subj ect 
expressed in its t itle and a prov i s ion outs ide the subj ect so expressed is 
vo id , and al so prescr ibes the form that amendment must take (Ar t . IX ,  s . 2 1 ) . 
One cannot but th ink that as const itut ional requirements , and pr esumably 
prerequ i s ites of val idity,  these prov is ions go too far . Other countr ies 
include s im ilar prov 1s 1ons in essent ially non- j ustic i able rules of 
procedure ,  wh ich seems an adequate approach . 
Some const i tut ions require  a number of read ing s of a bi l l :  i n  FSM 
there are two ; in Be lau and MI , three , in Tuvalu and K i r ibat i , at least 
two . Unless there i s  some par t icular purpose to be served th is is 
po intless , though in these par t icular cases there i s : i n  Tuvalu ( and in 
K i r ibat i ( s . 68 ( 3 ) ) ,  though the reason i s  not so stated ) a non-urgent b i l l  
is defe r red unt i l  t h e  nex t sess ion " so as t o  permit cons iderat ion of the 
B i ll by the Island Counc i ls"  ( s . 6 0 ( 2 ) ) .  ( I n Tuval u ,  the Rules of Procedur e 
prov ide for a separate stage for the cons ide r at ion of comments of i s land 
counc ils  on a b i l l . )  In Belau (Ar t . IX ,  s . 1 4 ) and FSM (Ar t . IV ,  s . 20 ) , 
r ead ing s  must be on d i f fe rent days . In MI , certain  b i l ls need spec ial 
reports to be made and publi shed before proceed ing beyond f i r st reading 
( Ar t . IV, ss . 2 ,  1 9 ,  20 ) . Such purposes could , however , eas i ly be served by 
better means . In g eneral , read ing s  are pas sed on a s imple maj or i ty but FSM 
( presumably in a id of state r ights) requ i res a two- th irds absolute maj or i ty 
on f i r st r ead ing and a two-th irds maj or ity of state member s  vot ing as un its 
on second read ing ( Ar t . IX ,  s . 20 ) , wh ich amply j u st i f ies separ ated read ing s .  
Ther e was noth i ng s imilar t o  the FSM prov is ion in prev ious pr act ice in the 
Tr ust Te rr i tory of the Pac if ic I s l ands , and apar t  from the inherent 
d i f f icult ies i t  poses for any controver s ial leg i slat ion , it can only have 
been included to d i scourage fur ther separat i sm ( though it m ight in fact 
exacerbate i t ) . 
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I t ur n  now to assent and veto : where there i s  a power to refuse 
assent I use the express ion " veto " . 
Th ere are three procedures : s imple ce r t i f icat ion that a b i l l  has been 
prope r ly passed (MI , PNG and Naur u ) ; veto (WS , Tuvalu , FSM and Belau) ; 
and " assent" ( S I , K i r ibat i and Vanuat u ) . 
The veto in WS and Tuvalu is nom inally exercised by the He ad of State , 
but ac tually by the Pr ime M i ni ster ( WS (Ar t . 6 0 ) ) or the Cabinet (Tuvalu 
( ss . 5 8 ( 2 ) , 3 9 ( 1 ) ) ) . Conceivably i t  was assumed that "Westm inste r "  
convent ions would apply, but th i s  i s  a mos t  quest ionable assumption , and I 
think that it must be accepted that a t r ue veto ex i sts - in S I  i t  is made 
qu ite clear that assent is a mere formal ity ( s . 59 ( 2 ) ) .  I n  FSM and Be lau , 
with pr es ident ial execut ives , the veto powe r is a real one . In Belau its  
exe rc i se can be over- r idden by a two-th i rd s  maj or i ty i n  each House (Ar t . IX ,  
s . 1 5 ) , but FSM places another restr ict ion o n  the power o f  the leg islature 
by r equ i r ing for the purpose a thr ee-quarte r s  maj or ity o f  the state members 
vot ing as un its ( Ar t . IX , s . 2 (q) ) .  
The " assent " in K i r ibat i ( s . 66 ( 3 ) - ( 6 ) )  and Vanuatu (Ar t . 1 6  ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) )  i s  
not a mere formality,  b u t  g ives the Pres ident a n  express power t o  refer to 
the cour ts a b i l l  that he be l ieves to be unconst itut ional . In a related 
proced ur e , PNG ( s . 1 1 0 ( 3 ) ) and Be lau ( Ar t . IX ,  s . 1 5 ) make prov is ion for the 
execut ive to return a b i l l  to the leg islature for cons iderat ion of 
amendments recommended by the execut ive . 
Except where there is a t r ue veto , the cer t i f icat ion procedure is by 
far the s implest to unde r stand and oper ate . Even if a procedure refer red 
to in the pr eced ing paragr aph is r equired there i s  no reason why a delay in 
cer t i f icat ion should not be i ntroduced for the purpose - in an analogous 
proced ur e ,  in MI cer t i f icat ion i s  del ayed pend ing Counc i l  of Iroij  
cons iderat ion (Ar t . II I , s . 3 ( 4 )  and see be low) . 
I need ment ion only four " other l imitat ions and controls " :  i n  the 
neo-Westm inster constitutions , the standard l im itat ions on the r ight to 
introd uce " money" bills  and amendments ( though the re are m i nor var i at ions ) ; 
the requ irement noted above of pr ior reports on certain types of b i l l s  in , 
for example , MI ; the entrenchment of some or all of the const itution ; and 
in MI the prov is ions r e lat ing to the Counc i l  o f  Iroij . On ly the last need s 
fur ther re ference here . 
The Counc i l  of I roij ( see , gener ally, MI Ar t . I I I  and Lynch 1 982b)  is a 
non- leg is lat ive body of t r ad it ional leader s elected by the ir pee r s , and has 
two funct ions in r e lat ion to leg islat ion . Fi rstly , it may request the 
Nitijela to recons ider any b i l l  ( b ills  not becom ing Acts unt i l  ce r t if ied by 
the Speaker (Ar t . IV , s . 2 1 ( 3 ) ) )  that " affects the customary law or a 
trad it ional pract ice , or land tenur e ,  or a related matte r "  ( Ar t . I I I , 
s . 3 ( 2 ) ) .  Th e NitijeZa must r econs ider accord ingly,  but make s the f inal 
dec i s ion . Second ly , the Counc i l  must be g iven an opportun ity to report to 
the Nitije la and to the publ ic on any b ill to dec lare the cus tomary law 
before it goes beyond f i r st read i ng , by means o f  a j oint committee of the 
Counc i l  and the Nitije la (Ar t . X ,  s . 2 ( 3 ) ) .  The second funct ion of the 
Counc i l  is analogous to the Vanuatu r equ i r ement that before prov id ing for a 
nat ional land law , of wh ich "The r ules of custom shall form the bas i s "  
(Ar t . 7 2 )  Parliament must consult with the s im i lar National Counc i l  of 
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Ch iefs ( Ar t . 7 4 ) . These prov is ions al low of a d irect trad it ional input into 
the leg islature of a k ind d i fferent from what m ight be had if  t r ad it ional 
leaders were ord inary leg islator s ,  without taking away from the supremacy 
of the leg islatur e .  B y  way of contr ast , in Yap State of FSM a counc i l  o f  
pilung and a counc i l  of tamol ,  compr i sed of t r ad it ional leader s ,  have a 
j oint veto ( in fact exe rcised ) over any b i l l : 
wh ich concerns t r ad i t ion and custom 
funct ion of a t r ad it ional leader 
t r ad i t ion and c ustom (Yap D i str ict 
Tr ust Te rr itory Code , S ) ! 
or the role or 
as r ecog n ized by 
Ch ar ter , Ti tle 3 
However ,  how these var ious inst i tut ions w i l l  ope r ate in pr act ice remains to 
be seen . 
Be lau has a prov is ion that is un ique among the Pac i f ic Cons t i tutions 
that I have stud ied : 
Ci t i zens may enact or repe al nat ional laws , except 
appropr iat ions , by init iat ive An init iat ive 
pet i t ion shall take e ffect if approved at the next 
general elect ion by a maj or ity of the pe r sons vot ing on 
the i n i t i at ive . A l aw enacted by i n i t i at ive or a 
repe al of a law by i n i t i at ive may not be vetoed by the 
Pr es ident . A l aw enacted or repealed by i n i t iat ive may 
be subsequently amended , repealed or r eenacted only by 
another i n i t i at ive pur suant to the prov is ions of th i s  
sect ion ( Ar t . XI I I , s . 3 ) . 3  
Approval of an i n i t i at ive pet it ion i s  thus by relat ive maj or ity , vot ing 
be i ng volun tary and abstent ions not being counted . The mechan ics of the 
procedure are not set out , but in any event it is a clumsy one . However ,  
i n  a country such as Be lau these may not be s ig n i f icant po ints . The 
resultant law is made d irectly by the people and not by the leg islatur e .  
I t  i s  i n  e f fect entrenched , and thus , l ike Or gan ic Laws in PNG , r esembles 
an add it ional const itut ional law. 
In a small country,  i t  i s  d i f f icult to say how non-government g roups 
that lack draft ing and other techn ical s k i lls could produce ef fect ive 
initiative laws other th an prog r ammat ic one s and d irect ions to the 
government , but if  they can th i s  procedure may present a threat to the 
leg islatur e .  There i s  also the real poss i b i l i ty o f  pol i t ical manipulat ion , 
espec ially as a maj or ity of the voter s  vot ing in the concur rent elect ion i s  
not required ( as will  b e  seen , th i s  i s  also a n  apparent de fect of 
const i tut ional " referenda" in Be lau) . But the Be lau Cons t itut ion i s  too 
young for the procedure to have been te sted . In relation to the poss ible 
form of in i t i at ive laws in Be lau , I am r eminded of a procedure ( now 
abo l i shed) i n  the former MI Nitijela ,  under wh ich there was prov is ion in 
its Rules of Proced ure for the introduc t ion of a " shor t- form" b i l l  - that 
is , "a b i l l  wh ich expresses an idea about des i red or intended leg islat ion 
but is not in a form for �dopt ion as law" . A " shor t-form" b i l l  was 
refer red to a committee for draft ing ( Rule 8 ( f ) )  ( th i s  is s im ilar to the 
Engl ish pr act ice before Henry VI , when b i l l s  wer e  merely pet i t ions to the 
K i ng and the j udges drew them up into statutes (see Maxwel l  1 962 : 3 9-4 0 ; 
Cr aies 1 9 7 1 : 2 1 -2 2 ) . Such an approach may be s u itable for i n i t i at ive laws , 
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and indeed could perhaps have a wider appl icat ion in leg i slatures with 
l imited resources and exper ience : someth ing of the s ame result m ight be 
obtained by means of a s imple resolut ion , but the " shor t- form" approach i s  
more formal and po s i t ive .  
CONST ITUTI ONAL AMENDMENT 
There is no general ag reement on the process of const itut ional 
amendment otherwise than that : ( 1 )  a spe c i al procedure i s  r equ i red ; and 
( 2 )  except in  Tuval u ,  MI , FSM and Be lau , certain prov is ions are entrenched 
mor e  deeply than othe r s .  Two levels of entrenchment is the r ule , except i n  
PNG wh ich h a s  four ( plus a t r an s i tory procedur e for urgent amendments 
( ss . 1 4 ( 1 ) - ( 3 ) , ( 6 ) , 1 7 ( 1 ) ,  ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) ) ) , K i r ibat i wh ich has a spec ial 
procedur e ,  amount ing to a Banaban veto , for the Banaban prov i s ions ( s . 1 24 ) ; 
and MI wh ich al lows const ituency appor t ionment to be var ied by Act s ubj ect 
only to the tabl ing and publ icat ion o f  a spec ial repor t ( Ar t . IV,  s . 2 ( 5 ) ; 
Ar t . XI I , s . 2 ( 3 ) ) .  
The bas ic procedure i s  amendment by Act ,  except in FSM and Belau , 
al though in MI some amendments ( the m i nor ones )  are " cons idered and 
d i sposed of as if  they had been proposed by B i l l "  (Ar t . XI I ,  s . 3 ) . The 
spec ial aspects are : ( 1 )  spec ial t ime for cons ider at ion ( except in 
Tuvalu) , and in SI spec ial not ice ( s . 6 1  ( 4 ) ( a ) ) (Vanuatu gets much the same 
res ult by requ i r i ng a spec ial s i tt ing of Par l i ament (Ar t . 8 3 ) ) ;  ( 2 ) a 
spec ial maj o r i ty or maj or it ies ; and ( 3 )  f inal approval by referendum in  
all cases in MI , FSM and Be lau , and in  the case o f  spec ially entrenched 
prov is ions in  WS , Na ur u ,  K i r ibat i and Vanuatu ( only Tuvalu , PNG and SI h ave 
no refe rendum prov i s ion ) . 
Add it ionally , PNG ( s . 1 3  ( a ) ) and S I  ( s . 6 1  ( 4 ) (b) ) requ i r e  const itut ional 
amendments to be expr essly stated to be such ( thus g uard i ng ag a inst 
acc idental or inc idental amendment)  , wh i le the requ i red spec i al meet ing in  
Vanuat u ,  refe renda in  other countr ies and the pr ocedures in  FSM , Be lau and 
MI descr ibed below get the same r esult . 
PNG also has a useful procedure by wh ich amendments can be made by 
ord inary Ac t if the Speaker , after consultat ion w i th the Ch ief Just ice or a 
Judge , cer t i f ies that they are not substant ive , or merely cor rect 
self-ev ident e r ror s ,  or  are merely inc idental or consequential ( s . 1 4 ( 6 ) , 
( 7 ) ) .  
Be lau (Ar t . XIV) and FSM ( Ar t . XIV, s . 1 )  are espec ially interesting , 
because not only i s  the process d i fferent from the mak i ng of Ac ts , but also 
( l ike MI ) they prov ide for d irect popular par t ic ipat ion . There are three 
ways i n  wh ich amendments may be proposed : by const itut ional convent ion ; 
by popular i n i t iat ive ; or by the leg islature . In all cases , amendments 
become e f fect ive on approval in  a referend um or the equivalent . FSM leaves 
procedures to st atute , but typ ically requ i r e s  approval by thr ee-qua r te r s  of 
the votes in three-quarte r s  o f  the states . Be lau spe l l s  out the 
procedures , allowing proposals to be i n i t i ated on a rev iew o f  the 
Cons t i tut ion ( see below) , on pet i t ion by 25 per cent o f  reg istered voter s ,  
o r  by a reso lution o f  three-quarte r s  o f  e ach House . As with i n i t iat ive 
laws , i n  Be lau a proposal is voted on at the next reg ular general e lect ion 
LEGISLATURES 161 
and requ i r es a maj or ity of the votes cast on the proposal s ,  and also a 
maj or i ty in three-quar te r s  of the state s .  
In M I  (Ar t . XI I ,  s . 4 ) , popular par t ic ipat ion i s  secured b y  requ i r ing 
the quest ion of the establ ishment of a const itut ional convent ion to be put 
to a re ferendum on pe t i t ion by 2 5  per cent of qual i f ied vote r s , and by 
requ1r 1ng approval ( e ither two- th irds or a s imple maj or i ty ,  depend i ng on 
the nature of the amendment )  of any amendment in a refe rendum .  I t s  
approach is more restr ict ive than those of FSM or Belau espec i al ly in that 
a convent ion can propose only amendments subm i tted by the Nitijela or by 
referendum ( and amendments related to or cons i stent with such amendments) . 
An impor tant aspect is the quest ion of review of the const itut ion , but 
only FSM , Be lau and MI prov ide for regular rev iews : FSM r equ ires  
r e ferend a ,  at not mor e  than ten-year intervals , on the quest ion of hold ing 
a const itut ional convent ion (Ar t . XIV, s . 2 ) , as does Be lau ( at f i fteen-year 
intervals) ( Ar t . XIV , s . 1  ( a ) ) :  MI r equ i res a r epor t  ( of unspec if ied o r ig in) 
on the des i r ab il ity of amendment , or on the c a l l ing ,  or the holding of a 
referendum on the call ing , of a constitut ional r e ferendum , to be prov ided 
for by the NitijeZa at least once every ten years ( Ar t . XI I ,  s . 6 ) . PNG 
( s . 26 0 ) , emphas i s ing I think the importance placed on the pe rmanence of the 
Const itut ion , r equ i r ed a s i ng le rev iew three year s after Independence ( the 
result of the review is not yet repor ted) , and K i r ibati r equ i r ed a rev iew 
of the Banaban prov i s ions ( a  very spec i al case , of pol i t ical r ather than 
leg al impor tance )  three year s after Independence ( s . 1 22 ) . The other 
Const i tut ions have no s imilar prov i s ion . 
I bel ieve that reg ular and cont inu ing rev iew i s  des irable even at the 
r i sk  of foster ing amendment , espec ially where  the consti tut ion is obv iously 
an impor ted produc t ,  or  i s  to some ex tent exper imental ( e . g . , in MI , 
K i r ibat i ,  Vanuatu and probably FSM) , or if some spec i f ically local 
development and adapt ion i s  expected : most o f  the smaller countr ies of the 
Pacif ic would fall into one or other of these categor ies . In th i s  re spect , 
I note that reviews are already under way , or are about to get unde r way,  
in Tuvalu and Be lau , wi thout a spec i f ic const itut ional requ i r ement . 
I r efer red above to the dev ice of spec i al entrenchment used in seven 
of the const itut ions , but the only pr inc iple appl ied seems to be that the 
depth of entrenchment depends solely on local pe rcept ions (or perhaps 
per suas ib i l i ty) at the t ime . There is no agr eement even on the relat ive 
importance of b i l l s  of r ights , wh ich are spec ially entrenched only in 
K i r ibat i ,  MI , Naur u and S I ,  wh i le PNG entrenches to the max imum only four 
prov is ions of the b i l l  and four more prov is ions in the rel ated field of 
states of emergency. Nor i s  there ag reement on the import ance of custom 
and l and , o nly SI , MI a nd WS spec ially e nt re nch i ng s uch m atte r s .  
I t  seems that the reason for the spec ial entrenchment of , and spec ial 
protect ion for , a prov i s ion i s  not its  intr insic importance ( i f the re be 
such a th i ng ) , but its  pol it ical importance at the t ime , and I think th i s  
is the r ight approach . Vanuatu seems t o  expr ess it most c lear ly i n  
spec ially entrench ing ce rtain pol it ically controvers ial issues , namely : 
the status 
e lectoral 
of B i slama , 
system , the 
Eng l i sh and Fr ench , 
powe r s  and org an i zat ion 
the 
of 
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Reg ional Counc ils 4 [ and ] the par l i amentary 
(Ar t . 8 4 ) . 
system 
Ove r-entr enchment and unnecessary entrenchment g ive an undes i r able 
r ig id ity to a const itut ion and are very l ikely counter-pr oduct ive . 
However ,  there i s  no doubt in my mind that r eg ular r ev iew i s  the best cure 
for const itut ional malai se , and the c r ux o f  the matter is that there must 
be some s imple and accept able way out ( perhaps in  par t ,  prov i s ion for Acts 
of I ndemn ity ( see be low) or  amendment by a stand ing const itut ional 
convent ion) in  cases whe r e  a bas ically impor ted const itut ion , or 
for e ign-or iented const itut ional th ink i ng ,  hampe r s  reasonable and prope r 
act ion . 
THE LEG I SLATURES AND THE EX ECUTIVES  
Leg i s lature/execut ive relat ions and t h e  control of t h e  latter b y  the 
former are centr al to any d iscus s ion of the leg islatur e ,  but I s imply po i nt 
out some re levant d i fferences be tween const i t ut ions d i scussed here . 
Th e f i r st group of d i fferences relates to the appo intment and 
d ismissal of the execut ives .  On the pr es ident ial-execut ive s ide , in Belau 
the Pres ident i s  elected in  the usual way by the nat ional elector ate 
(Ar t . VI I I , s . 4 ) , but in FSM by the Leg i s lature (Ar t . X ,  s . 1 )  ( making h im so 
much the more dependent on it) and in  add it ion he must be a membe r of 
Cong r e s s  e lected by a state at large ( i . e . , i n  a spec ial state seat)  
(Ar t . X ,  s . 4 ) . In Belau ( Ar t . VI I I ,  s . 9 )  and FSM ( Ar t . IX ,  s . 7 ) , he may be 
removed by the Leg is lature by impeachment , and as we shall see he may be 
recal led in Be lau . 
There are var iat ions among the par l i amentary-execut ive countr ies , too ,  
although the general r ule i s  that Heads o f  Gover nment at least ·are selected 
by the Leg i s lature and Mini sters by the Heads o f  Gove rnment . 
In K i r ibat i ,  the Pres ident i s  e lected by the nat ional e lector ate , but 
from a panel se lected by and from the Leg i sl ature ( s . 3 2 ) , in Vanuat u ,  where 
the Pres ident has cons ider able d i scret ionary powe r s , he i s  e lected by an 
e lector al col lege consist ing of Par l i ament and the Presidents o f  the 
Reg ional Counc i l s 5 (Ar t . 3 2 ) ; in WS the Head of State , who also has 
s ig n i f icant pe r sonal powe r s , is elected by the Leg is lature (Ar t . 1 8 ) , wh i le 
the Pr ime Minister is appo inted by the Head of State as the per son " who 
commands the conf idence of a maj or i ty of the Member s  of Parliament" 
(Ar t . 3 2  ( 2 )  (a ) ) .  
Even in the monarch ies , there are d i fferences as to the 
Governor-Gener al . In PNG ( where he has for pract ical purposes no power )  he 
is  nom inated by the Cabinet in  accord ance with a dec i s ion of the 
Leg i slature , and is d ismi s s ible on the " adv ice " of the Cabinet e i ther of 
its own mot ion or on a dec is ion of the Leg i slature ( s s . 8 8 ,  9 3 ) . In  S I , he 
is  nom inated by the Leg islature and i s  d ismissed in  accordance with an 
address by it ( and a two- th ird maj or ity vote ) ( s . 2 7 ) , wh i le in  Tuvalu he is 
nominated by the Pr ime M i n i ster after consult ing the Member s  of Par l i ament , 
and i s  d i smissed on the Pr ime M i n ister ' s  " advic e "  ( s . 2 8 ( 2 ) ) .  In these 
cases , inc identally , the Gove rnor-Ge ner al has real powe r s . 
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In general , the execut ives are responsible to and are d ismi ss ible by 
the leg is latures , though in WS the He ad of S t ate may be so d i smi ssed only 
on the g round of m isbehav iour or incapac ity , wh i le in Vanuatu the Pres ident 
may be d i smi ssed on s im ilar g rounds by the e lectoral college r e ferred to 
above . 
A po i nt ar is ing out of th i s  is that the closer the connect ion between 
the execut ive and the leg is lature the g r e ater the impl ic i t  or ind irect 
in fluence o f  the latter i s  l i kely to be , qui te apart from its d i r ect 
influence . A r elated po int i s  that all the par l iamentary-execut ive 
constitutions l imit , e i ther ab solute ly or by pe rcentage , the s i ze of the 
Cabinet ( although in SI the Leg i s lature may determine the s i ze) , so as to 
maintain par l iamentary control : max ima vary from f ive out of twelve in  
Tuvalu to 2 5  per cent in  Vanuatu .  
The d i smi ssal o f  the execut ive b y  the leg islature i n  the "We stm inster " 
countr ies has varying e ffects , though in g ener al it does not involve 
d i ssolut ion of the leg islature . Howeve r ,  in K i r ibati ( s . 7 8 ( 1 ) )  it does 
( log ic ally ,  s ince the President i s  e lected by the nat ional e lectorate ) , 
wh i le in Naur u  there i s  an automat ic d issolut ion i f  a new Pr es ident is not 
elected within seven days ( Ar t . 2 4 ( 2 ) ) ,  and in PNG one occur s if the 
Execut ive is d i smissed in  the last twelve month s of the normal l i fe of the 
Leg is lature ( s. 1 05 ( 1 )  (b) ) • In WS , Tuvalu , Vanuatu and MI there i s  a 
d i scret ionary powe r to d i ssolve : i n  WS , on the " advice " of the Pr ime 
Minister ( Ar t . 3 3 ( 2 ) (b) ) or if a new execut ive is not formed with i n  a 
reasonable t ime ( Ar t . 6 3 ( 2 ) ) ;  i n  Tuval u ,  i f  a new execut ive i s  not formed 
in a reasonable t ime ( s . 7 1  ( 3 ) ) ;  in  Vanuatu on the adv ice (wh ich does not 
appear to be b ind ing ) of the Cabinet ( Ar t . 2 6 ( 3 ) ) ;  and in MI by an out­
going P r e s ident if no incom ing execut ive can be formed (Ar t . IV,  s . 1 3 ) . The 
po int is that the g reater the l ikel ihood of a d i ssolut ion on the defeat of 
the execut ive , the g r eater ( i n general)  the d i s incent ive for votes of no 
conf idence , and the strong er the execut ive in the leg islature . 
Th ere are , however ,  othe r forms of control over the execut ive . In  
add it ion to the usual financ ial and leg islat ive controls , there are 
committee sys tems ( prov ided for in  any det a i l  only in PNG (Pt . VI ,  D iv . 2 , 
Subd iv . E )  though Public Accounts Committees are common) ; control of 
deleg ated leg islat ion ( prov ided for only in  PNG ( s . 1 1 6 ) ) ;  control of 
treaties ( see below) ; and in the par l i amentary-execut ive systems the 
phys ical pr esence of the execut ive in  the leg i slature and its availabil ity 
for quest ion ing both on the floor and in comm ittees . The pract ical 
impor tance of such controls should not be over looked . 
The f i nal aspects of par l i amentary control to wh ich I should l i ke to 
d r aw attent ion are the power in K i r ibat i ( s . 3 3 ( 2 )  (b ) ) and in PNG 
( s . 1 45 ( 1 )  ( a ) ) to move a mot ion of no conf idence in the He ad of Government 
pe r sonally , r ather than in  the Cabinet collect ively ( though the e ffect i s  
the same ) , and t h e  power i n  PNG to move a mot ion o f  n o  conf idence in an 
ind iv idual Mi nister ( s . 1 45 ( 1 )  ( a ) ) .  The latter prov i s ion , though at leas t 
supe r f ic ial ly attr act ive , is I think a ser ious breach of the pr inc iple of 
collect ive r espons ibil ity of the Cabinet itse l f  as expr essed in the 
Cons t i tut ion . 
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It should be noted that the execut ive can be d ismissed only on an 
express mot ion of no conf idence ( or in WS and K i r ibati on the vote on a 
matter that it has dec lared to r a i se an i ssue of conf idence - i n  K i r ibat i , 
due to the automat ic d issolut ion prov i s ion th i s  lends itself to a k i nd o f  
par l iamentary b lac kma i l) . There i s  n o  " convent ion " that on defeat on 
ce rtain mot ions or b ills ( e . g . , f i nanc ial pr oposals)  an executive should or 
must r e s ign . 
Control by the leg islature of the execut ive has its counterpa r t  in 
influence by the executive over the leg i slature . Th is i s  largely a 
pol i t ical and pr act ical matter , and I merely ment ion three po ints . 
F i rstly ,  i t  i s  not uncommon for the execut ive t o  have a fa i r ly tenuous 
cont rol of n umber s  in  the leg is lature , so for it to be over- r uled is 
equally not uncommon . Second ly , in  typical "We stminste r "  fash ion the 
par l i amentary-execut ive const i tut ions g ive the f i nanc ial i n i t iat ive to the 
execut ive . Th irdly , whe re there  i s  a t r ue execut ive veto ( even i f ,  as in 
Be lau and FSM the veto can be over-r idden) the execut ive has a fair ly t ight 
g r ip over leg islat ion . 
EMERGENCY POWERS 
The balance of powe rs between leg i slature and execut ive dur ing 
emergenc ies is everywhere an important cons t itut ional issue , though MI 
makes no prov is ion for emergenc ies . The general picture is one of a broad 
suspens ion of ind iv idual r ights , w i th leg islat ive powe r g r anted to the 
execut ive and l ittle in  the way of day-to-day par l iamentary superv i s ion . 
The declarat ion of a st ate of eme rgency is usually a matter for the 
po l i t ical execut ive . In Tuvalu the dec is ion is made by the Pr ime Minister 
( s .  18  ( 6 ) (b)  ) and in WS by the He ad of State in h i s  d iscr e t ion ( Ar t .  1 05 )  • 
Its cont inuance beyond a l imited per iod depends on the pos i t ive approval of 
the leg islat ure , except in  WS ( Ar t . 1 05 ( 2 ) ) whe re the Head of State can make 
cont inuing dec larations , e ach for 30 d ays . A declarat ion can be revoked by 
the leg islature , except in WS , FSM and , it seems , Naur u  ( though in that 
case the approval of the leg is lature m ight be revoked) . 
Except in S I  and Tuval u ,  the Execut ive is g iven leg islat ive power to 
deal with the emergency, l argely free from d i rect control by the 
Leg is lature , but PNG h as a more compl icated system under wh ich the 
Pa r l i ament can make Eme rgency Ac ts and the Cab inet Eme rge ncy Regulat ions 
(Pt . X ,  D iv . 3 ) . Eme rgency laws over-r ide cons t i tut ionally-guaranteed r ights 
except for the more fundamental ones , altho ugh in  WS , Naur u ,  Be lau , and FSM 
the over-r id ing powe r is absolute i f  necessary and in Vanuatu the preserved 
r ig hts are m inimal (Ar t . 6 9 ( 1 ) ) .  Howeve r ,  all the Constitutions except 
Be lau and FSM prov ide certain s afeg uard s  ag a inst detent ion without tr i al 
( though in Vanuatu ag ain the safeg uard is m i n imal ( Ar t . 69 ( 1 ) (b) ) ) .  
One m ight therefore expect prov 1s 1on for cont inuing par l iamentary 
superv i s ion and control , but in fact only PNG , Be lau and Vanuatu , and to a 
l im ited extent WS prov ide for i t . PNG h as f a i r ly elabor ate prov 1s 1on for 
supe r v i s ion and report  by par l i amentary committees (Pt . X ,  D iv . 4 ) . Belau in 
effect r equ i res a meet i ng of the Leg i slature every ten days (Ar t . VI I I ,  
s . 1 4 ) : Vanuatu mer e ly prov ides that the Leg i s lature shall meet " whenever 
i t  dec ides" ( Ar t . 6 8 ( 4 ) ) ,  wh i le in  WS control is l im i ted to power to revoke 
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Eme rg ency Or de r s  ( Ar t . 1 07 ( 2 ) ) .  Al l the Const itut ions , however ,  r equ i re 
ear ly meet i ng s  of the Leg is lature except in Tuvalu ( where the point is not 
really relev ant s i nce only the Leg islature can make eme rgency laws ) • 
Th e problem l ies in the unpr ed ictable natur e , g rav ity and requ i rements 
of any g iven emergency , the need for adequate power to cope with it , and 
the need to l im i t  responses to i t s  real requ i rements . Po ss ibly the Vanuatu 
( Ar t . 69 ( 2 ) ) ,  Be lau ( Ar t . VI I I , s . 1 4 )  and FSM ( Ar t . X , s . 9 (b ) ) prov i s ions that 
the response be " necessary" together with l imitat ions on detent ion wi thout 
tr ial , g re ater par l iamentary supervision as i n  PNG (which i s  d i f f icult in 
scattered i s land countr ies) , and the preservat ion of the tr uly bas ic 
r ights , i s  about the best that one could hope for . 
A r el ated prov is ion in PNG should , however ,  be ment ioned : that is , 
the power of the Leg islature to pass an " Ac t  of Indemn ity" , to rel ieve from 
l i ab i l ity ( c iv i l  and cr im inal)  a per son who contr avenes or fails to comply 
with a prov i s ion of a constitut ional law where : 
the contravent ion or non-compl iance was made in good 
faith and in except ional c i rcumstances for the purpose , 
or with the intent ion , of uphold ing th i s  Cons t i tut ion 
or protect ing P apua New Gu ine a ,  or  of deal ing with an 
emergency for wh ich no prov i s ion or no adequate 
prov is ion appeared to ex ist ; and • • • no blame­
worth iness attache s ( s . 1 37 ( 1 )  (b ) ) .  
Spec ial formal it ies are requ i red , and before cer t ifying the Ac t the Speaker 
must seek the opin ion of the Supreme Cour t .  Th is prov is ion may ease the 
mind of anyone who feels h imsel f forced , for a val id reason , to take or to 
r isk  tak ing unconsti tut ional act ion , but unfor tunately may tend to 
encour age such ac t ion : as always , the problem for the constitut ion-maker 
is one of balanc ing bene f its and d isadvantages , and in part icular of 
d i scour ag ing the complete over throw or ignor ing of the constitution , in the 
hope that it will  surv ive even breaches of i t .  What the PNG prov is ion 
attempts to prov ide is a k ind of spr ing-board back to const itut ional ism � 
PRES I D I NG OFF I CERS 
The off ice of Speaker ( or h i s  equ ivalent)  i s  central to the 
funct ioning of a leg is lature . I intend to concentrate here on three main 
po ints : h is membe r sh ip o f  the leg islature ; h is vot ing r ights ; and h i s  
funct ions . At the outset I po int out that Vanuatu make s no prov is ion other 
than that "Par liament shall elect a Speake r "  ( Ar t . 20 ( 1 ) ) .  
The general r ule i s , that the Speaker must be , and remain , a member of 
the leg i slature , but th i s  is not the case in S I  and K i r ibat i . In the 
former any per son qua l i f ied to be a member of Parliament may be elected 
Speake r ,  but if a member i s  elected he vacates h i s  seat ( s . 64 ) ; i n  the 
latter only a non-member i s  e l ig ible , and there are no restr ict ions ( even 
c i t i zensh ip) ( s . 7 1 ) .  In both cases h i s  normal term of off ice ends when the 
leg islature meets following a general elect ion . There is a th ird  
poss ib il ity : that the Speaker may be e i ther a member or a non-member .  
Th is is the case in C I  (Ar t . 3 1 ) , but not in any of the Constitut ions 
pr imar i ly d iscussed here . 
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The problem for a small country i s  two- fold : i n  a small leg islature 
the demands of m i n ister ial off ice may wel l  make i t  d i f f icult to prov ide a 
suitable Speaker from among the member s ,  wh i le to do so reduces the number 
of back-benche r s  in a pos i t ion to supe rv ise the execut ive ; and it i s  
d i f f icult for the electorate t o  s e e  i t s  member pr imar i ly a s  a n  impar t ial 
Speaker and not as its repr esent at ive and spo kesman . I adm i t  a strong 
pr eference for the K i r ibat i so lut ion , wh ich by helping to depolit ic ise the 
off ice also makes it available for ex t r a-par l i amentary funct ions ( see 
below) • 
There i s  l i ttle ag reement on the vot ing r ights of the Speaker . SI and 
K i r ibat i log ically g ive h im none . MI , Be lau and FSM g ive h im full r ights , 
wh ich assures e lector ate r epresentat ion at the r i sk of apparent par t i al ity 
(MI compl icates the picture by requiring all member s  pr esent to vote 
{Ar t . IV, s . 1 5 ( 4 ) ) ) . WS and Naur u g ive h im only a cast ing vote , and PNG 
( s . 1 1 4 ( 2 ) ) and Tuvalu ( s . 6 5 ( 3 ) ) a cas t ing vote wi th a del iberat ive vote on 
cer tain matte r s  only. {The except ions are in  both cases bas ically mot ions 
of no conf idence and const itut ional amendments . )  
The casting vote o f  the Speaker i s  a method o f  resolv ing deadlocks , 
but i f  he exercises it in h i s pol it ical j udgment once ag ain h i s  
impar t i al ity i s  in quest ion , whereas if  h e  exercises it b y  reference to 
some " convent ion" of preserv ing the status quo he may appear to h i s  
elector ate t o  b e  in default . There ar e ,  however , alter nat ives : i n  S I  
( s .  7 1  ( 3 ) )  and K i r ibat i ( s .  7 3  ( 3 ) ( s ubj ect t o  the Rules of Procedure)  for 
example , on a t i ed vote the mot ion is lost ( wh ich m ight create problems i f  
there i s  a pr ocedur al inh ib i t ion ag ainst t h e  re- introduc t ion o f  a de feated 
mot ion) . PNG ( s . 1 1 4 ( 3 ) ) and MI (Ar t . IV ,  s . 1 5 ( 7 )  have , I thin k ,  the best 
procedur e :  a t ied vote is a no-dec i s ion vote , the PNG prov i s ion be ing 
procedurally the be tter i n  deem i ng the mot ion to be withdr awn . A r eal 
que st ion i s , whe ther such matte r s  should be in  a constitut ion at al l . 7 
There i s  l i ttle to be said on the 
Speaker , wh ich are pr imar i ly to pr es ide 
bus iness ( though it i s  wor thwh ile to refer 
alter nat ive to " assent" ) .  MI , however ,  
useful i f  only for i t s  educat ive value :  
par l i amentary funct ions o f  the 
over the House and to manage i t s  
again t o  h i s  cer t i f icat ion as a n  
suppl ies a precedent t h a t  may be 
The Speaker shall be re spons ible for ensur ing that the 
off ic ial bus iness o f  the N i ti j ela i s  conducted in 
compl iance with th i s  Const itut ion and the Rules of the 
N i t ij ela , and shall exerc ise h i s  funct ions impar t ia l ly 
(Ar t . IV , s . 8 ( 2 ) ) .  
For small countr ies with scarce manpower resources the use of people i n  
multi- f unct ional roles i s  h ighly des i r able , and though the u s e  made o f  the 
off ice o f  Speake r m ight be g r eater the following select ion of non­
par l i amentary const itut ional funct ions may be suggest ive . He is the act ing 
He ad of State in PNG , Vanuatu , Belau and ( i f the re is non other already 
appo inted) Tuvalu , and in K i r ibat i i s  a member of the Counc i l  of State 
( wh ich admin isters the Government when the Cabinet i s  d i smissed ) ; i n  MI , 
he formally appo ints the President and the Ministe r s ;  he is Ch ai rman of 
the Electoral Commiss ion and a member of the Comm ittee on the appo intment 
of the Ombudsman in S I ,  and is consulted on any such appo intment in 
Vanuatu ; in Vanuatu , quite remar kably he or ig inally nom inated a j udge . 8 
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Some o f  the se funct ions may be held as a representat ive of the leg islature , 
but other s  seem to be based on the stand ing and impar t ial ity of the 
Speake r .  
F i nally , the re i s  prov is ion for a Deputy o r  Vice Speaker i n  all cases 
except FSM and Be lau ( where the matte r i s  left to the Leg is latures) , 
K i r ibat i and Tuvalu , and in each case ( includ ing S I )  he must be and remain 
a member .  S I , MI , WS and Tuval u prov ide for ad hoe appo intments of member s  
t o  pre s ide - PNG leaves th i s  matter t o  Act o r  Rules o f  Proced ur e .  I t  might 
here be noted that in S I  a member pre s id ing who is not the Speaker has a 
cast ing , but not a del ibe rat ive , vote ( s . 7 1  ( 2 )  (b ) ) ( unl ike the Speaker who 
has none) • 
M I SCELLANEOUS MATTERS 
There are a number of other features of some of the Const itut ions 
d i scussed here that are wor th ment ion ing , even if they cannot be examined 
in detai l .  I h ave chosen some that I f ind str i k i ng ,  or of pr act ical 
impor tance . 
The f i r st is the pos i t ion of the Attor ney-General , an off ice that is 
often a problem ,  e spec ially where i t  has to be f i l led by an expatr iate . 
MI , S I , K i r ibat i and Tuvalu illustrate d i fferent approaches ( in each case 
the off ice is a public off ice) . 
In MI , the At tor ney-Gener al is s imply the legal adv iser to the 
Execut ive ( Ar t . VI I ,  s . 3 ( 3 ) ) ( the re i s , however , a separate statutory off ice 
of Leg is lat ive Counsel ,  respons ible to the Leg islatur e ) . In S I , if  the 
Mini ster respons ible for j ust ice is not ent it led to pract ice in  the country 
the At torney i s  ent i t led to take part ( but not to vote)  in proceed ings in 
Par l i ament as adv iser to the Cabinet ( s . 4 2 ( 4 ) ) .  
K i r ibat i adopted an extreme , and unfor tunate , prov is ion : the 
At tor ney-Gener al , who is appo inted by the Pres ident per sonally ( s . 4 2 ( 2 ) ) ,  
i s  a full , vot ing , member of both the Cabinet and the Leg is lature ( ss . 4 0 ,  
5 3 ( 1 ) (c ) ) ,  but does not go out o f  off ice with the rest o f  the Cabinet . The 
result is to g ive the Pr es ident a nominated vote , respons ible to no 
electorate but only to the Cabinet ( wh ich is itself collect ively 
respons ible to the Leg is lature ) . 
Tuvalu ,  however ,  has an approach that seems to solve ( as far as a law 
can solve i t )  the problem of prov id ing leg al adv ice in the leg islatur e .  
Unless excused b y  Par l i ament , the At tor ney-General must attend a l l  meet ing s  
of Par l i ament wi thout the r ight t o  vote , and s imilar ly attends a l l  meet ing s  
of the Cabinet unless excused b y  t h e  Pr ime Mini ster ( s . 4 3 ( 4 ) , ( 5 ) ) .  
The second feature i s  the "Offic i al Opposit ion" and the party system , 
refe r r ed to in S I ,  PNG and Vanuatu . In SI the Speaker , after consultat ion , 
" adv ises" the Governor-Ge neral on the appo intment of a Leader of the 
Of fic ial Oppos i t ion and a Le ader of the Independent member s ,  bas ing 
" advice" on h i s  assessment of support for h i s  nom inee from the groups 
conce rned ( s . 66 ) , whereas in PNG the Parl iament recogn ises the pr inc ipal 
and second speakers ( i f any) on behalf of member s  not committed to support 
the Execut ive as Le ader and Deputy Leader , respect ively , of the Oppos i t ion 
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( s . Sch . 1 . 2 ( 1 ) )  ( in add it ion there is a g eneral r ecog n i t ion of the ex i stence 
of pol i t ical par t ies or g roup ing s in r e lat ion to the leadership of 
Pe rmanent Parliamentary Committees ( s . 1 1 9 ( 2 ) ) ) . These approaches are 
administrat ively convenient , but unless pol it ically necessary they tend to 
po lar ise the leg i slature and to institut ional i se opposit ion to the 
execut ive . 
Vanuatu merely states a pr inc iple ( wh ich in the c i rcumstances was 
hardly unavoidable) :  
Po lit ical par t ies may be formed freely and may contest 
elec t ions . They shall re spect the Cons t i tut ion and the 
pr inc iples of democr acy (Ar t . 4 ( 3 ) ) ,  
but in some c i r cumstances even th i s  could leg itimate oppr ess ion . 
Parties and an opposit ion are not essent ial to democr at ic 
par l i amentary government , and it seems best to say noth ing of them . 
The th i rd feature i s  the " recal l "  of membe r s , prov ided for in K i r ibat i 
and Be lau . In K i r ibat i ( s . 59 ) , the procedur e does not apply to membe r s  o f  
the Cabinet and involves :  ( 1 )  a pe t i t ion b y  t h e  maj or i ty of t h e  reg istered 
vote r s  in the member ' s  cons t i t ue ncy at the t ime of h i s last e lect ion ; ( 2 ) 
a refer endum among those vote r s ;  and ( 3 )  i f  the referendum approves 
recall , a by-elect ion - the problem of t r ac ing voter s  who have moved from 
the const ituency is obv ious ly maj or . In Be lau ( Ar t . IX ,  s . 1 7 ) a pe t it ion by 
25 per cent of the pe r sons who voted at the member ' s  last e lect ion i s  
requ i red , followed b y  a " recall elect ion " ( i . e . , a referendum) in  the 
const ituency and if  necessary a by-elect ion , but the r e  are l imits to the 
occas ions on wh ich a recall may be sought ; the President and 
V ice-Pr esident may be recalled by resolut ion of two- th irds of the state 
leg islatures in  thr ee-quarte r s  of the states , approved in a " nat ional 
recall e lect ion " ( Ar t . VI I I , s . 1 0 ) . The recall may be , in  pr i nc iple , h ighly 
democrat ic , but it is also expens ive and con fus ing , even i f  l im ited ( as it 
should be ) to the e l ig ible vote r s  in the const ituency from t ime to t ime ; 
f ur thermore ,  it may well inh ib i t  the introduct ion of necessary tough 
long-term measures and is obv iously open to pol i t ical manipulat ion 
( espec i ally in  Be lau) . Howeve r ,  i t  i s  more manageable in a small countr y ,  
where e l ect ion i s  o n  a pe rsonal r ather than a party bas is , than i n  othe r s . 
The four th feature i s  control over treat ies , in PNG , Vanuatu ,  MI , 
Be lau and FSM . PNG , in gener al , r equ i res  pr ior par l i amentary approval 
( s . 1 1 7 ) , wh i le FSM merely empowe rs the Leg is lature to r at i fy ( Ar t . IX ,  
ss . 2 (b) , 4 ) . In Vanuatu par l iamentar y r a t i f icat ion of certain treat ies i s  
requ i red ( Ar t . 24 ) , whe reas MI (Ar t . V ,  s . 1 ( 2 ) (d) ) and Belau ( Ar t .VII , 
s . 7 ( 2 ) ) r equ i r e  approv al in al l cases . In Be lau , fur ther , a treaty 
deleg at i ng " maj or governmental powe r s "  r equ i r es a two- th irds maj or i ty vote 
in the Leg is lature approved in  a r e ferendum ( Ar t . I I , s . 3 ) ; wh ile if the 
tr eaty author ises the pr esence or use of harmful substances " such as 
nuc lear , chemical , g as or b io log ical weapons or  of nuclear reacto r s "  a 
thr ee-quarte r s  maj or ity vote in a r e ferendum is needed ( Ar t . XI I I ,  s . 6 ) . 
Nuc lear we apons and the proposed Compact of Free As soc i at ion with the US 
are , of cour se , key i ssue s  in the Tr ust Te r r i tory of the Pac ific I s land s , 
and both MI (Ar t . XI I I , s . 6 ) and Be lau ( Ar t . XV,  s . 1 1 )  make add it ional 
pr ov is ion for the latte r .  
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It i s  nowhere stated that t r eat ies are par t  of the law { as in  the US ) 
and both PNG { s . 1 1 7 ( 7 ) ) and MI {Ar t . V ,  s . 1  (4 ) )  spec i f ically prov ide to the 
contrary.  
The concern o f  these countr ies with treat ies i s  under standable , and 
wh i le par l iamentary r at i f icat ion is a democr atic procedure it makes for 
delays and uncer tainties th at may be unacceptable in , for example , f i nance 
and t r ade matters { although PNG excepts urgent cases , and cases where 
advance approval "would not be in the nat ional interest " { s . 1 1 7 ( 5 )  {b ) ) ) .  
The requ i rement could well lead to the use of US-type " executive 
agr eements" not amounting to treat ies in  domestic law and hence not 
requ i r ing approval . 
F i nally ,  Be lau has a quite remar kable prov is ion , that might g reatly 
fetter the leg i slat ive powe r : 
S t atutes and tradit ional law shall be equally 
author itat ive . In case of con f l ict between a statute 
and a t r ad i t ional law ,  the statute shall pr evail only 
to the extent i t  is not in con f l ict with the under lying 
pr inc iples of the t r ad i t ional law { Ar t . V ,  s . 2 ) . 
No gu idance is g iven as to what are " unde r lying pr inc iples of the 
trad i t ional law" { one is r eminded of S i r  Edward Coke ' s  v iew of the common 
law ( see Maxwe ll 1 962 : 2 5 1 -52 ) , so the way i s  open for a cons iderable amount 
of j ud ic ial leg islat ion . However , US cour ts have d istingu ished between 
fundamental and othe r prov i s ions even of the B i l l  of Rights { in connect ion 
with the d i f ference between incorpor ated and un incorpor ated ter r itor ies 
(see de Smi th 1 9 70 : 1 08- 1 2 �  Laughl in 1 980 : 3 4 3 -6 0 )  so th at a bas i s  for the 
necessary j ur ispr udence may ex ist . 
CONCLUS ION 
At the end o f  a study such as th i s , one asks onese l f  what i t  proves 
and what use is i t : the answer depends on one ' s  interests and on what one 
is look ing for . My own pr imary i nte rests are in the draft ing of 
consti tut ions , and in the leg is lat ive and adm i n istrative implementat ion of 
them , r ather than in  pol it ical or soc iolog ical cons iderat ions , except to 
the extent that the latter affect the former . As a re sult , I der ive from 
th i s  and other studies in compar at ive const itut ions four main pr inc iples : 
three of them are t r u i sms , and the four th should be . 
F i r s t ly ,  there is no ideal set of const itut ional prov i s ions , and 
probably not even one for par t icular c i rcumstances . Secondly, the re are 
always alternat ive ways of ach ieving the s ame constitut ional purpose . 
Th irdly , even wi th i n  basically s imilar systems there are more var iat ions 
pos s ible than i s  often thought.  F i nally , a pr inc ipal use of the 
compar at ive study o f  constitut ions i s  as a source of ideas r ather than of 
pr ecedents , and the newe r  and smaller countr ies of the Pac i f ic may have 
much to offer older and larger countr ies in th i s  reg ard . 
To me , the most str i k ing features of the Leg i slatures d i scussed here 
are the i r  s imilar it ies and the ir " ord inar iness " . No matter how much it has 
been naturalised , and no matter wh at the local var iat ions , the leg i slature 
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in the Pac i f ic largely r emains an Ang lo-Amer ican importat ion , and r e f lects 
l ittle of the reg ion ' s long h istory of t r ad it ional government through 
formal and informal customary assemblies and meet ing s .  There are 
except ions - the Counc i l  of Iroij in  MI and the seats for t r ad i t ional 
leader s  in Be lau , for instance - but that is the gene r al const itut ional 
picture . Th is is not necessar i ly a bad th ing , and par l i aments may we ll be 
suitable inst itut ions - but it is not iceable .9 
However , the picture may be d ecept ive . 
In other pape r s  I have suggested that in oper at ion the MI Constitution 
may prove to be a hybr id of "Westm inste r " , US and t r ad i t ional patterns ( see 
Lynch 1 980 ) and that Vanuatu may be a blend of "We stminster " and t r ad it ion 
( see Lynch 1 9 8 1 a) , to take two instances . A f ur ther matter that may prove 
more important in pr act ice , at least in some par ts of the Pac i f ic , is that 
government tends to be consultat ive and consensual r ather than , as in the 
West , confrontat ional . " Consensus" in  th i s  case i s  more than j ust 
dec i s ion- maki ng by gene r al ag reement , and i nvolves a pos it ive avoidance of 
polar isat ion of att i tudes , and the del ibe r ate attainment , by consultat ion 
and d iscuss ion , of gene ral ly-acceptable solut ions ; it goes beyond 
consultat ion , and is d i fferent from comprom ise ( at least in the pej orat ive 
sense o f  that word)  • An inst itut ion that ope r ates on consensual l ines is 
l i ke ly to be qu ite d i fferent , in  r eal terms , from one that does not ( see 
Lynch 1 98 1 b ,  1 98 2 a ) . 
Re lated matters are the e ffect of the c lose pe r sonal l inks between 
many leg i slator s ,  publ ic servants , and other public f ig ures , all of whom 
tend to be reg arded as " leade r s " ; the fact that leg islators tend to be 
reg arded ( and to some extent to r eg ard themselves )  as spokesmen for the i r  
e lector s r athe r than a s  representat ives in t h e  Anglo-Amer ican par l i ament ary 
sense ; and the pos s i b i l i ty that procedur ally , if not s t r uctural ly , the 
leg islatures may adopt t r ad i t ional r ather than imported approaches and 
values ( ibid. ) . Such factor s ,  espec ially the last , may g ive a new 
complex ion to par l i amentary government . 
Though such matters are not covered , and probably 
effect ively covered , by the wr i tten words of const itut ions , i t  
that l i t t le cons ide r at ion seems t o  have been g iven to 
( trad it ional or other )  to or thodox par l iamentary systems . 
NOTES 
cannot be 
rema ins t r ue 
alternat ives 
1The H igh Court has r ecently ( March 1 98 2 )  held the matai franch ise 
prov i s ions , wh ich were contained in  the Electoral Act , i nval id . 
2The Ch arter i s , pro tem. , the Const i tut ion of Yap S t ate . 
3S ign i f icantly , th i s  prov 1s 1on is not contained in the Ar t ic le deal ing 
with the Leg is latur e .  
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4 The refer ence to Reg ional Counc i l s  i s  now omitted . See Constitution 
First Amendment Aat ( 1 980 ) s . 1 ( h ) . 
5 Now the chai rmen of the loc al government counc i ls . See Constitution 
First Amendment Aat ( 1 980 ) s . 1 ( g )  ( i i ) , ( i i i ) . 
6 Viv ian Bose ' s  rese rvat ions concerning the appl icab i l i ty ,  at all t imes and 
in a l l  places , of the pr inc iples of the r ules of law ,  and the need to 
" v i ew w i th sympathet ic under stand ing the pl ight of those that accept our 
pr inc iples and ideals but who , whether they be right or wrong, feel it 
the ir duty temporar i ly to rej ect certain of the matte r s  in wh ich they 
also have ult imate faith i n  order that the th ings in wh ich they bel ieve 
and we bel ieve can be pr eserved and ult imately restored in a newer and 
cleaner form" ( 1 959 : 4 1 et seq . ) ought to be borne in m ind .  
7 CI h as an even wor se prov i s ion ( Ar t . 3 4 ( 3 ) ) under wh ich i t  seems that a 
non-membe r  Speaker has a cast i ng vote . 
8 Th is prov is ion has now been om itted ( Constitution First Amendment Aat 
( 1 980 ) ) .  
9 However ,  I am informed that i t  was the del iberate dec is ion in MI to adopt 
the "We stminster system" because of its  r esemblance to the t r ad it ional 
order ( pe r sonal commun icat ions , but conf i rmed in par t  by MI Poli t ical 
Status Commiss ion 1 9 77 ) , and also that i t  was dec ided not to have direat 
iroij repr esentat ion in the leg islature but instead to prov ide for a 
trad it ional input through the Counc i l  of Iroij  ( per sonal communications 
and see Lynch 1 9 82b , 1 9 82c) . 

13.  THE L EGAL CONTROL OF TH E EXECUTIVE I N  PAPUA NEW 
G U I N EA 
A.P.W. Deklin 
Controll ing the Execut ive in Papua New Gu inea ( PNG )  in effect means 
controll ing the exerc ise of power by f ive g roups of people who are e i ther 
d irectly or  ind i rectly employed by the State . These include the Mini sters 
and the i r  per sonal staff , pub l ic servants and employees of State serv ices 
and employees of statutory bod ies . It is these people who exerc i se the 
actual powe r but in  the name of the par t icular execut ive org an to wh ich 
each of them belong s ;  and these are the bod ies beh ind wh ich the 
individual s seek shelter when challenged , or  in whose name they claim to 
act when assert ing powe r . One th ing i s ,  however , c lear : the execut ive 
power is der ived from a wr itten const itut ion , the Cons t itut ion of the 
Independent State of Papua New Gu inea . 
THE NEED FOR L EGAL CONTROL 
Th ird Wor ld const i tut ions have invar i ably adopted the tradit ional 
Western techn ique of d iv id ing the total governmental powe r into the 
celebrated tr ipart ite system of leg islat ive , execut ive and j ud ic i al powers , 
perhaps r ather bl indly ! Fo llowing the precedent of Western democrac ies , 
these constitut ions always al locate to the execut ive arm of government the 
power and funct ion of the actual gover n ing of the state . Th is puts the 
execut ive in a pos i t ion wher e  it is bound to have much impact on the daily 
l ives of the c i t i zens . 
The need to have legal control of the execut ive is but one aspect of 
the general concern to l im i t  power of gover nment ; what constitut ional 
lawyer s  call ' cons t i tut ional ism '  is bas ically government with l imited 
powe r s . But the j ust i f icat ion for the cry for g r eater control of the 
execut ive arm of government in par t icul ar is founded in the wor ld-wide 
exper ience of f r equent br eaches of the ind iv idual ' s  h uman r ights by the 
execut ive - what the I n ternat ional Commiss ion of Jur ists calls breaches of 
the r ule of law .  
In  h i s  address t o  the Internat ional Commiss ion of Jur ists at i t s  1 962 
Cong ress i n Rio De Jane i ro ,  its Secr etary General S i r  Le sl ie Munro 
observed : 
Th at in our endeavour to promote and foster under­
s tand ing and respect for the Rule of Law we have 
encountered over the years breaches of the Rule of Law 
breaches perpe tr ated by governments and the i r  
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i nstr uments . The most powe r ful arm of government is 
ind isputably the Execut ive , and by Execut ive I mean 
both the r ul ing pol i t ic ians and the i r  Administrations . 
The expe r ience of the Commiss ion shows that it is from 
the hands of the Execut ive that the ord inary c i t i ze n  
should have t h e  und isputed r ight t o  v ig i lant and 
cont inu ing protect ion from abuse of power . Execut ive 
i s  made for the c i t i zen , not for i tself ( In ternat ional 
Commiss ion of Jur ists 1 962 : 62 ) . 
But in the PNG context the control of the Execut ive in terms of 
protect ing the ind iv idual ' s  human r ights has another and even more 
impor tant d imens ion to it:  only i f  the Execut ive i s  control led e f fect ively 
can the National Goals that Papua New Gu ineans have set for themselves in 
the i r  Const itut ion ( see PNG Const itut ion : Pr eamble)  be ach ieved . If the 
governmental pol ic ies are to bene f i t  the h uman needs of the people of PNG 
i nstead o f  some other need s ,  control of the Execut ive i s  v ital . Such 
trad it ional doctr ines as ultra vires w i th wh ich cour ts have been ab le to 
control the execut ive lac k  full mean ing in PNG unless they are portrayed 
ag ainst th is wider context of the nat ion ' s const itut ional system .  
B u t  there we re also two other re asons that r ende red the concern for 
adequate leg al control of the Execut ive pr edom inant in the m i nds of the 
member s  o f  the Constitutional Plann ing Commi ttee ( CPC) on whose 
r ecommendat ions much of the pr esent Const it u t ion i s  based . In the f i r s t  
place , i t  was not iceable that t h e  Execut ive enj oyed what seemed t o  b e  an 
unnecessar i ly dom i nat ing pos i t ion under Aust r a l i an coloni al government . 
Although the execut ive dominat ion of the colon i al gove rnment was not 
peculiarly Austral ian ,  the deg ree of that dom inat ion was . As Professors 
Tordoff and Watts observed : 
• • •  in our exper ience of pol i t ical systems in As ia , 
Afr ica and the Car ibbean , we h ave not come across an 
administrative system so h ighly central i zed and 
dom inated by its bureaucracy ( PNG CPC 1 974 : 1 0/1 ) .  
The par t icul ar aspect of th i s  scenar io that concerned the member s  o f  the 
CPC most , was the opportun ity den i ed to Papua New Guineans to take par t  in 
the dec i s ion-maki ng process part icular ly w i th i n  the execut ive area of 
government . Hence , the CPC not only wanted to see the total powe r 
repatr iated as it we re from Canbe r r a  to Konedobu ,  but also that th i s  power 
should be returned as much as poss ible to the people themselves through 
some form of decent r al isat ion . Natur ally, th i s  would lead to a g reater 
number o f  execut ive bod ies . 
Secondly , the expe r ience of breaches by the Executive of indiv idual 
human r ights in PNG dur ing the colon ial r ul e  r ender ed the need to control 
the Execut ive obv ious to the member s  o f  the CPC . Both John Momi s  and John 
Kaput in we r e  ac t ive ly involved in break-away movements in New Br i t a i n  and 
Boug ainv ille respec t ive ly , and knew wh at br utal ity meant when the member s  
o f  the ir movements c lashed with the pol ice . I t  was dur ing th i s  pe r iod that 
the Execut ive o f  the colon ial adm in i stration t r i ed unsuccessfully to have 
the House of As sembly e nact the 1 970 Public Order B i l l  wh ich was a imed at 
restr ict ing certain human r ights . There was a consequent out-cry aga inst 
the move and th i s  led to a successful passag e  of the Hwnan Rights Ordinanae 
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( 1 97 1 ) sponsored by Sir Pe rcy Chatter ton , a long-t ime m iss ionary and a then 
member of the House of As sembly . The CPC ' s  concern in th is respect i s  
reflected i n  t h e  pr esent Basic Rights prov 1s1ons in t h e  Const itut ion . 
These prov is ions are some of the most elabor ate constitut ional prov is ions 
on human r ights in recent year s .  
THE D I LEMMA 
The quest ion of the need to control the executive is but one s ide of 
the challenge that all developing nat ions face . The other s ide i s  the need 
to allow the execut ive a certain freedom of act ion so that it can del iver 
the soc ial goods the people expect from it . The real d i lemma thus l ies in 
be ing able to bal ance these two needs wh ich often seem ant i thet ic to each 
other . Th e task of ach iev ing th i s  balance leg ally r ests on t ackl ing two 
fundamental quest ions . 
Fi rst , one needs to ident i fy those areas within the execut ive act ion 
where for nat ional and other leg i t imate r easons the execut ive must be 
allowed some relat ive freedom but subj ect to a posteriori control of some 
k i nd .  The means by wh ich th is r elat i ve freedom of act ion can be enj oyed 
is , of cour se , d iscret ion . Without discretion, much of governmental 
process wou ld be f r ustr ated and executive i n i t iat ive s t i fled . One can in 
fac t  see two d imens ions to th i s  scenar io .  In one set of s ituat ions the 
execut ive may be den ied any d iscret ion ; wh i l s t  in anothe r , d iscret ion may 
be confer red on the execut ive but i t s  exercise is made subj ect to e ither a 
priori or a posteriori control . In a priori control s i tuat ion , control 
acts as a g u ide to the exerc ise o f  d iscret ion , wh i lst in a posteriori 
control cases , control· in e f fect i s  a j udgment about an exerc ise that has 
al ready occ ur red . 
The second quest ion i s  the task o f  determ ining and ensur ing that the 
leg al means dev ised to control the execut ive act ion are both adequate and 
effect ive . It is th i s  question , and par t icular ly the adequacy of control 
in terms o f  inst itut ions and pr inc iples , that I want to confine mysel f  to 
in th i s  pape r . 
ADEQUACY OF L EGAL CONTROL 
The quest ion o f  adequacy o f  control o f  the execut ive has been a thorny 
i ssue in the Th ird World generally .  The t r ad it ional approach , at least 
accord ing to the common law sys tem , has been to rely on the par l i ament to 
control the execut ive ; and i f  th i s  fails , then to resort to the cour ts . 
But as it i s  now appreciated these t r ad it ional dev ices have the i r  internal 
as wel l  as external l im itat ions wh ich i nh ib i t  effect ive control of the 
execut ive . S . E .  F iner for instance , argues that it was the fai lure by 
par l i aments to control the execut ive on the Cont inent of Europe that led to 
the estab l ishment of admin i s t r at ive cour ts and the development of 
administrat ive law ( F i ner 1 980 : 3 4 8 ) . 
The r esponse to th i s  inadequacy by the Th ird World const i tut ions has 
been to incorpor ate add i t ional means o f  control through addi t ional 
ins t i tut ions and pr inc iples : ombudsman commiss ions and leadership codes 
come r ead i ly to mind .  But o ften these are carbon copies o f  s im ilar 
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i nstitut ions and pr inc iples e lsewher e .  However ,  the point that needs to be 
emphas ised is that impl ic i t  in the se cons t i tut ional a r r angements is the 
concern to take what may be called ' a  composite approach ' of prov id ing as 
many control dev ices as necessary to ach ieve an over-all adequacy of 
control . The rat ionale for the compos i te approach rests on two 
propos i t ions : F i r s t , it is now appr ec i ated that the tr ad i t ional control 
devices could be restructured to enable them to overcome some o f  the i r  
inherent l im itat ions in relat ion t o  controll ing t h e  execut ive . Second , 
that the r emaining l imitat ions of the t r ad i t ional control dev ices can be 
remed ied by new inst itut ions and pr i nc iples . In th i s  way i t  is hoped that 
the compos ite approach w i l l  ensure the attainment o f  the total adequacy of 
control that has been l ack ing . 
Although th i s  approach is commendable , i t  does appear that it has not 
been taken by Th ird Wor ld const itut ion-make r s  as a matter of del iber ate 
po l icy . Rathe r ,  th i s  approach seems to be impl ic i t  in the const i tut ional 
arr angements . One poss ible explanat ion for th i s  could be the will ingness 
o f  the Th ird Wor ld countr ies to emulate the pr ecedents and expe r i ences of 
the mor e  developed countr ies r ather uncr i t ically . I n  th i s  respect PNG is 
no except ion . Th is unconsc ious act has produced a number of problems : A 
g lance at the i r  operat ion shows that these var ious control dev ices are not 
org an ised into a cohe rent system. Th is natural ly leads to impr ec i se 
def in i t ions of the scope s of the i r  control roles and the consequent 
problems o f  over laps in j ur i sd ict ion and co-ord inat ion . 
I do not intend to d iscuss all these problems in the rest of th is 
pape r except to allude to some of them to i l l ustr ate the types o f  problems 
that var ious control dev ices m ight encounter in r eal l i fe . Rathe r ,  I 
i ntend to ident i fy the add i t ional control pr inc iples that the PNG 
Constitution has adopted , and to d iscuss br i efly only some of these 
pr inc iples to i l lustr ate the ir nature and the ir use . 
ADDI T I ONAL PR I NC I PLES OF CONTROL 
The PNG Constitution has adopted a number of add i t ional control 
pr inc iples to re inforce the t r ad it ional pr inc iples o f  par l i amentary and 
j ud ic ial control . These inc lude : 
a mod if ied form of the separ at ion of powers 
doctr ine ; 
the pr inc iple of par t ic ipatory democr acy;  
a Leader sh ip Code ; and 
the National Goals and D i rect ive Pr inc iples . 
It should be stressed that th i s  l ist is i l l ustrat ive r ather than complete . 
What then , has been the expe r ie nce in the appl icat ion of these add i t ional 
pr inc iples? 
( 1 ) A Mod i f ied Form of the Separ at ion of Powers Doctr i ne 
The F i nal Repor t of the CPC r eveals two unde r lying concepts about the 
org an isat ion and use o f  the total governmental powe r .  F i rst , ther e  is a 
clear and strong conv ict ion that i f  the Nat ional Goals we re to be ach ieved 
a concentr ated and init ial effor t towards th is end was r equ i r ed . Th is 
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necessitated max imum co-ope r at ion between all the agents 
governmental powe r . The CPC was not the r e fore concerned 
t r ad i t ional concept of separ at ion of powe r s  as such . 1 Th us , 
asser ted : 
I f  government i s  to be tr uly r espons ive to the people , 
i t  is v ital that those whom the people e lect to 
represent them should be able to contr ibute act ively 
and effect ively to the gover nment of the nat ion.  The 
leg islature should not be seen as a r ival to the 
execut ive arm , but rather as a ful l  and aonstruative 
partner ( PNG CPC 1 974 : 6/1 ) ( my emphas i s ) . 
In a s imilar vein the CPC s tated : 
• • •  cour ts do not • • •  exist in a vacuum . L i ke other 
inst itut ions of the government of a country they are 
caught up i n  po l i t ical real i t ies and often the i r  
dec i s ions h ave impor tant pol i t ical consequences .  I n  
car rying o u t  the i r  j ud ic ial role j udges and mag istrates 
must take full account of the goals of the soc iety in 
wh ich they l ive ; they must be attuned to the wishes o f  
that soc iety and t o  t h a t  extent must b e  pol i t ically 
consc ious ( although not par ty pol it ically consc ious) .  
At the same t ime , the j ud ic iary has a duty to protect 
the r ights of the ind iv idual and minor ity g roups : i ts 
j ob is not s imply to r e flect the w i l l  of the government 
of the day . These two pr inc iples may well be 
contr ad ic tory in a g iven s ituat ion and the cour ts are 
therefore faced with the need to make a sat isfactory 
compromise between them (ibid . : 6/1 ) . 
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The second under lying concept was the need to avoid concentrating one 
par t icular type o f  governmental powe r in one s i ng le inst itut ion . Thus , the 
leg islat ive powe r was to be exerc ised by agents othe r than by the National 
Pa r l i ament alone . In relat ion to the execut ive f ield , the CPC was qu ite 
spec i f ic on the point . The Committee s aw "a few very spe c i f ic execut ive 
funct ions"  that it proposed should be exer c ised by bod ies other than the 
National Execut ive Counc i l  and to be pe r formed str ictly in accordance with 
the Cons t i t u t ion ( PNG CPC 1 974 : 7/2 ) . 
These two concepts have been incorporated i nto the Cons t i tution and 
qual ify the separat ion of power s  doctr ine that is formally adopted by the 
Const itut ion . Th us , one f inds that some of the funct ions that are 
per formed by the Execut ive elsewhere have been allocated to const itut ional 
Of fice-Ho lder s  - a new class o f  governmental inst itut ions the Constitution 
created . The prosecut ion funct ion for instance , is be i ng car r ied out by 
the off ice of the Public Pr osecutor . The essence of these off ices is the 
const itut ional requ i rement that they are to be independent from outs ide 
control . Apar t from the o f f ice of the Public Pr osecutor , the other s  with 
executive-type funct ions are the off ice of the Public Sol ic i tor , the Public 
Serv ice Commiss ion , the Electoral Commiss ion , the Aud itor-General , the 
Clerk o f  the Parliament and the Ombudsman . But not all act iv it ies that 
these inst itut ions per form can be s a id to be execut ive in k ind ,  for some of 
them fall into the semi-leg i slat ive f ield . The E lectoral Comm iss ioner , for 
1 7 8  A . P . W .  DEKLIN 
i nstance , plays a maj or par t  in the leg i slat ive process in that Parliament 
has no powe r to amend h i s  r epor t  on changes to the ex ist ing e lectoral 
boundar ies . 2 The only powe r Pa r l i ament has is to e i ther accept or rej ect 
the repor t ( s . 1 25 ( 3 ) ) .  Although administ r at ively the Cons t i t u t ion Office­
Ho lder s  are a par t  o f  the execut ive structure , in funct ional terms they are 
not . 
Hence , even though the Cons t i tut ion has adopted the doctr ine of the 
separat ion of powers it is not a str ict separat ion in the t r ad i t ional 
sense . 
The att itude of the cour ts , espec ially the supe r ior cour ts , in th i s  
h a s  b e e n  amb ivalent largely because they have not come to g r ips with th i s  
bas ic scheme o f  t h e  Const itut ion . 
Th is pos i t ion was f i rst i l lustr ated in the Constitutional Reference 
No . 1  of 1 9 78 [ 1 9 78 ] PNGLR 3 4 5  i nvolv ing the o f f ice of the Public So lic i tor 
and the Ombudsman Comm i ss ion . For purposes o f  th i s  paper the re levant 
quest ion r e fe r red to the Supr eme Cour t by the Ombudsman was whether he had 
powe r to invest ig ate the conduc t of the Public So lic i tor or any of h is 
employees . The cons ide r at ion of th i s  quest ion involved the i n i t ial task of 
establish i ng the ex act status o f  the Pub lic Solic i tor within the structure 
of government as defined by the Cons t i tut ion . D i sappo int ing ly Pr entice CJ 
and Wilson J were content to take a nar row approach of interpret ing that 
quest ion from the v iew o f  the t r ad i t ional separat ion o f  powers doctr ine 
( although the Ch ief Just ice was prepared to cons ider the doctr ine in a 
wider context ,  ibid . : 3 50 ) . Pr itchard J ,  the other member of the Cour t ,  
took an approach that cor responded to the intent ions o f  the ' found ing 
fathers ' .  H i s  Honour spec if ically den i ed that separ at ion of powe rs 
doctr ine in the t r ad i t ional sense was ever cons idered as par t  of the PNG 
const i tut ional system ( ibid . : 3 77 ) . I f  th is was the case , H i s  Honour 
po inted out , the word ' pr inc ipal ' the Cons t i tu t ion uses to r e fe r  to the 
trad it ional arms of government ( ibid. : 3 84 ) would be a redundancy . 
Accord ing to P r i tchard J ,  therefore , the funct ions of government on the 
nat ional level are allocated to a number of arms of the Nat ional 
Government . Some of these are the pr inc ipal arms ; other s  are ' lesse r ' 
arms . The O f f ice of the Public So lic i tor falls into the latter category, 
but is ne i ther execut ive nor j ud ic i ary in the funct ions that i t  pe r forms . 
Pr ent ice CJ was prepared at one stage of h i s  j udgment to regard the 
Public So lic itor ' s  O f f ice as completely outside the framework of the 
Nat ional Government s ince the funct ion of leg al aid could not be eas i ly 
related to a governmental funct ion , and was in fact con fe r r ed independently 
on the Public So lic i tor by the people throug h  the i r  Cons t i tut ion . Th is is 
a better v iew than to regard the off ice as an arm o f  the National 
Government in order to avoid the log ical absurd i ty that Pr i tchard J found 
h imself in at the end wher e  he was forced to state that he was not pr epared 
to s ay that legal aid was not an admini strat i ve funct ion but par t  of the 
j ud ic i al funct ion ( see The State v. John Wonom [ 1 975 ) PNGLR 3 1 1 ) , even 
though he maintained at the s ame t ime that the Of fice of the Public 
Solic i tor was one of the lesser arms of the Nat ional Government - wh ich i s  
not t o  s a y  that the bas ic approach Pr itchard J t oo k  i s  not t o  b e  commended . 
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The issue o f  separ at ion of power s  also arose ind ir ect ly in Wonom 's 
Case , the f ir st const i tut ional case dec ided by the S upr eme Cour t two weeks 
after Independence . The i s s ue i n  that case was whether ind ictment should 
be brought in the name of the S t ate or in the name of the Queen of Engl and 
who is the const i tut ional He ad of S t ate . The cons iderat ion of the issue 
involved some d i scuss ion of the nature of the prosecut ion funct ion . Frost 
CJ who pre s ided over the case was prepared to reg ard i t  as an execut ive 
funct ion wi thout any attempt to r elate i t  to the ins t i tut ional structure of 
the Execut ive into wh ich the Public Pr osecutor was f itted . The other two 
member s  of the Cour t , Ra ine and W i l l i ams JJ , held it to be a j ud ic ial 
funct ion but also without any r eal e f fort  to put i t  in i t s  proper context 
as attempted by Pr itchard J in the 1 97 8  case d i scussed above . 3 
The i s s ue was thrown ag a in squarely at the Supreme Court a year later 
by Nahau Rooney and ag ain  the Supreme Cour t avo ided the i ssue ( see Re 
Rooney ( no . 2 )  [ 1 979 ] PNGLR 4 4 8 ) . In a letter to the Leader of the 
Oppos i t ion , Mr Okuk , on 1 3  July 1 979 , Rooney stated c lear ly the fundamental 
issue in he r case was " the separat ion of powe rs between the j ud ic i ary and 
the leg islature"  ( roneod j udgment SC 223 , 22 March 1 982 ) . Ra ine DCJ , 
although he quoted those very words , made no attempt to take up the issue 
but instead c lubbed the Minister down for contempt of cour t .  Wi lson J 
attempted some d i scuss ion of the independence of the j ud ic i ary without 
showing that th i s  independence i s  ther eby an aspect of the separat ion of 
powe r s  doctr ine . The other j udges only made vag ue references to the 
matter .  
Ve ry r ecent ly the S upreme Cour t conf irmed that there i s  a separation 
of powers doctr ine in the t r ad it ional sense under the Cons t i tut ion in the 
Constitutional Reference 1A of 1 981 ( r oneod j udgment , SC 223 , 22 March 1 982 
a t  p . 1 6 ) without any r e ference to the 1 9 78 Cons t i tutioal Re ference 
d i sc ussed above . The 1 98 1  Re ference was concer ned with amendments the 
National Parliament had passed to the Motor Traffic Act, the Local Courts 
Act and the District Courts Act r e spect ively , empowe r ing a po l iceman to 
serve a summons on a per son whom he suspected of hav ing committed a traffic 
offence . The amendments al lowed the pol iceman to f i le proof of serv ice of 
the summons in cour t and i f  the offender d id not pay the pr escr ibed f ine 
with in the t ime al lowed he was to be r ecorded by the Court as hav ing 
committed the offence and hav ing been found g u i l ty .  
The Public Solic i tor r e fer red t o  the Supreme Court for i t s  opin ion the 
quest ion whethe r these amendments infr inged s . 3 7 ( 5 )  of the Cons t i tution . 
Th at sect ion proh ibits any tr ial of an o ffence in the absence of the 
accused unless he so conducts h imself as to rende r  tr ial in h i s  presence 
impr ac t icable . The essence of the Public Sol ic i tor ' s  argument was that 
when the al leged offender f a i led to appear in cour t and pay the f ine , he 
was to be r ecorded as having been found g u il ty of the offence and yet there 
had been no ' hear ing ' as st ipulated by s . 3 7 ( 5 )  and ( 3 )  of the Cons t i tution . 
The S upreme Court accepted th i s  arg ument . Ke arney DCJ , however ,  went 
further and held that the amendments con s t i tuted a usurpat ion of the 
separat ion of power s  doctr ine by the leg islatur e : 
I t  is c lear from the s t r ucture that the Const itut ion 
contempl ates a general separ at ion of power s  between the 
three pr inc ipal arms of government - the leg islat ure , 
execut ive and j ud ic iary;  see Const i tut ion s . 99 .  As a 
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Par l i amentary system with an execut ive respons ible to 
Par l i ament , the separat ion of powers between the arms 
cannot be r ig id .  But the separ at ion pr inc iple remains 
of bas ic importance in the Cons t it ut ion and proh ibits 
incur s ions by one arm of government upon bas ic 
funct ions o f  another . The leg islat ion presently in 
question , I think , i s  an example o f  the leg islature 
hav ing gone too far in pr e scr ib ing r ules wh ich control 
j ud ic i al dec is ions in certain case s , thus invad ing the 
realm of j ud ic ial powe r • • •  He re there  are , in t r uth , no 
j ud ic ial funct ions for the cour t to per form; the 
leg islat ion has wholly absorbed the j ud ic ial process 
( Constitutional Reference No . 1  of 1 9 78 [ 1 978 ) PNGLR 
3 45 ) . 
The other member s  of the Supr eme Cour t agr eed . 
Never theless , th i s  v i ew m i sconce ives the separat ion of powers embod ied 
in the Const i t ut ion . F i rst , as Pr itchard J r ightly po inted out (see 
above) , the separat ion of powe rs in the t r ad it ional sense had never been 
intended to apply under the Const itut ion . Instead there are some powers 
that the Cons t i tu t ion has labelled as leg islat ive , execut ive and j ud ic ial , 
but there are other s  that are constitut ional powers wh ich do not f i t  i nto 
any of these three categor ies . Secondly , ther e  is noth ing in the 
Cons t i tut ion that prevents the National Parliament from confe r r ing the 
j ud ic ial power of the people on bod ies other th an the courts and s . 1 59 
expr es s ly author ises the Parliament to do that . The only except ion i s  
contained i n  s . 1 59 ( 3 )  where P a r l i ament is pr oh ib i ted from confer r i ng on 
bod ies outs ide the cour ts any powe r to impose a sentence of death or 
impr i sonment or to impose any other penalty of a cr im inal natur e . Wher eas 
the leg islat ive powe r cannot be pe rmanently d ivested from the National 
Parl iament under s . 1 00 ( 3 ) , the re i s  no s im i lar prov 1 s 1on i n  relat ion to 
e ither the j ud ic i al or the execut ive powers . Th us the S upr eme Court fai led 
to ind icate the full scope of s . 1 59 by not expl ain ing why P a r l i ament cannot 
con fer on itse l f  some other elements o f  the j ud ic ial powe r not proh ib i ted 
by the except ion conta ined in sub- s . 3  of that sect ion . Th irdly , the 
Constitution prov ides unde r s . 9 9 ( 3 )  that in pr inc iple the powe rs and 
func t ions of the three arms are to be kept separ ate from each other . To 
the extent that s . 1 59 empowe r s  the National Parliament to con fer j ud ic ial 
powers on bod ies outs ide the National J ud ic ial System , i t  could be arg ued 
that it is an e l abor at ion r ather than a con t r ad ict ion of s . 9 9 ( 3 ) , even with 
the except ion contained in sub- s . 3  of s . 1 59 .  But to the extent that s . 1 59 
i s  interpreted as empower i ng the Par l i ament to confe r on itself  any e lement 
of the j ud ic ial powe r , it i s  c lear ly incons i s tent with s . 99 ( 3 ) , and both 
sect ions wou ld therefore have to be reconc i led ; and th i s  the Supr eme Court 
fai led to do . Such r econc i l iat ion would r equ i r e  read ing down the 
prov is ions o f  s . 1 59 in orde r to g ive e f fect to the over- r id i ng i ntent ion 
expl ic i t  in s . 99 ( 3 ) . Th is means that the National Par l i ament is one of 
those bod ies ( outs ide the cour ts )  wh ich are inelig ible to have conferred on 
them j ud ic ial power because to do so wou ld breach the prov 1s 1ons of 
s . 9 9 ( 3 ) . The problem with that interpr etat ion , however ,  is that s . 1 59 i s  
not made subj ect t o  the prov is ions o f  s . 99 ( 3 ) . S uch interpretat ion can be 
maintained only if one reads ' in pr inc iple ' under s . 99 ( 3 ) to mean 
notwithstand ing any other prov is ions of the Const i tut ion . The S upr eme 
Court therefore fai led to g ive full cons ider at ion to the relev ant 
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const itut ional prov 1 s 1ons th at govern both the separat ion of powe rs and the 
j ud ic ial powe r , and thereby pe rpe tuate the m isconcept ion once more . 
( 2 )  Participatory Democ r acy 
The CPC r eacted ag a inst Execut ive dom inat ion by pr oposing a system of 
prov inc ial governments as the bas ic means by wh ich the people of PNG could 
share the power of government . Not unexpected ly the Conunittee ' s  chapter on 
pr ov inc ial government began w i th the sentence : 
Th ere is widespread d iscontent with the 
d i str ibut ion of power in our country,  and 
ye ar ning among our people for a g reater say 
conduct of the ir affairs  ( PNG CPC 1 974 : 1 0/ 1 ) .  
The Commit tee went on : 
pr esent 
a deep 
in the 
Our r ecommendat ion that a system of d istr ict- level 
government should be estab l i shed in the Cons t i tut ion is 
de s ig ned to ach ieve several ends at once : decent r al­
i sat ion 1 g reater par t ic ipat ion in dec i s ion-mak ing by 
local leader s 1  and greater coord inat ion o f  deve lop­
mental act iv i t ies under taken by gover nment o f f icer s in 
the d istr icts ( ibid. ) .  
The decentr a l isat ion o f  the governmental powe r has two impl icat ions 
for PNG ' s  Execut ive . It means that the execut ive power is decentr al ised 
along with leg islat ive powe r . The prov inc ial author it ies must be able to 
car ry out the laws th at the ir leg is latures enact . Th is fur ther requires  
the decen tr ali sat ion o f  execut ive str uctures and , consequent ly, all  
prov inces have prov inc ial execut ive counc i l s  prov ided for by  the ir 
respect ive const itut ion s .  
Although execut ive power and execut ive str ucture that goes with i t  are 
decentr al ised , the const itut ional means o f  the control over the Execut ive 
have not been decent r al ised . The lower cour ts that are located in the 
prov inc ial headquar ter s for instance , are den ied any j ur isd ict ion relat ing 
to const itut ional que s t ion s .  Th is j ur isd ict ion is restr icted to only the 
Supr eme Court ( s . 1 8  of the Cons t i tut ion) wh ich res ides in Port Moresby and 
does not go on c i rcuit  as the National Cour t does . For a country with a 
most d i f f icult ter r a i n  and severe tr anspor t and communicat ion problems , 
th is me ans unnecessary delay i n  d i spensing j ust ice at one end and more work 
for the S upr eme Court at the other . One basic r e ason for exclud ing the 
lower cour ts in th i s  respect i n i t ially appeared to be the lack of 
suffic ient profess ional leg al qual i f icat ion among mag istr ates mann i ng these 
cour ts . But th i s  problem was par tly attr ibutab le to a del ibe r ate pol icy of 
the Mag iste r ial Serv ice to oppose the appo intment o f  any qua l i f ied nat ional 
lawyer to the d istr ict cour t and those below i t .  Th is pol icy seems to have 
been condoned by both the Justice Depar tment and the Jud icial and Legal 
Serv ices Comm i s s ion . He nce , a numbe r of wel l  qua l i f ied nat ional lawye rs 
wer e  known to have appl ied to become mag istrates of lower cour ts only to be 
told that they could not be appo inted - although expat r i ate lawyer s  have 
found no bar r ier in gett ing the s ame appo intments . The appo intment of 
qual if ied nat ional lawyer s  to the bench of the lower cour ts would make it 
poss ible to increase the i r  j ur isd ict ion to include some constitut ional 
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que s t ions .  S uch a move would not deny the S upr eme Cour t any j ur isd ict ion 
s i nce it s t i l l  retains the powe r s  of j ud ic ial rev iew on a l l  exerc ises o f  
j ud ic ial powe r ,  includ ing const itut ional quest ions ( ibid. s . 1 55 ( 2 ) , and see 
Bayne 1 98 1 ) . The quest ion of tr ansfer o f  j ur i sd ic t ion to lower cour ts , 
however , is not really a quest ion of decentr al isat ion in the proper sense 
s i nce the cour ts are s t i l l  a matter of nat ional concern in the 
decentr al isat ion arr angements . The po int about decentr al i sat ion i s  that 
s ince lowe r cour ts are phys ically located in prov ince s , adequate 
j ur isd ic t ion should be g iven to them to at least prov ide inter im checks on 
any abuse o f  execut ive power by prov inc ial execut ives . Th is involves i n  
the m a i n  const i tut ional quest ions over wh ich they pr esently l ac k  
j ur i sd ic t ion . 
Ne ither the nat ional leg islature nor each of the prov inc ial 
leg islatures has adequate control over the prov inc ial execut ive . The 
National Parliament lacks a committee on prov inc i al government affair s .  So 
it has to take wh at the Minis ter o f  Decentr al i zat ion tells i t , although at 
t imes with a g r ain of salt ! P r ov inc i al leg islatures are more concerned 
with quest ions of who should get the money r ather than with the need to 
ensure that the control of prov inc ial execut ives is effect ive . 
The concept of par t ic ipatory democr acy under the PNG Cons t i tut ion i s  
not restr icted t o  decentr al isat ion only . I n  fact , the not ion that peoples ' 
r epresentat ives should take part in all stages of dec i s ion-mak ing r ing s 
throughout the constitut ional prov i s ions , i f  not throughout the whole 
const itut ional system. But somet imes the concept is pushed on to an 
ar t i f ic ial leve l .  For instance , although the CPC r ej ected r eg ional i sm as 
the proper form of decentr ali sat ion or someth ing that should be encourag ed 
in po l i t ical te rms ( PNG CPC 1 974 : 1 0/2 ) the Const i tu t ion lays it down as a 
pr inc iple to be observed in f i ll ing pub l ic o f f ices .4 Thus the pr act ice of 
the Chan Government has been th at i f  a vacancy i s  c reated by a H ighlander 
then it should be f i lled with another H ighlander , not with a To lai and 
def in i te ly not with a Sepi k ! 5 The Cons t itut ion and const i tut ional 
pr act ice therefore proceed on the assumpt ion that there i s  some r eg ional 
ethnic homogene i ty that needs to be fostered wh ich was the very th ing that 
the CPC r ai sed ser ious doubts about ( PNG CPC 1 974 : 1 0/3 ) . 
( 3 )  The Le ader sh ip Code 
The prospects of success of any nat ion , developed , developing or 
underdeveloped , depend on the qua l i ty o f  i t s  leader s .  The CPC was well 
aware o f  th i s , for  in its  own words :  
No amount of careful planning in governmental 
ins t itut ions or scien t i f ic d isc ipl ines w i l l  ach i eve 
l iber at ion and ful f i lment of the c it i zens of our 
country unless the leader s  - those who hold off i c i al 
posit ions of powe r , author ity or inf luence - h ave bold 
v i s ion , wor k  hard and are r e solutely ded icated to the 
serv ice of the i r  people ( PNG CPC 1 974 : 3/1 ) .  
In fact , the CPC was so concer ned with the quest ion that a good par t 
of its F i nal Report was al located to spe l l ing out the under lying cons ider­
at ions and the actual recommendat ions for a Leader sh ip Code . 
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There was no doubt that the expe r ience o f  leade r sh ip codes in other 
Th ird Wor ld countr ies , e spec ially that of Tanzan i a , had some influence on 
the th ink i ng in th i s  r espect .  However , as from 1 9 7 1  there was a 
Parliamentary IntegPity OPdinanae wh ich was a mini  leadersh ip code a imed 
pr inc ipally at the members of the House of As sembly . As the Executive was 
almost taken over by the PNG Ministers there had been i ncreas ing concern 
about br ibery within the government . Somare responded by dev is ing a 
Ministe r ial Code of Conduct .  But the Code was never o f f ic ially r eleased 
( ibid. ) and an assoc iated P ublic O f f icers I n teg r ity B i l l  suffered the same 
fate . 
The leader sh ip code that the CPC r ecommended was comprehens ive . I t  
was t o  cover the whole r ange o f  a leader ' s  conduc t :  from general moral 
standards to spec ial quest ions such as the acceptance of shares in for e ign 
compan ies or  the enter ing into partnersh ips with for e ign c i t i zens . The 
code was also to apply to v i r tually everybody who was in a publ ic pos it ion , 
except pub l ic servants who were below D iv i s ional Heads with in the publ ic 
service Depar tments .  
Not everyth ing r ecommended b y  the CPC found its way i nto the pr esent 
Code under Part I II D iv is ion 2 .  For instance , D iv i s ional He ads within  
Depar tments are not  included ; yet they w ield tremendous influence at  
in i t ial stages o f  pol icy formulat ion . At the prov inc ial level only 
prov inc ial pr emier s are covered by the Leade r sh ip Code ( Cons t i tut ional 
Amendment No . 3  - P r ov inc ial Government ( Consequent ial Amendments) s . 3 ( a) ) .  
I t  is s ig n i f icant , however , that the Code requ i res a leader not to act 
in such a manne r as to demean e i ther h i s  pos it ion or the off ice wh ich he 
occupies for the t ime be ing ( s . 2 7 ) . Th is r equ i rement i s  fur ther extended 
to include not only member s  of h i s  immed iate family but also the leader ' s  
nominees ,  t r ustees and agents ( s . 2 7 ( 3 ) ) .  The following are fur ther cases 
of conduct expressly proh ib ited : use of o f f ices for per sonal benef i t ;  
M i ni sters hold ing d i r ectorsh ips o f  companies ; leaders hold ing shares i n  
fore ign enterpr ises o r  interests in government contracts ,  or  other pa id 
employment . Fur ther , leader s  are proh ib i ted from accept ing br ibes or 
misappropr i at ing pub l ic funds or tak ing per sonal advantage from offic ial 
informat ion to wh ich they have access ( see Organic Law on the Duties and 
Re spon s ib i l it ies of Leader sh ip) . 
The task of enforc ing the Leader sh ip Code i s  the const itut ional 
respons ib i l ity of the Ombudsman Commiss ion ( s . 2 8 )  wh ich has descr ibed it as 
" by far the most awesome and important task entr usted to i t "  ( PNG Ombudsman 
Report 1 98 1 : 1 2 ) .  Al l leader s  have the const i tut ional duty to send to the 
Ombudsman Commiss ion annual statements of assets and interests . The 
Ombudsman Commiss ion then becomes the arbiter of the leader ' s  other 
interests for the purpose o f  determining whether these other interests pose 
r isks to the leader ' s  pr imary r espons ib i l ity for the pub l ic off ice he or 
she holds . 
It has been s a id that the Le ader sh ip Code does not have teeth . 
Pe rhaps the t r ue pos i t ion i s  that it has some teeth but not enough . In its 
1 9 8 1  r epor t to the Parliament the Ombudsman Commiss ion summoned f i fteen to 
expl ain why they were late in submitting the i r  statements out of 600  
leader s the Code presently covers . Dur ing the same per iod the cases of s ix 
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leader s were r efer red to the Pub lic Pr osecutor for prosecut ion be fore the 
Le adersh ip Code Tr ibunal (ibid . : 8 8-89 ) . 
One o f  the interest ing omiss ions under the present Leader sh ip Code i s  
a prov is ion debar r ing a leader from ventur ing into local bus iness ventures 
or into other types of commercial ac t ivity.  I t  has been not iceab le that 
the new c lass of wealthy Papua New Gu ineans wh ich has begun to emerge over 
the last e ight years consists pr imar i ly of the leader s  that the Code 
purpor ts to cover . These inc lude pol it ical leader s  and those that may be 
labelled as ' economic leade r s ' who have d ir ect access to the econom ic 
power . But most ' economic leader s '  are not covered by the Code . 
Pr esumably they wer e  excluded on the bas i s  th at they do not hold public 
off ice . An example of an ' economic leader ' would be a former pol i t ic i an 
who has a substant i al connect ion with those in powe r to enable h im to 
acqu ire loans and other types o f  benefits  f r om the government eas ily . Th is 
converg ing of the two interests was quite pr ed ict able at the dawn o f  
Independence , and it d id not take long for Somar e t o  real i se th is 
phenomenon . In 1 978 he attempted unsucce ssful ly to introduce a new 
Le ade r sh ip Code in order to pr event prec isely th is tr end of development . 
The measure precipitated Ch an ' s withdrawal from the Coal i t ion , although it 
was not g iven as the re ason for the wi thdr awal at the t ime . As Profe ssor 
R . B . Se idman po ints out , when " the pol it ical el ite all ies w i th the economic 
r uler s ,  i t  does not init i ate much change " (Se idman 1 978 : 346 ) . Pe rhaps 
there is some ev idence of th i s  in PNG . There has been a h igh level of 
pol it ical rhetor ic that preaches about the needs at the g r assroot level but 
clever ly merely se rves to d isg u ise the real interests , v i z . , those of the 
leader s  themselves .  
Ther e are two pr act ical problems that the Ombudsman Comm i ss ion faces 
in trying to enforce the Leader sh ip Code : one is adequate fac i l it ies , 
e specially staff to carry out inqu i r ies : the other i s  the r e s i stance by 
the leader s themselves to control under the Code . In v i ew of the s t i f f  
oppos i t ion that h a s  been exper ienced s o  f a r  from the leaders it almost 
seems sheer luc k  that the present Le ade r sh ip Code was passed in the f ir st 
place . For noth ing l ike it wou ld be enterta i ned or even thought of by the 
pre sent leader s ,  espec ially the pol i t ic i ans . It i s  interest ing to note the 
recent compl aint by Ombudsman Andrew Ma ino ,  who had been in charge of the 
Leade r sh ip Code Sect ion at the Ombudsman Commiss ion , that he was be i ng 
forced to leave the Ombudsman Commiss ion before h is term expired . 6 
The number of staff the Ombudsman Comm i s s ion has and the amount of 
f inance al located to i t  make i t  imposs ible to extend i t s  pr esence to all 
prov ince s . The Commiss ion the r e fore has to be organised reg ionally with 
off ices in Po rt Moresby , Lae , Mt . Hagen and Rabaul ( PNG Ombudsman Report 
1 98 1 : 1 6- 1 7 ) . Th is means that complaints from prov inces to wh ich a lot of 
powe r has been decentral i sed will  take t ime to r each the reg ional offices . 
One fundamental defect in the present Le ader sh ip Code from the 
viewpoint of control is  the den i al to the publ ic of access to the annual 
statements that leader s  submit to the Ombudsman Commiss ion ( as r equ i red by 
Organic Law and the Duties and Re sponsib i l it ies of Leader sh ip s . 4 ( 5 ) ) .  
When challenged , leade r s  o ften have referred to the fact that all the i r  
interests were o n  record a t  the Commiss ion for all t o  see , when they knew 
very wel l  that these r ecords wer e  not pub l ic records . 
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De spite its l imitat ions , the present Le ader sh ip Code has had some 
success in the sense that ther e  has bee n  a number of successful 
prosecut ions o f  leaders among whom wer e  several Mi niste r s  and Depar tmental 
Heads and a member of Parl iament . It i s  d i f f icult to s ay whether the mere 
ex istence o f  the Code does have some restraining effect on leader s .  But 
the g reatest we akness o f  the Code i s  its  inab i l ity to prevent what has now 
become a r ush to g r ab the econom ic powe r by leaders  for the i r  own ends . 
Un less th i s  tr end i s  r ever sed or at least arr ested ,  the pr esent deg ree o f  
d i fference between t h e  ' h aves ' and t h e  ' have nots ' in the bas ic mater i al 
comforts o f  l i fe will  become even mor e  mar ked . The Ombudsman Commiss ion 
expr essed th i s  concern in i t s  1 98 1  r eport to the Parliament in the 
fol lowing deeply fe lt rhetor ical quest ion : 
How can our people feel secure and tr ust the leader sh ip 
if such fundamental pr inc iples are forgotten in the 
g reedy scr amble to g r ab the f i r st fr uits  of economic 
development? ( PNG Ombudsman Report 1 98 1 : 5 ) . 
NATI ONAL GOALS AND D I RECT I V E  PR I NC I PLES 
The PNG Const itut ion prov ides mor e  than j ust the mere legal fr amework 
of government . I t  i s  wh at Wolf-Ph ill ips c lass i f ies as a programmatic 
const itut ion (Wo lf-Ph ill ips 1 972 : 34-3 8 )  in that it contains a prog r amme of 
act ion to wh ich the leg al fr amework  of government is related - or should be 
related ! The prog r amme a ims to ach ieve wh at had not been ach ieved by the 
t ime Independence came . The CPC put the po s i t ion succ inctly thus : 
We be l ieve that the s ig n i f icance of Papua New Gu inea ' s  
attainment o f  S e lf Government and Independence i s  that , 
by t r ansfe r r ing powe r into the hands of the people of 
th i s  country it g ives us a chance to de f ine for 
our selves the ph i losophy of l i fe by wh ich we want to 
l ive and the soc ial and econom ic goals we want to 
ach ieve . If the constitut ion is to be tr uly the 
fundamental char te r of our soc iety and the bas is of 
leg i t imate author ity , it should be an instrument wh ich 
helps to ach i eve these goals and not one wh ich 
obstructs • • •  it should be related to the nat ional goals 
that we leaders o f  th is country are enunc i at ing (PNG 
CPC 1 974 : 2/1 ) .  
The CPC r ecommended f ive National Goals wh ich have been incorpor ated 
into the Cons t i tut ion ' s  pr eamble . These ar e :  
I n teg r al human development 1 
Equal ity and par t ic ipat ion 1 
Nat ional sovere ignty and sel f- r el iance ; 
Natural resources and env ironment 1 and 
Papua New Gu inean ways . 
These f ive Nat ional Go als were based largely on the fundamental guide l ines 
for nat ional improvement known as the ' E ight Aims ' that the Somare 
Government adopted in 1 9 73 . To the CPC thes e  Aims , however ,  were too 
econom ical ly or ientated . The impl icat ion here be ing that other value s  such 
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as soc ial and cultur al goals appeared to have been ignored by the Aims . 
What it wanted to see we re goals that a im " at ach iev ing a free and j ust 
soc iety" (PNG CPC 1 9 74 : 8/9 ) . 
The implementat ion of the f ive National Goals is intended to be 
ach ieved through what the Cons t it ut ion calls the ' D i rec t ive Pr inc iples ' 
that accompany each of the National Goals . For instance , D i rec t ive 
Pr inc iple No . 1  under Nat ional Goal 1 ( I n teg ral  Human Development ) in the 
Cons t i t u t ion ' s  Pr eamble requ i res : 
everyone to be involved in our endeavour s  to ach ieve 
integr al human development o f  the whole per son for 
every per son and to seek fulf ilment through h is or her 
contr ibut ion to the common good . 
Al l government bod ies have the constitut ional duty " to apply and g ive 
effect to" the National Go als and D i rect i ve Pr inc iples (NGDPs) ,  although 
they are made non-j ust ic iable wh ich the Cons t i tut ion def ines as beyond the 
competence of any cour t or tr ibunal ( see Sch . 1 . 7 ) .  But th is does not mean 
that courts and tr ibunals cannot observe the relevance of the NGDPs in 
the i r  roles as interprete r s  of the law .  In fact the super ior cour ts have 
often done th i s  ( see K idu CJ in Constitutional Reference No . 4  of 1 980 ( The 
Vanuatu case) roneod j udgment ) .  
Otherwise there i s  hardly any ev idence that ser ious attempts have been 
made by all governmental autho r i t ies over the last e ight year s to implement 
the NGDPs . Obviously the fact that they are non- j ustic iable has depr ived 
the cour ts of any prac t ical role they could pl ay in g iv ing them some 
concrete meaning , although th i s  pos it ion r e f lects a tr end that has been 
followed by v i r tually all const itut ions that contain some type o f  nat ional 
goals ( such as the Indian Const it ut ion) . 
Nonetheless there i s  a clear const itut ional d ir ect ion that all other 
governmental author it ies are to implement the NGDPs . Under Sch. 1 . 7 the 
Ombudsman Commiss ion for instance , is requ i r ed to take them fully into 
account .  Whether that means the Commiss ion could invest ig ate complaints 
about breaches o f  them s t i ll remains to be seen . But the core quest ion 
that has hardly been d iscussed is whether they are mere g u ides or whether 
they are imperat ive const itut ional standards to wh ich all governmental 
act ion must conform at all stages . Undoubted ly the latter i s  the 
const itut ional pos it ion . But because of a lack of common ag reement on 
th is , there is very l it t le in ex i stence that suggests for instance the 
ex ist ing pol ic ies conform to these const i tut ional standards . Although i t  
is c lear that t h e  CPC conce ived t h e  NGDP ' s  as goal s and pr inc iples o f  state 
pol icy ( PNG CPC 1 974 : 2/2 ) . There i s  no spec i f ic procedural sys tem by wh ich 
the formulat ion of a pol icy ( to take one instance )  can be processed as 
intended by the constitut ion-maker s .  Hence , the NGDPs are one of the 
const itut ional areas to wh ich mor e  l ip-serv ice has been paid by government 
author i t ies generally, and the Execut ive in par t icular . 
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SUMMARY 
The PNG const itut ion-make r s  r esponded to the inadequac ies of the 
t r ad it ional devices for control of the Execut ive by adopt ing a compos ite 
approach wh ich introduces new pr inc iples o f  control . These pr inc iples 
include a mod if ied form of the separ at ion of powers theory,  par t ic ipatory 
democr acy , a leadersh ip code and the adopt ion o f  National Goals and 
D i rec t ive Pr inc iples . 
Although the pr inc iple of the supr emacy of the Cons t itut ion now 
appears to be established , the PNG S upr eme Cour t s t i l l  does not under stand 
ful ly the const i tut ional scheme under wh ich a mod i f ied form of the 
separat ion of powe r s  doctr ine has been incorpor ated into the Constitution . 
Decentr al isat ion is conce ived as the main feature of the part ic ipatory 
democr acy pr inc iple , though par t ic ipat ion by e i ther the people themselves , 
or the ir r epresentat ives in the dec i s ion-mak ing process at all levels is a 
common feature of the Cons t itut ion . 
The Le ader sh ip Code has had some restr a in ing e ffect on leaders 
gene r ally ,  although i t  has not prevented the leaders from monopolising the 
economic powe r and wealth in the country.  One r eason for th is could be the 
l ip- service leade r s  pay to the implementat ion of the Nat ional Goals and the 
D i rect ive Pr inc iples of State Po l icy conta ined in the Cons t i tut ion . 
NOTES 
1If  there i s  ever such a th ing in pr act ice ( see Sawer 1 9 6 1 : 1 77 ) . 
2Fo rmally the repor t  i s  presented by the Boundar ies Commiss ion but the 
Electoral Commiss ioner is obv iously by far the most important member .  
3 Interest ing ly enough none o f  the j udges in the 1 978 case referred to 
Wonom ' s Case . 
4PNG Cons t i tut ion , s . 2 54 ( c )  the word ' areas ' in the sect ion seems to have 
been interpreted as r eg ions . 
5A Wantok sys tem in a d i fferent form? 
6Be s ides the Ch ie f Ombudsman , the other Ombudsman , K .  Ander son , i s  
respon s ible for complaints . 

14. SUCCESSIONS OF GOV E RNM ENT I N  TH E POST-COLON IAL 
STATES O F  THE SOUTH PAC I F IC :  N EW SUPPORT FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISM? 
G.E.  Fry 
When the We stminster model was expor ted to the new states o f  As ia and 
Afr ica the r e  was a hope that consti tut ional prov isions m ight control 
po l i t ical behav iour . Th is hope was based on a be l ief in const itut ional ism 
that governmental powe r could be l im ited by a leg al document . The 
constra ints on governmental powe r were to be par t ly ensured by the 
opportun i t ies that a Westminster Const itut ion would prov ide for oppos it ion 
to an incumbent government and also for an actual change of government to 
occur if the elector ate or the par l iament became d isenchanted with the 
ex ist ing pol it ical leade r sh ip .  It d id not take long for th i s  bel ief to be 
shattered . Most of these states were never to exper ience a const itut ional 
change of government . Where  a change d id occur it was usually ach ieved by 
use of force . Where  there  was no change in the pol i t ical leade r sh ip the 
constitut ion was usually altered or ig nored to entrench a one-party state 
mainta ining its r ule through the employment or thr eat of force . 
By contrast , the exper ience of the e leven newly independent Pac i f ic 
States appears to g ive new suppor t to constitut ionalism .  Their  
Westminster-type constitut ions prov ide an oppor tun i ty to chal lenge the 
ex ist ing government and these cons t i tut ions actually govern the way in 
wh ich power changes hand s .  There have now been twe lve cases o f  a 
success ion of government in the reg ion . In each case the change has been 
const itut ional . They have also been peace ful : the const itut ional changes 
o f  power d id not have to be upheld by force ; those los ing power accepted 
the s ituat ion . Fur ther , where a change of government has not occur red , the 
oppor tun i ty for a successful chal lenge has nevertheless ex isted , the only 
except ion be ing Tong a .  Force has not been used to suppress leg it imate 
oppo s i t ion , nor has there  been any attempt to alter the constit ut ional 
mechan i sm in a way th at would entrench the ex ist ing powe r-holder s .  
Th is paper ex amines th is r ather un ique expe r ience o f  the post-colon ial 
states of the Pacif ic . The States  included are Papua New Gu inea ( PNG ) , 
F i j i ,  Weste rn Samoa (WS ) , Vanuatu , Solomon Island s ( S I ) , Tong a ,  K i r ibat i ,  
Tuvalu , Naur u ,  N i ue and the Cook I s lands ( CI ) . 1 
I h ave two main purpose s .  The f i rst  is to demonstr ate that most of 
the Pac i fic States share a common set of const itut ional mechanisms 
concer ned with chang ing governments , and fur ther , that these mechan i sms 
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d i ffer s ignif icantly from those contained in other var i ants of the 
Westm inster model expor ted to Dominions and , mor e recently , to As ia and 
Afr ica.  I argue that th is is so to the po int where we can talk of a 
' Pacific model of success ion ' .  My second pur pose is to demonst r ate the 
leg it imacy that has been accorded these constit ut ional mechan i sms through­
out the Pacif ic . Correspond ing to these purposes , the f i r st sect ion of the 
paper deals with the const itut ional pr ov i s ions , and the second with the i r  
operat ion . I conc lude b y  r a i s ing two gene r al quest ions t h a t  a r e  prompted 
by th i s  d i scuss ion ; f ir stly , why do the Pac i f ic countr ies accept and 
pos it ively support const itut ional success ion of a Westm inster- type when 
th i s  has not gener ally been the case in other post-colon i al soc iet ies , and 
secondly, what are the impl icat ions for const itut ional success ion in the 
future of the forces for change wh ich are already affect ing the nature and 
level of pol i t ical par t ic ipat ion and org an i sat ion in the Pac i f ic I s land 
States? 
CONSTI TUTI ONAL MECHAN I SMS 
Th ere is a h igh deg ree of s imilar ity in the approach taken by Pac i f ic 
Cons t i t ut ions to the quest ion of how , and in wh at c i r cumstances ,  gover n­
ments should be appo inted and d i smissed . A s tar t ing po int in understand ing 
th is s imilar ity is the fact that all the independent Pac i f ic countr ies were 
Br it i sh , Austr al ian or New Zeal and ter r itor ies . They each expe r ienced 
Br it ish-style decolon isat ion and pr epar at ion for se l f-government . N i ne of 
the e leven countr ies in fact adopted a form of Westminster model as the i r  
constitut ional str uc ture , the except ions be ing Tonga and K i r ibat i .2 We 
would therefore expect that these constitut ions would at least embody the 
gene r al pr inc iple under lying the We stminster v iew o f  success ion - that the 
opportunity should be pr ov ided , within certain pr escr ibed l imits , for 
governments to be changed if  the elector ate or a r epresent at ive par l i ament 
wi sh it . Th e s im ilar it ies in success ion mechan i sms actually go well beyond 
th is in e ight of the nine countr ies wh ich have a form of Westmins te r  model .  
Such mechan isms are not only shared , taken togethe r ,  they also amount to 
what arg uably is a unique var i ant of the Westminster approach to 
success ion . 
Why would such a un ique approach develop in the Pac i f ic ?  Three 
reasons may be advanced . The f i r st i s  that the countr ies involved shared 
the services o f  a hand ful of constitut ional adv iser s .  Professor Davidson 
of The Aust r a l i an Nat ional Un iver s ity,  for ex ample , moved from advising WS , 
to Naur u ,  and finally to PNG . Co lin A i kman was a consultant to both WS and 
CI Governments .  Another prom inent adv i ser , Pr ofessor Gh ai from Warwick 
Un ive r s i ty ,  was one of several adv ise r s  to PNG and later became the most 
influent ial consultant in S I  and Vanuatu .  We could therefore expect some 
ideas concerning the mechan i sms for chang ing governments to be transported 
from country to country with these adv iser s .  But it should also be 
emphas i sed that const itut ion-mak ing in the Pac if ic has taken place over a 
twenty year per iod - from the late 1 95 0 s  to the late 1 9 70s . Thus the image 
should not be created o f  several const i tut ional consultants wor k ing at the 
same t ime and communicat ing with each other on approaches to the task . 
Secondly , it is very l i kely that espec ial ly in 
wor k ing on Pac i f ic const itut ions would have been 
exper ience with Westminster success ion mechani sms in 
the 1 970s , those 
influenced by the 
the former Br it i sh 
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ter r i tor ies in Af r ic a .  Partly as a result of th i s  exper ience , think ing in 
leg al c i rcles had beg un to change par t icular ly i n  re lat ion to the encod ing 
of convent ions and the d iscr et ionary role of the He ad of State . 
A thi r d ,  and I think by far the most impor t ant , factor contr ibut ing to 
the development of a un ique approach in the Pac i f ic , was the general 
absence of organ i sed par t ies that could form a government under a 
Westminster sys tem . At the t ime that the ir constitut ions were be ing 
dev ised , seven of the e leven Pac if ic countr ies d id not have pol i t ical 
par t ies at al l ,  nor in most cases d id they loo k  l i ke deve loping . 3 On ly in 
Fij i ,  Vanuatu and Cl  exi sted what m ight be called a party sys tem . Faced 
with such a s i tuat ion the constitut ion-make r s  wer e  l i kely to dev i se s im ilar 
mechan isms to resolve the problem of who should select a government . The 
absence of par ties  in the South Pac i f ic countr ies e l im inated the usual 
approach to the cho ice of a government - namely , that the party that g ains 
a maj or ity o f  seats in Parliament after a g ener al e lect ion becomes the 
government , and its leader the Pr ime Mini ster . 
A ' PAC I FI C  MODEL ' OF SUCCESS ION?  
T h e  approach t o  success ion o f  government que st ions wh ich have emerged 
as a re sult of these influences has , I bel ieve , to be seen pr imar ily as a 
common response to s im ilar pol i t ical features at a t ime when certain 
aspects of the convent ional approach had become un fash ionable . There are 
g rounds for v iewing th is approach as a ' Pacific mode l ' of success ion , but 
by employing th is terminology I do not want to imply that the 
const i tut ion-make rs or the ir adv ise r s  saw it as s uch at the t ime . There 
does not appear to have been a g ene r al consc iousness among these people 
that such an approach was be i ng employed throughout the r eg ion . Just how 
th is approach d i ffe r s  from We stm i nster pr act ice in the models exported to 
the domin ions and to As ia and Af r ica will  become clearer after its  spe c i f ic 
features have been examined . 
There are three main fe atures o f  the ' Pac i f ic model ' :  f ir stly , the 
use of a par l i amentary vote to determ ine al l pr ime minister ial 
appo intment s :  second ly , the absence of a d iscret ionary role for the Head 
of State on quest ions of success ion , and th irdly , the encod ing of the 
convent ion that the Pr ime Minister should r e s ign following the pass ing of a 
no-conf idence mot ion . The most impor tant characte r i st ic is that the 
appo intment and d i sm i ssal of governments is solely in the hands of 
Pa r l i ament . Le t us take the appo intment o f  gover nments f i r s t .  The key act 
in se lect ing a government in these countr ies is the appo intment of a Pr ime 
Minister . The Pr ime Minister may then select h i s  ministry,  or in some 
states h i s  mini stry may be chosen whol ly or in par t  by par ty dec is ions . In 
e ither case i t  is the dec is ion to appo int the Pr ime Mini ster that is 
cr uc ial in determ ining who i s  to gover n .  Th e Parliament makes th i s  
dec is ion b y  vot ing for a pol i t ical leader when t h e  pos i t ion of Pr ime 
Mini ster becomes vacant . An absolute maj or ity is r equ i r ed so that i f  there 
are mor e  than two cand idates in the f i r st ballot other bal lots may have to 
be taken with the pe r son rece iving the least votes be ing el im inated after 
each round . 
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I t  should be emphas i sed that the prov i s ion i s  that such a vote be 
taken whenever there  i s  a vacancy , wh atever the reason . We would expect 
in normal c i r cumstances that the usual occas ion for a par l i amentary vote 
would be after a gene r al elect ion . However , the same procedure is also 
employed to se lect a new government after the res ignat ion of a Pr ime 
Minister and/or government , after the death of a Pr ime Minister or after 
the for ced d i sm i ssal of a Pr ime Minister following a successful 
no-conf idence mot ion . In the latter case , even i f  there i s  a prov is ion for 
the Pr ime Minister to adv ise a g eneral elect ion after a no-conf idence 
mot ion is car r ied , the new Pr ime Minister will s t i l l  be selected by 
Pa r l i amentary vote after the e l ector ate has determined the composit ion of 
Pa r l i ament . 
that Pa r l i ament should vote to select the Pr ime 
the government , i s  set  out without ambig u ity in most 
A typical form of word ing can be seen in s . 3 3 ( 1 ) 
The prov i s ion 
Ministe r , and hence 
Pacif ic Cons t i tut ions . 
of the S I  Cons t i tut ion : 
There shall be a Pr ime Mini ster who shall be elected as 
such by the Member s  o f  Parliament from among st the i r  
number in accordance with the prov is ions o f  schedule 2 
to th i s  Const itut ion . 
Schedule 2 s tates , inter alia : 
As soon as poss ible after a gene r al elect ion of Member s  
of Par l i ament o r  wheneve r the r e  is a vancy in the 
off ice of Pr ime Mi ni ster , the Gove rnor-Gener al shall 
convene a meet ing of member s  for the purpose of 
elect ing a Pr ime Minister • • • 
In the WS Cons t i tut ion the word ing is less pr ec ise and is open to 
interpretat ion . The re levant prov is ion states : 
Th e Head of State shall appo int as Pr ime Minister to 
pr es ide over Cabinet a Member of par l i ament who 
commands the conf idence of a maj or ity of the Member s  o f  
Par l i ament ( s . 3 2 ( 2 )  (a ) ) .  
Th is word ing was or ig inally used in the Samoan Amendment Act of 1 959 
wh ich introduced the f i r st stage of cab inet government . Dav idson explains 
th at at the d r aft bill stage the word ing " who i s  l i ke ly to command " was 
changed by the Work ing Committee on Self-Gove rnment to read " who command s " . 
Th is amendment , he says , " was intended to ensure that no appo intment would 
be made t i ll  the Leg i slat ive As sembly had cons idered the matte r and 
submitted a nom inat ion " (Dav id son 1 9 67 : 3 63 ) . Thus we see that , although 
the wor d i ng re flec ted the fact that th i s  Cons t i t u t ion was d r awn up in the 
late 1 9 50s , the intent ion was the same as that prov ided for more expl ic itly 
in later constitutions . 
Th e same word ing is used in the Cl Const itut ion of 1 96 5  ( s . 1 3 ( 2 ) ) .  In 
th is case , though , the intent ion is made clearer by the inclus ion of a 
prov is ion concern ing the appo intment of the Pr emier when the Leg islat ive 
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Assembly i s  not in sess ion . Confronted with th i s  s itutat ion the H igh 
Commiss ioner should appo int as Pr emier a member of the As sembly who " in the 
op1n1on of the H igh Commiss ioner , act i ng in h i s  d iscret ion , is l ikely to 
command the conf idence of a maj or ity of the member s  of the As sembly" . When 
Pa r l i ament is in sess ion the H igh Commiss ioner is to appo int the pe r son who 
" commands the maj or i ty" of the As sembly . The impl icat ion i s  th at the 
phr ase " commands a maj or ity" involves a par l i amentary vote . The s i t uat ion 
where  the CI Leg islat ive As sembly is not in sess ion is the only except ion 
to the par l iamentary vote be ing the sole determinant of all select ions of 
government in the e ight We stm inster systems conforming to the ' Pac i f ic 
model ' .  
We have concentr ated thus far on the role of the par l i amentary vote in 
appo int ing governments ,  wh ich o ften co inc ides with its  role i n  d i smissing 
governments . For example ,  a par l iamentary vote after a g eneral elect ion 
wh ich appo ints a new Pr ime Minister at the same t ime d ismi sses the 
incumbent Pr ime Mini ster and h i s  Government . The two func t ions are 
separ ate in re lat ion to a no-confidence mot ion . I f  i t  is carr ied by a 
maj or ity vote in Parliament , the Pr ime Minister  has to r e s ig n  or be 
d ism issed . The dec i s ion to select a new Pr ime M in ister i s  taken at a 
separate par l iamentary vote e i ther with or wi thout an intervening general 
elect ion . The only except ion i s  PNG where the d i smissal and appo intment 
funct ion is carr ied out s imultaneously ( s . 1 45 ) . 
A second char acter i s t ic of the ' Paci f ic model ' ,  and a corollary of the 
f i r st , i s  that the Head of St ate has no act ive or d i scre t ionary power in 
relat ion to quest ions of success ion of government . There are no 
except ional c i rcumstances in wh ich he can t a ke ac t ion . These are taken 
care o f  by other prov i s ions . Th is i s  so whether the Head of State i s  a 
Governor-General represent i ng the Br it ish Monarch , or the He ad of a 
Repub l ic . 4 Where the Const i tut ion prov ides for a He ad of State to intervene 
in matter s  of success ion , no d i scre t ionary powe r is involved . I n  such 
cases the Cons t i tut ion st ipulate s the par t icular act ion he must take if  
certain c i r c ums tances ar ise . In SI , for  ex ample ,  the Governor-General has 
the constitut ional duty to r emove the Pr ime Mini ster from off ice in the 
event o f  a no-confidence mot ion be i ng passed by Parliament ( s . 34 ( 1 ) ) .  
The th i rd d ist inct ive feature i s  the compulsory r emoval o f  a Pr ime 
Mini ster after a no-confidence mot ion has been passed by Pa r l i ament . Th is 
is not left to convent ion . The spec i f ic mechan i sms vary in respect of who 
it is that formally r emoves the Pr ime Min ister , 5 whether not ice has to be 
g iven of intent ion to put such a mot ion , 6 whethe r  an alternat ive Pr ime 
Minister has to be named , 7 whether there  is a proh ib i t ion per iod after an 
elect ion when a mot ion cannot be put , 8 and whether the Pr ime Mini ster has 
the opt ion of advis ing a gene r al e lect ion . 9 But whatever the spec i f ic 
mechani sm ,  the main pr inc iple i s  the s ame : a Pr ime Minister has to res ign 
or be d ismissed i f  the Parliament passes a no-confidence mot ion . 
These mechan i sms const itute an approach to success ion quest ions qu ite 
d ifferent from those taken in We stm inster con s t i tut ions exported to other 
ex-Br it i sh colonies . Following S t anley de Sm i th we can d i fferent i ate 
between the approach taken in the cons t i t i t ions of the Dominions and those 
of the new Commonwealth states in As ia and Afr ica (see 1 964 : 78-96 ) . In the 
f i r st g roup - the Dominions - the Pr ime Minister is not even ment ioned and 
the Governor-Ge neral  is g iven seeming ly unl im ited power in matte r s  of 
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appo int ing and d ismi ssing governments . The way in wh ich the main 
mechan i sms are actual ly used is left to convent ion . In the second g roup of 
const itut ions , those of Malaysia, Nigeria and Kenya , for ex ample , the re is 
an attempt at cod i fying Br it ish convent ions relat ing success ion quest ions . 
The Pr ime M i n i ster is actually refer red to in the Cons t i t u t ion . He is to 
be the pe r son who appears likely to command the support  of a maj or ity of 
the Lower House of Parliament . There was a s l ight r e f i nement of th i s  
prov is ion in t h e  Cons t i tu t ions of Br i t i sh Gu iana , Mal t a ,  Jamaica and 
Nyasaland . He re the wording was "best able to command" . Th is , argues de 
Smi th , c an be seen as " a  more satisfactory formula wh ich accur ately mir ror s 
Br it ish pract ice " ( ibid. : 9 5 ) . But in e i ther case it is the He ad of State 
who dec ides . Most o f  the new Westminster-type const i tut ions of Afr ica and 
the Ca r ibbean , in par t icul ar , also cod i fy convent ions sur round ing the 
d ismissal of a government by a no-conf idence mot ion carr ied by par l i ament . 
Generally the provis ion is that the Pr ime Minister should res ig n  and , i f  he 
fa i l s  to do so , the Gove rnor-General should d i smiss h im .  
Seen ag ainst th i s  bac kg round , I would arg ue that the ' Pac i f ic model '  
const i tutes a th ird  approach to success ion que s t ions with in Westm inster­
type cons t i tut ions . In th i s  approach , as we h ave seen , the Governor­
Gene r al does not have the d iscret ionary power to choose as Pr ime Minister 
the pe r son who i s  " likely to command " or " best able to command " the support  
of a maj or ity i n  P a r l iament . Instead the power to appo int governments i s  
g iven t o  Par l i ament i tsel f .  Th is includes t h e  case where a government 
collapses m id- term . A g ene ral e lect ion is not cal led to determ ine the 
issue as it would be in othe r We stm i nster systems . The only except ion i s  
where  a Pr ime Mini ster i s  d i smi ssed b y  a no-conf idence mot ion i n  wh ich case 
he may adv ise a general e lect ion r athe r than subm i t  to a par l iamentary 
vote . 
DEPARTURES FROM THE ' PAC I F I C  MODEL ' 
There are three Pac i f ic Const itut ions wh ich do not conform to th i s  
model :  those of F i j i ,  Tonga and K i r ibat i .  F ij i ' s  mechan i sms for chang ing 
governments bear a close resemblance to those contained in the Westm inster 
model var iant typ ically adopted in As ia and Afr ic a .  The Governor-Gene r al 
is g iven d iscret ionary powe r in relat ion to quest ions of success ion . 
" Ac ting i n  h is own del iberate j udgement " he selects as 
Pr ime Minister " the member of the House of 
Representat ives who appears to h im best able to command 
the suppor t of the maj or i ty of the member s  of that 
House " ( s .  7 3  ( 2 ) ) .  
There i s  no prov 1 s1on for a par l iamentary vote for leade r . But the 
requ i r ement that a Pr ime M i n i ster res ign or be d ismi ssed if a no-conf idence 
mot ion is carr ied in par l i ament i s  encoded ( s . 75 ( 5 )  ( d ) ) .  In th i s  respect 
it is s imilar to othe r Pac i f ic Cons t i tut ions . 
By contrast , s uccess ion of government in K i r ibat i i s  intended to 
ope r ate within a sem i-pr esident i al const i tut ional fr amewor k .  The member s  
o f  the government , t h e  Pres ident and the Min iste r s  he appo ints , h ave t o  be 
elected member s  of the Maneaba ( P a r l i ament)  • The Maneaba puts forward 
cand idates for the off ice o f  Presidency after a general elect ion . The 
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people then vote for the cand idate they wish ( s . 32 ) . There i s , then , by 
contrast with the ' Pac i f ic model ' ,  a d i r ect involvement o f  the people in 
the select ion of a government . The Maneaba can remove the Pr es ident by a 
vote of no-conf idence . I f  th i s  occur s ,  the Counc i l  of State ( Chai rman of 
Public Serv ice Commiss ion , Ch ief Just ice and Speaker )  per forms the 
funct ions of the Pres ident unt i l  a successor is e l ected by the people after 
the next gene r al el ect ion ( s . 35 ) . The Maneaba does not have the powe r to 
se lect the new government , only to remove the ex isting one . Th is ag ain i s  
a depar ture from the ' Pacific model ' .  In K i r ibat i ,  all dec i s ions to 
appoint gover nments are made by the elec tor s .  
In the c ase o f  Tong a there i s  no constitut ional prov 1 s 1on for a change 
of government . Although there  is a cab inet , the K i ng appo ints the 
ministers ( s . 5 1 ) . Pa r l i ament does not prov ide the cab inet . The Par l i ament 
is in any c ase unrepr esentat ive . The electo r al prov i s ions are heav ily 
we ighted in favour of the nobles and ag a inst the people ( s . 6 0 ) . A change 
of government can really only occ ur i f  the K i ng dies  or res igns , in wh ich 
case h i s  successor becomes the government .  Changes in the composit ion of 
cab inet do not really amount to a change in government in the Tong an case . 
There i s  no const i tut ional means o f  chal leng ing i t . There i s , for example , 
no prov 1s 1on for a no-conf idence mot ion . Clear ly th i s  places Tong a in a 
un ique categor y  in the Pac i f ic contex t . 
THE SUCCESS I ON MACH I NERY I N  OPERAT I ON 
It is one th ing to have const itut ional mechan i sms to govern when and 
how power should change hand s ;  i t  is another for these mechan i sms actually 
to be used and r espected by a government and those chal leng ing it . The 
exper ience of most Th ird Wor ld states would sugge s t  that one se ldom follows 
from the other . In the Pac i f ic , however , it does appear that the 
mechan i sms govern ing success ion of government have been reg arded as 
leg i t imate . The twe lve changes o f  government that have occur red have been 
const i tu t ional . Fur the r , seve r al o f  those leader s  los ing power made i t  an 
occas ion to publ icly support the const itut ional mechan i sm wh ich al lowed the 
change to occur . In F i j i ,  after the Apr i l  1 9 77  e lect ion , for example ,  Ratu 
Mara ,  thinking h i s  party had lost government , made the following statement 
dur ing a broadcast announcing h i s  res ignat ion : 
I w i ll tomor row mor n i ng tender my res ignat ion and that 
of my government to h i s  Excellency the Governor­
Gene r al . I h ave accepted the verd ict o f  the people of 
th i s  country a r r ived at by democrat ic processes and am 
proud to do so . Noth ing e l se would accord with th is 
pol it ical ph i losophy o f  our s in respect for 
par l i amentary inst i tut ions wh ich my par ty stands for . 
We have lost the gene r al e lect ions and the National 
Feder at ion Party have won . I t  i s  not only the i r  r ight , 
it is the i r  duty to form a government ( quoted in Mur r ay 
1 9 78 : 2 3 1 ) .  
There are three mechan i sms wh ich have actually been employed to change 
a government : the par l i amentary vote ; Head of S t ate d iscre t ionary powe r ;  
and the no-conf idence mot ion . We shall ex am ine e ach i n  tur n .  I t  should be 
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emphas i sed , however , that we are not j ust interested in these mechan i sms 
when the i r  use r esults in a change o f  government . As important for our 
present purposes i s  the i r  use or ava i lab i l ity even where  government does 
not change hand s .  Part of our task i s  to demonstr ate the fact that where  
change has not  occur red , the  constitut ional mechan i sms are still  ope rat ive 
and prov ide an oppor tun ity for change if  the r e  i s  enough support  
forthcoming . Th is is of par t ic ular s ig n i f icance because the Pac i f ic St ates 
have exper ienced very few changes o f  government . Despite the ex i stence of 
independent and self-gover n i ng states from 1 962 , WS is the only country 
that expe r ienced a change of government before 1 976 . Even the r e  the f i r st 
change d id not occur unt i l  1 9 70 when Mata ' afa was defeated after twelve 
years as Pr ime Minister .1 ° Fur ther , e ight of the twelve changes that have 
occur r ed took place in only two state s :  WS and Na ur u ;  s ever al countr ies 
have not exper ienced a change of government at al l .  
THE PARL I AMENTARY VOTE 
Based on the intent ions o f  the const itut ion-make r s ,  we would expect 
the par l iamentary vote for Pr ime Minister  to be of pr imary importance i n  
determining who w i n s  and loses governmental power in t h e  Pac i f ic S t ates . 
Th is expectat ion is confi rmed by the h i stor ical record . Of the twe lve 
changes of government that have occur red in the reg ion , n ine we re dec ided 
by a vote of Parl i ament .1 1  S ix of these fo llowed a g eneral  elect ion : in WS 
in 1 970 , 1 973 , 1 976 and 1 982 ; i n  Naur u  in 1 976 ; and in Tuval u in 1 98 1 . 
The other three cases occur red after the res ignat ion of the Pr ime Ministe r : 
twice in Naur u  in 1 978 ; and in S I  in 1 98 1 . There were , in add it ion , many 
occas ions on wh ich a par l iamentary vote resulted in the r eturn of the 
incumbent Pr ime Min i ster . 
Western Samoa has had the long est expe r ience w i th th i s  mechan i sm .  The 
par l i amentary vote was f i r st used in 1 959  to select the Pr ime Ministe r  who 
would take the country into Independence . S i nce Independence in 1 962 it  
has been used seven t ime s , always after a g ener al elect ion . On four of 
these occas ions the vote resulted in a change of government . Typical ly , 
the pe r iod between the g eneral e lect ion and the f i r s t  par l i amentary meet ing 
when the vote for leader i s  held is one of intense pol i t ical act iv i ty .  In 
some senses the pol i t icking that takes place dur ing th i s  pe r iod i s  more 
impor t ant th an that wh ich takes place pr ior to the general elect ion . Two 
factor s contr ibute strong ly to th is . F i r stly,  unt i l  recently there  has 
been a very low level of formal po l it ical org anisat ion in Samoan po l i t ic s . 
Un til  1 979 there was no po l it ical party.  Even now the re i s  only one  par ty , 
the Human Rights Protect ion Party ,  wh ich was in oppo s i t ion between 1 979 and 
1 982 . Those supporting the government d id not form a party though they 
were g rouped around the i r  leader ,  Tupuola E f i .  
Th is lack o f  par ty org an i sat ion has t o  b e  seen i n  conj uct ion with a 
second feature of Samoan po l i t ics the very h igh turnover of 
r epr esentat ives at e ach elect ion . Th is has been around 5 0  per cent for 
most general elect ions .1 2  In such c ircums tances it is d i f f icult for the 
polit ical leader s  aspir ing for the Pr ime Ministersh ip to maintain a large 
group o f  sol id suppo r te r s  in the Parliament . In the 1 982 e lect ion , for 
exampl e , over half of the Pr ime Mini ster ' s  supporter s were not returned 
( see Pacific Is lands Monthly Apr i l  1 982 : 5 ) . The leader ' s  task therefore 
becomes one of winning to h i s  s ide as many o f  the uncommitted new member s  
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o f  Pa r l i ament as poss ible be for e the vote for Pr ime Minister i s  taken at 
the f i r s t  par l i amentary s i tt ing .  The fact that there are so few 
ind iv idual s  to be influenced and that the stakes are so h igh encourages the 
use of both ' trad it ional ' and We stern enticements to be made to the 
uncommitted . Fam ily t ies and obl ig at ions are cal led upon , ' g ifts ' are 
ar r anged , and minister ial posts are offered as a spec i al inducement . 
In recent elect ions it has been imposs ible to ascertain at the 
beg inn i ng of th i s  per iod who w i l l  win the vote . There we re s ig n i f icant 
sh i fts of suppor t over the s i x  weeks . Th at anyone can be ent iced to JOln 
the oppos ite camp at th i s  t ime can be demonstr ated by examples from the two 
most r ecent e lect ions . Be fore the 1 9 79 vote Tupuola Ef i actual ly managed 
to pe rsuade the brother of the leader of the oppos ing fact ion to j o in h im 
in r eturn for a mini ster ial post ( pr ivate sources ) . Dur ing th is pe r iod 
after the 1 9 82 e lect ion Tupuola succeeded in winning the support of one of 
the main leader s  of the oppos ing party,  Laupepa .1 3 Laupepa had in fact been 
one o f  the contender s  for the leader sh ip of the Human Rights Pr otect ion 
Party .  The r esults th at e f fect ive pol it ick ing can have at th i s  t ime are 
also shown in the d r amat ic change in support  that has occur red ove r these 
weeks . Although e s t imates o f  support  are r ather shaky i t  was g ene rally 
thought at the beg inn ing of the 1 982 nego t i at ing per iod 1 4 that Tupuo la 
would lose heav i ly to Va ' a i Ko lone . By the end of the pe r iod Tupuola had 
g ained much suppor t  and only m issed out on the leader sh ip by one vote . 
Such features are also assoc iated with the pe r iod pr ior to the 
par l iamentary vote in some of the other Pac i f ic S t ates . Th is exper ience i s  
not confined t o  countr ies with a low level o f  pol itical par ty organisat ion 
l ike WS . In PNG , for ex ample ,  where the r e  are a numbe r  of pol it ical 
par t ies , the pe r iod be fore the par l iamentary vote in 1 977 had s im i lar 
feature s .  The outcome of the par l iamentary vote for leader could not be 
pred ic ted on the bas i s  of the gene r al elect ion results : the crucial 
negot iat ions were still to take place . Th is is the per iod in wh ich part ies 
look for suppor ter s  and par t ies negot i ate with e ach othe r about coal i t ions . 
As in the WS case , the tur nover of repr esentat ives is h igh and a 
s ignif icant n umber are uncommitted . 
Among those countr ies u s i ng the par l iamentary vote sys tem only Vanuatu 
and C l  have f i rm par ty systems . Ther e fore , only in these two countr ies is 
it generally poss ible to know who will form the government before the 
par l i amentary vote is take n .  The pre-par l i amentary vote pe r iod i s  
consequently of l e s s  s ign i f icance . In such c i rcumstances , the 
par l iamentary vote itself becomes a formal ity except where  numbe rs are very 
close and the re are a few waver ing member s .  The importance of the pe r iod 
before the par l i amentary vote is l ikely to dec rease in s ignif icance in 
countr ies l i ke PNG and WS as par ty org ani sat ion develops . The sys tem 
encour ages th i s  because it is obv iously to a leader ' s  advantage to have 
membe r s  of par l i ament committed to h i s fac t ion at the t ime of the g ene ral 
elect ion . Th is trend is already ev ident in both countr ies . 
Wh ilst the par l i amentary vote following a g eneral elect ion has been 
reg ular ly used throughout the reg ion , a vote to determ ine the select ion of 
a government following the res ignat ion of a Pr ime Min ister and/or the 
collapse of a government has only been taken on three occas ions : twice in 
Naur u and once in S I . 1 5  G iven the fluid i ty o f  al leg iance in many of the 
pol i t ies , the l ac k  of any ideolog ical base for pol i t ical commitment and the 
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lack o f  pol it ical org an i sat ion , we would expec t the m id-term collapse of a 
government to occur more often . The use of the par l i amentary vote r ather 
than a general elect ion to resolve the leader sh ip i ssue in these 
c i rcumstances appear s to have wor ked smooth ly . In  the three cases 
ment ioned the procedur e met with gene r al acceptance . 
D I SCRETI ONARY POWER OF THE H EAD OF STATE 
We noted above that the const itut ion-make rs had gener ally attempted to 
m1n1m i se or total ly ex lude d iscret ionary power on the part of a He ad of 
State as an element in  the determinat ion of who should govern i n  the 
Pac i f ic States . The main except ion is F i j i wh ich expl ic i t ly allows the 
Gove rnor-General to exerc ise such powe r . But we also noted the intent ion 
to g ive the He ad of State such powe r in  er when Parliament was not in 
sess ion . Fur the r , it was shown that al though the word ing of the WS 
Const it u t ion appeared to g ive the He ad o f  S t ate full d i scret ionary powe r in 
select ing a Pr ime Minister , the intent ion was that the He ad of State would 
always choose in accordance with the wishes o f  Par l i ament as expr essed in  a 
pa r l iamentary vote . In all three countr ies , the leg al word ing allows 
d i scr e t ionary power on the part of the Head of S t ate though the intent ion 
might h ave been otherwi se . •  I t  is not surpr 1 s 1 ng ,  then , that i t  i s  only i n  
these countr ies that we have seen the u s e  o f  s uch powe r .  
I n  WS i t  occur red i n  1 975  fo llowing the sudden death o f  the Pr ime 
Minister , Mata ' afa . With i n  a few hour s of Mata ' afa ' s death the He ad of 
State , Mal ietoa , asked Tamasese to form a government . Tamasese was a 
membe r of the Leg islat ive As sembly and a former Pr ime Ministe r  ( 1 970-73 ) . 
He was also the only tam 'aiga ( chief of h ighest rank)  in the Par l i ament . 1 6 
A par l iamentary vote was not taken nor d id the He ad of State make the 
appo intment subj ect to a later dec i s ion by Parl iament or to Tamasese 
advi s i ng a gener al elect ion . Th is ac t ion by the Head of State appe ar s 
contrary to the intent ion s of the const itut ion-make rs and al so to 
estab l ished pract ice s i nce 1 959 of hav ing a par l iamentary vote whenever 
the re was a need to se lect a government . Fe l ise Va ' a , wr i t i ng in Pacific 
Is lands Monthly shortly after Tamasese ' s  appo intment , observes : 
Although the leg al ity o f  the ac t ion of the He ad of 
State in swear ing in  Tupua Tamasese as Pr ime M i n is ter 
only 4 hour s after Mat a ' afa ' s death had been quest ioned 
by some , there had been pr act ically no obj ect ions and 
the Leg is lat ive As sembly had con f i rmed it ( Aug ust 
1 9 75 : 1 5 ) . 
The quest ion ar ises as to what would have happened i f  the Par l i ament had 
not ' con f i rmed ' the He ad of State ' s  dec is ion . The c i rcumstances 
sur round ing h i s  involvement do seem to suggest that th i s  was an except ional 
act ion taken i n  except ional c ir cums tances ,  the death of an incumbent Pr ime 
M i n i s te r . On subseque nt occas ions whe n  a new government has had to be 
selected a fte r general elect ions in 1 976 , 1 979 and 1 982 - it was the 
par l iamentary vote that was used to determ ine the outcome . 
The CI case was also one i n  wh ich except ional c i rcumstances prevai led 
(see Crocombe et . al . 1 978 ) . After the March 1 9 78 e lect ion Albe r t  He nry ' s  
Cook I s l ands Par ty was r e tur ned with a conv inc ing maj or i ty ( 1 5- 7 ) . In 
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Apr i l ,  however , the Democrat ic Party laid s ixteen e lect ion pet i t ions before 
the Ch ief Just ice charg ing that the votes made by people flown in free of 
charge from New Zealand by the Gove rnment amounted to ' bought '  votes (see 
Shor t 1 9 79 : 227-39 ) .  In July , Ch ief Justice Donne found in the pet i t ioner s '  
favour . He dec lared the ' fly- i n '  votes void . Th is had the e f fect of 
immed iately unseat ing the Pr em ie r  and seven o f  his Cook I s land Party 
colleag ue s .  Dr Tom Dav is ,  the leader of the Democratic Party and seven 
supporters became Member s  of P a r l i ament . Thus the incumbent gover nment was 
expe l led by j ud ic ial dec is ion . The He ad of State d id not d ismiss the Pr ime 
Minister or h i s Cabine t .  The appointment of a new government d id not 
follow the usual pr ocedur e of a par l i amentary vote for a Premier . Instead , 
the Ch ie f Ju s t ice , immed iately donn ing h i s  other hat as He ad of State , 
prorogued the Pa r l i ament and appo inted Dr Tom Dav is as Premier . As we 
noted above a par l iamentary vote is not requ i red if the Par l i ament is not 
in sess ion . By prorogu ing P a r l i ament the He ad of St ate cr eated cond it ions 
in wh ich he could take a dec is ion wi thout a par l iamentary vote . As in the 
WS c ase we could argue th at these are except ional c i rcumstances and ones 
that are unl i kely to r ecur . Apar t  from th i s  Dav i s  could clear ly command a 
maj or ity in the Leg is lat ive As sembly , and thus the He ad of State ' s  dec i s ion 
was not d i sputed . 
A much more content ious case of the use of d i scretionary powe r in 
select ing a government occur red in F i j i after the March 1 977 e lect ion . 
Here the Governor-Gene r al ' s  dec is ion d id not result in a change of 
government but rather in the return of a government despite its  minor ity 
support  in the new par l i ament . The Al liance Pa r ty g a ined twenty- four seats 
wh i lst the Nat ional Feder at ion Party g ained twenty-s ix .  One seat also went 
to the Fij i Nat ional ist Party and another to an independent . When the 
House of Representat ives met in May it was obv ious that the Al li ance 
Government d id not have the con f idence of a maj or ity of membe r s .  The 
oppos i t ion was , however ,  r e luc tant to move a mot ion of no-confidence 
because they feared that th i s  would g ive Ratu Mara the oppor tun i ty to 
adv ise a d i ssolut ion and to call anothe r gene r al elect ion . A mot ion was 
passed reques t ing the Gove rnor-Gener al : 
not to d isso lve Pa r l i ament should an adv ice in that 
behal f be tende red but to inv ite the leader of the 
maj or ity par ty in the House , namely , the Le ader of the 
Oppos i t ion , to form the government ( quoted in Mur r ay 
2 3 2 )  • 
Never theless Ratu Mara adv i sed d issolut ion of the House the following 
day and th i s  was accepted by the Gove rnor-General . In h is comprehens ive 
ex am ina t ion of these events , Mur r ay ( 1 978 ) q ue s t ions the Governor-Gene r al ' s  
act ions on two counts : f ir stly , that he based h i s  dec i s ion to se lect Ratu 
Mara on " factors other than the vot i ng streng th of the par t ie s " � and 
secondly , that he prov ided Ra tu Ma ra with the d issolut ion he requ i r ed .  He 
arg ues that , taken together ,  these act ions amount to a departure from 
We stm inster pr inc iples upon wh ich the F i j i an Const itut ion is based . He 
concludes that : 
The Gove rnor-General , hav ing chosen as Pr ime Minister 
the leader of the m inor ity party,  was able to d isavow 
fu r ther responsibil ity by claiming that he had no 
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d i sc r e t ion in refus ing to g r ant a d i ssolut ion . The 
Pr ime Ministe r , mor eover , was g iven the means for 
remov ing a House in wh ich , as a d irect r esult o f  the 
gene r al elect ion , he commanded on ly minor ity suppo r t , 
and in wh ich , on h is own statement , the oppo s i t ion 
commanded a maj or ity (ibid : 233 ) . 
Whether or not we agr ee that the Governor-Gene r al ' s  act ions amount to a 
departure from Westm inster pr inciples in the sense that he broke 
unwr itten r ules concern ing the use of his d i scret ionary powe r - it i s  c lear 
that h is act ions we re seen as par t i san by the party w i th maj or ity s upport  
in the  Parli ament . The National Fede r at ion Party already had a 
long stand ing d issat isfact ion with the e lectoral system , wh ich they reg ard 
as favour ing Alliance interests (see Vas i l  1 9 72 : 2 7 ) . Th at i s ,  they already 
held the v iew that the const itut ional mechani sms concerned with chang ing 
governments were we ighted ag a inst them . Th e He ad of State ' s  act ions in 
1 9 77 could only r e inforce that v i ew .  Th us the case may have more 
far- reach i ng impl icat ions for the leg i t imacy accorded Fi j i ' s  const i tut ional 
prov 1s1ons concerned with succe ss ion of government . By contrast , the Head 
of S t ate ' s  act ions in the WS and CI c ases d id not call into que s t ion 
continued support for the constitut ional mechan i sms . These act ions had the 
suppo r t  of Parliament and we re seen as necessary in except ional 
c i rcumstances .  
THE NO-CON F I DENCE MOT I ON 
The th i rd mechan i sm ava i lable for chang ing governments in the Pac i f ic 
States , the no-confidence mot ion , h as only been used in PNG and even there  
i t  has only once been successful in oust ing a government . At  first  s ight 
th is appears surpr 1s1ng . Most Pacif ic countr ies , as we h ave noted , have 
e i ther fluid mult i-party sys tems or no par t ies at al l .  Th is lac k  of f i rm 
par ty al leg iance would seem to lend i t se l f  to a s ituat ion whe re a challenge 
to an i ncumbent government could att r act the r equ i r ed support . Th is i s  
part icular ly s o  a s  there i s  a constitut ional g uarantee that a government 
cannot ignore such a mot ion . I f  it is car r ied ,  the government must r e s ign 
or adv ise a gene r al elect ion . 
How then do we expl a in the lac k  of interest in th i s  mechanism? Part  
of the answer l ies in the fact that in several o f  these s tates the Pr ime 
Minister has the opt ion of adv is ing a g eneral elect ion if a no-conf idence 
mot ion is carr ied . Such a possibil ity i s  not attr act ive to the ind iv idual 
member of Pa r l i ament because of the chance that he may lose h i s  seat at a 
general elect ion . 1 7  The odd s that th i s  may happen are ex tremely h igh i n  
many Pac i f ic countr ies . In WS , as w e  have seen , t h e  turnove r  o f  
par l i amentar ians h a s  been around 5 0  p e r  cent a t  all gene ral elect ions . 
Th us the poss ib i l ity of cal l ing an e l ect ion becomes a threat wh ich a Pr ime 
Ministe r  can hold over those plann ing a no-conf idence mot ion . 1 8  
I n  PNG , on the othe r hand , there i s  no such prov ision . The Pr ime 
Minister cannot adv ise a general elect ion if a no-conf idence mot ion i s  
carr ied b y  Par l i ament . Thus i t  i s  very tempting for the opposit ion par t i e s  
t o  mount a challenge . Between t h e  1 9 77 e lect ion and March 1 980 three 
no-conf idence motions were put . On the th i rd occas ion , i n  March 1 980 , the 
oppo s i t ion was successful and powe r changed hands without a gene r al 
SUCCESSION OF GOVERNMENT 2 0 1  
e lect ion be i ng called . S i nce becoming Pr ime Min ister , Chan h as cr it ic i sed 
th is mechan i sm ( see Ch an 1 982 : 2 ) . He arg ue s  that the fact that a challenge 
can be mounted at any t ime after the s ix months ' honeymoon pe r iod ' ( the 
pe r iod in wh ich a mot ion cannot be put after a government takes o f f ice)  
creates cons iderable instab i l ity : " the result o f  th is is that at almost 
every s i tt i ng of Parliament the air is th ick with r umours  that the 
government is about to fal l " . He suggests two mod i f icat ions to the r ules 
govern ing the use of th i s  mechan i sm .  The f i r st would be to proh ib it its 
use for a pe r iod - " say a year " - after a no-conf idence mot ion has been 
defeated . The second would be to g ive to the Pr ime Minister the ab i l i ty to 
recommend a d issolut ion of the Pa r l i ament if a no-con f idence mot ion is 
passed . Chan recog n i sed the wor th o f  the latter as a deterrent : 
i f  Membe rs of Pa r l i ament knew that fai lure to maintain 
a stable government could mean hav ing to face 
re-elect ion , they wou ld sur e ly th ink several t imes 
before cr eat ing such a s i tuat ion i n  the f i r s t  place 
(ibid . : 2 )  
Wh ilst no-conf idence mot ions have not been put e l sewhere i n  the 
Pac i f ic , the i r  role as a potent ial sanct ion should not be over looked . The 
knowledge that a par l iament could move s uch a mot ion would d i scour age a 
government from refus ing to r e s ign in a s i tuat ion where  it could not , for 
ex ample ,  get its leg islat ion passed . Although Dowiyogo c ited We stminster 
pr act ice as the reason for his res ignat ion from the Pres idency in Naur u in 
1 9 78 , he al so knew that if  he d id not r e s ign a no-conf idence mot ion could 
have been put to for ce h im out . 1 9 The same wa s t r ue when the Independent 
Pa rty left Ke nilorea ' s  governing coal i t ion in SI i n  Aug ust 1 98 1 .2 0 
Ken ilorea knew that there  would be no use in at tempting to cont inue 
governing because a no-conf idence mot ion could be pu t .  He res igned mak i ng 
a no-conf idence mot ion unnecessary.  Never theless the mechan ism was s t i l l  
i n  the backg round a s  a sanct ion . 
CONCLUS I ON 
We are in a pos i t ion to make th ree general observat ions concerning the 
Pacif ic expe r ience with success ion of government . The f i r s t  is the central 
role of pa r l iament in selecting and d ism issing governments .  The 
par l iamentary vote sys tem of se lect ing a new Pr ime Minister after a gene r al 
elect ion , or to f i l l  a m id-term vacancy, has governed how powe r changed 
hands in all but two instances :  WS in 1 9 75  and Cl in 1 97 8 .  Even these 
cases appear to be except ional with in the expe r i ence of these part icular 
countr ies . As a corollary of par l iament ' s  central i ty ,  we note the 
re lat ively i n s ign i f icant role for the He ad of S t ate , pol i t ical par t ies , and 
even the voter , par t icular ly when compared w i th the i r  respect ive roles in 
other We stm i nster systems . 
Second ly , we note the almost total absence of m id- term chal lenges to 
an incumbent government desp ite the ava i lab i l i ty of the no-conf idence 
mot ion and the fluid po l it ical al leg iances with i n  Pac i f ic par l i aments . The 
m id-term collapse of a government or the r e s ig nat ion of the Pr ime Mi n i ster 
is also very r are . 
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F i nally ,  we observe th at the const itut ional mechan i sms for chang ing 
government have met w i th general acceptance . Even where government has not 
changed hands - in F i j i ,  K i r ibat i ,  Vanuatu and N i ue - the mechan i sms wh ich 
al low the oppor tun ity for change are s t i l l  available and in use . 
Par l iamentary e lect ions are s t i l l  held , par l iamentary votes for leader are 
taken , and no-confidence mot ions c an s t i l l  be put . Elect ions are free and 
force is not used to suppr ess oppo s i t ion . Thus the leg i t imacy of the 
success ion mechan isms appears to be estab l i shed both in countr ies that have 
exper ienced a change o f  government and those that have not . We need , 
however , to make two qual if icat ions to th i s  observat ion . The f i r st is that 
th is does not apply to Tong a ,  as a change of government in the We stminster 
sense is not poss ible there . The K i ng ' s  author ity appears to be widely 
suppor ted by the Tong an people . Second ly , we noted that in F i j i the r e  has 
been a quest ion ing of the success ion mach inery,  and par t icular ly the 
e lecto r al sys tem , by the Ind ian- s uppor ted National Fede r at ion Party. The 
machine ry i s  v i ewed as favour ing Al l iance Party interests and contr ibut ing 
to the i r  own exclus ion from powe r . 
The conclus ion that there has been gene r al acceptance of the 
mechan i sms for chang ing gove rnment in the Pac i f ic prompts con s iderat ion of 
two que s t ions : f ir s t , how do we expl ain the leg it imacy accorded these 
mechan i sms , and secondly , how m ight soc ial and pol it ical change affect such 
acceptance in the future? These quest ions are complex and the i r  detai led 
cons iderat ion must l ie beyond the scope of th is pape r . For my pr e sent 
purposes , i t  i s  s u f f ic ient to suggest why these are important quest ions and 
to put forward some tentat ive propos it ions . 
In ask ing why it is that there  has been general support for the 
success ion mechan i sms we are re ally ask i ng why force has not been used to 
se i ze power in the Pac i f ic states and why incumbent governments have not 
sought to entrench the i r  own pos i t ion and cr ipple that of the i r  opponents 
by chang ing the r ules or ignor ing the ex i s t ing procedures conce rned with 
succes ion of government . These quest ions immed iately occur to us because 
of the exper ience of the post-colon i al states o f  Afr ica and much o f  As ia 
where the We stm inster success ion mechan i sms are quick ly j ett isoned and the 
mil itary coup or one-party state with suppr essed oppost ion became 
commonplace . 
An expl anat ion of the Pacif ic expe r ience would need to include 
cons ider at ion of : the very small s i ze of most of the states involved ; the 
gene r al absence of nat ional ist par ties ; the non-exi stence of armed force 
outs ide PNG , Fij i ,  Tong a and Vanuatu ;  the lack of e thn ically ' b ipolar ' 
states except in F i j i ,  and poss ibly Vanuatu ; the con t inued ex i stence of 
ch ie fly autho r i ty in Po lynes i a ;  the re lat ively low level of pol i t ical 
par t ic ipat ion and org ani sat ion ; and the absence of external involvement in 
domestic po l i t ical pr ocesse s .  
I would argue that the most important factor i s  that no s ign if icantly 
s i zed group w i th i n  these s t ates has fe l t  i t s e l f  to be fully ex l ud ed fr om 
the pos s i b i l ity of g a ining government or from hav i ng some representat ives 
of the i r  interests in powe r .  Mo st of the Pac i f ic I s l and States con s i st of 
only one ethnic g roup speaking the same lang uag e . Th is i s  the case in WS , 
CI , N i ue ,  K i r ibat i ,  Tuvalu and Naur u .  I n  s uch countr ies there i s  no ethnic 
g roup that would always feel exc luded from powe r by v i r t ue of be ing a 
minor ity g roup within a Westminster system based on ' maj or ity r ule ' . Th is 
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contrasts w i th v irtually all o f  Afr ica , As ia and the  Car ibbean where  there 
are typically several maj or e thnic g roups in one state , e ach g roup defin ing 
its pol it ical ident ity on the bas i s  of its  ethnic al leg iance . 
Papua New Gu inea and S I ,  although composed of large number s  of ethnic 
g roups , also do not conform to the pattern typical in other post-colon ial 
states . They have so many g roups that no one g roup can predom inate and 
ful ly exclude othe r s . Coal i t ions have to be formed . There is then , I 
would argue , a feel ing that i f  you play your po l i t ical cards we ll you could 
get access to powe r  through the Westm inster mechanisms . Th is i s  not to say 
that ethnic and reg ional loyalt ies are not felt very strongly but r ather 
that they are not pol it ical ly org an ised i n  s uch a way that a pe rmanent 
' in-g roup ' and ' out-g roup ' have formed in relat ion to po l i t ical power at 
the state leve l . On ly in F i j i and Vanuatu do the cond i tions ex ist for the 
development of such an ' out-g roup ' . In these countr ies , po l it ical 
alleg iances are gene r al ly dete rm ined by iden t i f icat ion with one of two 
maj or ethn ic g roups . Support  for pol it ical par t ies is by and large based 
on th i s  d i v i s ion . Although Vanuatu has a l arge number of t r ad i t ional 
ethnic groups i t  i s  the Anglophone/Fr ancophone over lay wh ich prov ides the 
most impor tant ' ethn ic ' d iv i s ion for pol it ics at the s tate level .  If the 
Indians in F i j i and the Fr ancophones in Vanuatu cont inually fee l  excluded 
from powe r the i r  support  for the We stm inster- type success ion mechan i sms is 
l i kely to wane . 
Many of the factors that I h ave put forward as contr ibut ing to 
const i tut ional success ion of government are cur rently undergoing change . 
The forces o f  We stern educat ion , c ash economy , the exper ience of t r avel , 
increased external interest in Pac i f ic po l i t ic s , un ion isat ion , the 
development of pol it ical par t ies , and the growth of armed forces , are 
already be i ng fel t .  There are more g roups want i ng to v i e  for pol i t ical 
power and to challenge chiefly author i ty where i t  is entrenched . Wh at 
impl icat ions do these trends have for const itut ional success ion in the 
future? I would contend that the changes in po l i t ical par t ic ipat ion and 
organ isat ion are l i kely to increase the propens i ty to change government and 
also the s ig n i f icance of that change . The pol it ical stakes are l i ke ly to 
be raised . Th is is unl i ke ly , however , at least in the short- term , to 
affect the r e spect for the const itut ional mechan i sms wh ich al low the 
opportunity for peace ful change of government . 
The mos t  l i kely threat to the continuance of const itut ional success ion 
would stem from the development of pol i t ical ' out-groups ' based on ethn ic 
or reg ional al leg iance . For r easons outl ined above , such developments are 
more l ikely in F i j i and Vanuatu though they may also occur in PNG and S I  i f  
pol it ical iden t i f icat ion based o n  large reg ions becomes the pr edominant 
patte r n .  If s uch g roups feel th at they are cont inually exclud ed from powe r 
by the ope rat ion of We stm inster success ion mechanisms they may wi thd raw 
the i r  suppo r t  for them . Th is may take the form of an attempt at 
success ion . It may be expr essed as a demand for a change in the rules so 
that powe r- shar ing is a pos s i b i l ity .  It may not only be the ' out-g roup ' 
wh ich could no longe r  accept the We stm inster success ion mechan i sms . The 
powe r-holde r s  could also change the i r  v iews on the des i r ab i l ity of the 
ope r at ion of such mechan i sms . The poss ib il ity of one of the opposing 
g roups g a in ing powe r m ig ht be cons idered to pose too g reat a thr eat to 
the i r  inte rests . Or it may be th at there is indeed a ' Pac i f ic way ' of 
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doing th i ng s  wh ich will  ensure that the states in th i s  part of the wor ld do 
not follow the example of other post-colon i al soc ie t ies . 
NOTES 
1Although the C l  and N i ue only enj oy ' assoc iated statehood ' s tatus they 
are never theless included because succes s ion of government quest ions are 
fully determined by processes w ith in these countr ies . 
2The term ' We stm inster model ' i s  used in the sense put forward by Stan ley 
de Smi th ( 1 96 4 : 7 7 ) . Although Tong a has Westm i nster t r apping s ,  e ffect ive 
power l ies with the K i ng .  K i r ibat i i s  a sem i-pr es ident ial model .  
3Part ies d id subsequently develop i n  Naur u ,  WS and S I .  There were part ies 
in PNG when the Const itut ion was be ing dr awn up but th i s  was a very f l u id 
system . 
4ws , Naur u ,  K i r ibat i and Vanuatu are republ ics . The CI , F i j i ,  N i ue ,  PNG , 
Tuvalu and S I  have Governor s-Ge ner al . Tong a i s  an i ndependent k ingdom . 
5The He ad of State or Gove rnor-General is g iven the constitut ional duty of 
remov ing the Pr ime Minister after a no-conf idence mot ion i s  passed in 
PNG , F i j i ,  S I , WS and CI . In the case of Vanuatu , N i ue ,  K i r ibat i , Tuvalu 
and Naur u  the const itut ion st ipulates that the Pr ime Mi niste r  shall 
res ign or adv ise a general elect ion . The Head of S t ate does not have a 
role in these countr ies . 
6Notice of intent ion to put a no-conf idence mot ion has to be g iven in PNG , 
S I , and Vanuatu and N i ue .  
7PNG i s  the only Pac i f ic Island S t ate to have the requ i r ement that an 
alternat ive Pr ime Min ister be named in a no-conf idence mot ion . 
8PNG i s  alone in hav ing th i s  r equi r ement . Dur ing a s ix months per iod 
after an e l ect ion a mot ion cannot be put ( s . 1 45 ( 4 ) ) .  
9The Pr ime M i n ister has an opt ion o f  adv ising a general e lect ion i n  F i j i ,  
Ni ue ,  WS and Cl . In the case of the CI , however , the Head of State i s  
g iven the d iscret ionary powe r t o  re fuse t h e  Pr ime Minister ' s  r equest for 
a d i ssolut ion . ( s . 1 4 ( 3 )  ( 6 ) ) .  In Naur u the Pr es ident does not have the 
power to call a general elect ion but if Par l i ament has not se lected a new 
Pr es i dent within seven d ays Parliament ' shall stand d issolved ' ( s . 2 4 ( 2 ) ) .  
In the other countr ies there  i s  no prov is ion for a gene r al elect ion . The 
matter has to be re solved by Parliament . 
1 0Mata ' afa ' s long term was not except ional . In s ix of the e leven countr ies 
under study the f i r st Pr ime Minister has he ld h is leader sh ip pos i t ion for 
mor e  than n i ne year s .  
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1 1 There we re ten such votes i f  we include the vote of no-conf idence wh ich 
ousted the Somare Gover nment in March 1 98 0 . Th is is , however ,  in a 
d i fferent c ategory and i s  cons idered separ ately . 
1 2 Based on f ig ures r epor ted in Pacific Is lands Monthly after each e lect ion , 
there was a 4 5  per cent turnover in Leg islat ive As sembly member s  in 1 970 , 
4 9  per cent in 1 973 , 60 per cent in 1 9 76 , 55 per cent in 1 979 , and 5 3  per 
cent in 1 982 . 
1 3 Th is is shown by the fact that it was Laupepa who nom inated Tupuola for 
Pr ime Minister dur ing the f i rst s i tt ing of Par l i ament . 
1 4 See ,  e . g . , Fe l i se Va ' a ' s  assessment of a poss ible 3 0- 1 7 against Tupuo la 
in Pacific Islands Monthly Apr i l  1 982 : 5 . 
1 5 In Naur u ,  Parliament e lected Lagumot Harr i s  as Pres ident following 
Be rnard Dowiyogo ' s  r e s ignat ion in Apr i l  1 978 . In March o f  the same year 
Parliament e lected Hamme r DeRobur t following the res ignat ion of Harr i s  
when h i s  government lost a n  appr ec iat ion amendment b i l l  b y  n ine votes to 
e ight . Th e SI c ase occur red in August 1 98 1 . Solomon Mamaloni was chosen 
as Pr ime Mini ster by a par l iamentary vote following the col lapse of the 
Ken i lorea Gove rnment . 
1 6 In the WS contex t Tupua Tamasese ' s  t r ad i t ional r ank i s  of part icular 
impor t ance . On ly ch iefs c an vote or stand for Parliament . The two Pr ime 
Ministers WS h ad between 1 959 and 1 976  were Tama 'aiga . The Head of State 
also holds a Tama 'aiga t itle . There are only four such t i tles i n  the 
countr y .  
1 7 I t  may also n o t  be attract ive to a pol it ical party as w e  saw in Apr i l  
1 9 77 in F i j i where  the National Fede r at ion d id not want t o  put a 
no-conf idence mot ion in case Ratu Mara adv ised a general e lect ion . 
1 8In the case of ws the h igh chie fly r ank of 
repor tedly d i scouraged any challenges 
sources) • 
Mata ' afa and 
dur ing the i r  
Tamasese also 
te rms ( pr ivate 
1 9Dowiyogo r e s igned after h i s  government lost a mot ion to close debate on a 
b i l l  to prov ide " a  g reater proport ion of phosphate royal t ies to be set 
as ide for government funds" ( see Backgrounder 1 9  May 1 9 78 : 1 7 ) . 
2 0Af te r  the s ix Ministers from the I ndependent Party announced the ir 
intent ion to withdraw from the coal it ion , Kenilorea tr ied to negotiate 
the necessary suppo r t  to govern but f a i led to do so . He then res igned 
and lost the subsequent par l iamentary vote for Pr ime Minister ( 2 0- 1 7 )  
( see Pacific Islands Monthly Oc tober 1 98 1 : 33 ;  Backgrounder 2 6  Aug ust 
1 98 1 : 3 ) . 

1 5. TH E R E LATIONSH IP BETWEEN TH E EXECUTIVE AND TH E 
LEG ISLATUR E :  SOM E ASPECTS OF TH E SYSTEMS OF 
GOVERNM ENT I N  M E LAN ESIA 
Y.P. Ghai 
The i ndependent states of the South Pac i f ic all have constitut ional 
systems wh ich may be br oadly characte r i sed as ' We stm inster '  ( although most 
of them have fe atures d i fferent from the c lass ical Westminster system and 
are thus somet imes r e fe r red to as ' export  Westm i nster models ' ( see de Sm ith 
1 964 ) or ' neo-We stm inster ' ( see Lynch 1 9 8 2 a ) ) .  On the other hand , all but 
one o f  the constituent ent i t ies o f  the US Tr ust Te rr i tory of Microne s ia 
( the except ion be ing the Ma rshall I s lands (MI ) ) have adopted the 
' Wash i ng ton ' model , aga in w i th some mod i f icat ions . De spite the fact that 
there was cons ide r able controversy over many other prov is ions of the 
independence constitutions , ag reement on the maj or quest ion o f  the form of 
government was in most cases reached eas i ly ( large ly following the 
' metropolitan '  model) and o ften with l ittle d i sc uss ion ( see Ghai 1 982 ) . 
Th is paper looks at some of the reasons for the ready acceptance of 
the ' metropol itan '  model and at some al ternat ives wh ich we re canvassed in 
the pre- independence pe r iod . I t  also d i scusses the mod i f icat ions to the 
We stminster system and concludes w i th some comments on the consequences o f  
t h e  adopt ion o f  that system . T h e  paper i s  confined to a n  examinat ion of 
the Cons t i tut ions of F i j i ( 1 970 ) , Papua New Gu inea ( PNG ) ( 1 9 7 5 ) , the 
Solomon I s lands ( S I )  ( 1 978 ) and Vanuatu ( 1 98 0 ) . 
REASONS FOR TH E ADOPTI ON OF THE WESTMI NSTER SYSTEM 
The abandonment o f  the Westm inster-based i ndependence const i tut ions in 
Afr ica and some parts o f  As ia h as g iven r i se to some controversy as to 
whether that sys tem was imposed by the colon ial autho r i t ies or demanded by 
the nat ional leade r s .  A s im i lar controversy i s  beg inning to emerg e in the 
Pac i f ic and c r i t ic i sm is m ade of the i n appropr i at e ness o f  the independence 
constitutions to local pol it ical , soc ial and economic cond it ions . Except 
in the case of Vanuatu , the people of the countr ies under cons iderat ion and 
the i r  leaders have h ad con s iderable freedom to fash ion the i r  own 
constitut ions . In no case was a const itut ion imposed upon them and in S I ,  
the colon ial author it ies i n  fact even advocated for a cons ide r able t ime the 
adopt ion of an alternat ive to the We stm inster system . 
It is nonetheless impor tant to appr ec i ate the context and the 
c i rcumstances in wh ich the leaders  made the i r  choices . Most we re brought 
up under a We stern system of educat ion and were deeply influenced by 
miss ions . They then rose to prominence through e lector al and const itut-
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i onal systems wh ich were the precur sor s  of the Westm inster system , and 
gained po l it ical and m in i s te r ial exper i ence under i t .  They h ad thus been 
soc ialised in var ious ways to bel ieve that other systems we re less 
democrat ic . Th is was par t icular ly str i k i ng i n  F i j i where  constitut ional 
dec i s ions were made by conservative , t r ad i t ional leaders ( in the Alliance 
Party) or by lawye rs ( in the Fede r al Party) , all profess ing a f irm 
commitment to the r ule of law. A cont inu ing respons ib i l i ty of the 
execut ive to the leg islature is cons idered to check d ictator i al tendenc ies 
and the d isreg ard of public opi n ion . 
A f u r ther reason for the prefe r ence for the We stminster system is s a id 
to l ie in its  cong r uence w i th t r ad i t ional Melane s i an forms of pol i t ical 
organisat ion , so that its  adopt ion would promote nat ional uni ty .  He re 
aga in ,  a contr ast i s  impl ied with the executive-pr es ident ial system , where 
execut ive power i s  const itut ionally vested i n  one pe r son , pr esumably from 
the maj or ity g roup .  
The Westminster system may wel l  serve th is purpose , e specially i f  
there are now only weak par ties , as h a s  s o  f ar been t h e  case i n  PNG and S I ,  
although , a s  we shall see , Peter Konilorea ( 1 972 ) arg ued that the creat ion 
of pol i t ical par t ies by the Westm inster system would itse l f  be d iv is ive . 
It does not follow , however ,  that it must ach ieve th i s  resul t . G iven 
polit ical part ies based on r eg ional or e thnic aff i l i at ions ( e spec i ally when 
elected on the bas is o f  a f i r st-past- the-post system of representat ion) , 
the consequence may we ll be that the ' winner takes al l ' , that the maj or i ty 
party g a ins full control over leg islat ive as well as execut ive powers ( and 
through the appointments power , even over the j ud ic i ary) . Multi- e thnic or 
r eg ionally-or ient ated s tates ( i . e . , those with ' permanent ' m inor i t ies)  
wh ich h ave adopted the Westm inster system h ave g enerally found i t  necessary 
to make federal or s imilar arr angements ( Canad a ,  Austr a l i a ,  Indi a ,  Malaya , 
South Afr ica ,  etc . ) . 
Other dev ices wh ich have been used to mod i fy the central i s ing and 
monopol i s ing consequences of the Westm inster ' expor t model ' i nclude the 
i solat ion of var ious ins t itut ions ( such as the public serv ice , the 
j ud ic iary or the publ ic prosecutors)  from execut ive control , and the 
establ ishment of ombudsmen ,  pub l ic sol ic i tor s ,  e tc .  ( see de Sm i th 
1 96 4 : Ch . 4 ) . St il l ,  a ' permanent ' maj or ity party in power will  have l i ttle 
reason to make concess ions to the m inor i ty ,  and the m i nor i ty will despa i r  
of gaining or shar ing powe r through e lect ions and may be tempted into 
subve r s ion .  
It  i s  consequently doubtful i f  the Westm inster system was appropr i ate 
in Fij i and Vanuatu .  F i j i contains two main communi t ies ( nat ive F i j ians 
and F i j i Indians in a propor t ion of 4 2 : 48 pe r cent) , wh ich have been 
pol i t ically organi sed along r ac ial l ines . Each community h as a chance of 
winn ing e lect ions only i f  i t  c loses r anks , and the community wh ich loses 
has no share in executive power . The Westm inster-type Const itut ion has 
therefore prov ided ne ither an i ncent ive for integ r at ion nor the possibil ity 
o f  power- shar ing ( problems wh ich have been compounded in F i j i by the 
r ac i ally-based e lectoral rolls and seats) • 
In the case of Vanuatu , the maj or d iv i s ion has been pe rce ived to be 
between the Eng l i sh- and the Fr ench- speak i ng sect ions of the populat ion , 
with the latter in the minor ity.  Al though the ' fr ancophones ' had proposed 
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a const itut ion with a ' F i fth Republ ic ' type pres idency , the const itut ional 
consultant appointed by the Fr ench Gover nment , Prof . c. Zorgb ibe , 
r ecommended a Westm inster system to al low for g r eater influence on pol icy 
by ' fr ancophone ' par l iamentar ians and a greater poss ib i l i ty of power­
shar ing . Th is view was not necessar i ly shared by the French Minister for 
Overseas Fr ance , M .  Paul D i j ourd , who wanted a strong pr esident with veto 
powers ( w i th the expectat ion that a ' fr ancophone ' pres ident m ight be 
harnessed to an ' anglophone ' pr ime ministe r )  and the d i sper sal of certain 
key powe r s  among st ch iefs , chai rmen o f  r eg ional counc il s , etc . In the 
m id- 1 960s , the Fr ench had already arg ued for a ' power-shar ing ' 
constitut ion , unde r wh ich both fact ions would have posts in the cabinet in 
proport ion to the i r  seats in the leg islature (a proposal wh ich has also 
been made in relat ion to Northern I r eland) • 
Th is sounded too much l i ke the pe rpetuat ion of the condom inium ,  and 
was opposed by the ( ' anglophone ' )  Vanuatu Par t i  on the g rounds that th i s  
wou ld make pol icy and administr at ion d i f f icult - a pos it ion wh ich I also 
took at the t ime ( see Gh ai 1 9 7 4 ) . I supported the normal r ule for the 
compos i t ion of the cabinet because I d id not cons ider the ' francophones '  to 
be a ' permanent ' minor ity . The factor s that div ided them from the 
' ang lophones ' ,  though potent , wer e  ar t if ic ial and it was unwise to adopt a 
constitution that would pe rpe tuate them . A more conventional par l i amentary 
system was l ikely to encour age ·  the integ rat ion of the two communit ies . 
Th at th is v iew was not shared by several leaders of the ' fr ancophone ' 
communi ty i s  ev ident from the i r  rej ect ion of the Independence Const itut ion 
and attempts at secess ion . 
PROPOSED ALTERNAT I VES TO TH E WESTMI NSTER SYSTEM 
On ly in the case of F i j i was there no debate as to wh ich basic form of 
government should be adopted . In one of the i r  early secret meet ings in 
1 969  to d iscuss a cons t i tut ion , the leader s  o f  the Alliance and Federal 
Parties agr eed on the Westminster system of the ' class ical Domin ion type ' 
in a matter o f  m inutes . There was no d i scuss ion of its mer its , its 
appl icab i l ity to local c i rcumstances or  of al ternat ives to i t . 
In PNG , although alternat ives we re canvassed , there was also l ittle 
ser ious d i scuss ion o f  them . The alternat ive wh ich appears to have rece ived 
the g reatest attent ion was the par l iamentary pres ident ( of the Ke nyan 
var iety) , although the s trongest proponent of the pres ident ial idea , John 
Gu ise ( see G u ise 1 972 ) , advocated a Tanzani an- type system ( the d i f ference 
be i ng that the President in Kenya remains a Member of Par l i ament and shares 
with his Cabinet collect ive responsibil ity and can be removed by 
Par l i ament , wh ile in Tanzania he i s  not a Member ,  cannot be removed by 
Par l i ament , and does not sh are h i s  execut ive re spons ib i l ity with the 
Cabine t ,  wh ich consists o f  e i ther elected or nom inated Membe rs of 
Par l i ament) • Gu ise proposed that the pres ident could be d ismi ssed by the 
leg islature , but also that he could d ismiss Par l iament " i f it car r ies on in 
a manner contrary to the good , stable government of the country" ( ibid. ) 
wh ich m ight have r a i sed the interest ing ques t ion of who would pul l  the 
tr igger f i r s t ! Although a membe r of the Cons t i t u t ional Pl ann ing Committee 
( CPC) , Gu ise d id not press these proposal s - in fact he too k  no par t  in the 
dec i s ions o f  the CPC . But he has r e turned to them in his submiss ions to 
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the General Const itut ion Commiss ion , wh ich is cur rently reviewing the 
ope r at i on of the PNG Cons t i t ut ion . 
Th e acceptance of the We stm inster sys tem was more problematic in S I  
and Vanuatu .  In the early 1 9 70s , the coloni al author i t ies in S I  dec ided 
upon a d iffe rent model ,  wh ich they were able to pe rsuade the elected 
Membe r s  of the As sembly to accept . The 1 9 70 Cons t itut ion abolished the 
Leg islat ive and Execut ive Counc ils ( in the i r  embryonic Westm inster form) 
and established instead a Gove rning Counc i l ,  in wh ich both leg islat ive and 
execut ive power s  were vested , and wh ich was to oper ate largely through a 
committee system for pol icy-mak i ng and administrat ion . I t  was to meet in 
pr ivate when d i scharg ing its executive funct ions , and in open sess ion when 
d iscuss ing leg islat ion . 
It was hoped that each member of the Counc il would s i t  on at least one 
comm ittee . Each committee was to be r espons ible for spec i f ic matte r s , 
wh i le the chairmen of all ( othe r )  comm ittees met as the Finance Comm ittee . 
There is l ittle ev idence of enthus iasm in S I  for these proposals (see 
Ru ssell 1 9 70 ; Paia  1 97 5 )  although they were submitted for publ ic d i scuss ion 
and a r ecommendat ion to adopt them was made by a Spec ial Select Comm i ttee 
of the Leg is lature ( Leg islat ive Counc i l  Pape r No . 2 2 of 1 969 ) . Moreover ,  
oppos i t ion was expressed by So lomon Mamalon i on behalf o f  " some young 
people " .  As the 1 9 70 Const i tut ion bears a strong resemblance to the system 
wh ich ope r ated in Ceylon ( now Sr i Lanka )  from 1 9 36  to 1 946  - known as the 
"Donoughmore Const itution" after the chairman of the Commiss ion wh ich 
recommended it - it is be st to turn in th i s  d i r ect ion to d i scover the 
rat ionale for the sys tem in S I . 
1 1 DONOUGHMORE 1 1 I N  SRI  LANKA : AN EXCURSUS 
The Donoughmore Commiss ion was asked to recommend amendments to a 
const itut ion under wh ich the maj or ity o f  the Membe r s  of the Leg i sl at ive 
Counc i l  we re e lected , wh i le execut ive respons ibil ity was vested in a 
nominated Execut ive Counc i l  ( i rremovable by the Leg islature) . The d ivorce 
between power and respons ib i l ity was agg r avated by the Leg islatur e ' s 
control over f inance . The Br it i sh had expected to wor k  the system by 
e l ic i t ing the s upport of the e lected member s ,  or at least some of them , but 
th is was not to be . The latter , although not organised in pol i t ical 
par t ies , un ited in the ir oppos i t ion to the execut ive . The absence of party 
organ i sat ion was expected to help the Gove rnment , but the Comm i ss ion noted 
that i t s  absence created other problems , for i f  the Membe r s  were div ided 
along par ty l ines , the Government could have expected the support of one 
group or  the other ( Ceylon 1 92 8 : 2 1 ) .  The e lected Membe r s  d id not obtain 
exper i ence of pol icy formulat ion or administrat ion , and so d id not learn 
' respon s i b i l i ty ' . 
Th e  Commiss ion r ecommended the abol i t ion of the Cons t i tut ion and its 
replacement by one under wh ich l eg i slat ive and execut ive funct ions would be 
comb ined in a state counc i l .  Execut ive respons ibi l ity would then be 
deleg ated by the counc i l  to seve r al committees , e ach with a minister ial 
chai rman . The ministers would meet as a board of ministers to determ i ne 
the order of bus iness and would be r espons ible for the budget e s t imates . 
The counc il ( and i t s  committees) would mee t  in pr ivate sess ion when s i tt ing 
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE 2 11 
as the exec ut ive , and in publ ic when s i tt i ng in a leg i slat ive capac i ty .  
The Commiss ion j ust i f ied i t s  proposals w i th three broad cons iderations : 
( 1 )  The non-ex i stence of a par ty system , wh ich pr evented stable 
par l i amentary government ; ( I t  acknowledged that the development of 
respons ible government m ight lead to the development o f  par ties , but 
feared that if par t i es d id develop , they would be along r ac ial or 
caste l ines , and therefore be " fatal to the best interests of the 
country" ( ibid. : 4 2 ) ) .  
( 2 )  I t  was not conv inced that the Westm i nster system was a good form of 
government , espec ially because of the ins ignif icant role of 
backbencher s ,  and cons idered that i t  may already be " obsolescent" even 
in Br itain ( ibid. : 4 3 ) . 
( 3 )  Member s  o f  the Leg i s l at ive Counc i l  in Ceylon had shown much more 
interest in administ r at ion than i n  pol icy-mak i ng . 
In so small a country and with the concept ion of the 
scope of government wh ich has ex i sted up to now , 
administrat ion r ather than leg islat ion has loomed large 
in the eye o f  the pol it ic ian ( ibid. : 4 4 ) . 
An over- r id i ng cons ider at ion ( which had no appl icat ion in S I  in the 
late 1 96 0 s )  was the Commiss ion ' s  v i ew that due to r ac ial d iv i s ions with in 
the populat ion , Ceylon was unl i ke ly to ach ieve se l f-government for a long 
t ime ( and hence would need to retain ex-offic io m in ister s ) . It was thus , 
in the end , unwi ll ing to accept the log ic of its  own other arg uments : the 
e l iminat ion o f  the o f f ic ial non-e lected maj or ity in the leg islatur e .  
The proposals were opposed b y  var ious Ceylonese leader s ,  although not 
only , or even pr imar i ly because of the fus ion of the Execut ive and 
Leg is lat ive Counc ils  e thnic and electoral prov is ions we re more 
controversial . But there  was d i ssat isfact ion w i th the fus ion , wh ich g rew 
as the shor tcoming s of the new system became apparent after its 
implementat ion . Although ag i tat ion for r e form beg an almost immediately , 
yet it was not unt i l  after Wor ld War I I  ( and par tly due to i t )  that an 
independent rev iew was made of the "Donoughmore Cons t i t ut ion " by a 
commiss ion under Lord Soulbury (see Ceylon 1 94 5 ) . 
By th is t ime the Br it ish h ad accepted a Domin ion status for Ceylon and 
so one d i ff iculty feared by Donoughmore was r emoved . The Soulbury 
Commiss ion accepted the cr it ic i sms made o f  the S t ate Counc i l  system . These 
we re that the execut ive committees : 
made administrat ion c umbrous 
vented any co-ord inated 
emergence of any r eal 
re sponsibil ity. These we re 
system that it could not 
( ibid . : 2 1 -2 2 ) . 
and d i l ator y ,  they pr e­
effort  and h indered the 
minister ial pol icy or 
defects so i nherent in the 
be e f f ic iently oper ated 
The Commiss ion perce ived r emed ies to these defects in the Westminster 
system , and Ceylon obtained I ndependence under a Westminster Const itut ion . 
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THE GOVERN I NG COUNC I L  I N  THE SOLOMON I S LANDS 
The backg round to the introduc t ion o f  the Gover n i ng Counc i l  appears to 
l ie i n  part in the confl ict between the ex-offi c io Member s  of the Execut ive 
Counc i l  and the e lected Member s  of the Leg islatur e ,  with the elected 
Member s  of the Execut ive Counc i l  under standably refusing to accept 
collect ive r esponsib i l i ty ( see Russel l  1 970 : 2 27-29 ) . The second official 
reason g iven was the absence of a party system : 
democr acy on the Westminster pattern depends for i t s  
wor k i ng o n  t h e  party system with its  i nherent concept 
of a government and an oppo s i t ion ( ibid. : 2 2 8 ) . 
It was also c laimed that the Gove rn ing Counc il was par t icular ly suitable 
for a small Melanes ian countr y :  based on consensus , i nexpens ive , s imple , 
capable of un it ing the country and allowing for the best and most effect ive 
use of available leaders and educated people ( see Br it ish Solomon I slands 
Protectorate ( BSIP ) 1 968 ) . 
The Const itut ion was opposed by some Member s ,  and a mot ion by Mamalon i 
to set up a commi ttee to rev iew i t  was passed in 1 9 7 1 . Mamalon i had 
attacked the Cons t i tut ion as being r etrog ress ive , in that it was ne i ther 
respons ive to modern need s nor in tune with t r ad i t ional custom wh ich 
requi r ed open and leng thy d i scuss ions ( see BSIP 1 969 : 40-4 1 ) .  
Th e Committee found var ious defects with the Cons t itut ion : i t  had 
proved to be ne i ther s imple nor cheap (Member s  had to t r avel more 
frequently to Honiara and stay for longer pe r iods) ; i t  ne i ther prov ided a 
place for individual leade r sh ip nor d id it e ncourage the development of the 
char acte r i st ic s  o f  leader sh ip ; co-ord inat ion at pol it ical level was 
d i f f icul t ;  the sys tem was d i l ator y ,  r equir ing wide consultat ion , and 
pol icy i n i t iat ives were d i f f icult to take ; f inally , the system was 
d i f f icult to under stand , i n  par t icular : 
the fact that committee meet ing s  and meeting s  of the 
Govern ing Counc i l  s itt ing as an execut ive are held in 
pr ivate i s  not consonant with customary pr act ice and is 
reg arded with some suspic ion ( BSIP 1 9 72 : 1 0- 1 1 ) . 
Th e Comm ittee therefore r ecommended the separ at ion of the Execut ive from 
the Leg is lature and the appo intment of a Ch ie f Ministe r .  I t s  r ecommend­
at ions were implemented in the 1 974 Const itut ion and prov ided the bluepr int 
for the next constitut ional rev iew comm ittee ( the terms o f  r e ference of 
wh ich enj oined i t  to depart as l ittle as poss ible from that Const itut ion) . 
Al though the 1 9 72 Committee advocated a return to the Westm inster 
system , it recommended that the par t ic ipatory features o f  the 1 970  
Cons t i tut ion should be retained through the establ i shment of a stand i ng 
adv i sory committee , con s i st ing o f  all non-minister ial membe r s . One- th ird 
of its  member s  were to be res ident in Honiara at any g iven t ime to 
famil iar ise themselves with government bus iness to be d i scussed in the 
As sembly and to adv ise the Ch ief Minister or other Ministe r s  of the 
Committee ' s  v iews on any matte r on wh ich its v i ews were requ i red ( see 
ibid . : 1 5- 1 6 ) . The subsequent h istory o f  th i s  proposal , wh ich d id not 
feature i n  the next Cons t i tut ion , is obscur e .  
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THE ROL E OF POL IT I CAL PART I ES IN  THE WESTMI NSTER SYSTEM : ANOTHER EXCURSUS 
The d i scuss ion both i n  Ceylon and SI tur ned on the role of pol it ical 
part ies . On the one h and , it was assumed that the Westm inster system could 
not wor k  unless there we re two well-org an ised par t ies ( more than two would 
cause problems : see Ceylon 1 928 : 42 )  and , on the other , that the 
development of par t ies would endanger nat ional un i ty . The latter 
assumption was under l ined by Pete r  Koni lorea ( 1 97 2 )  in his support of the 
Gover n i ng Counc il : par ty pol i t ic s  would fur the r  fr agment an already 
d iv ided countr y ,  for par ty s uppor t  could only be based on d i fferences of 
r ace , l anguag e  and reg ion .  
Ye t by now there i s  suff ic ient ev idence that a par l i amentary system 
can wor k  wi thout any strong party as well as w i th a multitude of part ie s  -
although in ways wh ich d i ffer s ignif icantly from a two-party s ituat ion ( see 
Dodd 1 976 ) . The par ty-less s i tuat ion i s  the more d i f f icult if all 
convent ions o f  the We stm inster system are adopted , as they have tended to 
be in the Pacif ic . In these c i rcumstances - whether they l ike it or not -
po l i t ic i ans must organise themselves into par t ie s , both to g a in and to 
retain power . 
I t  is a l so doubtful that part ies are necessar i ly d iv i s ive . I t  i s  
fash ionable t o  explain t h e  s t reng th o f  local or i s l and feel ing compared to 
nat ional i sm in terms of the absence of pol i t ical par t ies , but in Vanuatu 
the strong organisat ion of the Vanuatu Parti  was largely instr umental in 
overcoming separat ist tendenc ies . Apar t from F i j i ,  part ies in the Pac i f ic 
cannot expect to g a in power i f  they are  based on languag e  or ethnic i ty :  
they must e i ther form coalit ions o r  expand the i r  e lector al base throughout 
the country - both s tr ateg ies wh ich are l ikely to promote nat ional un ity . 
THE S EARCH FOR AN ALTERNAT I V E : VANUATU 
Because of i t s  j oint administ r at ion by Fr ance and Br itain , i t  is not 
surpr i s i ng that there was not a general acceptance of the We stminster 
system in the New Hebr ides . The Vanuatu Part i was anx ious to have 
execut ive a uthor i ty vested in one body , thus the Westm inster system , 
prov id ing the head of state only w i th formal powers , would have s u i ted it . 
The ' moder ates ' or ig inally advocated a pr es ident ial system of the 
' F i fth Republic ' type . A numbe r  of ' francophones ' were later pe rsuaded of 
the v ir tues of the We stminster system , but an i nfluent ial g roup led by the 
then Minister o f  F inance , Guy P r evot , held out for the pres ident ial system 
( although no formal proposals wer e  presented to the Const itut ional 
Comm ittee unt i l  it had ag reed on most prov 1 s 1ons of the pr esent 
Cons t itut ion , and we re then not ser iously pressed) . However ,  by th i s  t ime 
it had become d i f f icult to ident i fy what th is g roup really wanted s ince a 
fact ion of i t , led by J immy Stevens of the Nag r i amel and subsequently , on 
Santo ' s  secess ion , Vemara ,  had put out its  own pr oposals ( wh ich lawyers 
from the Phoenix Foundat ion had helped to draft)  advocating a pr ime 
minister i al system ( see Doorn 1 97 9 ) . In any case , the attent ion of the 
' moderates ' was focused on the quest ion of feder a l i sm or decent r a l isat ion . 
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B e fore d i scuss i ng the proposals that we re advanced in 1 9 79 , r e fe rence 
should be made to an e a r l ier  ( 1 97 7 )  proposal by J immy Stevens ( presumably 
also prepared by Phoe n ix ) . It included a US-style pr es ident - w i th a f ixed 
term to be elected by the people . Among the many inte rest ing - and 
occas ional ly b i zarre  aspects of that draft const i tu t ion ( wh ich 
proh ib ited , for instance , all forms of t ax at ion) was one wh ich r equired 
compulsory vot ing in the pres ident ial e lect ion on payment of a sum to be 
determined by the leg islatur e ,  the proceeds to be paid to the winn ing 
cand idate , for h is salary and the expenses of government dur ing h is four 
year s ' of o f f ice . 
Th e l ater ( 1 97 9 )  proposals by J immy S tevens are of interest pr imar i ly 
for the ir federal and con federal aspects , d iscussed by Peter La rmour 
e l sewhere in th is volume . The supreme execut ive power was to be vested in 
the Pr ime Ministe r , who was to be elected by a maj or ity o f  the As sembly and 
to hold off ice for as long a s  he commanded maj or ity support .  H i s  Cabinet 
would cons ist of four Ministers who had to be Member s  o f  the As sembly . 
There was no prov is ion for a head of s tate ; presumably the Pr ime Minister , 
who was also made commander of the m i l itary forces , would be so r egarded . 
Un l i ke these proposals , wh ich we re not formally presented to the 
Const itut ional Committee nor d i scussed by it ( indeed , J immy Stevens h imsel f 
seemed to have only a v ag ue not ion of what they contained ) , those pr esented 
by Guy Pr evot had been the subj ect of con s iderable debate . The i r  basic 
feature ( again , apart from the federal e lements )  was a Pr es ident elected by 
a college consist ing of Member s  of the National Assembly and Reg ional 
Counc i l s .  He was to hold o f f ice for f ive year s .  He was to appoint the 
Pr ime Minister from e ither with in or outs ide the As sembly . The Pr ime 
Minister also could choose h i s  Cabinet from the Assembly or outside i t . 
But once appo inted , ne i ther the Pr ime Mini ster nor h i s  Ministers  ( the 
' Government ' )  could be Member s  o f  the Nat ional As sembly or a Reg ional 
Counc i l . The Government could be d ism issed by a vote of no confidence by 
the Assembly . 
Th e ' moder ates '  suppor ted the proposal for th i s  Gaul l ist- type 
Pr esident on the g rounds of the stab i l ity it would prov ide . I t  was not 
easy to see if it was also r eg arded as helping the ' fr ancophone '  minor i ty .  
I f ,  a s  they had hoped , one o f  the i r  own n umber had been elected Pres ident , 
confl icts between the Government and the Leg islature would have become 
endemic , and the system would in all probab i l i ty h ave been unwor k able . The 
Vanuatu Parti  opposed the proposal mai nly on account of its fear 
( unde r standable but exagger ated) that with a ' francophone ' P r es ident there 
would be a cont inuat ion o f  the condominium under another name and by other 
means . There was l it t le d i scuss ion of the v ir tue of ' stab i l ity '  - a factor 
not to be l ightly d ism i ssed - to wh ich we w i l l  return in the conclud ing 
sect ion . 
MODI FICATI ONS OF THE WESTM I NSTER SYSTEM 
Although in the end , all four countr i es opted for the Westm i nster 
system , i t  was not w ithout mod i f icat ions to s u i t  local c i rcumstances and 
pred ict ions , in some respects s ig n i f icantly affect ing the operat ion of the 
system .  He re we can only d i scuss the mod i f icat ions related to the cor e  of 
the system , concern ing the relat ionsh ip between the leg islature and the 
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execut ive ( mod if icat ions impl ic i t  in b i lls of r ights , independent service 
commiss ions and the l ike must be excluded ) • 
Although in substant ive terms the matter may be cons idered minor , the 
quest ion of the head of state , part icularly as between the (Br it ish) 
Monarch or a local pres ident , g enerated conside r able controversy (see Lynch 
for thcoming )  • There was less controversy over the method of appo intment 
and tenure of the ' He ad '  ( or Her representat ive if the Br it ish Monarchy was 
opted for )  and , except in Vanuatu , almost no controversy as to its  role and 
funct ions . 
Th is somewhat paradox ical state of affairs came about because the 
gene r al pub l ic ,  unable to g r asp the complex structure of governmental 
systems , fas tened on to the formal or symbolic aspect o f  the state , and 
because the re appeared to be so much ag reement among the leaders on the 
quest ion of the role and funct ions of the head of state that it was 
reg arded as scarcely necessary to spell  them out . Un fortunately , th i s  
nar row focus tended t o  obscure and t o  pr e-empt other more substant ive 
issues . 
It has been suggested that the ve ry cho ice of the Westmins ter sys tem 
was d ictated by the wi sh to retain the Br it i sh Monarch as the Head of 
State . There appear s also to have been cons ider able misunders tand i ng , 
especially among the g eneral  public , of the impl icat ions o f  d iffe rent 
opt ions ( e . g . , i n  S I  a const i tut ional Pres ident of the I ndian type was 
cons idered by some to contain the seeds of d ic tator sh ip wh i le the Br it ish 
Monarch , r epresented by a Governor-General , was seen as a check on such 
tendenc ies)  • 
The net tle , however , was f i rmly g rasped by the CPC i n  PNG : i t  
recommended that there  should b e  n o  head o f  st ate a t  all . I t  argued that 
th i s  not ion h ad developed when k ing s had estab l ished the ir unchal lenged 
author ity in soc iety ,  fr equently through conquest , and that more recently 
some states adopted the pr es ident i al system as a k i nd of subst itute 
( although w i th the g rowth o f  democr at ic systems , executive power , although 
formally vested in the monarch/pres ident was no longer exerc ised at the i r  
own d i scret ion b u t  at t h e  d irect ion of t h e  e lected government) • There was 
no reason why the people of PNG should have to adopt th i s  for e ig n  ide a .  
The CPC also demol i shed t h e  concept o f  a head of s tate in funct ional 
terms . It argued that , contr ary to some popular concept ion , the ex istence 
of a formal head of s tate d id not prevent the emergence of d ictator ial 
pr ime ministers  and government ; that i t  could accentuate a consti tut ional 
cr i s is if the head of s tate and the pr ime m inister d id not get along wel l ;  
that a head o f  state could not prov ide a focus for nat ional un ity i f  h i s  
o f f ice d id not have i t s  roots i n  local culture and h istory ( as i n  PNG ) ; 
that pol it ical compromi ses and ultimately cour ts were better means than a 
head of s t ate to solve controversies and cr ises ; that a head of state was 
not necessary to ensure continuity of government , as the matter could be 
reg ulated by const itut ional r ules for the tr ans i t ion of government ; and 
that the formal funct ions of the head of st ate ( receiv ing ambassador s ,  
open ing sess ions o f  Parliament , g iv i ng assent to leg islat ion , etc . )  should 
be d isper sed among ministe r s  and the Speaker ,  thus emphas i s ing the 
collect ive nature o f  leader sh ip i n  PNG (see PNG CPC 1 974 : 7/1 -2 ) . 
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D i sc uss ions in other countr ies we re not pur sued with such 
thoroughness , and the arguments d id not even conv ince the Somar e  Gover nment 
in PNG . In its comments on the CPC r ecommendat ions , it propo sed b luntly 
that there should be a head o f  s tate and that he would be a pr es ident , only 
to shift soon afterwards to the Br it ish Monarchy , a move wh ich found favour 
with the Const itut ional Assembly . Le t us therefore examine why PNG as we ll 
as SI and F i j i chose the Br it ish Monarch as the Head of State ( an opt ion 
precluded in Vanuatu by i t s  condom inium h is tory) . 
In none of the countr ies was it necessary nor poss ible to 
inst itut ional i se a local d ignatory as Head of State ( the r eason why 
Malays i a  or Zanz ibar or perhaps even Western S amoa broke l inks with the 
Br it i sh Monarch) . I f  F i j i had not had its  I ndian populat ion , it m ight have 
proved poss ible to inst itut ional ise the F i j ian ch ieftaincy into the 
pres idency , although i t  would have been very d iff icult to agree wh ich o f  
t h e  chiefs should hold o f f ice . However ,  i t  w a s  pos it ive sent iment r ather 
than d i f f iculties of th i s  k i nd wh ich led F i j i in part icular , as we ll as 
other Pac i f ic states , to a retent ion of the Br it i sh Monarchy . Indeed , so 
natural d id it seem to the F i j ians that the Br it i sh Queen should be Head of 
State that the Constitution nowhere prov ides for he r to be the Head o f  F i j i 
- it s imply takes i t  for g r anted . By way o f  cont r ast , the PNG Cons t i tut ion 
rec ites that the people have requested the Queen to be Head of State , wh ich 
she h ad g r ac iously consented to be . 
In F i j i the monarchical vers ion of the Westm i nster system may have 
served a double purpose : i t  retained the l inks with the Br it i sh Crown 
des i r ed by the F i j ian people ( as ag ainst the I ndians , who wanted a 
republic}  and at the same t ime , allowed r ecog n i t ion of the t rad i t ional 
F i j ian h ier archy by appo int ing one of its senior member s  as 
Gover nor-Gene ral . I t  i s  perhaps no co incidence that the f irst  occupant o f  
that o f f  i c e  i s  t h e  g r andson of Cakobau who s igned t h e  Deed of Cess ion 
whereby sovere ignty over F i j i passed to the Br it i sh .  
To put i t  more gene r ally , the l ink w i th the Br it i sh Monarchy was 
r eta ined for conservat ive reasons ; it man i fests the des ire to m inim i se 
change , con s istent w i th the g ener al lack o f  enthus i asm for independence . 
In PNG one of the Somare Government ' s  mot ives in mov ing to the Monarchy was 
c learly the wish to r eassure the Papuans and the H ighlanders who approached 
Independence with cons iderable susp1c 1on . And in SI too , a number of 
Par l i amentar ians were anx ious about what I ndependence m ight br i ng ,  and were 
glad that through the adoption of the Monarchy , the Queen ' s  exper ience and 
wisdom would be available to the new Government ( although students o f  
Austral ia ' s  Const itut ion and po l i t ic s  know that the Monarch ' s  powers are 
vested i n  the Governor-Gene r al to be exerc i sed by h im without royal 
intervent ion - see S i r  John Ke rr  1 978 : 3 74 - 75 } . 
I t  is wor th noting that the younge r  people had fewe r anx iet ies , and 
wanted a republ ic both to mark unambiguously the attainment of 
Independence , and to promote nat ional i sm .  Un ive r s i ty s tudents marched in 
protest  aga inst Somare ' s  dec is ion to retain the Br it ish Monarch ; i n  
K i r ibat i ,  t h e  younger e l ements pe r suaded the o lder t o  go republican ; and 
in S I ,  Ba rt Ulufalu ' s  entry into the Leg i slature ( and h is leadersh ip of the 
Opposit ion} on the eve of the const itut ional negot iat ions changed the 
temper of d i scuss ions . If the 1 9 7 5  Cons t i tut ional Committee had not 
unan imously r ecommended the Monarchy and i f  th i s  r ecommendat ion had not 
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been endor sed b y  all t h e  local counc i l s , the Leg is lat ive As sembly m ight 
s t i l l  have opted for a r epublic . As i t  was , the Assembly ag reed on a 
compromise : S I  would be a monarchy on I ndependence , but on the f i rst 
ann iversary i t  would automat ically become a republ ic ,  the Governor-Ge ner al 
turn ing i nto a P r es ident at the s troke of m idnight , with substant ially the 
same powe r s .  However , at the London Confe rence i n  September 1 977 , under 
sl ight pressure from the Br it i sh ,  th is pos i t ion was ag a in abandoned in 
favour of monarchy , w i thout a t ime l imit ( see Gh ai forthcoming ) . 
The l in k  w i th the Br it i sh Crown was also seen as a way of obtaining 
favour able Br it i sh f inanc ial and technical ass i stance , and as a t icket for 
g aining entry i nto the Conunonwealth . ( Al though i t  is not a pr erequ i s i te , 
' royal ist ' colon ial officers have not been adverse to encour ag ing the 
bel ief . )  
F i nal ly ,  there  i s  the quest ion o f  honour s :  the Pr ime Ministers and 
the i r  suppo r te r s  soon find it useful to be able to win fr iends and to 
placate enem ies w i th kn ighthoods and the l i ke .  
Never th eless PNG and S I  have substantially mod i f ied the usual 
convent ions - as i f ,  hav ing adopted the Monarch , they wanted to cut off all 
he r l inks w i th the Governor-General - wh i le F i j i retained the t r ad i t ional 
patte r n .  The F i j i Cons t i tu t ion prov ides that t h e  Governor-Gene ral is t o  be 
appo inted by the Queen , and to hold off ice dur i ng her pleasur e ( s . 2 8 ) , 
wh i le in PNG ( s . 8 8 )  and S I  ( s . 2 7 ) , the Governor-Gener al is appo inted on the 
nom inat ion of Parliament with a f ixed term of o f f ice ( s ix years 
non- renewable - in PNG ( s . 9 1 ) and f ive ye ar s - renewable only once - in SI 
( s . 2 7 ( 3 ) ) .  His e a r l i e r  removal can be e f fected by Parl iament . Moreove r ,  
qua l i f icat ions for appo intment as Governor-Gene ral are spec if ied in PNG 
( s . 8 7 ) and S I  ( s . 2 7 ( 2 ) ) but not in Fij i .  Yet the F i j i Constitution 
obscures the real pos i t ion : the appo intment and removal of the Gove rnor-
Gene r al is i n  fact dec ided by the Pr ime Minister : by convent ion a 
f ive-year term is o ffered in the f i r st instance : and al though un l ike PNG 
and S I ,  there i s  no const i tut ional requ i r ement that he be a c it i zen , it is 
most improbable that a non-citi zen would be appo inted . F i j i also d i ffe r s  
from t h e  other two countr ies in t h e  way that t h e  Gove rnor-General ' s  powers 
are formulated . In g ener al , in al l three countr ies , he represents a 
const itut ional monarchy , and is therefore expected to act on the advice of 
the Government - the re appears to be no controver sy over th i s . Th is may be 
contr asted with the Pr esidency in Vanuatu ,  where Fr ance and the 
' francophones ' pressed strong ly for substantial d isc retionary powers in the 
Pres ident , on the theory that he was the g uard i an of the Constitution and 
protector of l iber t ies ( tas k s  that the Anglo-Saxons have learnt to leave to 
the cour ts)  so th at he would have powers to veto leg islat ion and could make 
appo intments in h is own d iscret ion to var ious o f f ices . The const itut ional 
prov i s ions r e flect a comprom i se between the French and Br it i sh approaches . 
The Pres ident cannot veto leg islat ion but he can refe r  any pr oposed law 
within two weeks of submiss ion for h is assent to the Supr eme Cour t for a 
rul ing on i t s  const itut ional ity ( Ar t . 1 6 ( 4 ) ) .  
Th is leads to d i fferences in the prov i s ions for assent to leg islat ion . 
In F i j i ,  the Governor-General shal l s ig n i fy that he assents or that he 
withholds assent ( s . 1 4 )  sugges t i ng a d isc ret ion that he may not have 
accord ing to Westminster convent ions (Ma r shal l and Mordig 1 959 : 1 96 )  and 
wh ich , otherwise , would probab ly have to be exe rc ised on the adv ice of 
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Cabine t .  Th is would g ive the Gove rnment a veto over leg islat ion - an 
unusual outcome ( although expressly prov ided for in a mod i f ied form in PNG , 
where the Governor-General may re fe r back bills  passed by Par l i ament 
( s . 1 1 0 ( 3 ) ) .  
A numbe r o f  r ules or convent ions shaping the relat ionship between the 
execut ive and the leg islature ( and the head of state) l ie at the core of 
the We stm inster system . Br iefly , these are : that the government is 
appo inted from the membe rs of the leg islatur e ;  that it is collect ively 
respons ible to the leg islatur e ;  and that it remains in off ice only for so 
long as it commands the support of a maj or ity in the leg islatur e .  The 
pr ime m inister i s  appo inted by the head of state and is the pe r son who is 
l i kely to command maj or ity support in the leg islatur e .  In a two-party 
system , such a pe r son would be the leader of the maj or i ty party.  When 
there is a mult ipl ic i ty of par t ies , the head of state may have a real 
d iscr e t ion as to the pe r son to be as ked to form a government , although he 
would not rema in pr ime minister without maj or i ty support , ach ieved e i ther 
through form ing a coalit ion or through the support of a pol i t ical group ( or 
groups) wh ich remain ( s ) outs ide government . Normally the government is 
deemed to have lost maj or ity s upport i f  i t  loses a vote of no conf idence 
( or ,  more controve r s i al ly ,  if Parliament defeats an impor t ant b i l l  of the 
government) • It was thought that the head of state could also d i sm i ss the 
government if conv inced from other ev idence that it had lost maj or ity 
suppor t ,  but i t  i s  now unl ikely that a head of state would so act . Another 
impor t ant aspect of the sys tem is the r ight o f  the pr ime m inister to ask 
for the d issolution o f  Par l i ament at any t ime ( although in except ional 
c i rcums tances the request may be refused by the head of state , i n  whom l ies 
the power of d issolut ion under the law ( see Marshall and Mor d ig 1 9 59 ) . 
Except in F i j i ,  the appo intment and d i smissal of the Pr ime Mi n ister is 
a matter for Parliament . F i j i follows the more convent ional pattern 
whereby the appo intment i s  with in the del ibe r ate j udgment of the 
Gover nor-Gene r al : he is to appoint as Pr ime Minister a Membe r of the House 
of Repr esentatives ( the lowe r and e lect ive House) who i s  l i ke ly to command 
the support of the maj or ity of that House ( s . 7 3 ( 2 ) ) .  Th is opt ion was 
rej ected e lsewhere in order to m inim i se the polit ical role of the head of 
state and to emphas i se the importance of Parliament , e spec ially where the 
absence of we ll-developed pol i t ical par t ies made nominat ion by h im 
d i ff icul t . 
Some consequences of the pol it ical role of the head of s tate should be 
noted . Even in F i j i ,  with its two-par ty sys tem , the exerc i se by the 
Governor-Gene r al of h i s  powe rs has tur ned out to be controve r s i al . For 
example , after the 1 9 77  e lect ion s ,  he fai led to call upon the leader of the 
winn ing Feder al Party to form a Government , and instead asked Ratu Mara of 
the Alliance Party to cont inue as a caretaker Gove rnment , although he had 
conceded de feat ( see Mur r ay 1 978 ) . 
I n  r eg ard to d i sm issa l , Fij i follows the t r ad i t ional system , but the 
powers  o f  the Head o f  S t ate are more carefully c ircumscr ibed ( s . 74 )  by 
requ i r ing an express vote i n  Parl iament ( unless the latter has been 
d issolved) • 
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Elsewhere d ismissal is pur ely a matte r for Parl iament , to be e ffected 
on a vote of no conf idence . By impl icat ion , the Government need not resign 
i f  defeated on a maj or pol icy i ssue . Th is i s  not an unreasonable rule , 
part icular ly in the c i rcumstances of a r ud imentary par ty system ( as in PNG 
and S I )  whe r e  the opposit ion by the maj or ity of the Leg islature to a 
part icul ar Government pol icy does not necessar i ly mean opposit ion to the 
Government as such . The r ule prese rves flex ibil ity as well as stab i l i ty 
( and is closer to the pos i t ion towards wh ich the B r i t ish system has been 
mov ing s i nce Harold Wilson) • 
PNG h as restr ict ions on how and when a vote of no conf idence may be 
passed , measures des igned to ensure some stab i l ity i n  government . No 
mot ion for s uch a resolut ion may be passed within s ix months of the 
appointment o f  a government ( s . 1 45 ( 2 ) ) and when a mot ion i s  introduced , it 
must nominate a pe r son who would become Pr ime Ministe r  if  i t  we re 
success ful . PNG a lso d iffe r s  from the other countr ies in al lowing a vote 
of no confidence to be moved ag ainst an individual Ministe r . Th is cuts 
across the pr inc iple of collect ive respons i b i l i ty establ i shed in its 
Const itut ion and can cause awkward problems for coalit ion Governments .  
The d issolut ion o f  Par l i ament i s  also handled d i ffe rently . In SI and 
PNG , d issolut ion be fore i t s  normal per iod of o f f ice can only be e f fected by 
the Par l i ament i tself on a resolut ion supported by an absolute maj or i ty .  
I n  Vanuatu ,  i t  can , i n  add i t ion , b e  e f fected b y  a dec is ion of the Counc il 
of Minister s ( not the Pr ime Minister )  and in F i j i ,  e ither on the request of 
the Pr ime Minister or by the Governor-Gene ral  h imsel f ,  i f  a vote of no 
conf idence has been passed and the Government has ne ither res igned with in 
three days nor r ecommended a d i ssolut ion . ( In Fij i ,  the Governor-Gene ral 
can also d issolve Par l i ament when the o f f ice of the Pr ime Minister is 
vacant , and he th inks no-one commands maj or i ty suppor t . )  
The consequence i s  that i n  PNG and S I  a vote of no conf idence does not 
enta il the d issolut ion of Par l i ament . Th is means that g iven the absence of 
e ffect ive par ty organ isat ion or d i sc ipl ine , Member s  are mor e l i ke ly to 
support such mot ions , s ince the i r  own seats are secur e .  Never the less , in 
e i ther country a vote of no confidence has only r arely been successfully 
car r ied , al though a numbe r of mot ions have been introduced (see Fry 
e lsewhere in t h i s  volume) • On the other h and , as the Government has no 
powe r s  of d issolut ion , i t  cannot use th is threat to bring backbencher s  into 
line . ( I t has been argued that th is cons ide r ably we akens the Pr ime 
Mini ster ' s  ab i l ity to control the Cabinet and Leg i slature ( see Chan 1 98 1 ) ) .  
So far the r ules reg ard ing d i ssolut ion , combined with the need in 
these two countr ies to operate coal i t ion Government , also mean that an 
excess ive amo unt o f  t ime i s  taken up i n  ' coa l it ion m anag eme nt ' ,  that 
coherent pol ic ies are hard to pur sue and that collect ive respons ib il i ty is 
hard to ach ieve . A fur ther problem , s ince Parl iament is unl i ke ly to vote 
for its ear ly d issolut ion , is that deadlocks can ar i se wh ich there may be 
no way to resolve short o f  new e lect ions . In s i tuat ions l ike th is , a case 
can be made for d i scret ionary powers in the Gover nor-Gene ral to remove the 
Pr ime Min i ster and appo int another , or  to d issolve Par l i ament ( as suggested 
by both Mamalon i and Konilor ea to me in pe r sonal communicat ions)  • But such 
powe r s  are bound inevitably to i nvolve the Governor-Gene r al in controversy .  
Fur thermore , even fr esh elect ions may d o  l i t tle t o  clear the a i r  i f  no 
220 Y . P .  GHAI 
c lear par ty pos i t ions ar e  taken , and to g ive the power s  o f  d issolution to 
the P r ime Minister would unf a i r ly strengthen h is hand . 
CONCLUS I ON 
De spite var ious problems with the Westminster system , the po l i t ical 
l ife o f  these countr ies has been conducted without breakdowns ,  ser ious 
deadlocks or challenges to the leg i t imacy of the const itut ional orde r . 
Although it  may somet imes preclude the pursu i t  of v igorous pol ic ies , this 
is not always a bad th ing . ' Coal it ion- bu i ld ing ' and ' management ' also have 
the i r  advantages and ass i st in maintain ing a measure of consensus . 
Coal it ion Governments are not necessar i ly unstable , as the exper i ence in 
the Pac i f ic and e lsewhere has shown ( see Dodd 1 976 ; Butler 1 97 8 ) . But it 
i s  poss ible that the d i f f icult ies that the Westm inster system creates for 
an aggreg at ion of powe r , for the r ise of nat ional leaders and for the 
pur suit of toug h  pol ic ies may i ncl ine some people towards systems wh ich 
have a ce r tain bui lt- i n  stab i l ity ,  as in some Afr ican pres idential systems , 
or the ' Wash ington ' and ' Gaull ist ' models (see Wilson 1 980 i n  r e lat ion to 
Sr i Lanka) . 
At the moment , P a r l i aments are genuine for ums for the art iculat ion of 
sect ional and r eg ional interests and for the resolution of d i fferent views . 
But as the economy becomes mor e  complex , c lass interests deve lop , for e ig n  
publ ic and pr ivate intervent ion increases , the ab i l ity of the par l i amentary 
systems to d ischarge these funct ions i s  l ike ly to be underm ined and future 
cr ises may seem to requ i r e  d i fferent so lut ions . Currently, the challenges 
to the We stm inster system ar i se from those who advocate customary or 
t r ad i t ional models , wh ich imply a further d i spe rsal and weakening of state 
powe r . Those fam i l iar with cent r a l i s ing tendenc ies in Afr ica and As ia will  
watch w i th interest to  see  i f  the r e  i s  a reversal of current att itudes in 
Me lane s i a .  
16. DECENTRAL ISAT ION I N  PAPUA N EW G U I N EA :  CONSTI TUTIONAL 
FORM AND PO LIT ICAL R EA L ITY 1  
R .J.  May 
Th is paper is nar row in i t s  geog r aph ic focus and modest in its  scope . 
And it is concer ned more with pol i t ic s  than with law .  But the quest ion i t  
addresses i s , I bel ieve , s ig n i f icant and of some re levance t o  other Pacific 
states fac ing demand s for local autonomy . That quest ion is twofo ld : what 
is the substance of ' decentral isat ion ' as embod ied in the Papua New G u inea 
( PNG) Cons t i tut ion and Organic Law on Prov inc i al Government ; does the 
polit ical real ity of decent ral isat ion cor respond to the concept elabor ated 
by the ' found ing fathers ' ?  
THE CONCEPT 
In 
Plann ing 
i sat ion . 
emergence 
the cour se of planning the Cons t itut ion , the Const i tut ional 
Committee ( CPC) made an early dec i s ion i n  favour of decentr al-
I n  its  lst Interim Report of September 1 9 73 i t  d i sce rned 
of some clear maj or ity v i ews " , accord ing to wh ich : 
a system of d i str ict government should be introduced 
with greater powers for d i str icts than those vested in 
ar ea author it ies ( ibid. ) .  
" the 
Two months prev iously the CPC had been pr e sented with a demand for 
immed iate d istr ict government 2 i n  Bougainville and a det ai led draft 
( prepared by the Boug a inv i l le Spec i al Po l i t ical Committee ( BSPC ) ) of the 
form wh ich it should take . Re fer r ing spec i f ically to the demand from 
Boug ainv i l le the CPC proposed a tr ipar t ite meet ing between the National 
Gove rnment , the CPC and the BSPC " to find a sol ut ion to the immed iate 
problem of mak i ng inter im arr angements for d i str ict government [ in 
Bougainv ille] , pend ing the Committee ' s  f inal r ecommendat ions" (PNG CPC ( 1 ) ,  
1 97 3 a : 9-1 0 ) . In i t s  2nd Interim Report of November 1 973 the CPC noted that 
th i s  proposal had been accepted by Cabine t : 
s ubj ect only to the cond i t ion that any ag r eement wh ich 
m ight be re ached must be with in a gene r al leg islat ive 
fr amewor k to be appl ied to the country as a whole 
( 1 9 7 3 b : 1 /7 ) ' 
and on the general quest ion of decentral isat ion it said : 
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We ar e conv inced i t  is essent i al that decentral isat ion 
of dec i s ion-mak ing be pol it ical and not mer e ly bureau­
crat ic i f  the bas ic obj ect ive of involv ing our people 
as much as pos s ible in the i r  own development i s  to be 
achieved ( ibid. : 4/3 ) . 
It saw d i str ict- leve l government as : 
an impor tant step towards accommodat ing strong 
pol it ical pre ssures for the g r ant ing of s ignif ic ant 
autonomy to par t ic ul ar areas of the country wh ich have 
been build ing up over the last f ive ye ars ( ibid. : 4/4 ) . 
The 2nd Interim Report d id not r e solve the que s t ion of what powers should 
be exer c i sed by Pr ov inc ial Governments though it d id recommend that there 
should be a s ingle nat ional pub l ic ser v ice and that " ce r t ain powers should 
be vested by l aw in Pr ovinc ial Government s " . The subj ect was then r e fe r r ed 
to expe r t  consultants ,  w. To rdo ff and R . L .  Watts . 
The pr ecise form of prov inc i al government wh ich was f inally 
r ecommended by the CPC i n  its  Report of 1 974 drew heav i ly on the 
recommendat ions of the consultants ' Report on CentraZ ProvinciaZ Government 
ReZations (Tordoff-Watts Repor t )  1 9 74 . The i r  te rms of r e ference requ i r ed 
them to outl ine opt ions and make recommendat ions : 
bear ing in m ind the [CPC ' s ] f irm commi tment to the 
deve lopment of a strong form of prov inc ial government 
( wh ich is a decentral i zed form of government with in a 
uni t ar y sys tem , s ubj ect to po l i t ical control at the 
d istr ic t [ i . e .  prov inc ial ] level)  ( 1 974 : i ) . 
And among a number of premises wh ich Tordoff and Watts l isted be fore 
proceed ing to the body of the ir repor t ,  the f i r st was th at : 
The form of decentr al i zat ion advocated by the C . P . C. 
is a fully decentr al i zed system with in a un i tary s t ate 
rather than a fede r al sys tem. Under the proposed 
system it is intended • . • that prov inc ial governments 
would enj oy conside r able autonomy , but that they would 
not have co-ordinate author ity with that of the centr al 
gover nment ( a  char ac te r i st ic of the federal pr inc iple) . 
Prov inc ial government would remain subj ect to f inal 
overall pol icy d irect ion and control from the centr al 
government . They would be subord inate governments and 
the supr emacy of the Nat ional Par l i ament would be 
unimpai red ( ibid. : 1 /3- 1 /4 ) . 
Tordo ff and Watts cons idered three alternat ive type s of decent r a l i sed 
po l i t ical sys tems : unitary,  federal and con feder al . Hav ing d i sm i ssed the 
last two of these ( " no-one has advocated a con federal  scheme " ;  " a  feder al 
system would be inappropr i ate " )  ( ibid. : 3/1 -3/2 ) , they d i st i ng u ished three 
broad types o f  un i tary system : completely centr al i sed un i tary systems ; 
unitary systems with administrative devolut ion and l imited pol i t ical 
devolut ion ; and uni t ary sys tems with moder ate or full polit ical 
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devolut ion . After consider ing the relat ive advantages and d isadvantages o f  
the se alternat ive types of unitary sys tem the consultants r ecommended : 
that a fully decentr al i zed system of u n i tary gove rnment 
should be constitut ionally assured as an ult imate goal , 
but that it evolve by stages , with each prov ince 
beg inn ing at that stage most con s istent with prov inc ial 
capac ity ( ibid. : 3/9 } . 
The recommendat ions of the CPC are se t out in chapter ten of i t s  Fina.l 
Report ( 1 97 4 } , wh ich also contains a schedule of proposed nat ional , 
prov inc ial and concurrent powe r s .  I t  noted : 
Exper ience in other r ecently independent states does 
not inc l ine us towards recommend ing a federal sys tem 
for Papua New Gu inea . The overwhelming maj or i ty of our 
people favour the maintenance of a un i tary state 
( 1 974 : 1 0 } .  
The Government ' s  ' Wh ite Paper ' ( Proposals on Constitutiona.l Princip les 
and Explanatory Notes PNG , 1 97 4 }  wh ich chal lenged the CPC r ecommendat ions 
on several po ints , expressed some reservat ions about the proposals on 
Prov inc ial Gove rnment , but " strong ly supported" the pr inciple . 
Fo llowing the conc lus ion , in Ma rch 1 97 5 ,  o f  the House of As sembly 
debate on the Pr ovinc i al Government proposals an interpar ty Follow-up 
Commi ttee was established to d r aw up an org anic law .  The commi ttee was 
ass isted by consultants Watts and W . R. Lederman , who pre sented a rough 
draft of the Or gan ic Law in July 1 9 7 5 .  The Watts-Lederman dr aft was 
intended , in the words of its author s :  
t o  put the relat ions o f  the National Government and the 
Pr ovinc ial Gove rnments on a flex ible but de f i n ite basis 
that prov ide s a strong centr al Nat ional Gove rnment 
along with s ignif icantly autonomous Prov i nc ial Govern­
ments ( ibid. } • 
The sequence of events concern ing Provinc ial Gove r nment between 1 975  
and 1 977 i s  wel l- known and h a s  been documented e l sewhere ( Conye rs 1 976 : 
Conye r s  and We stcott 1 979 : S t and ish 1 979 : General Cons t i tut ional 
Commiss ion 1 9 80 : Ballard 1 9 8 1 } :  the dec i s ion of the Cons t i t uent As sembly 
in July 1 9 75  to exc lude the Pr ov i nc ial Gover nment prov i s ions from the 
Const i tut ion : the prepar at ions , nonetheless , for the introduc tion of 
Provinc i al Gove rnment , includ ing the establishment of the Boug ainv i lle 
I nter im P r ov i nc i al Gove r nment i n  J u ly 1 9 74  a nd the cr eat ion of const ituent 
assemblies in othe r prov inces : the Boug a inv ille negot iat ions , culminat ing 
in the Boug a inville Ag reement of Aug ust 1 9 76 : and the eventual dec i s ion to 
r e i nstate the Provinc ial Gove rnment prov 1 s 1ons through amendment to the 
Constitut ion and the passage of the Or ganic Law . 
As I r ead i t , the Or ganic Law wh ich was passed in 1 9 77 d i f fe r ed from 
the Tordoff-Watts/CPC r ecommend at ions in some s ig n i f icant respects 
( r eflecting some of the d iffe rences wh ich eme rged between the Government 
and the Nat ional ist Pr essure Gr oup dur ing 1 9 74 to 1 9 75  - already part ially 
taken i nto account in the dr aft Organic Law prepared by Watts and Lederman 
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- and some of the par t ic ular c i r cumstances o f  the Boug ainv i lle negotiat ions 
and ag r eement ) ; but it retai ned the broad features of the fully­
decentr al ised-un i tary-system model put forward in 1 9 74 . 
It might be noted , however ,  that Go ldr i ng sees the 
d ifferently:  
The str ucture of prov inc ial government recommended by 
the CPC was qu i te d i fferent from that wh ich has emerged 
in the Const i tut ional prov i s ions of the Organic Law 
( 1 9 77 : 2 53 ) . 
The latter he descr ibes as " BuZsit bi Zong mekim beZ isi" : 
The mach inery e st ab l i shed by the Const itut ional 
ar r angements is such that if  the Nat ional Government 
has ce r tain po l ic ie s  wh ich i t  want s  to be carr ied out 
by prov inc ial governments , its ab i l ity to control 
prov inc ial administrat ion ( by control of manpower )  and 
of prov inc ial f inance can ensure that its  wi shes 
prevail ( ibid. : 2 83 ) . 
s i t uat ion 
The pol it ical c i rcumstances in wh ich Prov i nc ial Gove rnment was 
proposed , planned , rej ected , rev ived and the n halt ing ly implemented 
obv ious ly had much to do wi th people ' s  r e asons for r e j ect i ng ' fede ral ism ' 
and opt ing for what the Tordoff-Watts Report descr ibed as " a  fully 
decent r al i zed sys tem of un i t ary government " ,  but these c i rcums tances will  
not concern me  he re . No r will I attempt ( except by way of an indulgent 
footnote 3 ) the f r u i t less task of trying to locate PNG ' s  Organic Law on 
Provinc ial Gove rnment on a cont inuum from confede r at ion to cent r al i sed 
unitary state . The important th ing i s  that the CPC , and subsequently the 
National Pa r l i ament , spec i f ically r e j ected fede ral i sm for a uni tary system , 
and the Organic Law on Pr ovinc ial Government was intended to g ive 
express ion to th i s  dec is ion . 
Wh at , then , are the essent ial elements of the relat ionsh ip between the 
Na tional Gove rnment and the Pr ovinces as defined by the Const itut ion and 
the Organic Law? The essent ial elements are to be found in the prov isions 
conce rn ing : the status of the Provinc ial Gove rnment s ;  the d iv ision of 
powers between the Nat ional and Provinc ial Gove rnments ;  procedures for 
se ttl ing d i sputes between the two levels of Government ; i nte rgovernmental 
f inanc ial relat ion s ;  and administrative relat ions . The fol lowi ng 
par agraphs will attempt to sketch br i efly wh at I see as the more important 
prov i s ions in the se five areas . ( For a more thorough examinat ion of the 
const itut ional str ucture of Pr ovinc ial Gove rnment in PNG see Goldr i ng 
1 9 77 . )  
S tatus of prov i nc i a l  governments 
The subord inate status o f  the Pr ovinc ial Gove rnments in PNG ' s  
const i tut ional ar r angements seems to be clear ly r e f lected in seve r al 
prov i s ions of the Const i tut ion and Organic Law : e . g . , s . 1 870 of the 
Cons t i tut ion ( i nconsistency and j ust iciabil ity o f  pr ov inc ial laws ) ; s s . 1 9 ,  
2 8 ,  2 9  and 3 7  of the Organ ic Law ( wh ich respect ive ly secur e the power of 
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t h e  Nationa l  Pa r liament t o  make laws for the peace , order and good 
government of PNG ; r estr ict the ' conc ur rent ' leg islat ive powers o f  
Prov inc ial Gove rnments where  t h e r e  i s  ex ist ing nat ional leg islat ion or in 
matters o f  ' nat ional intere st ' ,  and enable the National Par l i ament to 
d isallow a prov inc ial law " i f in i t s  opin ion the d isallowance i s  i n  the 
publ ic inte rest " ) ; s . 1 87E o f  the Const i t ut ion and s s . 8 6-98  o f  the Organic 
Law ( s uspens ion of Pr ovinc ial Governments) ,  and , as Gold r i ng notes ,  in 
relat ion to the Public Se rv ice and f iscal matte r s .  It i s  these wh ich 
iden t i fy PNG ' s  sys tem of government as unitary.  
As aga inst th i s  const itut ional statement , however ,  i t  m ight be noted 
that the Bougainv ille Ch ar ter states that : 
the relat ionsh ip between Prov i nc i a l  and Centr al 
author i t ies , ar e [ s ic]  founded on pr i nc iples o f  comple­
mentar ity,  [ and that ] one is not infer ior in i t s  nature 
to the other 
wh ich , as Go ldr i ng comments , " asse r t s  even more than federal i sm "  
( 1 977 : 2 5 1 n )  - and that in a submiss ion t o  the th ird Pr em ier ' s  Counc i l  ( PC )  
con ference i n  1 980  i t  was stated ( by a Pr ovinc i al Gove rnment apparently 
without challenge)  that : 
the most important and fund amental pr inc iple that both 
Na tional and Prov inc ial Gove rnments should bear in mind 
[ i s that] both Gover nments are equal par tners in 
the Pr ocess o f  Govern ing the Country ( PC 3/3 /8 0 ) . 
Di v i s i on of powers 
As ear ly as November 1 9 73 , when Cabinet ag r eed in pr i nc iple to inter im 
d istr ict g overnment , a Task Force on Inter im D i str ict Gover nment was 
establ ished to make recommendat ions on the powe r s  and funct ions wh ich might 
be devolved upon or deleg ated to inte r im d i str ic t  governments .  The Task 
Force presented , in March 1 9 74 , a proposed Division of Functions Between 
CentraZ and District GovePrZments wh ich d ist ing u i shed funct ions wh ich should 
remain with the cent r al government (A f unct ions) , those wh ich should be 
concur rent (B funct ions ) , and those wh ich could be handed over to the 
Prov ince s  (C f unct ions ) . Th is l i st was incorpor ated in the CPC ' s  FinaZ 
Report as the " Second Schedul e " . The ph i losophy under lying the d iv is ion i s  
explained in the Report:  
The ' A '  l ist prov ides a minimum framework  for 
development wi th in a unitary state . The ' C '  l ist 
g u ar antees a minimal autonomy to prov inc i al govern­
ments . The ' B '  l ist is as accur ate an approx imat ion of 
the outstand ing powe r s  and funct ions o f  government in 
Papua New Gu inea as we have been able to secure 
It i s , in intent ion , a res idual l ist ( 1 97 4 : 1 0/ 1 0 ) . 
But wh i le the CPC r ecommended that f inal respon s i b i l ity for all of the 
power s  and funct ions on the "B" l ist be vested in the Nat ional Government , 
it expressed the v iew " Th at re sponsibil ity should be deleg ated to , or 
devolved upon , prov inc ial governments to the max imum pr act icable extent " .  
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Commen t i ng on the proposed d iv i s ion D i ana Conye r s  s a id : 
The l i st was use ful as a pre l imina r y  attempt to analyse 
the pr e sent funct ions of the Ce nt r al government but as 
a bas i s  for plann ing the tr ansfe r of funct ions to 
prov inc ial governments i t  had some de f ic ienc ies . In 
par t icular , it d id not cons ider the impl icat ions of 
tr ansfe r r i ng these function s , for ex ample ,  the changes 
in nat ional laws and depar tmental procedures wh ich 
wou ld be necessary , the f inanc ial impl icat ions and the 
effects on the relat ionsh ip betwe en publ ic servants 
wor k ing i n  the D i str icts and the i r  headquar te r s  in  Por t  
Moresby . Another problem was that i t  i s  re lat ively 
easy to d i st inguish between d i f fe rent funct ions on 
pape r but much more d iff icult to do so in  real i ty 
( 1 9 76 : 4 4 ) . 
Be tween the proposals of 1 9 74 and the ar r angements embod ied in Part VI 
of the Or gan ic Law the re is a subtle change of emphas i s :  D iv . 3  l ists those 
subj ects wh ich are " pr imar i ly ' prov i nc ial ' " ,  with in wh ich - subj ect to s . 1 9  
Prov inc ial Gove rnments have exclus ive leg i slat ive power ( t axat ion i s  
covered separ ately) ; Div . 4  l ists " concur r ent " s ubj ects , within wh ich 
prov inces may leg i slate , prov ided that such l aws are " not incons istent with 
any Ac t of the [Nat ional]  Parl iament " ( s . 2 8 )  ( though s . 2 9 l imits  the 
leg islat ive powe rs of the National Gover nment under th i s  d iv i s ion to 
matters of " nat ional interest " ) ; D iv . 5  prov ides that in " ' unoccupi ed ' 
leg i slat ive field s "  if the Nat ional Par l i ament has not made exhaust ive 
laws , on any subj ect , Prov inc ial Governments may make laws not i ncons istent 
with any nat ional leg islat ion . There is also spec i f ic prov is ion for the 
deleg at ion of power s  (Part VI I I ) . Howeve r ,  under s . 3 7 :  
The Nat ional Parliament may , by a two- th irds absolute 
maj or i ty vote , by resolut ion d i sallow any prov inc ial 
law ,  i f  in  its  op in ion the d isal lowance i s  in  the 
publ ic interest . 
The Organic Law prov isions concerning leg islat ive powe rs would thus 
seem to g ive the Provinces potent ial ly wide scope for i n i t iat ing pol icy , 
yet at the same t ime - subj ect to the inte r pre tat ion g iven to " nat ional 
interest " and " the publ ic interest"  - to g r ant the National Gover nment 
extens ive power to ove r r ule prov inc ial leg is lat ion . Moreover ,  although the 
passage of the Organic Law went some way towards r e solving fundamental 
quest ions about the d iv i s ion of powe r s  - and a January 1 9 77  dec i s ion of the 
Nat ional Execut ive Counc i l  (NEC )  wh ich prov ided a detai led l i st ing of 
administrative funct ions d iv ided into nat ional and prov inc i al " spheres of 
interest" (NEC 1 9/7 7 )  fur ther clar i f ied the s i t uat ion most of the 
uncer taint ies l isted by Conye r s , concer n i ng the quest ion of how to 
implement Provinc i al Government , r emained . Th is , together w i th a suspic ion 
that some publ ic ser vants wer e  fight ing a r e arg uard ac t ion ag a i n s t  
decentr al isat ion , resulted in  the Government ' s  dec i s ion to employ the 
consult i ng f i rm of McK i nsey and Co . to d r aw up a prog r amme for the 
implementat ion of administrative decent r a l i sat ion . A prog r amme based on 
the recommendat ions of the McKi nsey team was accepted by the NEC i n  
Septembe r 1 9 77 and a n  Of fice o f  Implementat ion was created t o  carry o u t  the 
prog r amme , wh ich involved a tr ansfer of funct ions , un i formly for al l 
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prov inces ,  i n  three stages between January 1 9 78  and January 1 9 79 . Those 
funct ions des ignated " prov inci al" with i n  the Depar tment s of Provinc ial 
Affai r s ,  Pr imary I ndustry,  Educat ion and Cormnerce were tr ansfer red to the 
Prov inces in January 1 9 78 ; those within He alth and Informat ion were 
t r ansfer red in July 1 9 78 , and in Januar y 1 9 79 the Bureau o f  Management 
Se rv ices ( BMS ) was placed under prov inc i al control . ( Cormnenc ing 1 977 , all 
Provinces had assumed responsibil ity for pr ov inc ial wor k s  and ma intenance 
and the Rur al Integ rated Plan as wel l  as for prov inc ial leg islatures and 
secretar iats . )  Funct ions of other Depar tments were expected to be 
transfe r red subsequently, but as far as I am aware no cohe rent prog r amme 
for further devolution has eme rged . 
I have arg ued el sewhere : 
The s i t uat ion wh ich now ex i sts is • • •  one in wh ich the 
real d istr ibut ion of pol icy making power s  i s  
e ssentially a pol it ical ( r ather than - as characte r i zes 
feder al sys tems - a const itut ional/ j ud ic ial)  proces s .  
Pr ov inces have not leg i slated in a l l  t h e  areas i n  wh ich 
they have author ity,  but they have used pol i t ical 
musc le to ach ieve pol icy obj ect ives even in areas in 
wh ich they do not have a clear competence (May 
1 98 1 : 1 8 ) . 
The development of an es sent ially political sys tem of decentral i sed 
government in wh ich governments have so far been r e l uctant to l i t ig ate 
and in wh ich the ab i l ity of the National Gove rnment to d i sc ipl ine the 
Provinces ,  short  of suspens ion , is in any case l imited - is presumably what 
the former Mini ster for Decent r al isat ion had in mind when in a Ministe r ial 
S t atement on Prov i nc ial Gove rnment , he spoke o f  "a concrete implementat ion 
of the concept of shar ing " (Momis 1 9 79 : 6 ) . The v ir tues of such 
ar r angement s , in a h i stor ical context , have bee n  argued in a Review of the 
Constitutional Laws on Provincial Government by Yash Gh ai and Mani I s ana : 
I t  was cons idered inappropr iate , when the Law on 
Pr ovinc i al Government was enacted , to set out much 
detai l ,  e i ther on the structure of Provinc ial 
Gove rnments , or  the relat ionsh ip between Provinc ial 
Government and the Na t ional Gove rnment . The Or ganic 
Law intended to lay down a broad framework  for 
Pr ov inc i al Government and the establi shment and fur the r 
evol ut ion of the sys tem was , in large measure , left for 
consultat ion between the Prov inc ial and the Nat ional 
Governments • • •  we cons ider that the Organic Law sets 
out an essent ially flex ible sys tem for the decentr al­
i sat ion of pol i t ical and adm in i st r at ive powe r s  • • •  The 
Organ ic Law is ther e fore concerned , in a very l arge 
measure , with the relat ionsh ip of d i fferent pol it ical 
author i t ie s  and many of the prov is ions o f  the Organ ic 
Law are concer ned , not with nar row leg a l  que s t ions , but 
with broad fundamental po l i t ical ques t ions ( 1 978b : 3-4 ) . 
El sewher e ,  however ,  Gh ai and Is ana descr ibe the Or ganic Law as " complex , 
leg al is t ic and d i f f icult to ope r ate " ( 1 978 a : 1 )  and comment that : 
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The Const i tut ional amendments to accommodate Prov i nc i al 
Gove rnment , the Organic Law on P r ovinc ial Government 
and the prov inc ial const i t ut ions , do not add up to a 
very coherent picture of the status of Prov i nc i al 
Gove rnments and the i r  place in the overall nat ional 
system ( ibid. : 4 ) . 
Settl ement  of d i spu tes 
The quest ion of con f l ict resolut ion was d i scussed in a gene r al way in 
the Tordo ff-Watts Repo r t  ( op. cit . : 8/ 1 -8/8 ) . Hav ing observed that , i n  any 
system in wh ich there are two or more levels of government , i nter­
governmental con f l icts are bound to ar i se ,  the consultants suggested f ive 
poss ible procedur e s  for conf l ict r e so lut ion : an arr angement whereby i n  any 
case of con f l ict the dec is ion of the National Gove rnment prevails ; 
r equ i r ements for consultat ion between governments ;  r equ i r ements for 
consent between governments ; j ud ic ial review ;  a spec ial commiss ion ; a 
Pr emier s '  Counc i l . Th e report r ecommended a combinat ion of the f i r st three 
and the last procedures and g ave qual i f ied support to a spec ial commiss ion . 
Interest i ngly,  however , it spe c i f ically r e j ected j ud ic i al r ev iew : 
In our v iew , the r ig id ity and leg a l i sm involved in such 
a procedure for settling centr al-prov i nc i al conf l icts 
is for most aspects of a un i tary system totally 
inappropr iate ( ibid. : 8/2 ) . 
Wi th spe c i f ic r e ference to the allocat ion of g r ants to Pr ov i nces Tordoff 
and Watts also recommended the appo intment o f  an adv isory expe r t  f inanc ial 
commi ss ion ( ibid. : 7/3 3-7/3 4 ) . The CPC Report of 1 974 broadly followed 
these recommendat ions includ ing one for an expe r t  Nat ional F i scal 
Commiss ion (NFC ) • 
Fo llowi ng the se recommendat ions , the Organic Law on Prov i nc ial 
Gove rnment inc ludes four pr inc ipal prov i s ions for set t l i ng d i sputes : 
s . 30 ( 2 )  r equires  the Minister for Decent r a l i sat ion , i f  r equested , to 
consult with a pr ov inc ial Execut ive on proposed leg islat ion in a concur rent 
f ie ld ;  s . 8 5  r equ i res  consultat ion between the Nat ional and Prov inc i al 
Gove rnments conce rn ing any maj or i nvestment ; s s . 7 5-78  e stab l i sh and l i st 
the funct ions o f  the NFC ; and ss . 82-84 estab l i sh and l ist the funct ions of 
the Premier ' s  Counc i l .  
The emphas i s  wh ich the Organ ic Law places o n  " consultat ion" reflects 
the intent ion of its framers " that prov inc i al government should embody a 
spi r it o f  fr iendly coope r at ion be tween the levels of government " (Goldr i ng 
1 9 77 : 2 56 ) an intent ion wh ich is made expl ic i t  in s . 1 870 ( 3 ) of the 
Const itut ion . Go ldr i ng expressed the opinion that " consultat ion would be 
reg arded as a real cons iderat ion by the cour t " , but added : 
Whether or not the consultat ion must be e f fect ive or 
mean i ng ful i s  deemed to be a pol it ical , r athe r  than a 
legal quest ion ( ibid. : 2 57 ) . 
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T h e  body s e t  u p  under the Or gan ic Law and t h e  NationaZ FisaaZ 
Corrunission Aat is r ather d ifferent from that r ecommended ear l ie r , both in 
its  compos i t ion and i t s  funct ions . Unde r s . 7 8 it has the func t ions : 
( a) to cons ider , and to report to the National 
Par l i ament and to the prov inc i al assembly con­
cerned on , any al leged d i scr iminat ion or unreason­
ableness in prov inc ial taxat ion and any proposals 
by the Nat ional Government to r emove or cor rect 
it ; and 
( b )  i n  accordance with Sect ion 79 [pr inc iples of 
allocat ion of uncond it ional g r ants] , to consider , 
and to make recommendat ions to the National 
Executive Counc i l  on , the al locat ion of un­
cond i t ional g r ants under Sect ion 6 4  to prov inc i al 
governments and as between prov i nc ial governments ;  
and 
( c) to cons ider , and to make recommendat ions to the 
National Gove rnment and prov inc ial governments on , 
othe r f i scal matters  relat ing to prov inc ial 
government refe r r ed to it by the Nat ional 
Government or a prov incial government . 
The NFC has been descr ibed as a ' buffe r ' between the 
and the Provinc ial Gove rnments . In introd uc ing 
Commiss ion B i ll 1 9 77  the Minister  for Finance s a id : 
National Government 
the Nat ional F i scal 
It will mean that a lot o f  pol it ics i s  taken out of 
• • •  d isputes [ between the cent r al government and the 
prov inces ]  and that solut ions will  be mor e read ily 
found . 
Sect ion 1 8 7H of the Cons t i tut ion prov ides for the estab l i shment of the 
Pr emier s '  Counc i l  (PC) and states that : 
A maj or funct ion of the Counc i l  • • • shal l be to avoid 
legal proceed ings between governments by prov id ing a 
for um for the non- j ud ic ial sett lements of inter­
governmental d isputes ( s . 1 8 7H (5 ) ) .  
Sect ion 1 87H (6 )  prov ides that an Organ ic Law may vest in the PC " med i atory 
or arbitral powe r s  or funct ions in relat ion to inter-governmental 
d i sputes " . Sect ions 8 2-84 of the Or gan ic Law prov ide for the sett ing up o f  
the PC . 
At its  f i r st meet ing , in Kav ieng in 1 9 78 , the Counc i l  r esolved : 
That a Wor k ing Committee be estab l i shed to prepare a 
report  proposing an Organic Law to g r ant Med iatory or 
Ar bi t r al Power s  to the Pr em i er s '  Counc i l ,  and enabl ing 
Leg i slat ion (Resolut ion No . 1 /7 8 ) . 
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Dr aft leg islat ion was subm itted to the PC conference i n  Wewak in 1 9 79 and 
the subj ect was r a i sed ag ain in Po rt Moresby in 1 980 . F inal ly , the 
"Provincial Gover>nments (Mediation and Arbitration "Procedures )  Act was 
passed e a r ly in 1 9 8 1 . I t  lays down procedur es for the non- j ud ic i al 
sett lement of d ispute s ,  but spec if ically " appl ies to a d ispute • • •  wh ich i s  
not e l ig ible for r e fe rence t o  the Nat ional F i scal Commiss ion" ( s . 3 ( d) ) .  
I n tergovernmenta l fi nanc i a l  rel ati ons 
Notw i thstand ing the CPC ' s  r e j ect ion of feder al i sm ,  the f inanc ial 
prov is ions of the Organic Law - wh ich broadly fo llow the recommendat ions of 
the Tordo ff-Watts Report - are for the most par t those of a federal sys tem . 
( Indeed the d i scuss ion of the pr inc iples of f i scal al locat ion in that 
Repor t m ight have been taken from ,  s ay ,  May 1 969 ! )  There is prov i s ion 
( r ather more gene rous than that recommended in 1 9 74 ) for exclus ive 
prov inc ial taxes ( s s . 56-60 ) ; there i s  prov is ion for cond i t ional and 
uncond it ional ( includ ing ' der ivation ' ) g r ants , and for the t r ansfer of 
proceeds of cer tain nat ional taxat ion ; and Prov inces are empowered to 
bor row and to g uar antee loans on short-term. 
There are , however , at least two s ig n i f icant restr ict ions on the 
formal f i scal powe rs of the Pr ovinces .  Sect ion 5 9 ( 4 ) enables the Nat ional 
Fi nance Mini ster , " afte r  consultat ion with the prov inc i al government " ,  to 
exempt from prov inc ial land taxes , other th an taxes on un improved land 
value , any mining or industr ial ac t iv i ty .  Sect ion 6 1  enables the National 
Parliament to " r emove or cor rect "  prov inc ial tax laws wh ich i t  con s iders to 
be d i scr im inatory or unreasonable . Be fore doi ng so i t  must refer the 
matter to the NFC ( see above) , but its recommendat ion i s  not b i nd ing and 
the dec i s ion of the Nat ional Parliament is non- j ustic i able . 
Also , Provinces are requ i r ed to subm i t  annually to the Minister 
re spons ible for prov inc ial affa i r s  a full statement of the f inanc i al 
pos i t ion and of the affai r s  of the Province ( s . 7 3 ) , and Prov i nces ( but not , 
at pr esent , prov inc ial bus iness enterpr i se s )  are s ubj ect to inspect ion and 
aud it by the Aud itor-Ge neral  ( and inc identally to review by the Jo int 
Conunittee o f  Public Accounts of the National Parliament ) . 
Be fore  leav ing the subj ect of f inanc ial re lat ions a br ief word on the 
subj ect of f i nanc ial autonomy .4 Be tween January and July 1 9 7 8  three 
Province s - No rth So lomons , East New Br itain and New I r eland - assumed full 
financ ial re spons ib il ity for the funct ions tr ans fe r red in 1 9 78 - 1 9 79 .  In 
May 1 9 78 (on the in it iat ive of the Depar tment o f  Fi nance)  the quest ion of 
cr i ter ia for g r ant ing such re sponsibil ity was d i scussed at the PC meet ing 
in Kav ieng . The mee t i ng passed a r e so lut ion ( Re solut ion No . 4/7 8 )  wh ich set 
seven cr iter ia to be met by Pr ov ince s before full f inanc i al re spons ib i l ity 
would be devolved (see May 1 9 8 1 : 3 1 ) . It was ant ic ipated that all 
Provinc ial Gove rnments should attain full Prov i nc i al Gove rnment status 
before e a r ly 1 98 1 . In fact , however ,  although Eastern Highlands j oined the 
' c lub ' in July 1 9 79 ,  there  has been no fur ther g r ant of full f inanc ial 
autonomy ( despite f ive appl icat ions)  unt il  th i s  year ( 1 98 2 )  ( when , i t  has 
been announced , another four Pr ovinces will g r ad uate ) . Pending the 
ach ievement o f  full f inanc ial autonomy , the f inanc ial al locat ions to these 
prov inc i al funct ions form par t of the nat ional budget in D iv . 2 4 8 .  The 
levels o f  expend iture are dete rmined after consultat ion between the 
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Prov inc ial and Nat ional Gove rnments and the former have some author ity to 
reallocate funds between the d iv i s ional subheads .  However budgetary and 
f inanc ial control over such funds is exerc i sed by the Depar tment of Finance 
for the Mi n i ster for Decentral i sat ion . Meanwh i le , the pr esent level of 
Div . 2 48 expend itures r e l at ive to the proj ected level of for umula g r ants has 
created a s i tuat ion in wh ich , unless the formula i s  chang ed , a number of 
prov inces stand to lose some subs tant i ally by sh ift ing to fully 
autonomous status . 
Admi n i s trat i ve rel a ti ons 
Sect ion 48  o f  the Or gan ic Law author i se s  a Province to employ a 
prov inc i al secretar i at of up to s ix per sons , over whom the National 
Government has no powe r  of d i r ect ion or control . Apart from th is 
secretar iat , all  prov inc ial administrat ive staff are member s  o f  the 
Nat ional Pub l ic S e rv ice : the costs of the i r  employment are borne by the 
National Government , but " except as prov id ed by any l aw r elat ing to the 
National Publ ic S e rv ice " ( s . 47 ) , they are subj ect to the d irect ion and 
control of the Provinc ial Government . 
The picture wh ich emerges from th i s  se lect ive and supe r f ic ial summary 
i s  one o f  a system wh ich indeed reta ins many o f  the essent i al features of a 
un itary state but wh ich never theless make s substant ial prov i s ion for 
devolut ion of powe r s  to pr ov inc i al government . Fur the r , the flex ib i l ity 
embod ied in the Organic Law , or  perhaps its lac k  of " coherence " (see Ghai 
and I s ana 1 9 78 a ,  1 97 8b) , and the emphas i s  placed on consultat ion r ather 
than l it igat ion as a means of resolv ing d i f fe rences between the two levels 
of government , has produced , as I h ave already suggested above , a very 
poZiticaZ  system of decentr a l isat ion . 
THE REAL I TY 
Obviously one cannot por t r ay the po l i t ical real i ty of prov inc ial 
government in contemporary PNG in the space of a few pages - even assuming 
that there is a s i ng le , obj ect ive ' r eal ity ' ( and that it can be under stood 
by non-Me lane s i ans) . Th e intent of th i s  sect ion i s  s imply to offer some 
comments on the way in wh ich prov inc i al government had developed , and i s  
developing , in a number of areas , par t icular ly those whose constitut ional 
prov i s ions have been d i sc ussed above . 
Be fore do ing so , however ,  I would l i k e  to suggest that there  are 
several h istor ical reasons why in PNG ' pol i t ic s ' ,  as opposed to 
' cons t i tut ional i sm ' , have been so impor tant in determining the form of 
Prov inc i al Government . For one , the whole d i sjointed and unce rtain h i story 
of decentral isat ion from 1 9 73 e ncour aged Pr ovinc i al Governments ( at least 
the more prog ress ive of them , who prov ided a model for other s )  to formulate 
the i r  ideas o f  wh at they wanted to do wi thout much regard to the constantly 
sh ift ing paramete r s  imposed (or not imposed) as the result o f  success ive 
reports and comm ittee dec is ions . Th is was par t icular ly so in those 
Provinces ( such as Nor th Solomons ,  East New Br itain , We st New Br itain , East 
Sepi k ,  Manus , New I r eland , S imbu and Central)  in wh ich expe r ienced public 
se rvants or art iculate students returned to the i r  prov inces to help plan 
the establ i shment of Pr ovinc i al Gove rnment , and in those few ( such as 
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Easte rn H ighlands)  where nat ional po l i t ic i ans played a s im i lar role . 
Secondly , f r us t r at ion caused by lac k  of f i rm d irect ion on decentral isat ion 
be fore 1 9 77 and frequent lac k  of co-operat ion from nat ional depa r tments 
pe r s uaded some prov inces to ac t uni laterally and negot i ate later ( e . g . , i n  
relat ion t o  the prov inc ial secretar i at ) . Th is t r ad it ion h a s  become par t  o f  
the sys tem; i ndeed I h ave the impress ion that there  i s  a g rowing ant ipathy 
be tween the Prov inces and the centre ( and par t icular ly between some 
nat ional pol it ic ians and some prov inc i al pol i tic ians) , wh ich could magnify 
th i s  tendency . Th irdly , although the r e  appears to be a g rowing r e v ision i st 
tendency to play down the role of No rth Solomons separat i sm in the process 
of inst itut ional i s ing decentr al isat ion , the dec i s ion in 1 9 73 that any 
ag reement with Bougainv il le must be w i th in a leg islat ive framework 
appl icable to the country as a whole ensured that the ult imate form of 
Provinc i al Gove rnment r e f lected strong ly the demands of that Province wh ich 
was the most ardent supporter of decentral isat ion and had the g r eatest 
capac ity for financ ial autonomy . F i nally ( and perhaps most important ) , 
with the establ i shment of prov inc ial assemblies , Prov i nces became 
po l i t ic i sed , and PNG pol it ic s  became prov inc i al i sed , to an extent that few 
people ant ic ipated even as late as 1 9 7 7 , and th i s  appears to have been 
assoc i ated with a s imilarly unexpected sh i f t  of pol i t ical we ight and 
admin i s t r at ive i n i t iat ive from the centre to the Prov inces (May 1 98 1 : 1 7 ) . 
Sta tu s  of prov i nc i a l  governments 
The f i r st gene r al observat ion to be made under th i s  head ing is that 
al though there  has been no formal challeng e to the concept of the un itary 
state , and the impl ic i t  dom inance of the Nat ional Government , the rhetor ic 
of prov inc ial pol it ic i ans and officials seems to r e f lect a widely accepted 
v iew that , as expressed in the submiss ion to the 1 980  Premier s '  Counc i l  
( quoted above ) , the Nat ional and Provinc ial Gove rnments " are equal par tne r s  
i n  pr ocess of governing the country" , that , i n  t h e  words of the 
Boug ainv ille Ch ar te r , "one is not infe r ior • • •  to the othe r " . Th is v iew i s  
put , e . g . , in arg u ing for amendment t o  o r  ignor ing of the Organic Law when 
i t  inh ibits prov inc i al act ion ( e . g . , i n  relat ion to over seas investment , or 
taxat ion) or i s  s imply seen as an aff ront to prov inc i al autonomy ( e .g . , i n  
relat ion t o  meas ures des igned t o  e n s u r e  f inanc ial accountab i l i ty) . At a 
mor e ab stract leve l I h ave heard prov inc i a l  offic i al s  arg ue that the 
National Government has no r ight to revenue from ( e . g . )  coffee , because 
co ffee i s  g rown " in the provinces" .  
A s econd gene r al observat ion i s  that the r e  have been tendenc ies to 
both centr al isat ion and decentral i sat ion in th i s  are a . Th us , e . g . : on the 
one hand , the dec larat ion of states of emergency in the Highlands 
Prov inces ,  the introduct ion of sectoral prog r amme fund ing , and pressure on 
Provinc i al Governments (with the impl ied thr eat of resort to s . 6 1  of the 
Organ ic Law on Provinc ial Gove rnment)  to reduce ce r tain prov inc i al tax 
rates , have a l l  been quoted as ev idence of a lac k  of real prov inc i al 
autonomy ; on the other hand , the real i s at ion that few r equ i rements o f  
Provinces ( e . g . , i n  relat ion t o  f inancial repor ting )  car ry any e ffect ive 
prov is ions for en forcement , and the d i scovery that the or ig inal prov i s ions 
for suspend ing Prov inc ial Gove rnments were so complex as to be ineffect ive , 
suggest ser ious weaknesses in the powe r s  of the Nat ional Gove rnment 
vis-a-vis the Province s .  On balance , however , I feel that evolut ion has 
favoured the Pr ovinces .  
DECENTRALI SATION 2 3 3  
Di v i s i on of powers 
The d iv is ion of leg islat ive powe rs set out in Part VI of the Organic 
Law ( plus the delegat ion to Pr ovinc ial Gove rnments of execut ive respons­
ibil ity in areas in wh ich they do not have leg i slat ive power )  g ives the 
Provinces a potentially wider f i e ld of ope r at ion than the states or 
prov inces e n j oy in most federal systems . At the same t ime , the fluid ity of 
the prov is ions by wh ich powe r s  are d iv ided has c r eated uncer tainty and 
confus ion over whe r e  powe rs r e s ide in r e l at ion to ce rtain admini strat ive 
dec i s ions taken at the prov inc ial leve l . To c i te two recent examples : in 
1 9 78 S imbu Provinc i al Gove rnment refused to r e imbur se the nat ional 
Depar tment of Works and Supply ( DWS) in the prov ince for ce r tain works  
under taken i n  S imbu , because , i t  alleged , DWS h ad not adequately consulted 
with the Prov inc i al Government : in another Province the Provinc ial 
Gove rnment decl ined to commit funds to a h igh school whose construct ion was 
said not to re flect prov inc ial pr ior i t ies . 
To date Provinces have not r ushed to exe rcise respon s ib i l i ty in all 
areas ava i l able to them , though most Provinces are cur rently exerc is ing a 
good deal of autonomy in pol icy-mak ing and administrat ion . More 
interest ing are the demands expressed by Prov inc i al Prem ie r s  and 
Secretar ies at Pr em ier s '  Counc i l  conferences , in submiss ions to the Gene r al 
Const i tut ional Commiss ion , and recently to the committee appo inted to 
rev iew the f inanc ial prov is ions of the Organic Law on Provinc ial 
Gove rnment . These demand s for add i t ional powe r s  to Prov i nces have covered 
such ' naturally '  nat ional respon s ib i l it ies as for e ign investment , overseas 
bor rowing , and aid , not to ment ion po l ice ( in 1 9 79 the East New Br itain 
P r emier  was sentenced to goal for maintain i ng wh at was in e ffect a 
prov inc ial pol ice force ) . On the pos i t ive s ide , s uch demands are , I 
bel ieve , ev idence of a growing sh i ft of pol icy i n i t iat ive ( and to a certain 
ex tent , expe r t i se )  from the centre to the Prov i nces :  as ag a inst th i s  there 
seems to be an emerg ing propens i ty for Provinc i al Governments ( and the i r  
bus iness arms) t o  ac t ,  o u t  of f r ustrat ion with central Gove rnment , i n  areas 
in wh ich they c learly do not have const itut ional or adm in istrat ive 
competence . 
Settl ement of d i sputes 
A d is t i nct ive feature o f  the PNG s ystem i s  the emphas i s  wh ich is  
placed , in the Const itut ion and the Organ ic Law ,  on the settlement of 
d i sputes through consultat ion . However ,  o f  the three mechan i sms prov ided 
to th i s  end , none has wor ked par t icular ly sat isfactor i ly .  Of the 
const itut ional prov 1s 1ons for consultat ion the Gene r al Const itut ional 
Commiss ion h as commented : 
Although the re has been some consult at ion be tween 
Na t ional Gove rnment and Provinc i al Gove rnments the 
ex tent to wh ich th i s  has been car r i ed out has been 
ex tremely poor . Our expe r ience has shown that there  
has been no mean ing ful consultat ion by Nat ional 
Gove rnment in a lot o f  areas in the concurrent f ie ld 
( 1 980 : 3 1 ) . 
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And ne i ther the NFC nor the PC has assumed the role appar ently intended for 
it . 
In the case of the NFC , to date no que st ion r e lat ing to ( a ) or ( c )  of 
its funct ions ( see above) has been r e fe r red to i t  by Nat ional or Prov inc ial 
Gove rnments ,  and in al locat ing the small amount of money made available to 
it by the Nat ional Gove rnment for uncond it ional g r ants it would appear that 
the NFC has been ' led ' by the Depar tment o f  F inance ( wh ich prov ides its 
secretar iat) . Th is is not nece ssar ily to be condemned . I f  issues of 
potent i al d i spute can be negot i ated on a government- to-gover nment bas is ,  
and i f  quest ions o f  g r ant allocat ion can be settled wi thout arous ing 
" prov inc ial and reg ional j ealous ies"  (Mann i ng 1 979 : 9 )  so much the bette r . 
However I s ee two maj or pr oblems in th e s i tuat ion wh ich h as deve loped : 
f ir s t ,  s . 79 d i rects the NFC to base i t s  dec i s ion on al locat ion on equal per 
capita payments , but al lowing also for " the locat ion and phys ical nature of 
a prov ince " ,  " the lac k  of deve lopment of a pr ov ince " ,  or  " any other 
relevant factor " .  In pr act ice , the NFC - following submiss ions from the 
Depar tment of F i nance - has al located par t  of the available amount to 
reduc ing inequal i t ies between Prov i nce s ,  part to supplement the cost of 
Prov i nc ial Gove rnment ( i . e . , the " costs of r unning the assembly and 
essent i al support ing services " )  , and par t  to supplement maintenance of 
capital assets . And funds th at m ight otherwi se have been al located to the 
NFC h ave been d iver ted to the NPEP . Th is would seem to be in contravent ion 
of the spi r it ,  and probably the letter , of the Organic Law. Secondly, i n  
sever al instances where  Prov inces m ight have been expected t o  refer matter s  
t o  the NFC ( e . g . , in case s where  the Na t ional Government h a s  opposed 
prov inc ial tax increases , and on the question of ' r e-cent r a l i s i ng '  sector al 
prog r amme funds )  , they have not done so . I n  submiss ions to the Comm i ttee 
to Rev iew the Fi nanc ial Prov i s ions of the Or gan ic Law on Prov inc ial 
Government seve r al Provinces expr essed the v i ew that the NFC i s  " in the 
pocket"  of the Depar tment of F i nance , and more th an one submiss ion called 
for its abol it ion . 
Th e PC , on the othe r hand , has served as a useful for um ,  and a rev iew 
of agendas and resolut ions of the PC confe r ences held to date shows that it 
has dealt with a number of s ignif icant issues and has passed important 
resolut ions . There are , however ,  maj or que st ions concern ing the extent of 
follow-up to PC resolut ions , and the capac i ty o f  the PC secr etar i at . Few 
resolut ions from the f i r st three con fe rences have yet been implemented . 
Th e M i n i ster for Decentr al isat ion has r ecorded that Prov i nces have : 
expr essed d isappo intment w i th the att itude of nat ional 
depar tments towards these conferences , as r e f lected in 
the poor attendance and non- implementat ion of 
resolut ions passed at the se confe rences (Momis 1 9 80 : 8 ) . 
However Prov inces also are qu i lty of non- implementat ion of resolut ions : 
e . g . , in an important resolut ion of the second conference in 1 979 , the 
Pr em ie r s  cal led on the Nat ional Gove rnment to set up a Provinc i al F inance 
In spector ate and under toook to amend prov inc ial f inance leg islat ion to g ive 
the proposed inspector ate access to all prov inc i al accounts and records 1 
to date , however , only a small numbe r of Provinces has made the necessary 
amendments . The lack of act ion on resolut ions is emerg ing as a maj or 
source of fr ustrat ion and eventually antagon i sm in the re lat ions between 
the National Gove rnment and the Provinces , and , taken with the generally 
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poor serv ice ava i l able from the small Secretar i at , thr eatens to undermine 
the e ffect i veness o f  the inst itut ion . ( In th i s  context an interest ing 
recent development is the emergence of four informal r eg ional P r emiers 
conference s . )  
I ntergovernmenta l  fi nanc i a l  rel a ti ons 
The f inanci al ar r angements o f  Pr ov i nc ial Gove rnment are complex , and 
are at pr esent under rev iew by an inte rdepartmental/nat ional-prov inc i al 
committee . ( For a more detai led d i scuss ion of the s ubj ect see the reports 
of the two consultants to th i s  committee - May ( 1 98 1 ) and Chell iah ( 1 98 1 ) -
and Mann ing ( 1 979 ) . )  I w i l l  restr ict myse l f  here to thr ee broad comments . 
First , Prov inc ial Governments are , and wi l l  cont inue to be ( the recent 
introduct ion of prov inc i al retail  taxes notwithstand ing ) , heav i ly dependent 
for the i r  revenue on g r ants from the Nat ional Government . Chell i ah 
( 1 98 1 : 9 ) c alculates Pr ovinces ' own tax and non- tax r evenues in 1 980  as 
constitut i ng one pe r cent o f  the i r  total r evenue s .  Th is s ituat ion seems 
inevitable g iven the s t r ucture of the taxat ion system ( e . g . , the cr it ical 
role of impo r t  dut ies and taxes on a small numbe r of for e ign companies , and 
the fact that the bul k of income taxat ion is collected in two Prov inces -
National Capital and Morobe ) and the very con s iderable inequalit ies in 
taxable capac ity be tween Provinces .  No r i s  it par t icular ly r emark able ; i t  
is a s i t uat ion wh ich , for a number of good r easons , character ises most 
federal systems . Never theless , the he avy dependence on revenue transfers 
does under l ine the importance of the methods employed , part icular ly the 
d istr ibut ion as between the r icher Pr ov inces and the poore r .  
Secondly , i n  seve ral respects the financ i al prov is ions o f  the Organic 
Law e ithe r  have not wor ked as intended or h ave been misinterpreted . The 
maj or element of the revenue tr ansfer to Prov inces compr ises a minimum 
uncond it ional g r ant , pr ov ided for by s . 6 4 of the Organic Law according to a 
formula set  out in Sch . 1 .  Es sent ially , the formula g ives to e ach Province 
a base amount equal to the level of expend iture on tr ansferred funct ions in 
1 9 76/7 7 ,  adj usted annual ly for var iat ions in the cost of l iv ing or in the 
level of nat ional revenue , wh ichever yields the smaller amount .  An 
apparently un foreseen aspect of th i s  formula is that it embod ies a downward 
ratchet e f fect in the payments to Prov i nces . In pr act ice , however ,  th i s  
h a s  n o t  b e e n  s ignif icant , because t h e  Depar tment of Fi nance has chosen 
( consc iously or unconsciously) to ignore the " wh ichever is less" prov i s ion . 
Another aspect of the g r ant formula,  as we have already noted is that for 
those non- ful ly- f inanc i ally-autonomous Pr ov i nces funded through Div . 248 
payments , a number are now rece iv ing larger al locat ions than would be 
ind icated by appl icat ion o f  the formula - such that several Provinces stand 
to lose by ach iev ing autonomy . ( I  unde r stand that the Prov i nces recently 
g ranted autonomy have been g uar anteed that they w i l l  not lose by doing so ; 
this is a sens ible pol icy dec is ion - wh ich apparently dates bac k to 1 9 78  
(Mann ing 1 9 79 : 1 0 ) - though the const itut ional bas i s  for it is not c lear . )  
We have already commented on the d i screpancy between wh at the Organic Law 
says about the al location of g r ants through the NFC and what actually 
happens . Re fe r r ing to the formal prov i s ions for NFC g r ants Mann ing wrote 
in 1 9 79 :  
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Th is pr i nc iple [ equal pe r capita g r ants]  will g r adually 
reduce the inequal it ies between prov ince s  • • • •  Other 
government pol ic ie s , par t icularly the N . P . E . P .  are 
also wor k ing to r emove i nequal it ies (ibid . : 1 0 ) . 
In fact , however , the re i s  to date no evidence for such a conclusion : 
neither the scale nor the d istr ibut ion of payments through the NFC has done 
anyth ing to reduce inequal i t ies , and the r e  has been no s ig n i f icant 
cor relat ion between pe r capita NPEP expend iture by Prov i nces and prov inc i al 
development ind icator s .  I ndeed Be rry and Jackson ( 1 98 1 ) concl ude the i r  
survey o f  inter-prov inc ial inequal i t ies and decentralisat ion with the 
comment that : 
Al l in all • • •  the financ ial arr angements for 
prov inc i al government in Papua New Gu inea seem l i kely 
to entrench ex ist ing inter-prov inc i al inequal i t ies 
( ibid. : 1 4 ;  see also H i nch l i ffe 1 98 0 ) . 
A t h i rd comment on the subj ect of f inancial r elat ions is that 
f inanc ial management and control by some Prov inces has left a lot to be 
des ired . In several instances where  a Pr ov i nc i al Gover nment h as appeared 
to be in f i nanc i al d i f f iculties the Nat ional Government has sought to 
consult w i th the Pr ovince but has been r e fused access to prov inc ial 
accounts ; i n  one case nat ional officer s  wer e  i nv i ted in to the Prov ince 
only to have the invitat ion withdr awn when they arr ived . Two Prov i nces 
have actually r un out of money through g ross m i smanagement and have been 
rescued by cond it ional loans from the National Government . Ye t although it 
seems to me that the Or ganic Law intended to pr ov ide for nat ional ove r s ight 
of prov inc ial f inances , in fact the Nat ional Government has been often 
unable , and some t imes , i t  would seem , r el uc tant , to exercise such ove r s ight 
( see May 1 9 8 1 : 3 3-3 9 ) . With r eg ard to financ i al repor t i ng ,  for example ,  the 
Organic Law s imply s ays th at Provinc ial Gove rnments w i l l  submit statements 
" as soon as pract icable after the end of the f i scal year " ( s . 7 3 ) , and 
car r ies no penalty for non-compl iance . The form i n  wh ich Prov i nces are 
requi r ed to repor t  has been l a id down in P r ovinc ial Government F i nance 
C i rcular s .  However in h i s  " S t atement on the F i nanc i al Activit ies of 
Provinc i a l  Gove rnments" , presented to the National P a r l i ament in May 1 979 , 
the Mini ster for Decentr al i sat ion observed that four Prov i nces had fai led 
to submi t  the i r  r eports for 1 9 78 , and in h i s 1 980  report he stated that 
three Prov i nces had f a i led to subm i t  the i r  reports " desp i te repeated 
warning s " ; f ifteen had submitted the i r  reports afte r the deadl ine , and 
that the remaining Province had submitted a repor t  wh ich d id not comply 
with the requ i r ements (Momi s  1 980 : 1 ) ;  he also commented that reports 
" contained a var iety o f  er ror s and many were s imply not put into the 
cor rect format" ( ibid. : 1 0 ) . Problems in th i s  area are l i kely to be 
ex ace rbated as more Prov inces attain full f inanc ial respons ib i l i ty .  
Admi n i s tra t i ve re l a t i ons  
Administr at ive relat ions have bee n ,  predictably , another complex 
i ssue . However ,  it would appear that in the effort  to reconc i le the 
dec is ion for a s i ng le nat ional publ ic serv ice with the demand for 
prov inc ial autonomy at least thr ee mechan i sms have ope r ated in favour of 
the Prov i nces : an unexpectedly larg e number of sen ior pub l ic servants h ave 
DECENTRALI SATION 2 3 7  
chosen t o  pur sue career s  in the P r ovinces r a ther than in Port Moresby ; 
there has been a strong tendency for Prov i nces ( espec i al ly the more 
' developed ' P r ov inces )  to recruit  public se rvants from the i r  own Province , 
and several Prov inces have chosen to ignore the const i tut ional l imitat ions 
on the s i ze o f  the prov inc ial Secretar i at . 
CONCLUS I ON 
To suggest that const itut ional struc ture  does not prov ide an 
explanat ion of the wor k i ng s  of a pol it ical sys tem ( though it is an element 
of the system) is not to say anyth ing novel ( c f .  e . g . , May 1 966 , 1 969 ) . 
Ye t in the growing l iterature about Pr ov i nc ial Government in PNG few 
wr iters  get far beyond the inst itut ional aspects o f  the sys tem ( the notable 
except ion be i ng S t and i sh ( 1 979 , for thcom ing ) ) .  I would arg ue that in PNG 
more than i n  most countr ies it is imposs ible to understand Provinc i al 
Gove rnment wi thout under stand ing the developing pol i t ical processes with in 
wh ich it ope r ates . Fur ther I would suggest that recent pol i t ical 
developments have tended , on balance , to sh i ft the pol i t ical we ight of the 
sys tem in favour of the Provinces . 
Finally ,  bear ing in m ind that th i s  is a leg al wor k shop I would l i ke to 
draw attent ion to the comments above concern ing d ispute settlement . I f  in 
fact the mechan i sms prov ided for consu ltat ion cannot be employed 
effect ively to resolve d i fferences between the Nat ional and Provinc i al 
Governments as Prov i nc ial Gove rnment evolves , ther e  may be an increas ing 
tendency for Prov inc i al Governments to turn to l i t ig at ion . In th is 
contex t , the r ecent leg al chal lenge over f i shing l icenses in M ilne Bay may 
mar k the emergence of a new trend . 
NOTES 
1 Th is pape r make s extensive use o f  mater ial pr e sented in my Report to the 
Committee to Review the Financial Provisions of the Organic UJ:w on 
Provincial Government ( May 1 98 1 ) . 
2 ' Di str icts ' we re renamed ' Pr ov i nce s ' in 1 9 75 , though the term ' Provinc i al 
Government ' was in widespread use from around 1 973 . 
3 For a gene ral cr i t ique o f  
( 1 9 69 : 1 0- 1 1 ) . Also see 
federa l i sm " . 
attempts to 
Ri ke r  ( 1 969 , 
' def ine ' 
1 97 0 )  on 
feder a l i sm ,  see 
" the tr iv ial i ty 
May 
of 
4 The te rms ' f inanc ial autonomy ' , ' full f i nanc ial autonomy ' ,  ' full 
financ ial respons ib i l ity ' , ' ful l f inanc ial control ' have been used inter­
changeab ly . The Min ister for Decentral i sat ion has g iven the following 
def i n it ion : " Full  f inanc ial control means th at the prov inc ial government 
controls all funds available to the prov ince includ i ng pub l ic serv ice 
administr a t ive funds under Div i s ion 248 , any funds at the end of the 
f inanc i al year wh ich would in the past have returned to Consol idated 
Revenue would remain with the prov inc ial government . Budgeting would 
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have to come from the Prov inc ial Government and the moni tor ing of 
expend iture would be done on the f i nanc ial r epor t  under Sect ion 73 of the 
Or gan ic Law (Mom i s  Mini ster ial Statement on Prov inc ial Government , 
1 979 : 23 ) " .  
1 7. TH E PUBLIC SERVICE AN D TH E STATE IN AND OUT OF 
M E LAN ESIAN CONSTITUTIONS 
J.A. Ballard 
TWO KI NDS OF CONSTITUT I ON 
The Const itut ions o f  the Pacif ic are independence char ter s ,  dr awn up 
as par t o f  the t r ansfer of power to spec i fy the inst itut ional arr angements 
of the post-colon ial state and prov ide ostensible leg it imacy for its 
author ity.  The leg i t imacy o f  the const itut ions themselves is e stabl i shed 
by popular consultat ion , negot iat ion among the po l it ical el ite , 
r at i f icat ion by an elected assembly and tac i t  or expl ic i t  approval by the 
r e t i r ing metropol itan power . L i ke a flag ,  an anthem and membe rsh ip in the 
Un ited Nat ions (UN) , a wr itten const itut ion i s  one of the d ist ingu ish ing 
mar ks of the newly independent state . 
But constitut ions can be someth ing more than a r t i facts outlining and 
delimit ing the pol i t ical institut ions o f  the state . The Br it i sh 
Const itut ion is the standard deviant , a coher ent but flex ible body of r ules 
and convent ions wh ich descr ibe patterns of r epeated behav iour , assumpt ions 
and expectat ions whose prec ise content and extent vary with the 
commentator . The Br it i sh Cons t i tut ion has evolved , wh ile other 
const itut ions have been negot iated or imposed as par t of a revolut ionary,  
federal or post-colon ial settlement . There is a sense in wh ich the Br it i sh 
Cons t i tut ion is analogous to the r ules of the g ame in all states , 
under lying , supplement ing or even d i splac i ng wr itten const itut ions (Wheare 
1 95 1 : 1 - 1 8 ) . The wr itten const i tut ion presc irbes powers , funct ions and 
relat ionsh ips : the real const i tut ion descr ibes actual pr act ice . 
A s im i lar d ist inct ion can be d r awn between two k inds of po licy . There 
is o ffic ial pol icy , promulg ated from above w i th proper author isat ion , and 
there is pol icy that descr ibes " a  committed structure of impor t ant 
resources " ( Schaf fer 1 9 77 : 1 48 ) . The state i s  also subj ect to equ ivocat ion . 
I t  i s  often t r eated as equ ivalent to the formal inst i tut ions of government , 
despite the d if f icult ies of dr awi ng neat boundar ies around State 
activ it ies , but i t  is also the structure of commitments suppor ted by public 
author ity. 
G iven the par t icular requ i r ements of the tr ans fe r of power to 
post-colon i al state s ,  as well as the trad i t ions of const i tut ional des ign 
s i nce the l ate e ighteenth century,  i t  i s  l i kely that certain elements of 
the real constitution will  be enshr ined in i ndependence char ter s  and that 
others  w i l l  be left to organic laws or om itted from spe c i f icat ion 
altogether .  For example ,  the career pub l ic and mil itary serv ices , 
invent ions of the n i neteenth century but now the central core of the state , 
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are se ldom ment ioned in wr itten constitut ions except in terms of the i r  
i solat ion from pol it ical inter ference . De ta i l s  of structure and funct ion 
are left to ord inances ,  r eg ulat ions and convent ions wh ich are amended even 
less often than const itut ions themselves ,  and almost never in the i r  
fundamentals . 
It is not surpr i s i ng that the publ ic service is large ly ignored in 
post-colonial constitut ions . The colonial state in its  pure form was a 
public serv ice ed i f ice and Br it i sh colon ial const i tut ions were concerned 
exclus i ve ly with the g r adual l im itat ion of publ ic service d i scret ion by 
increas i ng ly elect ive leg islat ive and execut ive counc il s , thus confe r r ing 
wh i le containing power ( F i tzpatr ic k  1 980 : 1 23 ) . On ly as self-government 
became imminent and local isat ion o f  the pub l ic serv ice was planned d id it 
become necessary to prov ide an alternat ive to the Secr etary o f  State for 
Colon ies as arbiter of the i ndependence and local po l i t ical neutr a l i ty o f  
t h e  public service . Hence t h e  Public Serv ice Comm i ss ion and its 
consecrat ion i n  independence constitut ions , with attendant commentar ies on 
the d ifference between convent ions surround ing the Br it ish c ivil  serv ice 
and the lack of such convent ions among new ministe r s  in the colon ies (see 
Mulhall 1 96 2 ) . Other public serv ice matter s  could safely be left to 
convent ion and precedent : in fact these we re the only matte r s  on wh ich 
convent ion and precedent could be said to be estab l i shed in the colon ial 
state . M i ni s te r s  and leg islator s  m ight h ave d iff iculty in determining 
appropr i ate roles with i n  the i r  const i tut ional l imits , but localisation o f  
t h e  publ ic serv ice ensured soc ial isat ion t o  convent ions and precedents and 
thus continu i ty from the colon ial to the pos t-colon ial state . 
THE PUBL I C  SERV I C E  I N  THE WR I TTEN CONSTI TUTI ONS OF THE PAC I F I C  
Pac i f ic Cons t itut ions wh ich were dr awn up dur ing the tr ansfer o f  power 
from Br it ain , Austral ia and New Ze aland (NZ ) deal with the publ ic serv ice 
under three head ing s .  In chapters on the execut ive , there i s  some t imes 
ment ion of minister s '  powe r s  over adm in i s tr at ive depar tments . Ch apters  
wh ich deal  with the  public serv ice , the  state serv ices or administrat ion 
are concerned with public serv ice commiss ions or the i r  equivalents and with 
s imilar bod ies for legal and j ud ic i al serv ices , pol ice and armed forces . 
In add i t ion some const i tut ions prov ide for an ombudsman and/or leadersh ip 
code w i th spec i f ic controls over the publ ic serv ice . (The much o lder 
Cons t i tut ion of Tong a ,  whose royal prov i s ions bear l ittle r esemblance to 
those post-colon i al const itut ions , makes no re ference to a publ ic serv ice . )  
F i j i ' s  Cons t i tut ion prov ides that : 
Where any Mini ster has been charged with respons ib il i ty 
for the administrat ion of any depar tment of the 
Gove rnment , he shall exercise g eneral d i rect ion and 
control over that department and , subj ect to such 
direct ion and control , any depar tment in the charge of 
a Minister • • • shall be under the supe r v i s ion o f  a 
Pe rmanent Secr etary or of some othe r supe r v i s i ng 
off icer whose off ice shall be a public off ice ( s . 82 ) . 
Th is s t andard Br it ish post-colon ial prescr ipt ion is repeated in the Solomon 
I slands ( S I )  Const i tut ion ( s . 40 )  and its e ssence ( omitting " gene r al "  from 
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" di r ect ion and control" ) appear s in t h e  Cons t itut ions o f  K i r ibati ( s . 4 7 )  
and Tuval u ( s . 4 1 ) .  The Const i tut ional Planni ng Committee ( CPC) i n  Papua 
New Gu ine a  ( PNG )  r ecommended an ident ical prov i s ion , and the Government ' s  
counter-proposals merely spec i f ied that " heads of Depar tments are to 
supe rvise government depar tments subj ect to m iniste r i al control and 
d irection " . However ,  by a cur ious transformation of draft ing , the PNG 
Const itut ion prov ides only i n  s . 1 48 that : 
( 2 )  Except as prov ided by a Const itut ional Law or an 
Act of Parl iament , all  depar tments ,  sect ions , br anches 
and funct ions of government must be the po l i t ical 
respons ib i l ity o f  a Minister • • • ( 3 )  s ub- s . ( 2 )  does not 
confer on a Ministe r  any powers of d ir ect ion or 
control . 
Despite th i s ,  and despite the absence of any prov is ion at all for 
ministe r ial control in other constitution s ,  the Westminster convent ions o f  
minister ial control have appl ied generally throughout t h e  Commonwealth 
Pacif ic .  
Al l o f  the l arger Pac i f ic Commonwealth s tates have Public Serv ice 
Commiss ions ( PSC) , and the i r  Cons t i tut ions spec i fy methods of appo intment 
and qual i f icat ions for member sh ip as well as the PSCs ' power s  and 
funct ions . There is a clear d iv i s ion between those s tates wh ich follow the 
Br it i sh decolon i sat ion model , in wh ich the PSC is respons ible only for 
pe r sonnel matte r s  of appo intment , r emoval and d i sc ipl ine , and those wh ich 
follow the Austr alia-NZ model , in wh ich the PSC has also broader management 
respons ib i l i t ies wh ich are subj ect to minister ial control . The S I ,  
K i r ibati and Tuvalu follow the Br it i sh decolon i s at ion model ,  wh ile We stern 
S amoa (WS ) , F i j i ,  PNG and Vanuatu follow the Aust r al i a-NZ model , implanted 
in all but the last well be fore Independence . But whe reas the PNG 
Const itut ion ( s . 1 9 1 ) spec if ies the PSC ' s  management funct ion and its 
mini ster i al control , and the WS Const itut ion ( s . 8 7 )  i nd icates that the PSC 
" shal l  have reg ard to the g eneral pol icy of Cabinet relat ing to the Public 
Serv ice " , the F i j i and Vanuatu Const itut ions would suggest on the i r  face 
that the PSC h as only pe r sonnel r e spons i b i l i t i e s  and is wholly independent 
in the ir exerc ise . The add i t ional funct ions subject to m in ister i al control 
are laid out in leg islat ion . 
The smaller Pac i f ic states , w i th no resources for the establishment o f  
i ndependent PSCs , maintain t h e  coloni al model whereby publ ic service 
per sonnel and management controls are vested in the head of the serv ice , 
usually the Ch ie f Secre tary in the Br it i sh colon ial model . Thus in the 
Cook I slands the Secretary o f  the Pr emier ' s  Depar tment serves as pr inc ipal 
administrat ive off icer and head of the publ ic serv ice , with respons ib il i ty 
for appointments , d ismissals and d i sc ipl ine , s ub j ect to the "general policy 
of Cabine t "  ( ss . 7 3-7 4 ) . In Naur u the Ch ief Secr etary holds s im ilar powers , 
though there  i s  prov i s ion for Parliament to leg islate for a Public Se rv ice 
Board ( s s . 6 8-69 ) .  In N i ue ,  the NZ State S e rv ices Comm iss ion cont inues to 
serve as the PSC , though it may deleg ate its  powers to the Secretary to 
Government ( ss . 6 4 ,  6 7 ) . 
The Constitutions of the larger states , F i j i ,  PNG , S I  and Vanuatu , 
prov ide for the creat ion of an ombudsman , with j ur i sd ic t ion to inqu i r e  into 
complaints aga inst the publ ic serv ice , and the l atter three also prov ide 
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for a leade r sh ip code with further l im itat ions on the act i v i t ies of publ ic 
se rvants . 
On ly in two Const itut ions is there ev idence of some of the pol i t ical 
pr essures wh ich focussed on the pub l ic serv ice at the t ime of Independence . 
Th at of F ij i spec i f ies in s . 1 0 5 ( 9 ) : 
In selecting cand idates for entry i nto the publ ic 
serv ice the Public Serv ice Comm iss ion shall 
( a) g ive preference , o ther th ing s be ing equal , to 
local candidates who , i n  its  opin ion , are s u itably 
qual i f ied and shall not select per sons who are not 
c i t i zens o f  F i j i except to the extent that the 
Pr ime Minister has ag reed that such per sons may be 
select.ed ; and 
( b) ensure that , so far as poss ible , each commun ity i n  
F i j i r ece ives f a i r  treatment i n  the numbe r and 
d istr ibut ion of o f f ices to wh ich cand idates of 
that commun ity are appo inted on entry . 
The Const i tution of Vanuatu , on the other h and , contains in ss . 5 5 and 5 6  an 
unusual and d i spar ate l ist of pr inc iples , e .g . , that " Public servants owe 
the ir alleg iance to the Const itut ion and to the people of the New 
Hebr ides" ,  and st ipulates , e . g . , that only c it i zens shall be appo inted , 
that publ ic servants shall be g iven salary increments in accordance with 
the law ,  and that pe r sonal pol it ical advisers o f  m in i s ter s shall not have 
secur ity of tenur e .  These c lear ly r eflect some of the sources of d istrust 
dur i ng d i f f icult negotiat ions over a const itut ional ag reement , and they 
contrast with the bland and uncontested prescr ipt ions concerning the publ ic 
service found el sewhere in Pac i f ic Cons t i tut ions . 
THE PUB L I C  SERV I C E  I N  MELANES I AN RULES AND CONVENTI ONS  
Formal decolon isat ion through t h e  ' t ransfer of power ' was a moment i n  
which the coloni a l  s tate was ostens ibly open t o  reshaping , its  inst itutions 
and trad it ions vulnerab le to nat ional ist r e forms . In pr act ice , however , 
th i s  was t r ue on ly to the ex tent that there was a mob i l ised pol i t ical force 
capable o f  f r aming and implement ing alternat ive ar r angements .  Vanuatu ,  
with the best mob i l i sed nat ional ist par ty i n  the Pac i f ic , had ostens ibly 
substant ial oppor tun i t ies to reorg ani se and redirect the fragmented pub l ic 
serv ices that it inher i ted from the condominium ,  yet there have been 
d i f f icult ies in matching pol it ical capac i ty w ith public serv ice issue s . In 
PNG and SI the problems of the publ ic serv ice were seen largely i n  terms of 
the need for local isat ion and decentr a l i s at ion , and such po l i t ical 
resources as could be mob i l ised were committed to these issue s  r ather than 
to more r ad ical restructur ing of publ ic se rv ice s t r uctures that were taken 
for g r anted . Where there were pol icy vacuums - for instance in PNG ' s  
macro-economic and f inanc ial pol ic ies , because of the prev ious i n s i s te nce 
on maintaining Canbe r ra ' s  prerog at ives - ther e  was unusual scope for pol icy 
and inst itut ional innovat ion ( see Garnaut 1 98 1 ) .  The only obv ious v acuum 
in the publ ic services i tself was the absence of Me lanes i ans , and 
local isat ion w ithout restructur ing meant that the publ ic serv ices surv ived 
decolon i sat ion intact as the embod iment of the state . 
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L i ke the creat ion o f  PSCs to replace colon ial secretar ies , 
local isat ion prog r ammes and the establ ishment of m in is ter i al control were 
maj or agend a  items for colon ial administrat ion dur ing its f inal year s .  
However ,  local isat ion and even ' min i ster i al isat ion ' were seen a s  f in ite 
processes wh ich , once ach ieved , d id not need to be r e inforced by 
constitut ional sanct ion . Localisat ion was dependent on local educat ional 
development and was left to each ter r itory ' s  initiat ive . On the other 
hand , ' min ister ial isat ion ' , the establ ishment of minister ial controls 
through gene r a l i st permanent secretar ies over departments wh ich had been 
under the control of spec ial i st d irector s ,  was for the Br it i sh a fairly 
we ll standardised process ( see Wettenhall 1 976 ) . 
In the c ase of S I  i t  was pushed through by J . H .  Smi th ( F i nanc ial 
Secr etary, 1 970-73 ) and A . T .  Clar k  ( Ch ief Secr etary , then Deputy Governor , 
1 972-77 ) , both of whom had oper ated the ministe r ial system in Northern 
N iger i a .  There Clar k  had wr itten a Gu ide t o  Administr at ive Procedures for 
m inister ial and public servant behav iour in 1 957 , and these we re s t i l l  
standard i ssue when Clar k  p u t  them i nto effect in Honiara in 1 976 . They 
r emain in force by convent ion . The complementary and compulsory Monday 
' Morn ing P r aye r s ' wh ich Clar k  i n i t i ated as a weekly co-ordi nat ing meeting 
of permanent secretar ies remained intact , albe i t  as Wednesday ' Ve sper s ' , 
unt i l  they were suspended under the new Mamaloni Government in August 1 98 1 . 
In PNG the Austral ians had no compar able pr ecedents but the 
Conunonwe alth Cabinet ' s  procedures  were impor ted as g uidel ines for ministers 
by the PNG Cabinet Secretar i at ( see Lynch 1 98 1 ) ,  and Peter Ba iley of the 
Aust r al ian Depar tment of the Pr ime Minister and Cabine t v i s i ted to counsel 
the ministers and depar tment heads o f  the new Somare Government in 1 9 72 . 
S i nce ' minister ial isat ion ' on the Canbe r r a  mode l  d id not involve d i splac ing 
spec ial ist d i r ector s with gene r al i st pe rmanent secretar ies i t  was a more 
gradual process . 
The tr ansfer of power in the New Hebr ides was a much more tr aumatic 
affair , with Fr ench r e s i stance subver t ing all of the arr angements in the 
standard Br it ish package of o ff ic ial decolonisat ion . The French had no 
alter nat ive package of the i r  own , but the fact that the f i r st m inister ial 
government was establ i shed under Fr ench patronage meant that the Fr ench had 
an opportun i ty to introduce the ' Pa r is model '  of m inister ial cabinet , a 
pol it ical secretary in the f i r st instance , to co-ord inate the wor k  of 
var ious publ ic serv ice d iv i s ions . When Vanua- aku Party m iniste r s  j oined 
the Government of National Un ity ,  they appo inted sen ior par ty offic ials as 
the ir pol i t ical secretar ies , and they have maintained th is arr angement 
despite a momentary i ntent ion at the end of 1 9 8 1  to amend the Const i tut ion 
by prov id ing for appo intments at th i s  level to be made by the PSC . 
The pr esence of a strong ly mob i l ised par ty , the confrontat ion ist 
approach o f  the Fr ench , and the absence of a un if ied colon ial state made 
for except ional problems in the tr ansfer of powe r in the New Hebr ides . 
Elsewhere const i tut ion-mak ing could proceed on the safe assumpt ion that the 
publ ic serv ice , g r adually local ised , would prov ide cont inuity for the 
state , ensur ing only g radual change in the exist ing pattern of committed 
resources . In the New Hebr ides the fr actured nature of the colon ial state 
was mos t c lear ly r e flected in the maintenance of thr ee separate public 
service s ,  those of the Fr ench , the Br i t i sh and the condom inium ,  compounded 
for a cr i t ical pe r iod in 1 977-78  by Vanua- aku ' s creat ion of a People ' s  
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Prov i s ional Gove r nment controll ing most o f  the country outs ide V i l a .  The 
integ r a t ion of the publ ic services into the un i f ied machinery of a s i ng le 
post-colon i al s tate has been a d i f f icult process . In pr inc iple th i s  should 
have been e ased by the r ap id departure o f  most French and Br it ish staff 
shortly after Independence , but the i r  departure removed the l im i ted sources 
of expe r t ise capable of plann ing and execut i ng integ rat ion . There has thus 
been no e ffect ive capac i ty for taking advantag e  o f  the opportun i t ies for 
reshaping the public service . 
The convent ions wh ich define that r elat ionsh ips between ministers and 
publ ic servants , a c r uc ial l ink in the chain  of r epresentat ive government , 
rema ins outs ide wr itten constitut ions . So do the fundamental features o f  
the publ ic se r v ices themselves ,  all based o n  coloni al pr ecedents . Th i s  
does n o t  mean that these relat ionsh ips and features are beyond challenge , 
but sh i ft ing them requires wel l  mob i l ised and focussed po l i t ical will . I n  
PNG the ToRober t  Committee recommended in 1 9 79 r ad ical changes i n  the 
nature o f  the public service and in the mach inery for pol icy co-ordinat ion : 
publ ic servants would not spend the i r  caree r s  in publ ic employment but 
would also c i rculate with in the pr ivate sector , to wh ich several government 
act iv it ies wou ld be h ived off , and the PSC wou ld be integr ated with the 
act iv it ies of the main co-ordinat ing comm ittee , the Budget Pr ior i t ies 
Committee . Fur ther committees o f  review fr ittered away these init iat ives 
and they were not taken up aga in after the change o f  government i n  Febr uary 
1 9 80  (see Ballard 1 982 ) . In S I  the change o f  government in Aug ust 1 98 1  led 
to proposals by the new Pr ime Minister , So lomon Mamalon i ,  that permanent 
secretar ies be replaced by pol it ical appointees . His restructur ing of 
central government mach inery,  tog ether with the reposting of the most 
sen ior permanent secretar ies , broke up the co-ord inat ing o f f ic ial c l ique 
wh ich h ad determined much pol icy under the prev ious government .  
Decentr al isation i n  Me lane s i a  has r equ i r ed the g reatest adj ustment in 
publ ic service convent ions and in the patterns of r e source commitment . 
Th is is par t icular ly tr ue of PNG , whe r e  the nego t i at ion of a model of 
decentr al isat ion was mor e tr aumat ic than the negot i at ion of a 
const itut ional sett lement , with wh ich it was only par t i al ly inter twined . 
The add it ion of a chapter on Provincial Government in the Const itut ion and 
the ensh r ining of the terms of ag reement w i th the Nor th Solomons Prov ince 
in an organic law were a cond it ion of that ag reement , but the des ign of 
publ ic service arr angements for all prov i nces was left to management 
consultants and an admini strat ive task force . The result ing system of 
decentral ised government substant ially sh i f ted the bases o f  po l it ical power 
with in the state but d id not affect fundamentally the convent ions and 
patterns of behav iour of the centr al core of the pub l ic serv ice . 
In S I  the new Mamalon i Government has v igorously pushed through the 
f inal stages o f  the Provincial Government Act ( 1 98 1 ) ,  but the process of 
negot iat ing a model has been much less traumatic than in PNG , and the 
process �f implement ing it is l ikely to be more g r adual . Vanuatu ' s  
Decentralisation Act ( 1 98 0 )  was dr awn up dur ing the pol i t ical cr i s i s  of  
that year wi thout much opportun ity for detailed negot i at ion . Its  
implementat ion i s  be ing carefully controlled from the centre and its  impact 
on the publ ic service and the d i str ibut ion of powe r in the s tate has been 
neg l ig ible . 
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STATE , CONST I TUTI ON AND PUB L I C  SERV I C E  IN  MELANES IA  
The colon ial state in Me lane s i a  was a n  increas ing ly bureauc r at ic set 
of publ ic serv ice inst itut ions ope r at ing without bene f i t  of wr itten local 
const itut ions unt i l  a decade or so before independence . G iven the 
cont inu ing dom inance of the publ ic se rv ice in the post-colon ial state , 
independence const itut ions can be seen as con t r acts between r e latively 
small mob i l i sed pol i t ical e l ites . The leg i t imacy of these const itut ions 
r emains largely a matter of concern to these e l ites , wh ich in most 
instances a im to ensure the cont inuity and leg ality of const itut ions as a 
bas is for r eg ular i sed admin istrat ive act iv i ty .  In fact , the public serv ice 
is in mos t  c ircumstances the ch ief benef ic i ary and chief supporter of a 
const itut ion , though it could also expec t to be the most notable surv ivor 
of the ove r throw of a const itut ion .  Wr itten const i tut ions may come and go 
with coups d ' etat and r evolut ions , but the pub l ic se rvice l ike the V icar of 
Br ay ,  exemplar of an ear l ier Es tablishment , per s ists with the state itself . 
The leg it imacy of the colon ial state in Me lane s i a  rested on its 
capac i ty to prov ide serv ices for wh ich a demand had been g ener ated , and to 
incorporate local symbols of author i ty i nto the colon i al administr at ion , 
backed up by coe r c ion when necessary.  The leg i t imacy of the state was thus 
very much c aught up in the pub l ic ser v ice , and new inst itut ions of 
r epresentat ive government based on e lectoral leg i t imat ion d id not supplant 
the publ ic service in th is r egard . The leg it imacy o f  the post-colon ial 
state cont inues to rest on its ab i l ity to de l iver serv ices and to 
incorpor ate local symbols .  
In Vanuatu the Vanua- aku Party has successfully incorpor ated these 
symbols for the past decade and , through i t s  al l iance with the Co-oper at ive 
Fede rat ion , it de l iver s  the most s ig n i f icant of external services . 
Elsewhere the leg i t imacy of the post-colon i al state is l ikely to depend on 
publ ic services whose e f f ic iency decl ines wh i le demands increase . The 
terms of wr i tten constitutions are not l i kely to affect mate r ially the 
resultant c r i s is of leg i t imacy . 

1 8. M I N ISTE R IAL AND BUR EAUCRATIC POWER IN PAPUA N EW 
G U I N EA :  ASPECTS OF TH E DUTTON/BOURAGA D I SPUTE 
Y.P. Ghai and D. Hegarty 
I NTRODUCTION  
For t h e  past decade t h e  sys tem of mini ster i al government in Papua New 
Gu inea (PNG) has oper ated under a cons ider able deg ree of stress . The 
not ions of both collect ive and indiv idual r espon s ib i l ity , usually r eg arded 
as essent ial to the successful ope r at ion of a par l iamentary system , have 
appl ied more in the br each than in the observance . Re lat ions between 
Minister s and heads of departments have been frequently strained and rarely 
have the i r  r e spect ive powers , r oles and responsib i l i t ies been def ined . 
Convent ions on appropr iate re lat ions between M i n i sters and heads have not , 
as yet ,  been adequately establ ished . The result has been a deg ree of 
publ ic uncer tainty about the stab i l ity ,  cohes ion and d irect ion of 
gove rnment , and about the effect iveness o f  pol icy implementat ion . 
In many ways th i s  s i tuat ion has its  r oots in the late colon ial per iod . 
The colon ial bur eaucr at ic po l i t ical sys tem d id l it t le to prepare the g round 
for a system of mini ster ial government . Under-Secretar ies in the 1 964-68 
House of As sembly, M i n ister ial Membe r s  and As sistant Minister ial Membe rs in 
the 1 968-72  House we re g iven only minor powe rs and func t ions , and the 
Admin istrator ' s  Execut ive Counc i l  d id not assume the form of an embryo 
Cabinet unt i l  1 9 7 1  (see Wo lfe r s  1 9 7 1 ) . The House of As sembly , unt i l  1 9 72 , 
was tr eated very much as an appendage to the Admin istrat ion , wh ich 
encouraged , as one wr iter on Car ibbean decolon isat ion has descr ibed , a 
style of " cuc koo pol i t ic s "  in wh ich pol it ic i ans learn the r ituals of the 
leg islature but have no powe r over , and therefo r e  no respons ib i l ity for , 
substant ive matte r s  (see S i ngham 1 96 5 ) . As Ministers beg an to assume 
execut ive control in the short  pe r iod of t r ansit ion to Independence 
( 1 9 7 2 - 7 5 ) , antagon i sms deve loped between the new Ministers  and sen ior 
bureaucrats ( larg e ly expatr iate)  h ithe r to unaccustomed to po l i t ical 
d irection (see Voutas 1 98 1 ) .  These antagon i sms we re to some extent 
d iminished by the Somare Government ' s  pol icy o f  maki ng po l i t ical 
appointments to senior departmental pos it ions , but , i n  turn , th is po l icy 
created its own problems for minister ial government (see Ballard 1 9 76 ) . 
One e ffect was to create small bureaucrat ic c l iques , influent ial with 
par t icular sen ior Ministe r s . But i t  also created a hybr id str ucture at the 
top of the public service with some depar tmental heads be ing pol it ical 
appo intees wh i le other s  were career publ ic servants . Th is posed fur ther 
problems for the establ ishment of ' convent ional ' ministe r i al - depar tmental 
relat ions . 
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S i nce 1 972 the absence o f  maj or ity par ty gover nments and the need for 
coalit ions has also been a maj or factor i nh ib i t ing the e f fect ive develop­
ment of cab inet sol idar ity and collect ive respons ib i l ity . Fact ional 
d isputes between coal it ion par t ies , fr equent reshuffl ing o f  m i n i str ies and 
portfol ios , and the relat ive inexper ience o f  Ministers together with the 
h igh r ate o f  mob i l ity of sen ior bureaucrats has h i ndered the establ i shment 
of a fr amework of wor k i ng relat ions between Mini ster s and bureaucrats . 
The attainment of Independence i n  1 97 5  d id not improve the s ituat ion . 
Complaints by Mi nisters of bureaucrat ic ' obst r uc t ion i sm ' , and by bureau­
crats of m in i ster ial ' inte r fe rence ' have been fr equent . A n umber of 
depar tmental heads have res igned largely as a consequence of c lashes with 
the ir M i n i sters � and on a number of occas ions Ministers  have completely 
ignored the adv ice of the ir depar tmental heads . The Chan/Okuk ' National 
Alliance ' Coal it ion o f  1 980-82 h as been par t icular ly prone to confl ict of 
th i s  k ind . Tens ion between Ministers and heads has not assumed the 
pr oport ions o f  a total c leavage , nor has there been an over t  struggle for 
power between the two g roups , but i t  never theless has had a deb i l itat ing 
effect on pol icy-mak ing and the implementat ion of pol icy . 
Leg i slat ive-execut ive problems of th i s  k ind are by no means un ique to 
PNG . I t  does appear , however , that the I ndependence Const itut ion of 1 9 75 , 
r ather than fac i l itat ing the ope rat ion of a minister i al system , has to some 
extent compounded the problems desc r ibed above . De spite the clear 
intent ion of the Const itut ional Pl anni ng Committee ( CPC) to estab l i sh a 
sys tem of minister ial author ity over execut ive government ( PNG CPC 
1 9 74 : Ch . 7 ) , s . 1 48 of the Const i tut ion conta ins a clause wh ich ser iously 
d iminishes that concept . Sect ion 1 4 8 ( 2 ) prov ides that all depar tments ,  
sect ion s , br anches and funct ions o f  gover nment "mu st be the po l i t ical 
respons ib i l ity" of a Min ister , yet s . 1 48 ( 3 )  says th at th i s  " does not confer 
on a M i n ister any power of d i rect ion or control " !  
In late 1 9 8 1  and early 1 9 82 a d ispute between Pol ice M i n i ster , Mr 
Warren Dutton , and Po l ice Commiss ione r , Mr Ph i l ip Bourag a , brought to a 
head the issue of appropr iate re lat ions and relat ive powers of Ministers 
and bur eaucr ats . In November ,  Cabinet requested Mr Bour ag a ' s  r e s ignat ion 
for h i s  r e fusal to r espond to requests for i n formation from h i s  M i ni s ter . 
Mr Bour ag a re fused to r e s ign claiming that as a const itut ional off ice­
holde r ( Po l ice Commiss ioner ) he wa s protected from ministe r i al d i rect ion . 
The Coal it ion Cabinet was c learly d iv ided on the issue , and , r ather than 
d ismiss Mr Bour ag a as it had the power to do under Sch . 1 . 1 0 (4 )  referred the 
matter to a board of inqu i r y  established under the Pub lic Service (Interim 
Arrangements ) Act ( 1 9 73 ) . The Boar d ,  upon chal lenge to its  j ur i sd ict ion , 
refer red three quest ions to the Supreme Cour t as it is r equi r ed to so under 
s . 1 8  of the Cons t i tu t ion when any quest ion r elat ing to the interpr etat ion 
or appl icat ion of the Const i tut ion ar i ses . Be fore the S upr eme Court 
del iberated , Mr Bour ag a res igned as Commiss ioner of Pol ice to contest the 
1 9 82 n at ional elect ions . 
DUTTON/BOURAGA CASE 
The Board of Inqu i r y  was hear ing charg es aga inst Ph ilip Bourag a  of 
certain offences under the Pub lic Service Act .  Mr Bour ag a  was the 
Commiss ioner of Po l ice appo inted under s . 1 93 of the Const itut ion � he was 
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also the Secr etary o f  the Depar tment o f  the Pol ice . The charges against 
h im arose out o f  h is r e fusal to answer var ious que r ie s/order s  of the 
Mini ster of Po lice , Warren Dutton , v i z : 
( 1 ) on 2 9  January 1 98 1  the Minister asked h im to adv ise h im on the overall 
pr ior i t ies for f und ing for the next year ; 
( 2 )  on 4 F ebr uary 1 98 1  the Minister asked h im to br ief  h im on the 
H ighlands law and order s i tuat ion ; 
( 3 ) on 1 8  Aug ust 1 98 1  the 
cer tain d i sc ipl inary 
and ,  
Mini ster 
charges 
asked for detai led informat ion on 
aga inst a member of the pol ice force ; 
( 4 )  the Mi ni ster asked h im to br ief h im on the k i ll ing o f  a member o f  the 
pol ice force and on al leg at ions of a demonstrat ion and str i ke by 
member s  of the pol ice force . 
At the hear ing quest ions arose as to the competence of the Public Serv ice 
Commiss ion ( PSC) to inst i tute these charges and that o f  the Minister to 
issue these order s .  
Th ree quest ions were refer red to the Supr eme Court ( SCR No . 1  of 1 9 82 ; 
r efe r ence unde r s . 1 8 , 23 Ma rch 1 9 82 ( roneod j udgement) ) :  
( 1 )  D id the PSC have the power to charge the Cornm i ss ioner/Secretary for 
refus i ng to answer these quest ions? 
( 2 ) D id the Minister of Pol ice have the power of d i rect ion or control over 
the Commiss ione r/Secretary to issue the orders? 
( 3 ) D i d  the Mini ster have powe r under s . 1 96 of the Cons t i tu t ion to issue 
the orders? 
The r e fe r ence was determined by the Cour t  con s i st ing of three j udges , 
K idu CJ , Kapi J and Pr att J ,  all of whom answered the thr ee quest ions in 
the neg at ive . In g iv ing the i r  dec i s ions , the j udges d i scussed var ious 
sect ions of the Const itut ion , those deal ing with the powe rs and funct ions 
of the PSC ( ss . 1 92 ,  1 93 ,  1 94 ) , the Comm i ss ioner of Pol ice ( ss . 1 96 ,  1 98 ) , 
and the powe rs and r espons ib i l it ies of the National Execut ive Counc i l  (NEC)  
and ind iv idual Ministers ( ss . 1 4 1 , 1 48 ,  1 49 ) . 
To answer the f i r st ques t ion ,  the Court f i r s t  cons idered whether 
Bouraga should be cons idered as the Cornmiss ioner of Police or Secr etary of 
Po lice . The Cons t i t ut ion estab l i shes the o f f ice of the Commiss ioner of 
Pol ice and prescr ibes his funct ions ( s . 1 98 )  and prov ides for his  
appo intment ( s . 1 93 ( e ) , ( 2 ) ) .  The  Depar tment o f  Pol ice was estab l i shed 
administrat ively under the PubZic Service Act and its funct ions , largely 
overlapping with those of the Commiss ioner under s . 1 98 ,  were g azetted . The 
Cour t ' s  v iew was th at the establ i shment of the Depar tment and the 
appointment of the Secretary wer e  unconst itut ional ( although Pr att J was 
will ing to concede constitut ional val id i ty if the Departmental func t ions 
wer e  def ined nar rowly) , and therefore Bour ag a ' s l i ab i l ity had to be 
determined on the bas i s  that he was the Commiss ioner . The j udges found no 
2 5 0  Y . P .  GHAI AN D  D .  HEGARTY 
bas i s  for the competence of the PSC in the matter of the d isc ipl ine over 
the pol ice . Although s . 1 9 1 ( 1 ) (c )  o f  the Const i tut ion enabled Par l i ament to 
vest the PSC w i th such competence over the pol ice , it had not done so . 
Moreover , it was of the opi n ion that under Sch . 1 . 1 0 ( 4 )  of the Const itut ion ,  
the power o f  d i sc ipl ine and d i sm issal o f  the Cormniss ione r rested with the 
body r espons ible for h i s  appo intment , i . e . , the NEC in consultat ion with 
the PSC and the relevant par l iamentary comm ittee ( s . 9 3 ( 2 ) ) ,  and could not 
be vested in the PSC . The j udges never theless went on to d iscuss the 
po s i t ion on the assumption that Bour ag a was the Secr etary of the 
Depar tment ,  and came to a s im ilar conclusion . Although appo inted under the 
Pub lic Service Act, he was appointed pur suant to s . 1 93 of the Const i tut ion 
wh ich prov ides that " all o f f ices in the Nat ional Publ ic Serv ice the 
occupants of wh ich are d ir ectly r e spons ible to the NEC or to a Ministe r "  
are i n  fac t  t o  b e  appo inted b y  the NEC i n  consultat ion with the PSC . I n  
spi te of the fac t  th at the Pub lic Service Act ( s . 76 )  purports t o  g ive 
d i sc ipl inary powers over heads o f  depa r tments to the PSC , the Court held 
that the PSC h ad no j ur isd ict ion , for under Sch . 1 . 1 0 (4 ) , that powe r lay 
with the NEC i tsel f .  
The second quest ion i nvolved the d i sc uss ion o f  s . 1 48 o f  the 
Const itut ion , wh ich deals with the funct ions of Minister s .  The f ir st 
sub- sect ion g ives to the Pr ime Minister the power to al locate portfol ios 
and respons ib i l it ies to h imself  and other member s  o f  the NEC , wh i le the 
second s ays that "All depar tments , sect ions , br anches and funct ions of 
government must be the pol it ical respons ib i l ity of a Min i ster " .  The th ird 
sub- sect ion , however ,  goe s  on to say that the second sub- sect ion does not 
confer on a Minister any powe r of d irect ion or control . The Court held 
that sub- s . 3 merely pr ov ided that no minister ial powe r f lowed from sub- s . 2 ,  
not that Minister s could not have powe rs under any bas i s , e . g . , an Act or 
through a deleg at ion from the NEC ( s . 1 49 ,  which vests respon s i b i l i ty for 
execut ive gover nment in the NEC , also enables it to de leg ate that 
respons ib i l ity to a M i n i ster ) . In the instant case , no delegat ion by the 
NEC had been made in th is r eg ard to the M i n ister , and the Cour t found that 
there was no leg i slat ive vest ing of author i ty in the Mini ster e i ther . 
Although the quest ion was d isposed of thus , all the j udges went on to 
d iscuss the meani ng of the " po l i t ical responsib i l i ty" of the Minister 
vested in h im by s . 1 48 ( 2 ) . K idu CJ descr ibes i t  in the case o f  the 
Mini ster of Po l ice : 
as the duty to ensure that the Force and the 
Commissioner have funds to carry out the i r  funct ions . 
He is also respons ible for speaking on the i r  behalf 
when they are under cr it ic ism .  
Kapi J defined " po l i t ical r esponsibil ity" a s  involv ing : 
( a) all matter s  concerning the depar tment wh ich 
requ i r e  the del iber at ions or dec i s ion of the NEC in i t s  
responsibil ity f o r  t h e  execut ive government of  PNG , 
e . g . , to subm i t , adv i se , inform , r epor t or br ief the NEC , on quest ions l ike 
budge t  pr ior it ies and al locat ions : and to : 
( b) inform , r eport or answe r  que s t ions in Parliament 
or the pub l ic through news med ia r eg arding any matters 
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concern ing the f unct ion of the government as a member 
of the Cabinet . 
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Pr att J defined the Minister ' s  po l it ical respons ibi l ity as h i s  respons­
ibil ity as a member of the Government 
for what the department has done in the past , is doing 
in the pr e sent and must do or should do in the futur e .  
H e  has the responsibil ity t o  de fend the depar tment when under attac k  in the 
Pa r l i ament ; and has to do the best he can to obtai n  funds for h i s  
par t icular department to c a r r y  o u t  the ope r at ion with in t h e  context of the 
ent ire f inanc i al commi tments of the country as determ ined by Cabinet . 
The j udges drew s im ilar impl icat ions for m in ister ial powe r from th i s  
def in i t ion of pol it ical respons ib i l ity . K idu C J  s aid that t h e  respons­
ibil ity : 
c ar r ies with i t  the r ight of the m ini ster to be adv ised 
and informed o f  the act iv ities , pe r formances ,  problems 
of those who are under h i s  pol it ical respons ib il i ty .  
I t  i s  the respons ib il ity o f  a c iv i l  servant t o  adv i se 
the ir m in ister s .  Gr anted ne i ther the Const itut ion nor 
the Pol ice Ac t nor the Pub l ic Serv ice Ac t spec i f ically 
so prov ides .  However ,  the Government al str ucture set 
out in the Const itut ional Laws and Stat utes would not 
funct ion if c iv i l  servants were not obl iged to adv i se 
the i r  m in i ster s .  
He c ites wi th approval a quotat ion o f  Jenn i ng s ' o f  the pr inc iples upon 
wh ich c iv i l  servants act , wh ich emphas ises the c iv il servants ' duty to 
pr ov ide information and suggest ions to the Mini ster for pol icy and to carry 
out ministe r i al pol icy (see Jenn i ng s  1 94 7 ) . Pr att J cons idered that i t  
imposed a n  obl igat ion t o  prov ide information and mater i al pertain ing t o  the 
depar tment and its  ope rat ion . Re fe r r ing to the Secretary ' s  respons ib il ity 
to the Minister  r e fe r r ed to in s . 1 93 ,  ( 1 ) , ( c) , he says that whatever the 
amb i t , it must in commonsense be an i nteg r al par t of the respon s ib il ity to 
acqui r e  informat ion r elevant to a Minister ' s  por tfol io , and to keep the 
Minister in touch with what is going on in the depar tment . Neve r theless 
all the j udges found that the Mini ster had no powe r to requi r e  the adv ise 
and informat ion . But , i n  formulat ions of extreme ambig u ity , they also 
said : that the Secretary had the obl igat ion to prov ide the adv ice and 
informat ion ( K idu CJ ) ; that the Minister cannot d irect " but he does have 
the r ight to request such informat ion and to be fur n i shed with the same " 
( P r att J ) ; and " the only th ing s . 1 48 ( 2 )  confe r s  on the Minister is the 
r ight to request ( and not the p01Jer to orde� ) anything for the purposes of 
his pol i t ic al respons ib i l ity" ( K api J ) . 
The th ird que s t ion concerned the interpr etat ion of s . 1 96 ,  sub- s . 1  of 
wh ich says that the pol ice force i s  subj ect to the control of the NEC 
through a Min iste r , and the second sub- sect ion says that the Minister has 
no powe r of command w ith in the pol ice force except to the extent prov ided 
for by a const itut ional law or an Ac t .  The Court  inte rpreted " command "  to 
mean the s ame th ing as " d i r ect ion and control" in s . 1 48 ,  and held that the 
Mini ster had no powe r in the absence of delegat ion from the NEC or a 
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s tatutory prov i sion to r equ i r e  the Comm i ss ione r to answer que s t ions , 
although " he has the r ight to be i n formed and br iefed " , and the convent ions 
of c iv i l  service responsibil ity as under s . 1 48 also appl ied here . 
COMMENT ON THE CASE 
It i s  easy to cr i t ic ise the Court for r ul ing s wh ich must make the 
proper funct ion i ng of the Gover nment we ll n ig h  imposs ible . On the one hand 
the j udges ac knowledge that the d i scharge of minister i al respons ib i l ity i s  
imposs ible wi thout the M i n ister ' s  powe r t o  r equ i r e  information and 
b r i e f ing s from the publ ic servants , and that the publ ic servants have the 
obl igat ion to prov ide these . On the other hand , they s ay that noth ing in 
the Const itut ion g ives the Minister the powe r to requ i r e  these ; i ndeed , 
Minister s cannot g ive any kind of d i rect ive to the publ ic servants who are 
supposedly there  to serve them . Under th i s  r u l ing the Ministers cannot 
reasonably d ischarge the i r  funct ion of pol icy-mak ing or the supe r v i s ion o f  
its implementat ion , o r  i ndeed defend the depar tment ag ainst cr i t ic ism . 
Th is is a par t icularly acute prob lem in a country l ike PNG wher e  the 
educat ional standards o f  Ministers  are l i kely to be low , and the i r  
administrat ive exper ience l im ited or n i l .  The CPC ' s  wish t o  e stabl ish the 
supremacy o f  pol it ical leader sh ip c an be eas i ly f r ustr ated by an 
unco-operat ive public serv ice . 
But the pr imary blame for th i s  state of affairs  cannot be placed on 
the Supr eme Cour t .  The Cour t appeared fully aware of the i ncong r u i ty o f  
the r e s u l t  of its dec is ion b u t  f e l t  compelled t o  i t  b y  t h e  terms of the 
Const itut ion . Its dec i s ion h ighl ights yet another defect in a complex , 
verbose and overdrafted Const itut ion ( the nature of wh ich prev ious 
const itut ional l it igat ion has already demonstr ated ) . In th i s  par t icular 
instance , it is not too d if f icult to t r ace the or ig ins of the problem . The 
CPC h ad r ecommended strong ly in favour of the pol it ical answe r ab i l ity o f  
the publ ic servants t o  Ministe r s .  Th is w a s  endosed by the Government as 
well as the Const ituent Assembly and the penult imate d r aft ( four th )  of the 
Const itut ion d id not contain sub- s . 3  of s . 1 48 .  The publ ic serv ice , l arge ly 
expat r iate at that t ime , pr ofoundly unhappy at the loss of its  powe r 
impl ic it in s . 1 48 ,  and d isturbed by the poss ib i l ities  of minister ial 
" excesse s " , pr ompted the add it ion of sub- s . 3  at the last m inute , and there 
i s  r eason to be l ieve that none of the pol i t ical leader s  we re aware of its  
impl icat ions . Th is sub- sect ion tog e ther with the other const itut ional 
prov is ions vest ing both pe r sonnel and management f unct ions over the publ ic 
se r v ice in the PSC ( s . 1 9 1 ) ( ag ain contr ary to the recommendat ions of the 
PNG CPC 1 9 74 : Ch . 1 2 ) constitute a maj or contrad ict ion o f  the Const itut ion . 
As we argue be low , the Cour t could have found a way to invest igate the 
r ig id i ty o f  these prov is ions , but i t  i s  not to be blamed for the general  
result . 
Although the dec is ion may seem a v ictory for the depar tmental head s 
ag ainst the i r  M i n i ster s ,  it may tur n out to be pyr r h ic . For the corollary 
o f  the hold ing that the PSC had no d isc ipl inary power over the heads is 
that the NEC does ( under Sch . 1 . 1 0 ( 4 ) ) ,  wh ich is contrary to the general 
bel ie f  that depar tmental heads enj oyed secur i ty o f  tenure unde r  the "PiibZia 
Serviae Aat . It i s  far from obv ious that th i s  r ul ing was inev itable , for 
it can be argued that s . 1 9 1  in combinat ion w i th the "PiibZia Serviae Aat does 
vest d i sc ipl inary powers in the PSC ,  thus express ing a " contrary i ntent ion" 
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wh ich under Sch . 1 . 1  (c )  d isplaces t h e  appl icat ion of Sch . 1 . 1 0 (4 ) . Wh ile it 
may be argued that th i s  part icular hold ing r estores some balance between 
the Minister and the Secretar y ,  wh ich otherwi se wou ld be t il ted under 
s . 1 48 ( 3 )  i n  favour of the Secretary ( and both Kapi and Pr att JJ were able 
to accept s . 1 48 ( 3 )  because of the ultimate sanct ion of d i sm issal of the 
Secr etary by the NEC) , i t  neve r theless creates problems of its own 
especially as the PSC would as a r ul e  be reluc tant to d isc ipl ine a sen ior 
publ ic servant . The remedy env isag ed by Kapi and Pr att JJ is drast ic and 
accentuates a sense of cr i s i s . I t  introduces add it ional tens ions between 
the Ministe r  and h is depar tmental head . I t  br eeds insecur ity in the head 
wh ich can lead to intr igue and search for a l l i ances with other Minister s ,  
thr eaten ing collect ive m in i ster ial r espon s ib i l i ty .  
If  the Cour t was confronted with a d i f f icult s ituat ion its 
intervent ion scarce ly served to e stabl i sh he lpful g u idance for the exerc ise 
of execut ive powe r .  The Cour t had the opt ion o f  decl ining j ur isd ict ion , 
and it is subm itted that it should have done so . Exper ience in other 
countr ies h as shown that i t  is sens ible for cour ts to exercise 
self- rest r a int in tak ing on const itut ional cases . Both for the i r  own 
cred ib i l ity and pr e s t ig e  as well as to retain flex ib i l i ty in the po l i t ical 
system , cour ts should take on con s t i tu t ional issues only i f  they are 
unavoidable ,  and should attempt to d ispose of the case by dec id ing on the 
spec i f ic and narrow i ssues r athe r  th an make r ul ing s on wider issue s .  A 
court too w i l l ing to intervene in const itut ional d i sputes prov ides l ittle 
incent ive for the par t ies concer ned to f ind wor k able accommodat ions and 
compromises by themselves and pr events the emergence of pol it ical 
convent ions to determ ine re lat ionsh ips between d i ffe rent g roups . 
Th is i s  a par t icul ar ly important cons iderat ion in a deve loping 
pol it ical system . Cour ts should be spec ially chary of g ett ing involved in 
internal matters  of c ab inet procedur es , and the re lat ionsh ip between 
ministers and departmental head s .  A cour t dec i s ion prov ides a r ul ing wh ich 
can as a gene r al pr inc iple only be changed by a const itut ional amendment , 
wh ich is d i ff icult , and a r ul ing wider th an necessary o ften over looks 
cons iderat ions that ar ise when the spec i f ic f acts o f  a spe c i f ic d i spute are 
present . Un for tunately the National and Supr eme Cour ts have been all too 
will ing to j ump into the fr ay and to make r ul ing s on i ssues wider than has 
been str ictly necessary to d i spose of the case . Th is has encourag ed the 
tendency to convert po l it ical into constitut ional problems , to engender a 
sense of c r 1 s 1s , and has served to d amage the pol i t ical process . The 
problem has been aggr avated by the nar rowly leg al i s t ic approach the Cour ts 
have frequently adopted , so that instead o f  taking g r and constitut ional 
pr inc iples as the i r  g u idel ine s ,  they have chosen spec i f ic words of the 
Cons t i tu t ion as the i r  star t i ng po ints . 
Most o f  these def ic ienc ies are revealed in th i s  case . Bour ag a  had 
res igned from h is pos ts before  the Court beg an its hear ing s �  and therefore 
its r ul ing could have no e f fect on his l iab i l ity . On ly Kapi J r efe rs to 
th is fac t ,  but neve rtheless dec ides to go on to substant ive issues . The 
Cour t should have s a id that , s ince the Board of Inqu i r y  h ad declared itself 
functus officio , there was no longer a competent r e fe rence before i t .  Even 
if it d id want to take j ur isd ict ion , it should have conf ined itse l f  to the 
quest ion of the powe rs of the Mini ster over the Commiss ioner of Police , 
once it had determ ined that a depar tment of pol ice could not be e stablished 
under the Public Service Act with i t s  own Secr etary.  The Cour t would then 
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not need to have pronounced on the pos i t ion o f  depar tmental heads . The 
cons ider at ions that apply to the Conun i ss ioner of Pol ice are d if ferent from 
those pe rtain ing to the head of an administ r at ive depar tment . 
The Cour t could have come to a d ifferent result on the facts . There 
is l it t le d i sc uss ion as to the mean ing of " powe rs o f  d i r ect ion and 
control" . I t  could be argued that what s . 1 48 ( 3 )  proh ib its is the g iv i ng of 
orders  for execut ive ac t ion . 
What the Mini ster had been ask ing for here was informat ion or 
br ief ing , outs ide the proh ib it ions o f  that sub- sect ion . P r att J d i scusses 
th i s  po int expl ic itly - the informat ion r equested by the Minister was 
necessary to carry out prope r ly h i s  pol it ical respons ib i l it i es : 
Request ing and receiv ing such informat ion had no affect 
on the member s  o f  the force . No member was be ing 
d i r ected or controlled in r elat ion to the pe r formance 
of h i s  dut ies under the Pol ice Act • • •  I h ave no doubt 
that s uch d irect ion was not the type in the mind of the 
framers o f  the constitution If one could use a 
naut ical analogy , the M i ni ster has the powe r to command 
the Maste r to g ive information about the sh ip ' s 
complement , fuel endur ance , cargo and dest inat ion , but 
not to tell the he lmsman to change cour se immed iately 
as the sh ip is in imm inent danger  of r unn ing ag round 
because both the captain and the Mini ster have been 
engaged in a d i spute on the br idge instead of loo k i ng 
ahead . 
Ye t he concludes that the Minister doe s not have the power to ask for th i s  
information ! 
WAYS OUT OF AN UNSAT I SFACTORY S I TUATI ON 
The j udgments themselves suggest a number of ways out of th i s  
d i f f icult s ituat ion . Kapi J appe ars to ascr ibe v e r y  l im i ted powe rs t o  the 
Ministe r . I f  orders  are necessary then the Minister must obtain the NEC ' s  
pe rmi ss ion . I f  a confl ict s ituat ion ex ists then the Mini ster " may r elay 
d i rect ions" ( in the fash ion of a conduit  or cour ier )  from the NEC to the 
Conuniss ioner . Th is does not appear to be a sat is factory solut ion for i t  
ser iously underm ines the author ity o f  the M i n i ster . Pr att J s uggests that 
in a con f l ic t  s i tuat ion the NEC could ( should? ) d i sm i ss the departmental 
he ad �  but th i s  i s  a fai r ly d r as t ic measure wh ich would incr e ase the 
insecur i ty of the head ,  and perhaps lead to sycophant ic r elat ions . A th ird 
suggest ion o f  both Kapi J and Pr att J i s  to prov ide powe rs for Ministers 
under spec i f ic laws as , for example , are contained in the Education Act .  
Pr att J maintains that : 
the sys tem of us ing an Ac t of Par l i ament to def ine and 
d i r ect minister ial control over spe c i f ic areas had the 
g reat advantage of lett ing everyone know exactly what 
power s  are confer red in what areas , with the approval 
of the par l iamentary member s .  
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Th is , however , i s  l ik e ly t o  lead t o  fur ther leg al i sms , unnecessary 
leg i slat ion , and i s  unl i ke ly to help in the del ineat ion o f  the g eneral 
pr inc iples of mini ster ial control . 
A r elat ively s imple way out would be for the NEC to deleg ate its 
powers o f  d irect ion and control ( s . 1 49 ( 4 ) ) to ind iv idual Ministe r s . Pr ime 
Minister s ,  however ,  h ave been r e l uctant to delegate full NEC author ity to 
indiv idual . Ministers ( perhaps wisely) g iven the nature of Coal it ion 
Cabinets ,  the relat ive inexper ience of Ministe r s , and the large s i ze of 
the ir Cabinets . A f ifth and perhaps most s u i table opt ion would be to amend 
the Puh lic SePVice Act g iv ing Ministers  g ener al powe rs of d irect ion and 
control . F i nally an amendment to the Const i tut ion m ight be attempted , 
delet ing s . 1 48 ( 3 )  and amend ing other sect ions ( s . 1 92 ) , mak ing clear the 
d ist inct ion between a Ministe r ' s  control over pol icy and h is lack the reof 
over oper at ional matte r s . 
For the public service the s i tuat ion also r ema ins unsat isfactor y .  The 
Ch ai rman of the PSC , Mr Renag i Loh i a ,  has suggested that the NEC deleg ate 
the powers of appointment and d isc ipl ine to the PSC , thus prov id ing a 
degree of secur ity of tenur e and obv iat ing , i n  the longer term ,  the need 
for pol it ical appo intees . Alter nat ively , Mr Loh ia has suggested that 
departmental heads be g iven a spec i al contract . 
CONCLUS I ON 
We have argued that the S upreme Cour t could have decl ined j ur isd ict ion 
in the case and that its  will ingness to ' enter the fray '  in i ssues such as 
these damages the political  process and tend s  to engender . a  cl imate of 
' cr i s i s ' .  It could we ll be arg ued , however , that had the i ssue been 
al lowed to s immer i n  the po l it ical arena in the hope of a pol i t ical 
solut ion , the cr 1 s 1 s  ( involv ing as i t  d id the head of one of the 
d i sc ipl ined force s )  would have e scalated . It m ight also be arg ued that in 
the part icular s i t uat ion of a ' hung ' Coal i t ion Cabine t ,  recour se to the 
Court may well have been the only way out . In so do ing a cour t sol ut ion 
m ight r e inforce the stature and author ity of both the Cour t and the 
const itut ional system .  On balance , however ,  it appe ars to us that ' bai l ing 
out ' a par alysed Coal it ion Cabinet ( or a Pr ime Minister who is unable to 
asse r t  author i ty over h is Execut ive)  in s ituat ions such as these , the Cour t 
only encour ages fur ther references to it from the pol i t ical arena and 
might , in the long r un ,  j eopard i se its  independence . 
The upshot of th is case is that in terms of appropr i ate power and 
wor k ing r e l at ions the const itut ional s ituat ion r emains unsat isfactory.  The 
status quo has bee n ,  if anyth ing , r e i nforced . A Minister ' s  powe r remains 
d iminished for s . 1 48 ( 3 )  has been interpr eted to mean exactly what it says . 
The sen ior bureaucrat ' s  power vis-a-vis the Minister  r emains in that he is 
not subj ect to " d irec t ion or control " ,  but h is power i s  heav i ly qual i f ied 
by h i s  insecur ity of tenur e .  Shor t of a const i tut ional amendment wh ich , in 
a f inely d iv ided Par liament , wou ld be d i f f icult to negot iate , pe rhaps the 
only short-term ' solut ion ' is for both Ministers  and bureaucrats to heed 
K idu CJ ' s  suggest ions reg ard i ng the i r  respect ive obl ig at ions , and respons­
ibil i t ies . 

1 9. JUDICIA L  LAW-MAK I NG UNDER TH E PAPUA N EW G U I N EA 
CONSTI TUTION 
8.8. Sakora 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
Th is paper intends to examine the law-mak ing powers vested in the 
j ud ic iary by the Papua New Gu inea ( PNG ) Cons t i tut ion and to cons ider how 
the cour ts have d i scharged th i s  onerous r espons ib il ity . 
Th e PNG Const itut ion i s  unique in the common law const itut ions , and 
mor e  clear ly so with in the Corranonwealth . Wh ilst it is patterned on the 
' We stm inster model ' ,  its un iqueness is r e flected inter aZia in its 
adaptat ion and bui ld ing onto that model .  Th at is to say, our Cons t i t ut ion 
does mor e  than j ust the usual : as well as lay i ng down the bas ic structure 
of government by des ignat ing the pr inc ipal organs of a par l i amentary 
democr acy and vest ing them with the i r  ' trad i t ional ' powers and funct ions , 
it is what Professor Go ldr ing calls " a  novel statement of pol i t ical 
ideology and aspirat ions of the people"  ( 1 978 : 1 5 ) .  Independence i s  not 
me rely to be the end of an er a ,  but the beg inn ing of a new one in wh ich the 
people must th ink and ac t with a whole new purpose . Independence not only 
means that our people are now doing th ings themselves , but also th at they 
must per form them in  the i r  own way . Th is does not imply a r evers ion to the 
' pr e-contact ' pos i t ion : what i s  inherent in  th i s  ph i losophy i s  that the 
government together with the people must wor k  with new v igour and pur pose 
towards a common goal . As the Const itut ional Planning Committee ( CPC) put 
it in i t s  FinaZ Report: 
We bel ieve that the s ign i f icance of Papua New Gu inea ' s  
attainment o f  Se lf-Government and Independence i s  that , 
by t r ansfe r r ing powe r into the hands of the people of 
th i s  country,  i t  g ives us a chance to def ine for 
ourselves the ph i losphy of l i fe by wh ich we want to 
l ive and the soc ial and econom ic goals we want to 
ach i eve . If the Const itut ion is to be t r uly the 
fundamental character of our soc iety and the bas is of 
leg i t imate author ity , it should be an instrument wh ich 
he lps to ach ieve these goals and not one wh ich 
obst r ucts . Our Const i tut ion should look towards the 
future and act as an acceler ator in the process o f  
development , not as a br ake . I t  should be related to 
the nat ional goals that we the leaders  o f  th i s  country 
are enunc iat ing . We have , the r e fore , f r amed our 
r ecommendat ions for the proposed Cons t i tut ion with 
these goals in m ind ( PNG 1 9 74 : 2/1 ) .  
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One of the features of the Cons t i tut ion wh ich r e f lects its un iqueness 
r elates to the subj ect o f  th i s  paper : j ud ic ial law-making . In l ine w i th 
the g ener al intent ion of the const i tut ion-make r s  to break as far as 
poss ible with the colon i al past , it was env isaged that a new start be made 
with the leg al system . 
THE NATI ONAL JUD IC IAL SYSTEM 
Sect ion 1 55 of the Const itut ion estab l i shes the Nat ional J ud ic ial 
System wh ich cons ists of the S upreme Cour t ,  the National Cour t ,  and such 
other courts as are e s t abl ished under s . 1 72 .  The other cour ts include the 
' i nfe r ior ' cour ts in the cent r al h ier archy of the cour ts system , namely the 
local and d istr ict cour t s . At tached to th i s  cent r al system are the v i l lage 
cour ts and the admini str at ive tr ibunal s .  Separ ated from it are the land 
med iator s ,  the land cour ts and the r ecently-estab l i shed National Lands 
Commiss ion . 
The system essent i ally is based on the Austr a l i an and Eng lish cour ts 
system with the poss ible except ion o f  the v i llage cour ts . The two supe r ior 
cour ts i n  the h ie r archy , the Nat ional and Supr eme Cour ts , h ave the i r  
respect ive j ur isdict ions prov ided for in t h e  Const it u t ion ( ss . 1 62 ,  1 66 ) . 
In contr ast to most other Commonwealth j ur i sd ict ions , the re is no appe al to 
the Jud ic i al Committee of the Pr ivy Counc i l .  
The Const itut ion vests the j ud ic i al author ity o f  the people i n  the 
Nat ional Jud icial System ( s . 1 48 ) . It goes to g r eat leng ths to make 
detailed prov is ions for the establ ishment of the cour ts , the i r  
j ur isd ic t ions , the i r  other powe rs and dut i e s  (see , f o r  example ,  s s .  2 2 ,  
5 7 ,  6 0 ,  and Sch . 2 . 3 ) , and the qua l i f icat ions and mode o f  appo intment of 
j udges ( ss . 1 6 1 ,  1 64 ,  1 65 ,  1 69 ,  1 70 ,  1 7 1 ) .  Th is i s  in add i t ion to Nat ional 
and Supreme Court Acts and the Organic LaUJ on the Judicial and Legal 
Ser>Vices Corronission.  
In l ine with the intended new s t a r t  in the leg al system , a l l  the 
j udges on the pre- i ndependence Supr eme Court bench at the date of 
Independence were re-appo inted - the i r  former commiss ions hav ing l apsed on 
that day - unde r the new ret i r ing age and term of appo intment prov is ions . 1 
THE SOURCES  OF PAPUA NEW GU I N EA LAWS 
As with all other areas of nat ional development , the Const i t i t ion g ave 
a c lear mandate to the cour ts of PNG , and mor e  spec i f ically , the Nat ional 
and Supr eme Courts , to develop the under lying law of the countr y .  It 
prov ides that the law o f  independent PNG shal l con s i st o f  statute or 
wr itten l aw and the under lying law .  The stat ute law i s  the Cons t i t u t ion 
itse l f ,  o rg an ic laws , Ac ts of both the nat ional and prov inc ial par l i aments , 
leg islat ion from Australia  and the Un ited K i ngdom ( adopted by v i r t ue of 
Sch . 5 ) , s ubord inate leg islat ion made under any o f  those laws , and emergency 
regulat ions ( ss . 9 ,  20 , and Sch . 5 ) . The under lying law, subj ect to 
l im itat ions , compr ises c us tom and the pr inc iples and r ules of common law 
and equ i ty that appl ied in England immed i at e ly before Independence ( Schs . 
2 . 1 ,  2 . 2 ) . 
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Sect ion 2 0  s ub- s . ( 1 )  prov ides for an Act o f  Parl iament to declare and 
enable the development of the und e r lying l aw ( see also s . 60 ) . S ub- sect ion 
( 2 )  prov ide s  that unt il the n ,  the under lying l aw and the manne r of its 
development is to be as pr e scr ibed by Sch . 2  ( adopt ion , e tc .  o f  certain 
laws ) . As ye t no such Act has been enacted . Th is may be del iber ate on the 
par t  of Parliament because i t  could be sa id that the const itut ional 
prov is ions on the subj ect are c lear and requ i r e  no fur ther elabor at ion . 
Although th i s  may be t r ue of the adopt ion of the common law (see Sch . 2 . 2 ) , 
and of the development of the under lying law ( see Sch .  2 . 3 )  par l i amentary 
inact iv ity in th is respect , unfor tunatley , h as been used as an excuse for 
the j ud ic ial reluctance or inac t iv ity so far . In any case , as if  the 
message needed further emphas i s , s . 2 1  def ines the purpose of Sch . 2 i n  the 
followi ng way : 
The purpose of Schedule 2 ( adopt ion , etc . , of cer tain 
laws ) and o f  the Ac t o f  Par l i ament r e fer red to in 
Sect ion 2 0  ( under lying law and pre- I ndependence 
s tatutes)  is to ass ist in the development of our 
ind igenous j ur ispr udence , adapted to the chang ing 
c ircumstances of Papua New Gu ine a .  
For the prope r  implementat ion o f  the above-s tated purpose , sub- s . ( 2 )  o f  
s . 2 1  prov ided for the estab l i shment o f  a Law Re form Connn iss ion ( LRC) ( wh ich 
duly happended in 1 97 5 )  and invested both it and the courts with the 
respons ib i l ity . The pe r formance of the LRC is a story in itself . 2 As far 
as the cour ts are concerned , s ix weeks  after I ndependence Day , Frost CJ i n  
Johns v .  Thomason ( 1 976 ) PNGLR 1 5  adver ted t o  t h e  d uty in th i s  way : 
In these c i rcumstances the respondent r e l ies upon the 
doctr ine of r a t i f ic at ion . I t  was not suggested , nor i s  
such a suggest ion tenable , that th i s  common law 
pr inc iple is i nappl icab le or inappropr iate to the 
c ir cumstances of Papua New Gu inea ( Cons t itut ion Sch . 
2 .  2 )  ( ibid. : 1 9 ) • 
About a year later H i s  Honour in State v .  John Beng ( 1 976 ) PNGLR 4 7 1  
ment ioned t h e  matter aga i n .  Pr ent ice DCJ ( as he then was) , when confronted 
with a form idable l ist of fore ign case law c it ed by the defence counsel at 
a tr ial one month after Beng , s a id : 
I think the t ime has come when c itat ion of Un ited 
K i ngdom cases and those from non-Code states of 
Austral ia should be e schewed unless they rel ate to 
subj ects c lear ly not covered by our Code . The Code we 
have must be administered by Papua New Gu inean lawye r s  
who should , I t h ink , be ass i sted in the i r  del ibe r at ions 
if  r e ference to dec i s ions of countr ies and states wh ich 
do not adhere to a Code s im ilar to our own is made less 
fr equently • • •  We should be build i ng up a body of 
dec i s ions o f  Papua New Gu inea Cour ts for spe c i al ly 
Papua New Gu inea s ituat ions and c ustoms ( State v .  
La.iam Kiala and Meiai Gomosi , unrepor ted j udgment , N .  
1 1 8 o f  1 7  November 1 9 77 at 5 ) . 
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The Supreme Cour t made early r e ference to the subj ect in both Mairi v .  
Tololo ( unrepor ted j udgment , SC . 94 of 1 5  Apr i l  1 976 ) a nd  Constitutional 
Reference No . 1 of 1 9 ? ?  [ 1 978 ) PNGLR 2 9 5  ( law of ent icement ) ; but mak ing 
mere ment ion i s  no subs t itute for actually cons ider ing and do ing someth ing 
about i t . Indeed , in the l atter case the Cour t concluded th at as the 
common l aw act ion o f  ent icement had been abo l i shed in Enq land before 
Independence ( by the UK Law Reform (Misae llaneous Provisions) Aat ( 1 97 0 ) ) ,  
there  was no such tor t adopted in PNG , and , as the re was no ev idence o f  a 
country-wide cus tom on the subj ect ,  was not prepared to formulate a new 
rule pur suant to Sch . 2 . 3  ( as it c lear ly should have done , using the a ids 
already prescr ibed the rein ( see also s . 6 0 ) ) .  
Af te r those ear ly cases the recog n i t ion and appl icat ion of custom and 
the need to develop an underlying law were d i scussed less and less 
fr equently and with decreasing ser iousness . I t  would seem that it was left 
to Pr itchard J to do someth ing about the matter . His Honour , as wel l  as 
stat ing the constitut ional obl ig at ion o f  the Cour ts in State v .  Joseph Tapa 
( unr epor ted j udgment , N . 1 40 o f  1 0  May 1 9 78 ) , in re lat ion to cor robor at ive 
ev idence of accompl ices and the requ i r ement for proper d irect ion and 
war ning to be g iven , s a id : 
The j udges of th i s  Cour t have a c lear cut obl ig at ion 
under Schedule 2 . 3  of the Const i t ut ion to develop the 
under lying law of Papua New Gu inea and for th i s  r eason , 
I feel in th is par t icular case , I should attempt to do 
so ( ibid. : 1 3 ) . 
H i s  Honour then proceeded to formulate four pr inc iples upon wh ich the PNG 
cour ts should cons ider the ev idence of accompl ices wh ich e ssent i al ly 
qual if ied and extended the common law r ule as enunc iated in Davies v .  DPP 
[ 1 9 5 4 )  AC 3 78 .  
THE UNDERLY I NG LAW 
As noted ear lier , the underlying law ,  s ubj ect to cert ain 
constitut ionally prescr ibed cond i t ions , con s i sts of custom and the 
pr inc iples and r ules of common law and equ ity that appl ied in England as at 
1 5  September 1 9 75 . 
Schedule 2 . 1 in clear and unamb ig uous lang uage adopts custom and says 
i t  shall be appl ied and enforced as par t  o f  the underlying law .  The only 
l imitat ions are as pr e scr ibed by the Const itut ion itse l f  ( s . 2 1 ( 2 ) ) ,  that 
is , if the appl icat ion and enforcement o f  any custom w i l l  r esult in 
inconsistency w i th a consti tut ional law or s t atute , or  will  be r epugnant to 
the gene r al pr inc iples o f  human ity . The Native Customs (Reaognition) Aat 
( 1 96 3 )  had already prov ided a s im ilar prov is ion i n  a somewhat l im i ted way 
and included the s ame restr ict ions . 3 I t  was , pe rhaps , because of the d i smal 
failure of th i s  Act to encour age sys temat ic j ud ic i al r ecog n i t ion and 
appl icat ion o f  c us tom that i t  was thought best to entrench such a prov is ion 
in the Cons t i tut ion . 
The hope for a fresh s tart in th i s  area,  as reflected in the spec i f ic 
prov 1s 1ons of the Cons t itut ion , was str eng the ned fur the r by r equ i r ing that 
an Ac t of Pa r l i ament prov ide for the proof and plead ing of custom ( Sch . 
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2 . 1 ( 3 ) ( a) ) .  I t  was also prov ided that th i s  Act should r eg ulate the manner 
in wh ich , or  the purpose for wh ich , custom may be recog n ised , appl ied or  
enforced . I t  was also to make prov is ion for the r esolut ion of con f l icts o f  
cus tom ( Sch . 2 . 1 ( 3 ) (c ) ) .  De spite th i s  c lear intent ion of the Const i t ut ion , 
no such Ac t yet has been enacted by Parliament . Could th i s  be s a id to be 
attr ibuted to a tr ust by Par l i ament that the j ud ic i ary would per form its 
constitut ional duty and develop and apply custom as par t o f  the under lying 
law? Pe rhaps it is r ather due to a t rend wh ich David We isbrot suggested 
has taken place in PNG Gover nment whereby after the innovat ive measures o f  
the immed iate post- independence pe r iod , l aw r e form has been sh i fted t o  the 
" back-bur ne r "  (We isbrot 1 98 1 : 727-3 1 ) . 
The adopt ion of common l aw ( Sch . 2 . 2 )  is subj ect to spe c i f ic cond it ions 
under the Cons t i tut ion . Under Sch . 2 . 2 ( 1 ) the pr inc iples and r ules o f  
common law and equ i ty in Eng land immed iately before Independence are to be 
appl ied and enforced as par t  of the und e r lying law except i f ,  and to the 
extent that : 
( a) they are incons istent with a Cons t i tut ional Law or a 
S t atute ; o r  
( b) they a r e  inappl icab le o r  inappropr iate t o  t h e  c i rcum­
s tances of the country from t ime to t ime , or  
(c )  i n  the ir appl icat ion to any par t icular matter , they are 
incons istent with c us tom as adopted • • •  
Cond it ion ( a) r equires no e l abor at ion here . Cond i t ions ( b )  and ( c ) , 
however , a r e  more problemat ic and of g reat concern to the deve lopment of 
PNG ' s  under lying law.  
There would seem to be no d ispute that c us tom has supremacy over the 
common law in any part icular matter . I f  a par t icular pr inc iple or r ule of 
common law con fl icts with c us tom as adopted , then custom prevail s .  But 
custom must h ave been adopted as appl icable in the f i rst  place in order for 
i t  to pr eva i l  over common law in the event of an i ncons istency . As long as 
custom remains undefined , the l i kel ihood of common law con f l ict ing with 
custom will r emain r emote . As with the appl icat ion of custom under the 
Native Customs (Recognition) Act,  the cour ts ( w i th the except ion of v illage 
cour t s )  after Independence are s t i l l  r e l uctant to recogn ise and apply 
custom . 
In a case wh ich pr e sented a clear oppor tun i ty to formulate a new law 
of ent icement the S upr eme Cour t was content to leave a vacuum in the law :  
Sa ldanha J i n  Constitutional Reference No . 1  of 1 9 ? ?  [ 1 978 ] PNGLR 2 9 5  s a id : 
As long as the r e  i s  doubt that the r e  may be remedy at 
customary law for the wr ong of ent icement i t  would not 
be prope r  for th i s  Court to formulate a r ule of law on 
th i s  subj ect ( ibid. : 3 00 ) . 
As wel l  as shr inking its  r e spons ib il ity under Sch . 2 . 3  to fomulate an 
appropr iate r ule ( because the re was no ex i s t ing r ule of law) as par t  of the 
under lyi ng l aw the S upreme Cour t ,  wh i lst adver t i ng to custom ,  made no 
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enqu iry into the poss ible appl icat ion of c ustom . It is obv ious , there­
fore , that i f  the common law tort h ad not been abol i shed in England , the 
common l aw pr inc iples on th i s  tor t would have been applied without any 
adver tance to custom .  The oppor tun ity that presented itse l f  t o  the Supr eme 
Cour t as ear ly as 1 977 was lost . 
The Court  d id make refe rence to lack of ev idence of c ustom on the 
matter , but in the l ight of i t s  g eneral r e l uctance up to now to cons ider 
custom i t  i s  quest ionable whether i t  would have been entertained if 
adduced . In v iew o f  wh at has tr anspi r ed s i nce then one wonders i f  counsel 
would have been g iven the t ime of day i f  he h ad suggested adduc ing ev idence 
on custom . 
Part 3 of Sch . 2  deals spe c i f ically with development of PNG ' s under­
lying l aw .  The Const itut ion does not merely vest the law development 
powers in the National and Supr eme Courts : i t  goes fur ther and pr ov ides 
the Courts w i th aids to be used in th is t as k : 
If in any par t icular matte r before a cour t the r e  
appears t o  be n o  r ule of law t h a t  i s  appl icable and 
appropr i ate to the c i rcumstances of the country,  i t  i s  
the duty of the Nat ional J ud ic i al System , and i n  
par t icular of t h e  Supreme Cour t and t h e  National Cour t , 
to formulate an appropr iate r ule as par t  of the 
under lying law hav ing reg ard 
( a) in par t icular , to the National Goals and D i rect ive 
Pr inc iples and the Basic Social Obl igation s ;  and 
( b) to D i v i s ion 1 1 1 . 3 (Basic Rights ) ; and 
( c )  to analog ies to be dr awn from relevant statutes 
and cus tom; and 
{ d )  to the leg i slat ion of , and to relevant dec i s ions 
of the cour ts o f ,  any country that in the opi nion 
of the cour t has a leg al system s im i lar to that in 
Papua New Gu inea ; and 
( e )  to relevant dec i s ions of cour ts exerc i s i ng 
j ur i sd icat ion in or in respect of a l l  or any par t  
of the country at any t ime ; and to the 
cir cumstances o f  the country from t ime to t ime ; 
Noth ing could be clearer than the above prov is ions as to the duty of the 
cour ts and the areas or matters  that can be cal led i n  or r esorted to for 
ass istance .  Schedule 2 . 4  requ i r e s  the cour ts t o  ensure that : 
with due reg ard to the need for consi stency , the 
under lying law develops as a coherent system in a 
manner that is appropr iate to the c i rcumstances of the 
country from t ime to t ime , except in so far as it would 
not be prope r to do so by j ud ic ial act .  
Th is except ion can only mean that i f  a par t icular g ap has to be f i l led by 
complex leg islat ion r athe r than ind iv idual r ules then it should be left to 
the leg i slature to do so . It cannot , however , be r ead as an ever-pr esent 
brake on the cour ts ' law-development powe r s . There are undoubted ly cer tain 
matters that need to be i n  leg i slat ive form r ather than in the form of a 
j ud ic ial dec i s ion in order to g ive extens ive and exhaust ive cover age . 
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There fore what Sch . 2 . 4  env i sages by the except ion i s  that in such 
s i tuat ions the cour ts will  refer the matter to Pa r l i ament for enac t ing . 
Th is can be done under the very next prov 1 s 1on . Scheule 2 . 5  r equ i res the 
j udges to comment on the st ate , the s u i tab i l ity ,  and the development of the 
underlying l aw ,  together with any r ecommendat ions as to improvement that 
they th ink it proper to make in the i r  r epor ts under s . 1 87 of the 
Consti tut ion . 4 
JUD I C I AL LAW-MAKI NG : THE TASK 
From the for ego i ng it can be seen that the j ud ic i ary in PNG , unl i ke 
its counte rpart in other countr ies , has an expl icit and far-r eaching 
law-mak ing r espons i b i l ity to d ischarge .  Our j udges have to do more than 
j ust per form the i r  t r ad i t ional funct ions of applying the law .  They are i n  
a un ique pos it ion to par t ic ipate fully in t h e  overall  development of the 
country.  
I t  is a t r u i sm that soc i al , economic and po l i t ical changes in soc iety 
are only poss ible through changes in the law and the leg al system . Th is i s  
par t icular ly per t i nent in PNG where t h e  inhe r ited econom ic and pol i t ical 
inst itut ions were struc tur ed under laws meant for h ighly developed and 
soph ist icated soc iet ies . As wel l  as interpr e t i ng the Const i tut ion ( s . 1 8 ) 
and applying the laws passed by Par l i ament , our j udges have to rev ise , 
r eform and deve lop through j ud ic i al pronouncements the laws that are 
sui table for the c ir cumstances o f  the country.  No longer can they say w i th 
any degree o f  tr uth that ' j udges do not make laws , they mer e ly apply them ' . 
Moreover , to say so would be to ig nore the h i story of the development o f  
the common law i n  England . The common law o u r  j udges invar iably apply i n  
pr eference to custom ,  is t h e  result or culm inat ion of centur ies of j ud ic i al 
law-mak ing . Hence , the j udges in PNG c an no longer be concer ned only with 
wh at the law i s :  they must al so cons ider what it ought to be . The 
Cons t i tution has ensured that the r e  be no doubt about th i s . 
Even i f  c us tom is found to be inappl icable in a par t iuclar case , the 
very fact that the common law is be ing applied r a i ses the quest ion of what 
the law ought to be . Lord Denning ' s  challenge to colon ial j udges in the i r  
appl icat ion of the Eng l i sh common law i n  Nyali Ltd. v .  The A-G. of Kenya 
[ 1 956 ) 1 QB 1 ,  2 0-2 1 , i s  most pe r t inent to the j udges of post- independence 
PNG . The fact that no leg al pr ecedent or author ity ex ists on a part icular 
matter should be no bar to j ud ic i al determ inat ion . As Lord Denning said in 
Paaker v .  Paaker [ 1 9 5 4 )  P 1 5 ,  2 2 : 
What is the argument for the other s ide . On ly th i s , 
that no case has been found in wh ich it has been done 
before .  Th at argument does not appeal to me in the 
least . I f  we never do anyth ing wh ich has not been done 
be for e ,  we shall never get  anywhere . The law will  
stand s t i l l  wh ilst  the  rest o f  the  wor ld goes on : and 
that will be bad for both . 
Lord Denn i ng r ecently took the oppo r t un i ty to re inforce h i s  v iews in the 
pr eface to h i s  book The Discip line of raw :  
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My theme i s  that the pr inc iples o f  law l aid down by the 
j udges of the nineteenth century - however s u i ted to 
soc ial cond it ions of that t ime - are not s u i ted to the 
soc ial necess i t ies and soc ial opi n ions o f  the twent ieth 
century . They should be moulded and shaped to meet the 
needs and opin ions of today ( 1 979 } . 
Eve n  when a par t icular common law r ule or pr inc iple is not 
incon s istent with custom i t  should s t i l l  be subj ected to a fur ther test to 
see that it is not inappl icab le or inappropr iate i n  PNG ' s  chang i ng 
c i rcums tances ( see Sch . 2 . 2 ( b ) ) .  However , th i s  test seems not to be appl ied 
in our cour ts . How o ften does one read in the j udgment statements such as 
- "No mater ial was put before  the cour t to s uggest there were any customary 
r ules on the s ubj ect" ; or - " I t h as not been argued in th i s  case that the 
common law pr inc iples are inappl icab le or inappropr iate to the 
c i rcumstances o f  the country" . 
Admi ttedly , i f  a par t icular matter is not an i s s ue and is ther e fore 
not necessary for the dec i s ion of a par t icular case , the cour t i s  not bound 
to deal with it , j ust as it is not bound to deal with anyth ing that counsel 
has not dealt with or  made submiss ions on . Never theless , it i s  submitted 
here that in PNG our j udges are requ i red to do mor e  than j ust dec ide cases : 
they have to dec ide with soc iety and the future very much in the i r  m i nds . 
In suppor t of the ' j udges merely apply the laws ' arg ument , i t  is often 
said that i t  would be a naked usurpt ion of leg islat ive powers o f  the 
Parliament i f  the j ud ic i ary attempted to change laws or  i ntroduce new ones 
by i t s  dec i s ions . Th is argument c e r tai nly doe s  not hold water in PNG wher e  
the Cons t itut ion confe rs o n  the j ud ic iary spec i f ic law reform and 
law-mak i ng and developing powe r s . I t  is also arg ued that j ud ic i al 
law-mak i ng would somehow affect the doctr ine of separat ion of powers , 
ther eby undermining the independence of the j ud ic i ar y .  Th is arg ument i s  
usual ly advanced b y  t h e  proponents o f  t h e  str ic t  Montesquieu theory o n  the 
separ at ion of powe r s . S t retch ing the doctr ine to its absurd conclus ion 
would mean that in PNG , M i n i ster s ,  as membe r s  of the Execut ive , could not 
s i t  in Parliament and introduce leg islat ion but here , as in other 
Commonwealth countr ies , most leg is lat ion i s  in i t i ated and introduced into 
Par l iament by Cabine t Minister s .  As for the independence of the j ud ic i ar y ,  
one f a i l s  t o  appr ec i ate how i t  could b e  affected adversely .  Independence 
does not mean to ex ist or to ope r ate in i solat ion . At least under the PNG 
Cons t itut ion , the j ud ic i ary cannot funct ion i n  a vacuum ;  i t  i s  r equi red to 
take an act ive role in the overall development of the country . In any 
case , as we ll as being the arbiter on const i tut ional quest ions and 
interpretat ion , the Supr eme Cour t has a clear leg i slat ive power in one 
spec ial respect : under s . 1 9  it has powe r to declare an ex ist ing or 
proposed law i nval id . The e f fect of dec lar ing a par t icular law i nval id i s  
t o  r epe al t h a t  l a w .  S o  for all intents and purposes ,  t h e  j ud ic i ary i s  
eng ag ed i n  leg islat ive func t ion s .  " P r oposed law" has been d e f i ned t o  mean 
a law that has been formally placed before P a r l i ament ( s . 1 9 ( 5 ) ) .  Just as a 
debate by Parl i ament would dec ide the fate of such a b i l l , the Supr eme 
Court intervene s ,  by r e fe r ence ( see s . 1 9 ( 3 ) ) ,  and dec lares whe ther or not 
the b i l l  can become law .  In th i s  r espec t the Cour t thus pe r forms also a 
leg islat ive funct ion . Schedule 2 . 5  requ i r e s  j udges to make r ecommendat ions 
as to improvement o f  the underlying l aw i n  the i r  annual reports ( see 
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s . 1 87 ) . If  the r ecommendat ions are accepted and implemented , the 
j ud ic iary, however i nd ir ec tly , is i nvolved i n  the mak ing o f  a new law .  
F i nally , the common law o f  England as at 1 5  S eptember 1 9 75 , i s  itse l f  
( as noted e ar l ie r ) , t h e  produc t  o f  centur ies o f  j ud ic ial law-maki ng . So 
when some j udges s t i l l  s ay they do not make laws , are they not resort ing to 
what Bentham cal led " a  ch i ld i sh f ic t ion " ?  S i r  John Salmond put i t : 
Doubtless j udges h ave many t imes alte r ed the law wh i le 
endeavour ing in good faith to declare i t . But we must 
r ecog n i ze a d ist inct law-creat ing power vested in them 
and openly and lawfully exercised ( S a lmond 1 947 : 1 79 ) . 
JUDI C I AL LAW-MAKI NG : THE PERFORMANCE 
One year after I ndependence , N i cholas O 'N e i l l  d id a pos t-mor tem on the 
law-mak ing per formance of the j ud ic i ary ( 1 976 ) . H i s  verd ict was that , w i th 
one notable except ion , the j udges had been r e l uc tant to take up the 
challeng e  g iven to them by the Cons t itut ion . 
Seven years after I ndependence the po s i t ion is s t i l l  the same , 
although there  have been , dur ing that per iod , some add i t ional except ions . 
There h ave been many oppor tun i t ies for the cour ts to be mor e  dar ing and 
innovat ive , but the j udges let most of them sl ip by.  Although all o f  them 
have taken g reat pains to acknowledge the i r  const itut ional obl ig at ion , i t  
wou ld seem that that i s  as far as they h ave been prepar ed t o  g o .  For 
instance , i n  the Re Rooney (No . 2 )  [ 1 979 ) PNGLR 4 4 8 , the Supr eme Court could 
have appl i ed c us tom when cons ider ing the quest ion of an appropr iate 
sentence . W i l son J i n  another ' mi ssed oppor tunity ' case , John Kaputin 
v .  State [ 1 979 ) PNGLR 5 59 , said that the S upreme Court in the Rooney Case 
g ave the par t ie s  the chance of adduc ing ev idence of custom in relat ion to 
sentence but that it was taken ne i ther by the prosecut ion nor by the 
defence . I w i l l  stand cor r ected on th i s , but I h ave found no such 
reference in the j udgment . My under stand ing on th i s  matter has always been 
that an attempt by Mr s Rooney ' s  counsel to adduc e  ev idence of custom for 
the purpose of ass ist ing the Cour t in determining the proper sentence was 
rej ected by the Cour t .  John Kaputin 's Case presented another opportun i ty 
to apply custom . The Supreme Cour t  d ism issed the appeal after refus ing an 
applicat ion for fresh ev idence to be called . Th is ev idence was to be on 
custom .  The bas i s  for the refusal was that Kaput in ' s  counsel at the t r i al 
had been aware of th i s  r e spons ib i l ity but- had chosen not to call the 
ev idence , and that the appeal ag a inst sentence was for the purpose o f  
r ev iew and n o t  for r e- t r i al . I t  i s  d i ff icult to apprec i ate t h e  Court ' s  
r ul ing on th i s  as the appeal ag ainst seve r i ty o f  sentence d id not d i spute 
the c r iminal law s anct ion but r ather its sever ity.  I n  th i s  respect , i f  
ev idence o n  customary s anct ions in t h e  ToZai soc iety were thought t o  be 
l ikely to r ender the appeal a re- t r i al ,  the very fac t  that the i ssue before 
the Cour t h ad po ss ible customary relevance or impl icat ions should have made 
the Court r ea l i se i t s  d uty to enter tain the ev idence . 
It wou ld seem that despite the frequent acknowledgements of the i r  
const itut ional obl igat ion , no real and consc ient ious e ffor ts are made by 
the cour ts to i nqui r e  into the pos s ib le appl icat ion of custom in any g iven 
case . Instead they i nvar iab ly r esor t  to the common law as the i r  f i r s t  step 
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and once a par t icular pr i nc iple or r ule of the common law i s  d iscovered , 
its  appl icab i l ity i s  accepted as a matter of cour se .  The r eal que s t ion as 
to whether or not a par t icular common law r ule or pr inc iple , though 
appl icable , i s  appropr iate to the c ircumstances of PNG r arely war r ants as 
much as a ment ion . 
It h as been s uggested ( N i cholas O ' N e i l l ,  above )  that the cour ts may 
have been going about the matter the wr ong way . I n stead of following the 
order of i nqu i ry env isaged by the Const itut ion , some j udge s  go d i rect to 
common law instead of going to custom f ir s t . The methodology suggested by 
Kapi J ( Wangi Savings and Loan Society Limited v. Bank of South Pacific 
Limited, unrepor ted j udgment ,  SC . 1 85 ,  2 5  November 1 980 ) would seem to be 
the followi ng : in a par t icular case before a cour t when there is no 
relevant wr itten law ,  an inqu i r y  is made of the unde r lying l aw ;  i n  th i s  
inqui r y  t h e  f i r s t  matter t o  be cons idered i s  custom ; i t  i s  o n l y  when there 
i s  no r elevant and appl icable r ule of custom to meet the facts o f  the case 
that r esor t  is made to the common law ( not before )  • If the inqui r y  
f in i shes u p  w ith a par t icular pr inc iple or  r ule of common l aw ,  i t  should 
not be appl ied as a matter of cour se . I t  h as to be determined whether th i s  
pr inc iple or r ule does in fac t  apply to PNG and i s  appropr iate t o  i t s  
c i rcumstances . I f ,  however ,  no r elevant under lying l aw ,  whether org inat ing 
from custom or the common law ,  i s  formed to meet the par t icular case , the 
cour t i s  bound to formulate a new r ule or pr inc iple to meet the spec i al 
cond it ions and c i r cumstances of the country ( Sch . 2 . 3 ) . I t  is s ubm i tted 
that generally the cour ts do not fol low the cor rect methodology , or , i f  
they do , custom gets a pass ing ment ion instead of be ing inqui r ed i nto 
deeply . 
In some instances the role of custom i s  dealt w i th per f unctor i ly at 
the outset befor e gett ing into the ser ious bus i ness  of trying and 
determin ing the case . In PNG Ready Mixed Concrete Pty Limited v. The 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea and UtuZa Samana e tc .  ( unrepor ted 
j udgment , N . 3 1 9 , 1 3  Oc tober 1 98 1 ) Mi les J dealt with c ustom as follows : 
Be fore tur n i ng to the pr inc iples o f  law to be appl ied 
to the facts as above stated , it is des i r able to record 
that counsel have ag r eed and I th i n k  r ightly that w i th 
reg ard to the cons ider at ion o f  Schedule 2 . 1 of the 
Constitution the case i s  not to be dec ided by any r ul e  
of Papua New Gu inea custom b u t  by r efer ence to the 
pr inc iples o f  law and equ i ty as they were i n  England on 
1 5  September ,  1 97 5 . 
So counse l  had adv i sed the cour t that custom was not r elevant to the 
case . One wou ld be interested to know how counsel ar r ived at the 
conclus ion . The ' squatter s '  i n  th i s  c ase had claimed that the 
Administrat ion had to f ind them alternat ive l and nearby as at the t ime the 
lease was g r an ted to the company they were alr e ady on the l and . 
Fur thermor e ,  it was argued that at no t ime before or after the lease to the 
company d id the Government make any moves to e j ect them from the land , and 
that before the lease was g r anted , they had not been not i f ied in order that 
they might lodge any obj ect ions ag a inst the g r ant . I t  is admitted that the 
subj ect land was Government land and that the people were , by l aw ,  
squatter s .  Never theless , one cannot help but th ink that because o f  the 
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c ircumstances sur round ing the case , pe rhaps some k i nd o f  customary r ight , 
m ight h ave been acqui r ed by them . 
There are also cases whe re the cour ts , wi thout cons ider i ng custom at 
all , ignor e a c lear common law pr inc iple to a r r ive at an unj ust dec i s ion . 
In Jacob Prai and Otto Ondawame [ 1 979 ] PNGLR 1 ,  an appeal ag ainst 
conv ict ion (of two We st I r ianese i l leg al immigr ants}  based on defect ive 
informat ion for dupl ic ity , defence counsel prope r ly arg ued that if the case 
h ad been tr i ed in England the appe llants would have been d ischarged . 
Saldanha J s aid th i s : 
But it must be bor ne in m ind that in our j ur isd ict ion , 
the pr inc iples and r ules o f  Eng l ish common law are 
adopted only " • • • except i f ,  and to the extent that they 
are inappl icable or i nappropr i ate to the c i rcumstances 
o f  the country from t ime to t ime" ( Sch . 2 . 2 ( 1 } (b} of the 
Cons t i t ut ion} ( ibid: 9 } . 
H i s  Honour then made the following ex traord inary statement : 
Th is event occur red at Vanimo wh ich i s  near the border 
with West I r ian and r emote from any b ig town where 
legal adv ice m ight be read ily available . Mo st 
mag istr ates are not leg ally qual i f ied , and , presumably , 
the mag istr ate who heard th i s  c ase was not so 
qual i f ied . From my own knowledge and exper ience o f  
po l icemen in Papua New Gu inea ,  I would say the 
pol iceman who drew up the informat ion would not be 
expected to be acquainted with such n iceties as the 
r ule ag ainst dupl icity that an informat ion must g ive 
the defendant reasonable informat ion of the nature of 
charg e .  In c i r cumstances s uch a s  those i n  th is case , I 
am of the v iew that r ig id adher ence to techn ical it ies 
in the appl icat ion of Engl ish common law is 
inapppror iate to the c i rcumstances of the country at 
the pr esent t ime and is l ikely to r esult in inj ust ice 
be ing done ( ibid. } . 
Does i t  mean then that one ' s  fate is determined by where  one was 
arrested and charged , and by who drew up the informat ion? The r ule ag ainst 
dupl ic ity appl ies d i ffer ently , so i t  would seem from His Honour ' s  r emarks , 
depend ing on whether one i s  in a remote outstat ion or in an urban are a .  
Why should a defendant be v ict im ised b y  t h e  shor tcoming s  o f  the system? 
One fails  to see how inj ust ice would be done if the r ule ag a inst dupl ic ity 
etc .  wer e  appl ied to the case . 
PROBLEMS OF ADMI N I STER I NG CUSTOMARY LAWS 
It has been argued that the reluctance to involve custom in the 
j ud ic ial process has been due in the main to the compos i t ion of the S upr eme 
and National Cour t bench and the leg al pr ofess ion . Th at is to say , the 
pr edom inance of expatr iates on the bench and in the profess ion means that 
they will  always be d i s incl ined to introduce and entertain ev idence of 
custom or any c ustomary con s iderat ions . Th is may be t r ue o f  the expatr iate 
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lawyer s  now , but cer ta inly not of the bench . The present bench has three 
j udges on i t  who are nat ional s  and mor e nat ional l awyer s  are pr act i s ing 
before the courts now than pr e- i ndependence . Perhaps c ustom w i l l  now be 
increas ing ly accorded the prominence i t  deserves , and we can hope for a 
general  improvement in the area of l aw r e form and development . But to r e ly 
completely on the chang ing composit ion of the bench and the bar to improve 
matte r s  is to ignore the fac t  that custom as a body of coher ent and 
determi nable law ,  must be f i r st ascer t ained . 
In th i s  r espect , the Ac t env isag ed by Sch . 2 . 1  ( 3 ) should be enacted 
without delay f It would seem that Par l i ament c annot rely on the j ud ic i ary 
to d ischarge i t s  d ut ies prope r ly without g iv ing i t  the means by wh ich it  
can do so . The cour ts have not the t ime nor the proper apparatus to 
inqu i r e  i nto areas wh ich are very much unknown and l i kely to include 
substan t i al local var i at ions . 
Another r eason g iven for the m inor role played by custom is that in a 
g reat maj or ity o f  cases the par t ies a r e  concerned pr imar i ly with quick 
determinat ion o f  the i ssue s  before the cour t .  T ime and money are involved 
in l i t igat ion and a par ty wou ld not be d isposed to hav ing h i s  case 
prolonged over matter s  that do not affect the outcome d irectly. Th is i s , 
of cour se , under standable . However ,  counsel and the cour ts must be ever 
aler t  to the fact that each c ase in PNG is a potent ial law-maker .  As well 
as dec id ing the par t icular i s s ues be fore i t , the cour ts are bound to evolve 
and develop a l aw s u i t able for PNG cond it ions and c i rcumstances . Hence the 
pr act i t ioner s  in PNG have a spec ial respons ib il i ty to assist  the cour ts in 
the i r  g reat t as k .  L i ke the j udge s ,  the lawyer s  of PNG must be v i ta l ly 
concerned with wh at the law ought to be because they too have an important 
role to play i n  the overall development of the country.  Every i ssue 
relevant to law r e form and development must be put before the cour ts for 
the i r  cons ider at ion and determ inat ion . 
Th e ' othe r  cour ts ' in the cour ts system too can and must contr ibute to 
the development of an under lying law.  Under s . 1 8 ( 2 )  they are r equi r ed to 
refer to the Supr eme Cour t any quest ions re lat ing to the interpr etat ion or 
appl icat ion o f  a const itut ional law.  Cases can also be s tated by the 
D i str ict Cour t for cons iderat ion and determ inat ion by the h igher cour ts . 
In add it ion ther e  are the spec i f ied pe r sons and author i t ies under s . 1 9 6 who 
can contr ibute to the overall development o f  an under lying law for the 
countr y ,  by r efer r ing matte r s  to the Supr eme Cour t .  
F i nally ,  one means b y  wh ich a t  least a start could b e  made now to g ive 
custom g reater prom inence i s  to ut i l ise the v i l lag e cour ts . The Vi llage 
Courts Act was passed in 1 973 to estab l i sh informal peopl e ' s  cour ts to 
fac i l it ate the resolut ion of d i sputes by t r ad i t ional means . To overcome 
the pr e sent d i l emma of the Supreme and National Cour t s , the v i l lage cour ts 
could become the repos i tory o f  c ustomary law .  Decis ions of these cour ts 
could be col lected and collated for use by the h igher cour ts . Eventual ly ,  
a determinable and defined body o f  customary law could emerg e . 
WHAT I S  THE CONTENT OF THE UNDERLY I NG LAW TO B E ?  
I t  is subm itted the frame r s  o f  the Const i tut ion env i saged that out o f  
common law and custom would emerge a body o f  law that would combine the 
aspects o f  the two systems most suitable for the curr ent cond i t ions and 
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c ircumstances of the country . I t  is hoped that th is is what will 
eventually r esult . To d i scard the common l aw completely in preference to 
custom would be , I s uggest , a retrograde step . After all , PNG has to ex i st 
in th is wor ld with other nat ions and other peoples . In th i s  r espect , some 
of its  laws and inst itut ions must r e flect those that obtain in other 
democrat ic countr ies . We cannot ex ist in i solat ion from the rest of the 
wor ld . Ultra-nat ional ism may not be the best th ing for PNG in th i s  day and 
age of internat iona l i sm .  We are in a un ique pos it ion to evolve someth ing 
that apprec iates the best of the two sys tems . 
CONCLUS I ON 
It has to be acknowledged , with r e spect , that the cour ts are faced 
with a formidable t as k  for wh ich they are ne i ther prope r ly equipped nor 
g iven adequate ass istance . It could thus be said that too much may be 
expected of o ur j udges . Perhaps the Const itut ion has cr eated unreasonable 
hopes and th i s  may in turn adver sely affect the j ud ic iary in the long r un .  
To do i n  the space o f , say , a decade , what the Engl ish j udges d id over a 
number of centur ies i s , w i thout a doubt , n igh on imposs ib le ( although the 
Eng l i sh j udges were not compel led , as our s are , by spec i f ic const itut ional 
mandates and other pr ov is ions) . Pe rhaps an under lying law that evolves 
g r adually wou ld be pr e fe r able to one result ing from ind iv idual ' r ushed 
j obs ' , as it were , from the j udge s . 
The und e r lying law must develop as a coher ent system in a manne r that 
is appropr iate to the c i rcumstances o f  the country from t ime to t ime , 
hav ing due r eg ard to the need for consistency (see Sch . 2 . 4 ) . It is 
subm itted that th i s  cannot happen i f  i nd iv idual j udge s  try to establ ish 
m i lestones in any and every c ase that comes be fore  them . The law reform 
and development funct ion must be car r i ed out as a co-ord inated effort  by 
the whole bench . Otherwi se , another problem will  be created in the process 
whereby all the b its and pieces scattered throughout many j udgments have to 
be sor ted out and collated . In the r ush to sat isfy the h igh expectat ions 
of the Cons t i tu t ion there  could be a tendency to make j ud ic ial 
pronouncements on v ar ious aspects of a par t icular law by i nd iv idual j udges 
with l ittle co-ordinat ion o f  the process . Th at is to say , the m ilestones 
from the cour ts may not be r at ional extens ions of each other . In the end 
these m ilestones may not prov ide a complete str uctur e .  
So perhaps we a r e  expect ing too much too quickly . However ,  the record 
of the cour ts so far , with except ions o f  cour se ,7 suggests that l ittle 
effort  h as been spent to make even a modest s t ar t .  It is poss ible , o f  
cour se , t h a t  t h e  j ud ic ial r e l uc tance u p  unt i l  now i s  connected with the 
status of the under lying law .  Under the Cons t i tut ion the unde r lying law i s  
subord inate t o  the const i t i t ional laws and leg islat ion . Consequently , i f  
leg al problems or issues c an b e  reso lved b y  reso r t i ng t o  the ex isting 
determinab le leg islat ion then why bother about developing someth ing wh ich 
will not enj oy equal and impor t ant status in the end? 
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NOTES 
1Judges are now appo inted for an i n i t i al term of three year s , r enewable 
for fur ther three-year terms . Ret i r ing age of the j udges i s  now set at 
f i fty- f ive year s , to be extended to s ixty by the J ud ic ial and Legal 
Serv ices Comm i s s ion . 
2wh ilst the j ud ic iary h as been reluctant in developing the under lying law ,  
the LRC , a t  least under the Chairmansh ip o f  Be rnard Narokob i , has made 
many r ecommendat ions and subm itted draft b i lls on them which have been 
v i r tually ig nored by the Government . 
3Sect ion 7 prov ides that c ustom shall not be taken i nto account except in 
spec i al c ir cumstances or unless not to do so would cause inj ust ice to the 
accused . 
4 It is s uggested that the Gove rnment/Parliament wou ld take mor e  not ice of 
recommendat ions from the j udges than from the LRC . 
5The Ac t was to make prov is ions for ( a ) proof and plead i ng 
any purpose ; ( b )  reg ulat ion of the manne r in wh ich , o r  
wh ich , custom may b e  recog n ised , appl ied o r  enforced ; 
resolut ion of confl icts o f  c ustom . 
of c ustom for 
the purpose for 
and ( c )  the 
6The author i t ies are : ( 1 )  the Parl iament ; and ( 2 )  the Head of State , 
ac ting with , and in accordance w i th , the adv ice of the Nat ional Execut ive 
Counc i l ;  and ( 3 )  the Law Of fice r s  of Papua New Gu inea ; and ( 4 )  the Law 
Re form Commiss ion ; and ( 5 )  the Ombudsman Commiss ion ; and ( 6 )  the 
Speaker ,  in accordance with Sect ion 1 37 ( 3 )  (Ac ts of I ndemnity) . 
Fo llowing the Vanuatu Case, ( unreported SC . 2 04  (Re ference SCR . No . 4  of 
1 980 ) , of 3 Aug ust 1 98 1 , the Le ade r of the Opposit ion has been added to 
the l is t . 
7 The Supreme Cour t ' s dec is ion on the 
Vanuatu Case ( see above ) ; and 
i solated cases . 
que s t ion of locus standi in the 
the except ional ind iv idual , are but 
20. THE I MPACT OF TH E PAPUA N EW G U I N EA CONSTITUTION 
ON TH E R ECOGN ITION AND APPLICATION O F  CUSTOMARY 
LAW 
D. Weisbrot 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
In the per iod in Papua New Gu inea ( PNG) from se lf-government in 1 973 
unt i l  full Independence i n  September 1 97 5 ,  d ur ing wh ich the Const i tut ional 
P l anning Comm ittee ( CPC) c anvassed the opinions o f  the populace and drew up 
i t s  bluepr int for the I ndependence Cons t i tut ion , there were many notable 
express ions of d iscontent from prom inent nat ional ists about the ' r ece ived ' 
or imposed system of l aw .  
The then Minister for Just ice , John Kaput i n ,  spoke of the law, as 
ut i l i sed by the Aust ralian author i t ies , as : 
an instr ument of dominat ion and oppr ess ion by the 
r u l ing c lasses • • •  an instrument o f  colonialism and a 
means whereby the econom ic dominance o f  the wh ite man 
was establ i shed over us ( Kaput in in a Minister ial 
Pol icy S tatement 1 973 : 1 -2 ) . 
The then Ch ie f Minister , M ichael Somar e ,  s t ated in 1 9 73 that : 
We are fac ing , at th i s  moment , the need to dev i se a 
system of laws appropr i ate to a sel f-governing , 
independent nat ion . The leg al system that we are in 
the process o f  creat ing must ensure the orde r ly and 
prog r e ss ive development of our nat ion . But , in 
add i t ion , it must r espond to our own needs and values . 
We do not want to create an im itat ion of the 
Austral ian ,  Engl ish or Amer ican legal systems . We want 
to build a framework of laws and procedur es that the 
people of Papua New Gu inea can recog n i se as the i r  own -
not someth i ng imposed on them by outs ider s .  There i s  
great scope for imag inat ion and c r eat iv ity in mak ing 
the law responsive to the needs o f  the people and I put 
th is challeng e  to all o f  you concerned about the future 
o f  our nat ion : how c an we build a l eg al sys tem that 
will  tr uly serve the people ' s  needs ( 1 974 : 1 4 ) . 
De spite th i s  clear d i ssat isfact ion w ith the inher ited leg al system , and the 
popular bel ie f  that c ustomary law should play a central role in the 
development of new laws and leg al inst itut ions , the Cons t i tu t ion wh ich 
eventually emerged failed to prov ide the bluepr int , or even the author ity ,  
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for th is legal t r ansformat ion . And fai led bad ly . Wh i le customary law does 
have a role to play in the leg al system of PNG , th i s  role is largely 
def ined and encouraged by leg i slat ive init iat ives mostly enacted or 
inspired pre- i ndependence and not by the Const i tut ion i t self . The 
failure o f  the Const itut ion to fac i l itate leg al change can probably be 
attr ibuted to three main factor s .  F i r st , there i s  an element of technical 
fa i lure in the prov i s ions r elat ing to legal development and the " under lying 
law" wh ich makes i t  d i ff icult for change to come through the courts . These 
matters are d iscussed in g reater deta i l  below . 
Secondly , there i s  the well- known phenomenon that once i ndependence i s  
achieved , t h e  rhetor ic g ives way to t h e  new polit ical ' r eal it ies ' .  The 
contest for power i s  no longe r  between the ind igenous people and the 
colon ial author i t ies , b ut between compet ing e lements within the indigenous 
soc iety . In the context o f  PNG , the clash of inte rests was between the 
emerg ing po l i t ical e l ite - gener ally young , urban-based , well- educated , and 
successful in under stand i ng and manipulat ing Western- s tyle pol i t ical , 
economic and leg al inst itutions and the t r ad i t ional leader s .  Th us 
' custom i s ing ' the leg al system would i nev itably tr ansfer power from the 
polit ic i ans who led the movement for i ndependence back to the t r ad i t ional 
leader s ,  and th is was not to be . 
F inally , the post-colon ial per iod has g ener ally been character i sed by 
a de-emphas i s  on law r e form , par t icular ly in contrast to economic develop­
ment concerns (We isbrot 1 9 80 : 2 1 7 ) . Pr obably because ' the law '  in the 
form of k iaps , nat ive regulat ions , l abour ordinances ,  l and r eg i stration 
schemes ,  t axat ion measur es , the Queensland C r im inal Code , and the cour ts 
appeared in the m inds of most Papua New Gu ineans to be the power ful 
cutting-edge o f  colon ial i sm ( F i tzpatr ick 1 9 80 : 25 1 -5 2 ) , there was a strong 
focus on law reform in the immed iate pre- i ndependence pe r iod . There were 
commiss ions of inquiry on land matters , court  structure and tr ibal 
fight ing , and a committee on const itut ional pl ann ing ; leg islat ive 
init i at ives on a host o f  topics ;  r estructur ing o f  the deg ree progr amme at 
the Un ivers ity ' s  Faculty of Law to teach " law in its soc i al context" ; the 
establi shment of a Law Re form Commiss ion ; and v igorous debates on how 
l eg al i nst itut ions should be tr ansformed . W i th in a few year s ,  however , 
with independence ach ieved , and a h ighly dependent economy , l eg al chang e  
was n o  longer v iewed a s  espec i ally compell ing . 
With r e ference to the Constitution i t se l f , the pos i t ion on four 
matte r s , central to the development of the nat ional leg al system , i s  
largely respons ible for the fai lure o f  c ustomary law t o  become a 
s ignif icant , much less pre-emine nt , source of law in PNG : ( 1 ) the 
releg at ion o f  the Nat ional Goals and D i rect ive Pr inc iples to the pr eamble , 
and the i r  non- j ust iciable natur e ;  ( 2 )  the fai lure to r equi re a review o f  
the colon i al leg i slat ion , wh ich was adopted holus-bolus ; ( 3 )  the sources 
of law prov 1 s 1ons , especially s . 9  and Sch. 2 ,  wh ich allow adopted wr itten 
law to pre-empt the foster ing of a Me lane s i an j ur ispr udence , and accord 
Eng l i sh common l aw and equity ' equal ' s tatus w i th i nd igenous c ustomary l aw;  
and ( 4 )  entrust ing the development o f  a nat ional " under lying law" to the 
j ud ic iary . 
In the body of th i s  paper I will  expand on these four matters in turn , 
and then d iscuss the now dormant recommendat ions of the PNG Law Re form 
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Commiss ion a imed at expand ing the r o l e  and scope o f  customary law ,  before 
prov id ing some h e s i t ant conclus ion s .  
T H E  NATI ONAL GOALS A N D  D I RECT I VE PRI NC I PLES 
The National Goals and D i rect ive Pr inc iples (NGDPs)  formulated by the 
CPC were intended by the Comm ittee to prov ide : 
A c lear definition of Papua New Gu inea ' s  most 
fundamental nat ional goals • • •  towards wh ich the people 
and we leaders are wor k ing . Th is should help to ensure 
that the se obj ect ives will become known throughout the 
country and prov ide a yardstic k  aga inst wh ich 
g overnment per formance can be j udged ( PNG CPC 
1 9 74 : 2/1 ) .  
The goals themselves r e fer mainly to soc ial , pol i t ical and economic 
concerns , but many would bear as well on quest ions of legal  development . 
For example , they call for " • • • d evelopment to take place pr imar i ly through 
the use o f  Papua New Gu inean forms of social and pol i t ical organ ization" 
(No . 1 (6 ) ) ;  for PNG " to be po l i t ically and econom ical ly independent " 
(No . 3 ) ; for the "wise assessment of for e ign ideas and values so that these 
will be s ubord i nate to the goal of nat ional sovere ignty and self- r e l iance " 
(No . 3 (5 ) ) ;  and for a :  
f undamental r e-or ientat ion o f  our att itudes and the 
inst itut ions of government , commerce , educat ion and 
r e l ig ion towards Papua New Gu inea forms of par t ic i­
pat ion , consultat ion , and consensus , and a cont i nuous 
renewal of the respons ivene ss of these inst i tut ions to 
the needs and att itudes of the People (No . 5 ( 1 ) ) .  
The CPC r ecommended that " Al l  courts and other adj ud icatory tr ibunals 
shall be g u ided in the exerc i se o f  the i r  funct ions" by the NGDPs . However ,  
i t  also r ecommended that they should " not be d irectly j ust ic iable " , 
c aut ion ing that never theless they : 
should not be reg arded by any cour t ,  othe r adj udicatory 
t r ibunal or inst itut ion o f  government as be i ng o f  less 
we ight than other d irectly j us t ic iable prov i s ions 
( ibid . : 2/2 5 ) . 
The recommendat ion also prov ided that the Government should make spec i f ic 
r e fe rence to the NGDPs in formulat ing and explaining nat ional policies and 
programmes . 
The Government s uppor ted these CPC proposal s , but po inted out that : 
Courts are not however to apply the goals as law but 
must administer the law as it stands • • •  The Government 
supports the r ule of law ,  wh ich r equires the cour ts 
must apply the law as i t  ex ists ( PNG Gov t .  Paper 
1 9 74 : 4 ) . 
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I n  the end , s . 2 5 of the Cons t itut ion spec i f ied that the NGDPs are 
non- j ust i c i able , 1 but imposed a duty on all governmental bod ies " to apply 
and g ive e f fect to them as far as l ies with i n  the i r  respect ive power s " . 
Fur ther , the NGDPs are said to be par t icular ly r elevant in the 
cons ide r at ions of the Ombudsman Conun i ss ion , e spec i ally i n  Leader sh ip Code 
matters ( s . 2 5 ( 4 ) ; and see s . 2 1 9 ( 1 ) ,  ( 2 )  and ( 3 ) ) .  Schedule 2 . 3  d irects the 
cour ts to have r eg ard to the NGDPs where no r ule of law appl ies and they 
are called upon to formulate a new r ule of under lying law ;  and s . 2 2 calls 
for r egard to be had for the NGDPs i n  j ud ic ial determ inat ion o f  the nature 
of r ights , powers  and duties recog n i sed by the Const i t ut ion (see also 
s . 3 9 ( 3 ) ( a ) ) .  
Const itut ional law author i t ies have expressed doubts as to whe ther the 
Supr eme Cour t j udges , par t icular ly those schooled in the Anglo-Austral i an 
tr ad it ion wh ich does not r eg ard the preamble to a piece of leg islat ion as 
an aid to interpretat ion , would be will ing to be g u ided by the NGDPs 
(Go ld r i ng 1 9 78 : 3 7-3 8 ) . In fact , these fears have been j ust i f ied by the 
pr act ice of the post- independence j ud ic iary . In the seven years s i nce 
Independence , the NGDPs have been g iven j ud ic ial con s iderat ion only a 
handful of t imes , 2 even though there we re many matters before the cour ts in 
wh ich they could h ave , and should have , been ut i l ised . Government , as 
well , h as r ar e ly thought i t  necessary to j ust i fy or explain pol icy 
dec i s ions in te rms of the NGDPs , and i ndeed many pol it ic i ans and 
bureaucr ats have been openly scornful of them ,  profess ing to v i ew them as 
someth ing of interest only to academics and ant iquar i ans . 
Thus it wou ld appear clear that the CPC ' s v is ion of the NGDPs as a 
' gu id ing lamp ' in nat ional and legal development has fallen far shor t  of 
the mar k .  
REV I EW O F  COLON I AL L EG I S LATI ON 
The CPC was adamant about the need for an autochthonous , or  
home-g rown , constitut ion . Re fer ences to the break w i th the colon ial past 
and f irm assert ions of nat ional sovere ignty and independence are scattered 
throughout the document wh ich c arr ies the po inted , i f  cumber some , name of 
"The Cons t itut ion o f  the Independent State of Papua New Gu inea " . The 
NGDPs , d iscussed above , are espec ially concerned with matter s  of 
sovere ignty , i ndependence , self- r e l i ance , and t r ad i t ional Me lanes ian ways . 
In i t s  approach to PNG ' s  internat ional obligations , the Cons t i tu t ion 
adopts , in s . 2 73 , a mod i f ied ' Nyerer e '  approach . Th at is , a pre­
i ndependence tr e aty could be ' resc ued ' by declar ing that PNG would treat i t  
" as i f  it were b ind ing " for a pe r iod not exceed ing f ive ye ar s . Al l other 
inte rnat ional ag r eements would be deemed to have lapsed , and even the 
resc ued t r eat ies wou ld be reviewed dur ing the f ive-year pe r iod . 
Th is r eservat ion of the r ight to pick and choose with reg ard to 
internat ional law was not , however ,  matched by a s im ilar scheme on the 
nat ional level .  The CPC d id r ecommend a r ev i ew o f  ex ist ing law :  
Ideally , only those ex isting laws wh ich are in 
conformity w i th the new Cons t itut ion should be adopted 
by i t . However ,  we recog n i ze the necess i ty to make 
And later : 
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prov 1s1on for a reasonab le t ime to elapse be fore the 
Const itut ion becomes fully e ffect ive in respect of the 
body of pr esently exist ing l aw ,  to e nable all of our 
present laws to be carefully r ev iewed , and incon s i stent 
laws r epealed or  amended as is appropr iate . We suggest 
that a pe r iod o f  two year s should prov ide suffic ient 
t ime for th i s  wor k  to be done ( 1 97 4 : 1 5/2 ) . 3 
We bel ieve that many of the laws that will  be in force 
at independence are more appropr iate to the 
c ircums tances of colon ial r ule than to a soc iety 
seek ing to ach ieve the National Goals and D i rect ive 
Pr inc iples . . .  The need for a thorough-going review o f  
our legal system i s  apparent to all of us  ( ibid. : 8/9 ) . 
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The CPC s uggested that such a rev iew b e  under taken b y  the Law Re form 
Commiss ion or by the ' spec ial body ' - a permanent committee of Par l i ament -
to be establ i shed with a br ief to r ev iew ex i s t ing laws : 
for the purpose of mak ing recommendat ions for the 
repeal or amendment of those laws wh ich are not in  
conformity w i th e i ther the National Goals and D i rect ive 
Pr inc iples or the Fundamental Human Rights and 
Obl igat ions ( ibid. : 1 5/2 ) . 4 
I n  i t s  f i nal form the Const itut ion make s no reference to such a 
leg i slat ive r ev iew . Sect ion 9 prov ides that the laws of PNG cons ist o f ,  
inter alia, laws " adopted b y  o r  under th is Const i tut ion " , and Sch . 2 . 6  
e ffect ively adopts all pre- i ndependence colon i al laws , a s  well a s  a number 
of Eng l ish and Aust r al i an ( Commonwealth) laws ( Sch . 5 ) . The Law Re form 
Commiss ion is charged with the " spec i al r espons ib i l i ty" of over see ing the 
development o f  the " under lying law" , or PNG common law ( see Sch . 2 . 1 4 ) , but 
no d irect ions are prov ided about review of ex i st ing leg i slat ion . 
Even where  ad hoe reviews were under taken they were not always very 
f r u itful . One good example is the r ev i ew of the Queens land Criminal Code 
( 1 89 9 )  wh ich appl ied in  both colon ial Papua and New Gu inea by v ir tue o f  
adopt ing ordinances . 5 G i ven a poss ible opportun i ty t o  rev iew and 
substant i ally r ev ise and adapt the Cr im inal Code , the Law Re form Comm ittee 
o f  the Just ice Depar tment d id r emar kably l ittl e . The Criminal Code Act 
( 1 974 ) wh ich eventuated was merely a conso l idat ion of colonial leg islat ion 
in PNG with some m inor amendments . The maj or law reform thr ust in ensur ing 
c ircumstant i al appl icab il ity was in r epl ac i ng r efe rences to " the Terr i tory" 
or "Austr al i a" with "P apua New Gu inea "  - but even here some oppor tun it ies 
were m issed . Unde r  the 1 974  Ac t ,  e . g . , i t  was s t i l l  a cr ime pun ishable by 
l ife impr isonment to " seduce any pe r son serv ing in the De fence Force of 
Australia • • •  from h is duty and alleg i ance to Her Maj esty" ( s . 4 1 ( a ) ) .  I t  
also retained such archaic offences a s  "De famat ion o f  For e ig n  Pr inces"  
( s . 5 3 ) ) ,  and the c l ass ically inappropr iate o ffence of be i ng found with a 
" blackened " face with intent to commit a cr ime ( s . 4 1 4 ( e ) ) .  These defects 
may now be r emed ied , however ,  by Sch . 2 . 7 ( 1 ) wh ich prov ides for 
non- substant ive changes in names , t i tles , o f f ices , per sons and inst itut ions 
necessary to adapt adopted leg islat ion to the c ircumstances of the countr y .  
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The maj or substant ive changes to the Code were the add i t ion of twelve new 
sect ions ( 1 58- 1 59 ,  1 6 1 - 1 69 ,  632 ) deal ing with counte r fe it ing cur rency , none 
of wh ich have been the subj ect of an i nd ictment s ince , and the e l im inat ion 
of offences r el at ing to r a i lways , wh ich do not ex ist in PNG . 
De spite  the fact that the Code po s i t ion on a 
matters d i ffers quite s ubstantially from t r ad it ional 
cr im inal responsibi l i ty (We isbrot for thcom i ng ) , and 
there is a wide g ulf between local att itudes and the 
the Code ' s  Ch . 2 2 on sexual offences ( ibid. : par a . 4 1 6 ,  
were made at all to these par ts o f  the Code . 
number of impor t ant 
Me lanes i an not ions of 
that , for example , 
V ictor i an mor a l i ty o f  
fn . 1 7 ) , no changes 
Thus the Const itut ion m i ssed a cr uc ial opportun i ty to ensure that 
there be established as part of the decolon isat ion process a systemat ic , 
comprehens ive r ev iew to determine the s u itab i l i ty of the adopted Anglo­
Austral i an leg i slat ion to the c ircumstances of an i ndependent , Me lanes ian 
s tate . G iven the fact that s . 9  and Sch . 2 ( see below) , i n  enumerating the 
sources of law and the components of an under lying l aw ,  make customary l aw 
and the NGDPs subord i nate to pos i t ive law ,  and the fac t  that some key areas 
of the law, such as cr iminal law ,  are almost ent irely statutory ,  the 
fai lure to rev iew and r ev ise the adopted leg islat ion has ensured the 
entrenchment of Anglo-Austral ian law and process , and the st ifl ing of 
init iat ives to adapt and " c ustom i ze" the law .  With the scope and 
const itut ional supr emacy of wr itten law, c ustomary l aw is left - on those 
r are occas ions when the j ud ic iary sees f it to cons ider i t  as a source of 
under ly i ng l aw only with an inter s t i t ial role , f i ll ing in the g aps in 
leg islat ive scheme s , or  in those i ncreas ing ly few areas not covered by 
leg islat ion . It should be r emembered that the common law and equ i ty 
prov is ions now r e l i ed upon by the cour ts were themselves developed in 
England dur ing a per iod of r e lat ive i nact ivity by the then undeveloped 
leg islat ive br anch , and well before par l iaments began to c losely r eg ulate 
so many ar eas o f  soc i al and commerc ial r e lat ions . 
THE CONST ITUTIONAL SOURCES OF LAW 
Sect ion 9 prov ides that : 
The 
( a) 
( b ) 
( c) 
( d )  
( e )  
( f )  
laws o f  Papua New Gu inea cons i s t  of -
thi s  Cons t i tu t ion ; and 
the Organic Laws ; and 
the Ac ts of the Parl i ament ; and 
Emergency Regulat ions ; and 
laws made under or adopted by or  
Cons t itut ion or any o f  those laws , 
subord inate leg islat ive enactments made 
Consti tut ion or any of those laws ; and 
the under lying law, and none other . 
under th i s  
includ ing 
under th i s  
Sect ion 3 7 ( 2 )  prov ides that n o  one "may b e  conv icted of a n  offence 
that is not de f ined by , and the penalty for wh ich i s  not presc r ibed by,  a 
wr itten law" . Therefore purely c ustomary offences may not g ive r ise to 
cr im inal l iab i l it ies in the cour ts , 6 even in the v i l lage cour ts - although 
the v i llage cour ts may pun ish a breach of a lawful order made with r eg ard 
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t o  a customary law ,  i nso far as th is i nvolves a n  element o f  contempt o f  
cour t .  
Sect ion 2 0  prov ides that a n  Act o f  Par l i ament shall declare , and 
prov ide for the development o f ,  the under lying law of PNG . As no such Ac t 
has yet been promulgated - or even debated - the ' trans it ional ' prov 1s 1ons 
o f  Sch . 2  s t i ll apply . The purpose of Sch . 2 ,  accord ing to s . 2 1 , " is to 
assist in the development of o ur ind igenous j ur ispr udence , adapted to the 
chang ing c i rcumstances of Papua New Gu inea" . 
Schedule 2 . 1 prov ides that : 
c ustom is adopted , and shall be appl ied and enforced , 
as par t  of the under lying l aw [ except] in respect o f  
any custom that i s , and t o  the extent that it  is , 
i ncon s i stent with a Const itut ional Law or a statute , o r  
r epugnant t o  t h e  general pr inc iples o f  human ity . 
The prov i s ion i s  s im ilar in terms to the Native Customs (Reaognition) Aat 
( 1 96 3 )  s . 6 , wh ich imposes two add it ional qual i f icat ions : that the custom 
not be against the publ ic interest 1  and that it  not adver sely affect the 
welfare of a ch i ld .  Schedule 2 . 1  ( 3 )  also prov ides that an Act of 
Parliament m ay ( 1 )  prov ide for the proof and plead ing o f  any custom1 and 
( 2 ) r egulate the manner in wh ich , or the purpose for wh ich , custom may be 
recog n i sed , appl ied or enforced 1 and ( 3 )  prov ide for the r eso lut ion of 
confl icts of custom .  As the Parliament has not yet acted , those matte r s  
are a l l  st i l l  governed b y  t h e  prov i s ions o f  the colon ial e r a  Native Customs 
(Reaognition) Aat.  
Schedule 2 . 2  adopts the pr inc iples and r ules o f  the common law and 
equity of England ( includ ing the Royal Pr erog ative , s ubj ect to spec ial 
qual if icat ions contained in sub- s . ( 2 ) ) i n  ex i stence at the t ime of 
Independence , notwithstand ing statutory r ev is ion ,7 as the other main source 
of the under lying l aw ,  except i f ,  and to the extent that : 
( 1 )  they a r e  i ncon s istent w i th a Const itut ional Law or a Statute 1 o r  
( 2 )  they a r e  i nappl icable or inappropr iate t o  the c i rcumstances o f  the 
country from t ime to t ime 1 o r  
( 3 ) i n  the i r  appl icat ion to any par t icular matter they are incons istent 
with c us tom as adopted by [ Sch . 2 . 1 ) .  
Notice that wh i le the common law i s  made subj ect to a j ud ic ial 
determinat ion o f  c ir cumstant ial appl icab i l i ty and appropr iateness ( see 
be low) , it i s  assumed that , unl ike customary law ,  there will be no clash 
with " the gene r al pr inc iples of humanity" . ( Fo llowers  of the opin ions o f  
the European Cour t o f  Human R ights may f i nd th i s  assumpt ion somewhat 
i l l- founded. ) 
An aff irmative duty is placed on the National Jud ic i al System , 
par t icular ly on the Supreme and National Cour ts , to formulate an 
appropr iate r ule as part of the under lying law where ne i ther custom nor the 
common law are appl icable . In formulat ing such a r ule , the Court must have 
regard to several factor s ,  includ ing the NGDPs and the Basic R ights under 
Sch . 2 . 3 .  
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The Law Re form Comm i ss ion i s  g iven a " special respons ibil ity" to 
r epor t to the Parliament and the National Execut ive Counc i l  from t ime to 
t ime on the development of the under lying law ( s . 2 1  and Sch . 2 . 1 3-2 . 1 4 ) . 
At f i rst g l ance , with c ustom l i sted as the init ial source of the 
under ly ing law, adopt ion of the common law made subj ect to con s i stency with 
adopted c ustom , the wide r ange of subs id iary sources available in 
formulat ing a new r ule of under lying law ,  and the aff i rmat ive duty placed 
on the j ud ic iary to develop the under lying l aw ,  the const itut ional scheme 
r eg ard ing sources of law would appear to have made good the CPC ' s  wish that 
customary l aw form the bas i s  o f  the new legal  system and that a un iquely 
Me lane s i an j ur ispr udence be developed . In pr act ice , however ,  this i s  far 
from be i ng the case (We isbrot for thcoming 1  N a rokob i 1 9 77 : 5 2 1  and O ' Ne ill 
1 9 76 : 245, 249 , 252-5 8 ) . 
In essence , the const itut ional scheme has  fai led to propel customary 
law to the for e because i t  d id not fully take into account the 
pre- independence exper ience of the relat ive l ack o f  impact on the legal 
sys tem o f  the Native Customs (Reaognition) Aat ( 1 96 3 ) . Cons ider at ion of 
that expe r ience would have po inted up several problem areas . Fi rst , that 
the wr itten law ,  par t icular ly in certain areas such as c r im inal law ,  is so 
extens ive that there is o ften l ittle room to manoeuvre in incorporating 
custom . Second , that the cour ts and coun se l ,  s t i l l  largely expatr iate , 
have often been strongly ant ipathet ic towards c ustomary law ,  or , at best , 
unfamil iar  with local custom . Th ird ,  whe r e  customary law "may" be taken 
into account it  almost surely will not be . I f  i t  is the po l icy to 
encour age the use o f  customary law ,  an affirmat ive duty , without easy 
escape c lauses and with appropr iate sanc t ion s , must be placed on the cour ts 
and counse l .  Four th , the r e  are enormous d i f f iculties inherent in 
ascert ain ing c ustomary l aw on a case-by-case bas i s , and in separating 
customary " rules of law" from customary process , and in overcoming 
confl icts between d ifferent c ustomary r eg ime s , even where the cour ts and 
counsel act in the best of faith .  F i fth , because o f  the problems o f  ad hoa 
ascerta inment desc r ibed above , thought must be g iven to prov id ing 
inst itut ional ass istance to the cour ts and throwing out ascertainment 
quest ions to the wider community,  by the recognit ion of ch iefly author ity 
in appropr iate cases , or through the use o f  assesso r s  or r e ferees , or by 
nat ional or provinc ial or local governmental recognit ion ( through 
leg islat ion or other means) of g ener al pr inc iples o f  customary law where 
poss ible , o r  by other means ( We isbrot for thcom ing ) . And s ixth , r ecognit ion 
of the inev itab i l ity of the common law being adopted where it "may" be , 
g iven the tr ain ing and d i spos i t ion of leg al per sonnel and the customary law 
ascertainment problems descr ibed above . 
THE JUD I C I ARY AND THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF UNDERLY I NG LAW 
Schedule 2 does attempt to coax the j ud ic i ary i nto responsibil ity for 
the development of the under lying law .  As d i sc ussed above , Sch . 2 . 3  places 
a duty on the bench to formulate new rules of under lying law where 
necessar y .  Schedule 2 . 4  prov ides that : 
In all cases , it is the d uty of the National Jud ic i al 
System ,  and espec ially of the S upr eme Cour t and the 
National Cour t ,  to ensure that , w i th due reg ard to the 
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need for consistency , the under lying law develops as a 
coherent system in a manner that is appropr i ate to the 
c ircumstances of the country from t ime to t ime , except 
inso far as it would not be proper to do so by j ud ic ial 
act .  
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Schedule 2 . 5  prov ides that in the i r  annual r eport to Parl iament , under 
s . 1 87 ,  the J udges shall : 
i f  in the i r  opin ion it is des i r able to do so 
comment on the s tate , suitab i l i ty and development 
of the unde r lying l aw ,  w i th any r ecommendat ions as to 
improvement that they think it prope r  to make (see , 
e . g . , PNG SC 1 976 : 1 -2 ;  1 9 77 : 2-3 ) . 
Even with the ascertainment problems l isted above , the scheme 
contained in Sch . 2  for the r ecognit ion of c ustom and the development of the 
under lying law ,  coupled with the d uty placed on , and the t r ust placed in , 
the j ud ic iary , could have enabled a progress ive and innovat ive bench to 
move towards the fuller integ r at ion of c ustomary law in the legal system , 
decreased r e l i ance on the common law ,  and g r ad ual development of new r ules 
o f  under lying law par t icular ly s u ited to the needs and cond it ions of PNG . 
In the words of the CPC : 
In carrying out the i r  j ud ic ial role , j udge s  and 
mag istr ates must take full account of the goals o f  the 
soc iety in wh ich they l ive ; they must be attuned to 
the wishes of that soc iety and to that extent must be 
po l i t ically consc ious ( although not par ty po l i t ically 
consc ious)  ( 1 97 4 : 8/1 , 8/1 5- 1 6 ) . 
The CPC d id recog nise that there were d isadvantages in g iv i ng the ma in 
respons ib i l ity for legal development to the j ud ic i ary . In par t icular , i t  
recog n i ses that " cour ts tend t o  b e  formal istic and leg a l i s t ic " ; that the 
j udiciary was pr edom inantly expatr i ate ; that the courts , as f inal arbi te r s  
of t h e  Cons t itut ion , could over shadow " the powe rs of other inst itut ions 
wh ich expr ess mor e  d i r ectly and clear ly the w i shes o f  the people" ;  that 
the cour ts have a l im ited capac i ty to e f fect comprom ises (ibid . : 8/1 5 ) ; and 
that a bui lt- in tens ion ex i sts between the cour ts ' role as protector of 
ind iv idual r ights and l iber t ies and the i r  role as determine r s  of pub l ic 
pol icy and fac i l itator s of nat ional goals (ibid . : 8/ 1 ) . 8 
Even had the cour ts taken the CPC r ecommendat ions and the 
const itut ional scheme ( Sch . 2 )  to hear t ,  j ud ic ial development of an 
ind igenous j ur ispr udence on a case-by-case bas i s  would , of neces s i ty ,  have 
been a s low process (PNG SC 1 977 : 3 ) . Wh ile the CPC d id have its  eyes open 
to the d i sadvantages l i sted above , I do not bel ieve that they we re pr epared 
for what d id ,  in fact , eventuate : the cour ts returned to business as usual 
after the formal i t ies o f  Independence , applying the common law wi thout 
he sitat ion or indeed cons ider at ion , as r equ i r ed by Sch . 2  - and almost 
ent irely ignor ing the NGDPs and customary l aw .  Th is s i tuat ion has 
cor rected itsel f  somewhat with the par t ial local isat ion of the Supreme 
Cour t and several new appo intments in the wake of the ' Rooney Af fair ' 
r es ignat ion s .  
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The following i s  a ( by no means comprehens ive) s ample of cases in 
wh ich the cour ts demonstr ated r emarkable narrowness and a pred i spos i t ion 
towards f ind ing the common law " appl icab le and appropr iate" without any 
s ignif ic ant , or most- t imes even c ur sory , exam inat ion of c ustom . 
In State v .  Kewa Kai [ 1 97 6 ]  PNGLR 4 8 1 , the Cour t cons idered the 
unwr itten r equ i r ement o f  cor roborat ion in r ape cases under s . 3 57 of the 
Code , and found that before I ndependence it amounted to a r ule of pr act ice 
fall ing shor t o f  a r ule of law .  Pr ent ice DCJ ( as he then was) held that 
after I ndependence if i t  amounted to a r ule o f  law then it was cons istent 
with the wr itten law and appl icab le and appropr iate to the c ircumstances o f  
t h e  country and " not incons i stent with estab l i shed custom " ; i f  it was 
s t i l l  a r ule of pract ice then i t  was con s i stent with the pr inc iples o f  
natural j ust ice . Without any r eal d i scuss ion of the customary s ituat ion , 
H i s  Honour concluded that the cor roborat ion r ule ' s :  
con t inued appl icat ion would I th i n k  be i n  keeping with 
the development of the under lying l aw that is imposed 
as a duty upon the courts ( at 482 ) . 
In W. A .  Flick & Co . v .  Thompson [ 1 976 ] PNGLR 1 1 2 ,  Saldanha J appl ied 
the common law on restrai nt of t r ade without any d i sc uss ion of whether th i s  
amounted t o  adopt ion o f  a n  under lying law or any cons iderat ion of c ustom o r  
publ ic po l icy ( appl icable and appropr i at e  t o  the c i rcumstances of the 
country) (O 'Ne ill 1 9 76 : 254-55 ) .  S im ilar ly i n  Government of PNG v .  McCleary 
[ 1 976 ] PNGLR 3 2 1 , the S upreme Court laid down new pr inc iples for assess ing 
d amages for non-economic loss w i thout any r e ference to the unde r lying law 
( O 'Ne ill 1 976 : 2 57-58 ) . 
In Buka v .  Lenny [ 1 978 ] PNGLR 5 1 0 ,  the quest ion before the Cour t was 
whether a customary brother was a " near est  relat ive " for the purposes of 
br ing ing a complaint reg ard ing adultery under Native Administration 
Regulation (New Guinea) 8 4 ( 3 )  in the absence of the aggr ieved spouse . 
Wi lson J found that wh i le the leg i slat ion appl ies only to ind igenes , and 
Melane s i an society is organised along k insh ip l ines and char acter ised by 
extended fam il ies , that never theless the word " relative "  in the reg ulat ion 
must be interpreted as " a  blood relation"  or " de scended from a common 
ancestor " 9 
In Constitutional Reference No . 1  of 1 9 7 7 :  Poisi Tatut v .  Chris 
Cassimus [ 1 97 8 ]  PNGLR 2 9 5 , the S upr eme Cour t cons idered the quest ion o f  
whether an act ion for ent icement w a s  avai lable in PNG . The Cour t found 
that the Eng l i sh common law on ent icement was vacated by l eg i slat ion i n  
1 9 70 and could thus n o t  have been adopted under Sch . 2 . 2 .  Pr ent ice C J  then 
interpr eted Sch . 2 . 4 ,  wh ich places a duty on the cour ts to : 
e nsure that , with due r eg ard to the need for 
cons istency , the under lying law d evelops as a coherent 
system in a manner appropr iate to the c i rcumstances of 
the country from t ime to t ime 
as r equ i r ing that any custom adopted as par t  of the under lying law must 
obtain throughout the country : 
CONSTITUTION AND CUSTOMARY LAW 
before undertaking the duty o f  formulat ing an 
appropr iate r ule as par t  of the under lying law ,  i n  
reg ard t o  a matter close-kn i t  into the fabr ic of 
trad i t ional v il l age l i fe ,  the Cour t would I th ink , need 
to have ev idenced before i t  an appropr iate almost 
country-wide custom ( ibid . : 2 98 ) . 
2 8 1  
As baffled counse l could not adduce ev idence o f  a nat ional c ustom the Court 
refused to act at all .  The Court d id not adver t  to the Native Customs 
(Recognition) Act s . 4 ,  wh ich obviously recog n i se s  that c ustom may vary 
accord ing to " the place in r elat ion to wh ich that quest ion ar ises " , and 
establishes procedures for resolv ing confl icts of c ustomary r eg imes ( s . 1 0 ) . 
G iven the 7 00 or mor e  d i fferent tr ibal g roups in PNG , e ach with its  own 
customs and usages , th i s  r ul ing makes it ext r aord inar i ly d if f icult for even 
the most enthus ias t ic and consc ient ious counsel to assert that a r ule of 
under lying l aw should be based on c ustom . The r ul ing bel ies Ra ine DCJ ' s  
statement that : 
In some quarters i t  is fash ionable to suggest that the 
S upr eme Cour t is sh i r k ing th i s  duty [ under Sch . 2 . 3 ,  to 
develop the under lying l aw] . It is not so . we are not 
g iven the tools with wh ich to wor k  ( ibid . : 2 99 ) . 
It is most i ron ic that the Cour t has used a queer interpr etat ion of the 
very prov i s ion of the Cons t itut ion wh ich imposes a duty on i t  to develop 
the unde r lying law in order to thwar t th i s  d uty. Indeed , Saldanha J ' s  
j udgment poses the c lass ic Catch 22  s ituat ion : s ince the r e  i s  no ev idence 
of a nat ional c ustom , custom may not be adopted ( under Sch . 2 . 1 )  as the 
under lying law, but " as long as the r e  is a doubt that there may be a r emedy 
at customary law • • •  it would not be proper • • • to formulate a r ule of 
[ under lying ] law on th i s  subj ect" ( under Sch . 2 . 3 ) . De spite the duty placed 
upon the Cour t by the Cons t itut ion , Saldanha J prefer r ed to leave the 
matter to Parl iament . 
In State v .  Misimb Kais [ 1 97 8 )  PNGLR 2 4 1 , the accused was charged with 
hav ing carnal knowledge of a g i r l  al leged to be h i s  adopted daughter under 
custom ( in accordance with the Adoption of Chi ld.Pen (Customary Adoption) 
Act ( 1 96 9 ) s . 5 ( 1 ) ) .  Andrew J found after rev iewing s im ilar prov i sions in 
leg i slat ion from New Z e aland , Queensland , Victor i a ,  New South Wales , and 
Tasmani a  ( but not looking to customary law) that " s . 2 26 • • • c annot be read so 
as to include the o ffence of incest between adopt ive parent and child "  ( at 
252 ) . 
The S upr eme Cour t unanimously approved o f  th i s  j udgment in Sangumu 
Wauta v .  State [ 1 97 8 )  PNGLR 3 26 , a case with par allel facts . Pr entice CJ , 
h av i ng accepted Andr ew J ' s  i nterpretat ion of s . 2 26 , also po inted to the 
cons t i tut ional inj unct ion ( s . 3 7 ( 2 ) ) aga inst conv ict ing a per son for an 
offence not def ined by a wr itten law ;  the fact that under both the Native 
Customs (Recognition) Act ( s . 6 )  and the Const itut ion (Sch . 2 . 2 ) custom i s  
subord inate to t h e  wr itten law ;  and the l im ited purposes for wh ich custom 
i s  ava i lable in cr iminal cases under s . 7  o f  the Native Customs 
(Recognition) Act .  Pr ent ice CJ makes h is l ack of enthus i asm for " the 
incr ustat ion of unwr itten ( var i able)  custom upon the pi l lars of the 
Cr im inal Code " plain : 
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I s  the Cr>iminaZ Code 's prov is ions a s  to incest to take 
e ffect in the d if fe rent soc i e t ies and v i l lage s  
d iffe rent ially according t o  what may b e  proved as the 
part icular adopt ion process and its part icular local 
e ffect in e ach par t icular case? S uch a poss ib i l ity 
would render the ope r at ion o f  the Statutory C r im inal 
Law and its administrat ion qui te uncer tain . F i nd i ngs 
o f  g uilt in each case , would depend not upon the terms 
of the S t at ute , but upon the evidence as to the 
par t icular " law" in each case . Availab i l ity of 
w i tnesses as to such " law" , and the var i able enthus i asm 
of prosecuting counsel and of pol ice , in procur ing 
the i r  attendance , would surely prove an unsatisfactory 
bas i s  for find ing the Zaw. S uch a proces s  would 
poss ibly m i l itate s trong ly against the development of 
"a coherent system" o f  unde r lying law (Sch . 2 . 4  of the 
Constitution) ( ibid. : 332-33 ) . 
In State v .  Aubafu FeaJna & Ors [ 1 97 8 ]  PNGLR 3 0 1  " three very pr imi tive 
v illage men from a r emote part o f  the Weste r n  P r ov ince " wer e  charged with 
improper or i ndecent inter fe rence with a cor pse , i n  v iolat ion of s . 24 1 ( b) 
of the C r iminal Code , for r emov ing some par t s  of a corpse and subsequently 
eating them . Ev idence was placed before the Cour t that in the accused ' s  
impover i shed v i llage area , i t  was not uncommon to eat dead bod ies for meat , 
but in r ecent years with increased government contact and influence the 
pract ice had g r adually d i sappeared , or at least became mor e  clandest ine . 
Wi lson J posed a test of " gene r al community s tandards " :  
The average contemporary Papua New Gu inean will be one 
with average att itudes to matter s  of l ife and death and 
to matte r s  r e lat ing to food wh ich is good to eat . He 
will not be a man g iven to h istr ion ics or extreme 
abho r r ent r e act ion s ,  but , on the other hand , he will 
not be lacking in some emot ional feel i ng and he will 
have the ab i l ity to th ink . He w i l l  be affected by the 
t r ad i t ions of his ancesto r s  and he will be aware that 
he i s  l iv ing in a chang ing wor ld .  He will be a 
v i llager in heart and in pr act ice a moder ate 
Me lanes ian man ( ibid. : 3 09- 1 0 ) . 
The advent of the ' moder ate Me lanes ian ' mar k s  a sharp move away - but one 
that has not as yet been followed by Wilson J ' s  brother j udge s  - from the 
long l ine of dec i s ions wh ich h ave tended to measure r easonablene ss , 
decency , propr iety and other l ike concepts ag ainst the s tandards of the 
accused ' s  local community . 1 0  As with the d ec i s ion in the Poisi Tatut 
( ent icement) case , the g ener al community standard would make it very 
d iff icult to present a c ustom-based de fence . In the present case ev idence 
of custom was in fac t  presented , but Wi lson J r efused to adopt or apply i t  
because : 
s uch a custom ,  in so far as i t  condoned acts o f  
cann ibal i sm ,  could not be adopted and appl ied in th i s  
Cour t ,  because unquest ionably i t  i s  r epugnant t o  the 
gene r al pr inc iples of humani ty and • • •  i s  unlawful . 
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The accused were conv icted and sentenced to f i fteen months with hard labour 
( twelve months of wh ich we re served in pr e- t r ial detent ion) out of a 
max imum l i ab i l i ty of two year s .  
The r ecent case of State v .  Uncune Auname & Or>s 
h ighl ights many of the problems already d isc ussed . 
repor ted as a :  
[ 1 98 0 ]  SC , No . 1 90 , 
The case was widely 
l andmark in j ust ice in Papua New Gu inea , one wh ich 
encompasses the important quest ions of the suitab i l i ty 
of Western- s tyle j us t ice in a non-We stern country and 
the related que s t ion of " j ustice"  versus " legal i ty" 
( Byrne 1 98 1  : 6 ) . 
In th is c ase f ive accused , includ ing the son o f  the deceased , were charged 
with the wi lful murder of an old woman , who was alleged to be known in the 
community as a sorceress respons ible for the deaths o f  at least twenty 
people ,  at Porge r a ,  Enga Prov i nce . The accused i n i t i ally r ecorded pleas o f  
g u ilty , b u t  after r ev iewing t h e  records o f  interv iew t h e  t r i al j udge , Mr 
Bernard Narokobi ( see unrepor ted dec i s ion of National Cour t ,  4/6 /8 0 )  
decl ined to accept th i s  plea in relat ion t o  the son , who was later 
acquitted in a separ ate proceed ing . The four accused whose g u i lty pleas 
were accepted were each sentenced to three months ' impr i sonment with hard 
labour , and e ach was ordered to pay compensat ion o f  f ive mature pigs to the 
deceased ' s  other son immed iately upon release . The Public Pr osecutor 
appealed against the inadequacy of th i s  sentence , wh ich set in mot ion the 
Supr eme Cour t hear ing . Narokobi AJ , who had been a leg al adv iser to the 
CPC and the f i r st Ch ai rman of the Law Re form Commiss ion , arr ived at h i s  
dec is ion on sentence after a leng thy and deta i led d i scuss ion of t h e  public 
pol icy cons iderat ions involved in the case . He determ ined f ir st , that " it 
is not uncommon , not only in the s i tuat ion of Enga but throughout PNG , to 
k i l l  sorcerers  or sorce resses" and that " fear of sorcery i s  a r eal i ty" even 
among st educ ated , chur ch-going people (see ibid . : 2 ) . Narokobi J expr es s ly 
resolved to s i t  " as a Melanes i an J udge among Me lanes ians . I r un a g r ave 
r isk  that I m ight put on Anglo-Aust r a l i an cognit ive lenses to see 
Melane s i an s i tuat ions and events" (ibid . : 3 ) . He then enumerated the 
spec i f ic matte r s  taken i nto cons iderat ion , wh ich included , inter aZia , that 
the mot ive for the k i ll ing had not been mater ial g a in or elevated soc i al 
stand ing , but r ather was in the natur e of sel f-defence ag ainst a feared 
sorceres s 1  that the offence was committed under colour of customary 
percept ions , beliefs and obligat ions to the c l an 1  that it was not done i n  
open defi ance o f  the leg i t imate author i ty o f  the state as ev idenced b y  the 
fact that the accused immediately g ave themselves up to the i r  tuZtuZ , its 
local repr esentat ive 1 that subsequent event s showed s ig ns o f  r epentance , 
r est itut ion and " r estor at ion of human relat ions stra ined " , as ev idenced by 
the defendants ' offe r s  of compensat ion to the deceased ' s  k in 1  and that the 
danger to the community posed by the accused was " largely set off by the i r  
cultur al environment" .  
Narokobi J also cons idered the r elevance of the NGDPs , and the 
const i tut ional duty to develop the under lying law .  As to the former , he 
wrote in r e ference to the NGDPs of " Integ r al Human Development" : 
The struggle to b r i ng about a nat ion in wh ich all men 
will g ive and r ece ive through co-ope r at ion and sol id-
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a r ity must be faced by the courts o f  l aw .  We must ask 
the fundamental quest ion . Do j udge s  contr ibute towards 
j ust ice by pl ac ing people beh ind bar s for long per iods? 
(ibid . : 9 ) . 
The under lying law prov i s ions o f  Sch . 2 were r a i sed in r elat ion to the order 
for compensat ion . Re lying on Schs . 2 . 1 ( recog n i t ion o f  c ustom) and 2 . 4  
( j ud ic ial developments of the law) together with s . 1 09 ( 4 ) 1 1  or 
alternat ively on Sch . 2 . 3  ( development o f  a new r ule o f  unde r lying law)  
coupled with s . 1 09 ( 4 )  and s . 7 ( e ) of the Native Customs (Recognition) Act 
( wh ich permits a cour t to take custom into account in sentenc ing ) , Narokobi 
J wrote that : 
Be ar i ng in m ind also the d uty imposed on me by the 
Constitut ion to develop the under lying law ,  I would 
take the view that the c i rcumstances o f  th i s  country 
demand that compensat ion as a form of l iab i l ity be 
recogn i zed and appl ied . I do so in th i s  case 
( ibid : 1 4 ) •1 2  
As an ind icat ion o f  the impor tance o f  the issue s  involved , the Ch ief 
Just ice , S i r  Bur i K idu , l isted f ive j udges ( as opposed to the normal three) 
to hear the appeal o f  the S upr eme Cour t .  The f ive j udges unanimously 
upheld the appeal , quash ing the order for compensat ion and impos ing a 
s ix-year sentence on the four accused ( less seven months t ime alr eady 
served in custody) . About hal f of the 3 9-page dec i s ion is devoted to 
d i sc uss ion of a procedur al point reg ard i ng temporal l im itat ions on the 
inst itut ion of an appeal by the Public Prosecutor ( under the Supreme Court 
Act ( 1 97 5 )  and the Supreme Court Rules ( 1 97 7 ) ) ,  i nc lud ing v ir t ually al l of 
the opin ions o f  Grev i l le-Smi th and Kearney JJ , wh ich i s  i tself interest ing , 
but the S upreme Cour t does as we ll cons ider que st ions of j ud ic i al 
development of the under lying l aw .  
On t h e  quest ion of sentence all j udges expressly ag reed with the Ch ie f 
Just ice that the penalty imposed by the tr ial cour t was " gros s ly inadequate 
for the c r ime of w i l ful murde r "  ( Uname Auname , SC , No . 1 90 ,  at 1 ) . K idu CJ 
wrote that wh ile i t  was quite proper to cons ider cultur al factor s i n  
sentenc ing , they : 
should not ove rr ide the c lear d ictates of the 
Parliament that those who commit the cr ime of w i l ful 
murder attract to themselves the poss ible penalty of 
impr isonment with hard labour for l ife . If Parliament 
represents the people of PNG and the laws it make s 
reflect the att itude of the people , then Cour ts must 
take heed ( ibid . : 3 ) . 
Th is last l ine was not meant to be rhetor ical , apparently , although it does 
r a ise the po i n t , left unment i oned by the cour t ,  that the l eg i s l at ion i n  
quest ion i s  t h e  Cr im inal Code wh ich , as d i scussed above , was adopted from 
Queensland with l ittle mod if icat ion . 
The opin ion wh ich cons ide r s  most closely the re levance of customary 
law and the propr iety o f  j ud ic ial boldness is that of Mr Just ice Kapi . 
Wh ile r ecog n i s ing the wide d iscret ion and powe r s  of the sentenc ing j udge to 
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impose an appropr iate penalty in a part icular case , Kapi J found that of 
necess ity th is d i scret ion may be exercised only within  the bounds laid down 
by the relevant leg islat ion . In th i s  case , the cour t ' s power to pun i sh was 
controlled by s . 1 9  of the Cr im inal Code wh ich spec i f ies the types of 
pun ishments wh ich may be appl ied and by s . 309 , wh ich specif ies the 
pun ishment for wilful murder . K api J r efe r r ed to s . 3 7 ( 2 )  of the 
Const itut ion wh ich t ies cr im inal pun ishment to wr itten law ,  and found that 
the under ly i ng law as determined under Sch . 2  d id not amount to "a wr itten 
law" for the purposes o f  s . 3 7 ( 2 ) . 
Kapi J a lso took except ion to the tr ial cour t ' s use of s . 7 ( e )  of the 
Native Customs (Reaognition) Aat ,  f ind ing that th i s  prov i s ion ent i tles a 
court to look at custom and t ake it into account in sentenc ing ( that is , i n  
m i t ig at ion) , b u t  does not enlarge t h e  power of the court t o  formulate 
qua l itat ively d i f ferent pun ishments outs ide the controll ing statutes . In 
conclus ion , he found that : 
There i s  no room for developing the under lying law in 
th i s  case . The development of the under lying law under 
Sch . 2 . 3  a r i ses only when there appear s to be no rule of 
l aw that is appl ic able . In th i s  case the Criminal Code 
Aat is appl icable ( ibid. : 3 5 ) . 
Th is c ase i l lustr ates several of the problems d i scussed above : the 
pr e-empt ive nature of the wr itten law :  the fai lure to adapt the adopted 
colon ial leg islat ion : the weak prov i sions in the Const itut ion reg arding 
the role of customary law and the under lying law: and the tr iumph of 
str ict legal ism over creat ive j ud ic ial development of the law .  In th is 
case , m ight not the S upr eme Cour t have said , in relat ion to the 
compensat ion order , someth ing along these l ines : ( 1 )  that the Cr im i nal 
Code s . 1 9  is silent on the matter of compensat ion order s :  ( 2 )  or that in 
any event the award o f  compensat ion does not amount to a " penalty" with in 
the mean i ng of s . 3 7 ( 2 )  of the Cons t i tu t ion or a " pun i shment " within 
ss . 1 8- 1 9  of the Code , g iven that the dominant mot ive is rest i tut ional 
r ather than pun i t ive : ( 3 )  and that the refore the tr ial court d id have the 
author ity ,  if not the duty , to formulate a new r ule of under lying law 
pur suant to Sch. 2 . 3 :  ( 4 )  or to try another tac k , that the t r i al cour t was , 
in add it ion to pun ish ing the accused , enforcing a const itut ional Basic 
Right on behalf of the v ic t im - s ay s . 3 5 r eg ard ing the r ight to l ife or 
s . 5 3 on unj ust depr ivat ion o f  prope r ty - and thus could "make all such 
orders and declarat ions as are necessary or appropr iate for the purposes"  
of enforc i ng the r ight ,  pur suant to  s . 5 7 ( 3 ) . Certa inly the law has  seen 
far g reater f ic t ions than these employed wher e  pol icy cons ider at ions have 
war ranted i t , under c i rcumstances far less c losely assoc iated with 
const itut ional d ir ectives . 
* * * * * * 
CONCLUS I ON 
I t  was suggested at one t ime that a possible t itle for th i s  pape r be 
"Turn ing the T ide? The Impact of the PNG Const itut ion on Tr ad it ional Law" . 
In fact , for the reasons d i sc ussed in th is paper , there is not much 
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quest ion that the Const itut ion has not turned the t ide in reg ard to the 
expans ion of the role of c ustomary l aw in the legal system of PNG . 
Th is is not to s ay that there h ave not been any r eforms in PNG which 
have enhanced the role o f  c ustom , or created new l egal  i ns t i t u t ions based 
on trad i t ional laws and inst i tut ions , or s imply softened the otherwise 
harsh e ffects of the imposit ion of al ien laws and inst itut ions . For 
example , the aforement ioned Native Customs (Recognition) Act ( 1 96 3 )  sets 
out the areas o f  c iv i l  and cr iminal law in wh ich custom may be pleaded , 
r ecog n i sed and enforced ; the Marriage Act ( 1 96 3 )  r ecog n i se s  customary 
mar r iages ;  the Local Courts Act ( 1 96 3 )  permits that cour t to make orders 
r egard ing c ustomary l aw ;  the Adoption of Chi ldren (Customary Adoptions) 
Act ( 1 96 9 )  r ecog nises customary adopt ion ; the Wi l ls, Probate and 
Administration Act ( 1 96 6 )  ( in force 1 970 ) r ecognises customary success ion , 
and st ipulates that " tr ad it ional prope r ty" ( e .g . , she l l  money) must pass 
accord ing to custom and s uccess ion so i t  may not be altered by will ; the 
Workers Compensation Act ( 1 979 i extends bene f i ts to pe r sons who are 
reg arded as c ustomary dependant s ;  3 the Business Groups Incorporation Act 
( 1 97 4 )  and the Land Groups Incorporation Act ( 1 974 ) both allow for 
customary g roups to form the bas i s  of modern bus iness assoc iat ions ; the 
Land Disputes Settlement Act ( 1 97 5 )  prov ides for med iated solut ions to land 
d i sputes w ith c ustomary law as the bas i s :  the Legal Training Institute 
(Amendment) Act ( 1 97 6 )  r equires  law g raduates to eng age in the study o f  
customary l aw before profess ional ly qual i fy i ng : 1 4  t h e  Local Government Act 
( 1 96 3 )  empowe rs those bod ies to pass ord inances sett ing out local custom : 
the Sorcery Act ( 1 97 1 ) creates certain offences and recog n ises certain 
defences in cr im inal matter s involv ing sorcery or attacks on alleged 
sorce rer s :  the Inter-Group Fighting Act ( 1 97 7 )  introduces the t r ad i tional 
concept of g roup respons ib i l ity to the cr imi nal law ,  as well as encourag ing 
settlement by med iat ion r esult ing in compensat ion ; and f inal ly ,  perhaps 
most impor tant of al l ,  the Village Courts Act ( 1 974 ) , wh ich e stablished a 
cour t system bound only by natur al j ust ice and the Act ,  with the a im of 
ensur ing : 
peace and harmony in the area for wh ich it is 
established , by med iating in and e ndeavour ing to obtain 
j ust and amicable settlement o f  d i sputes . 
With the i r  emphas i s  on mediat ion of d i sputes ( arbi t r a t ion i s  available as a 
last resor t ) , procedural and ev identiary informal ity,  the bann ing of 
lawye r s , elect ion o f  mag istr ates by the local community , r e l i ance on local 
c ustoms and usages , blurr ing of the c i v i l-cr im inal d i st inct ion , and 
recognit ion of g roup r e spons ib i l ity, the v il lage cour ts represent a maj or 
step away from the rel iance on the substance and procedures of the common 
law .  
However , as noted ear l ier , most o f  these leg islat ive i n i t iat ives were 
passed , or  have the ir foundat ions i n  i nqu i r ies conducted , by the colon ial 
adm i n i s t r a t ion or the local House of As sembly in the build- up towards 
Independence , with r elat ively l ittle happening s ince Independence . 
In Uname Auname , above , Andrew J found that the tr ial j udge (Narokobi 
J )  had e r r ed by seem ing to adopt the r ecommendat ions o f  the PNG Law Re form 
Commission " as be i ng the re levant appl icable law" . Wh ile Andrew J ' s  
pos i t ion i s  no doubt cor rect , the f r ustrat ion of Narokobi J i n  see ing h is 
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r epo r t  on the role of c ustom in the legal system and the attached 
recommendat ions and draft b i lls on the unde r lying law and other matter s ,  
( PNG LRC 1 97 7 )  lang u ish ing without even leg i slat ive cons ider at ion , i s  
certa inly unde r standable . 
In my v iew , adopt ion of the Commiss ion ' s  Unde r lying Law B i l l  as the 
successor to Sch . 2 of the Const i tut ion would remedy many of the 
inadequac ies found in the pre sent scheme , and is of c r uc ial importance if  
the CPC Report and the statements o f  pol i t ical leader s  about the need to 
return to " tr ad it ional ways" are to be g iven e f fect . 
Cl ause 3 ( 1 )  spec i f ies that the 
wr itten law does not apply,  or 
However , c l . 3 ( 2 )  says : 
under ly ing 
appl ies in 
law shall apply i f  the 
par t  only , to any matte r .  
Where i t  i s  e stabl ished before a Cour t ,  that a r ule of 
c ustomary law, wh ich compl ies with the requirement s o f  
[ C l ause ] 4 ( 1 )  appl ies t o  a matter t o  wh ich a wr itten 
law i s  also appl icable , i f  in the par t icular c i rcum­
s tances o f  the matter the cour t cons ide r s  it 
appropr iate i t  may apply that r ule of under lying l aw in 
add i t ion to or as an alternat ive to the appl icable 
wr itten law .  
Clause 4 prov ides : 
( 1 )  Customary law is adopted and shall be appl ied , 
e i ther d i r ectly or by analogy as the underlying law 
unless -
(a ) i t is s ubstan t i al ly incons istent w i th any wr itten 
law r elevant to the subj ect matter ; or 
(b ) i ts appl icat ion would be contr ary to the Nat ional 
Goals and D i rec t ive Pr inc iples , Basic Rights and 
Basic Soc ial Obl ig at ions under the Const itut ion . 
( 2 )  Nothing in th i s  sect ion shall perm it the 
appl icat ion of a law other than customary law to 
customary land . 
( 3 )  Where the cour t con s ider s that par t of a r ule of 
customary law to be appl ied as the unde r lying law does 
not comply wi th the prov i s ions of par ag r aphs (a ) or (b ) 
of Subsect ion ( 1 )  the Cour t may , in so far as i s  
pract icable to do so , mod i fy t h a t  par t of the r ule in 
such a way as to make i t  comply with the prov is ions o f  
th i s  sect ion . 
Clause 5 fur ther prov ide s :  
( 1 ) Where  the under lying law appl ies , i n  the absence 
of any deve loped pr inc iple or r ule of the unde r lying 
law ,  and where under the prov 1 s 1ons of Sect ion 4 ,  
c ustomary law does not apply to the whole or par t of 
any matter before i t , the cour t may cons ider the common 
l aw as a source of the under ly ing law, and if  
appropr iate , adopt a r ule of common l aw as a r ule of 
the under lying law ,  but only i f  -
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( a) i t  is cons istent with the wr itten law ;  and 
( b ) i t  i s  appl icable and appropr iate to the c i rcum­
s tances of the country ; and 
( c) its enforcement would be in accordance with Nat ional 
Goals and D i rec t ive Pr inc iples and Basic Rights and 
Basic Social Obl ig at ions under the Const itution . 
( 2 )  Where a r ule of the common law i s  not adopted as a 
r ule of the under lying law under Subsect ion ( 1 ) , the 
court shall formulate a r ule of the under lying law, 
appropr iate to the c ircumstances of the country , hav i ng 
reg ard to -
(a ) the Nat ional Goals and D i rec t i ve Pr inc iples , Basic 
R ights and Basic Social Obl ig at ions under the 
Constitution ; and 
( b ) analog ies to be d r awn from r elevant wr itten law and 
under lying law ;  and 
( c) for e ign law .  
Th us the B i ll would completely r eve r se the relat ive pos it ions o f  
customary l aw and common l aw a s  sources o f  the under lying l aw ,  a s  ev idenced 
by j ud ic i al pract ice , and go much fur ther than Sch . 2  of the Cons t i tut ion . 
Customary law would be the under lying law, wh i le the common law would only 
be a supplementary source . The qual i f icat ions on the adopt ion of custom 
under the Native Customs (Recognition) Act s . 6 ,  and under Sch . 2 . 1 ( 2 )  o f  the 
Cons t i t u t ion are r epl aced by r efer ence to the wr itten l aw and the gene r al 
pr inc iples conta ined in the preamble to the Cons t i tut ion . Wh i le expressly 
d iscard ing the repug nancy c lause as a colon i al rel ic ,  and bas ing leg al 
development gene r ally on custom , the Commiss ion recog ni sed the need to 
prov ide safeguards aga inst the adopt ion of trad it ional values and pr act ices 
deemed incompat ible with des i r able soc ial goals , s uch as equal r ights for 
women ( ibid. : 2 0 ) . The NGDPs , Basic Rights ,  and Basic Social Ob l igat ions 
prov i s ions in the preamble , are thus also g iven a spec i f ic role in leg al 
development . The wr itten law ,  as well , wou ld be less pre-empt ive , g iven 
the prov is ion in c l . 3 ( 2 )  wh ich pe rmits the co-exi stence o f  a r ule of 
under lying law on a matter dealt w i th wholly or par t i al ly in leg islat ion . 
Fur ther , c l . 1 7 ( 1 ) prov ides for a new r ule of statutory i nterpretat ion : 
When interpreting any prov i s ion o f , or any word , 
expr ess ion or proposit ion i n ,  any wr itten law ,  the 
court  shall g ive e ffect to any r elevant customary law ,  
pract ice o r  pe rcept ion r ecog n i zed b y  the people t o  be 
affected as a result o f  the interpretat ion . 
Cl ause 8 ( 1 )  of the B i l l  places an aff i rmat ive d uty on the cour ts to 
ensure that : 
with due r eg ard to the need for consistency , the 
under lying law develops as a coherent system i n  a 
manner that is appropr iate to the c i rcumstances of the 
country . 
Th is restates Sch . 2 . 4  but cl . 8 ( 2 )  would also requ i r e  that where  a cou r t  
decides that customary law shall not apply or  where  a r ule of common l aw is 
adopted or where a r ule of under lying law is formulated it must expressly 
prov ide reasons for so doing . Th is prov i s ion i s  a imed at the present heavy 
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r el iance o f  the courts on Engl ish and Australian precedents and the 
consequent failure to cons ider custom : 
At pr esent the courts seldom d i scuss i f  the r ule of the 
common law they apply is appropr i ate . They blandly 
s t ate that it i s . In some of these cases if the 
impl icat ions of the r ule were analyzed in terms of the 
National Goals and D i rec t ive Pr inc iples , it may well be 
found unsuitable ( ibid. : 2 2 ) . 
The Under lying Law B i ll must not be thought of as a panacea ,  however ,  
for the scheme i t  sets up to develop the under lying law rel ies heav i ly on 
the ascertainment of customary law in the courts on a case-by-case bas i s , 
wh ich will inev itably be s low and d i ff icult . Fur the r , the integ r at ion ist 
pol icy of u t i l i s ing customary l aw i n  the western- s tyle cour ts involves the 
hazardous , if not impermiss ible , pr act ice of d ivorc ing customary law from 
its processes ,  as well as other ascertainment problems . For both of these 
reasons i t  i s  also impor tant to pur sue a str ategy of ex tend ing offic ial 
r ecognit ion to t r ad i t ional inst itut ions , o r  creat ion of " neo- trad i t ional" 
inst itut ions such as the village cour ts , and thereby r eturn legal 
dec is ion-mak i ng to the g r assroots level as env isaged by the CPC . 
NOTES 
1De fined by Sch . 1 . 7 of the Cons t i tu t ion as : 
heard or determined by any cour t or 
spec if ied . 
" The quest ion may not be 
tr ibunal " except as otherwise 
2see , e . g . , Public Cu:r>ator of Papua New Guinea v .  Public Trustee of New 
Zealand [ 1 97 6 ]  PNGLR 4 2 7  i n  wh ich Prent ice DCJ ( as he then was) afforded 
a l iber al interpretat ion of s . 4 3 of the Wi l ls Probate and Administration 
Act ( 1 96 6 )  hav ing r eg ard to the NGDPs , so as to accept the val id i ty of a 
will with several formal defects . 
?trh e  Gover nment Paper ( PNG Govt . Paper 1 9 74 ) i s  s i lent on th is point . 
4The proposal regard ing the establi shment of the Pe rmanent Committee i s  
found in PNG C P  1 9 74 : 5/1 /2 0 at par a . 1 2 1 . The Government Paper i s  ag a in 
s i lent on th is po int ( see 1 9 74 : 1 8- 1 9 )  and the only Pe rmanent Comm ittee 
expressly endor sed is the Public Accounts Comm i ttee ( ibid. : 2 2 ) . See 
s . 1 1 8 wh ich establ i she s the Public Accounts Comm ittee and " such other 
comm i ttees as are determined by the P a r l i ament f r om t ime to t ime" . 
5In Papua , the Criminal Code Ordinance ( 1 90 2 )  s . 1 .  In New Gu inea , 
init ially , by the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance s . 1 6  and Sch . 2 .  The 
Code was s ubsequently r epealed , and then r e- adopted with some minor 
amendments , by the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance ( 1 92 4 ) . For 
fur ther d i scuss ion of the cr iminal law in colon ial and independent PNG , 
see We isbrot for thcoming .  
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6See T i tle 1 1 ,  s . 8  of the Trust 
for puni shment of an " act 
nat ive custom" , i f  the penalty 
months impr isonment , or both . 
Territory (Micronesian) Code , wh ich al lows 
made a cr ime solely by gene r al ly r espected 
does not exceed a f i ne of $ 1 00 ,  or  s ix 
7 The express  c ut-off date for recept ion of the common law e l iminates an 
ear l ie r  controver sy over the e ffect Eng l i sh statutory mod i f icat ion had on 
PNG ' s  r ece ived law.  See Booth v .  Booth ( 1 93 5 )  5 3  CLR 1 ( H igh Cour t of 
Austr a l ia) and In Re Johns [ 1 97 1 -72 ] PNGLR 1 1 0 ,  wh ich both suppor ted the 
propos i t ion that statutory mod i f icat ion in Engl and/Aust r a l i a  d id 
concur rently alter the law in PNG , and Murray v .  Braum River Timber 
Co . [ 1 96 4 ]  PNGLR 1 67 ,  which s trong ly opposed that v iew . The express 
select ion of the Eng l ish common law ,  r athe r than the Austr al ian var i ant , 
headed off  another i nc ipient controversy. 
8These f actors also g o  a long way towards explain ing the ' const itut ional 
cr i s is ' caused by the ' Rooney Affair ' i n  1 9 79 (Bayne 1 98 0 : 1 2 1 ;  We i sbrot 
1 9 79 : 240 ) . 
9See also Labian-Saiuwen v .  Yerei-Yautan [ 1 9 6 5-66 ] PNGLR 1 52 ,  1 58-59 . The 
Law Re form Conun iss ion ' s  draft Adultery and Enticement Bill  ( 1 97 7 )  c l . 1 5 , 
spec i f ically def ines " relat ive " as " a  per son who is r eg arded by c ustom as 
a re lat ive " . 
1 0See .  e . g . , R .  v .  Noboi-Bosai [ 1 97 1 -7 2 ]  PNGLR 2 7 1 , w i th facts very s im i lar 
to Aubafu Feama. In th is case Pr ent ice J ( as he then was) acqui tted the 
accused by local is ing the concepts of decency and propr iety , and applying 
the standards "of the r easonable , pr imit ive Gabu s i  v i l lager • • • in e a r ly 
1 97 1 " ( ibid . : 2 83-84 ) . For other examples , see We isbrot for thcoming . 
1 1Wh ich prov ides that " Each law made by the Pa r l i ament shal l rece ive such 
fair , large and l iberal constr uct ion and interpr etat ion as w i l l  best 
ensure the attainment of the obj ect o f  the law accord ing to its t r ue 
intent , mean ing and spir it • • • " .  
1 2See also the s im ilar Solomon I s lands case of Isak Tosika v .  John Siho 
( C ivil  Appeal Case No . 5/79 )  where  the H igh Cour t overturned a lower 
cour t ' s compensat ion order , made in accordance with customary law ,  
imposed o n  top of a l i fe sentence for w i l fu l  murder . 
1 3 Remedying the e ffect of Mary Gugi v .  Stol Commuters [ 1 97 3 ] PNGLR 3 4 1 , in 
wh ich bene f i ts were restr icted to the Western- s tyle nuclear fam i ly .  
1 4Although th is r equir ement seems to b e  per pe tually waived . 
21 . JUDICIAL TECH N I QU E  AND TH E INTERPR ETATION OF PAC I F I C  
ISLAND CONSTITUTIONS 
P.J. Bayne 
The Const itut ions of the i ndependent Pac i f ic Nations are , accord ing to 
the i r  terms , " supreme law" , and thus any other laws incon s is tent with them 
are to that extent void . To r e inforce th i s  supremacy , the Const itut ions 
vest in the supe r ior cour ts the funct ion of constitut ional r ev iew . Th us , 
these courts may r ev i ew the const itut ional i ty of leg islat ive and other 
governmental (or pr ivate) act ion to determ ine whether i t  conforms to the 
supreme law o f  the const itut ion . There has been no g reat debate over the 
necess i ty for const itut ional r ev iew .  The Const itut ional Planning Comm ittee 
( CPC) of Papua New Gu inea ( PNG )  d id exam ine the matter , and proceed ing from 
the premise that the not ion that the people should be governed by the law 
under lay " the very idea of having a constitut ion at al l "  (PNG CPC 
1 974 : 8/1 ) ,  it found that an independent j ud ic iary should exerc i se the 
funct ion o f  const itut ional r ev iew . 
The dec is ion of a cour t in the exerc i se of its  funct ion of j ud ic ial 
rev iew necessar i ly makes the cour t a pol i t ical inst itut ion . I t s  dec i s ion 
shapes what the government can and cannot do , and thus bears on how 
resources are d i str ibuted in the soc iety .  The ins ight that courts are 
polit ical inst itut ions , however ,  is " not the end of the d i scuss ion , but its 
beg inning " (Ch ase and Ducat 1 979 : 56 ) . Wh ile i t  certainly does not follow 
that the cour ts should behave in the same manner as other po l it ical 
ins t itut ions , it does r a ise the quest ion of the leg itimacy of the cour ts ' 
author i ty , o r , to put i t  another way, how the courts can d istingu ish the i r  
role from the roles o f  other , par t icular ly t h e  representat ive , pol i t ical 
inst itut ions . 
The argument of th i s  pape r is that the manner in wh ich a 
constitut ional cour t j ust i f ies i t s  r eview i s  c r it ical to the leg it imacy of 
th at rev iew i n  that par t icular case and , over t ime , to i ts leg i t imacy to 
exerc ise the funct ion of r ev iew at all . Chase and Ducat put the po int well 
in the i r  argument that : 
any d ifference wh ich inheres in the j ud ic ial ins t itut­
i on ex i sts because o f  the j ust i f ic at ion wh ich j udges 
are compelled to offer for the i r  dec i s ions ( 1 979 : 57 ) . 
Th e PNG CPC d id to some extent pe rce ive that the k i nds of 
j ust i f icat ion offe red by the cour ts had a bear ing on the eff icacy with 
wh ich the i r  task of j ud ic ial r ev iew could be pe r formed . It was pr epared to 
accept the pol it ical role of the cour ts i f  they would take account of the 
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National Goals to be spel t  out i n  the Cons t itut ion ( PNG CPC 1 974 : 8-1 5 ) . 
Fur ther , i t  recommended that the leg al t ie w i th the Austral ian legal system 
should be cut ( ibid . : 8-2 ) - ach ieved by dev ices that made the Cons t i tut ion 
legally autochthonous - and that the cour ts be pe rmitted to take account o f  
t h e  CPC Report and the debates in  both the House of As sembly and the 
Const it uent Assembly ( see now s . 24 ) . The Const i tuent Assembly o f  PNG , 
wh ich enacted the Const i tu t ion , added prov 1 s 1ons des igned to ensure that 
the common law of England should be appl ied only if conformable to the 
Cons t itut ion ( Sch . 2 . 2 ) . 
Wh i le such prov i s ions are useful s ig nposts , they do l ittle more than 
restate the fundamental prob lem . The earl ier , and some of the r ecent o f  
the othe r , Paci f ic Cons t i tut ions prov ide much l e s s  g u idance to t h e  cour ts . 
The supr emacy c l auses i n  e ach o f  these Const i tutions should be regarded as 
plac i ng the common l aw i n  a pos i t ion i nfer ior to that o f  the Cons t i tut ion 1 
and the We ster n  Samoan (WS )  Cons t i tut ion has an appl icat ion of l aw 
prov i sion (Ar t . 1 1 1 ( 1 ) ) ,  wh ich is sugges t ive of th is pos i t ion . The 
Cons t i tu t ions o f  the Solomon I slands ( S I )  ( s . 76 and Sch . 3 )  and of Vanuatu 
( ss . 45 and 9 3 )  prov ide more ample author i ty for the supe r ior cour ts to 
develop a mode of constitut ional i nterpr etat ion free from the influence o f  
common l aw pr inc iples . In a l l  of these nat ions however ,  i t  is large ly for 
the supe r ior cour ts to wor k  out modes of j ust i f icat ion . 
* * * * * * 
Th e fact that cons t i tut ional review has pol it ical consequences has led 
many Un ited States (US)  commentators  to dwell on the counter-maj or itar i an 
impact o f  the cour ts . The argument is that dec is ions wh ich inval idate 
leg islat ive act ion r un counter to the wishes of a maj or i ty o f  the 
r epresentat ives o f  the people , and some commentator s have been led to 
challenge the propr ietary o f  const itut ional rev iew .  The Pac i f ic courts do 
need to j ust i fy the i r  power to r ev iew ,  but should they take into account 
the counter-major itar ian argument? 
To answer the arg ument by claiming that the people have g iven the 
power of r ev iew to the j ud ic i ary is not s u f f ic ient , for , even if it may be 
s a id that th is occur red when the constitut ion came into operat ion , the 
leg islat ive act ion under challenge is a later express ion of the major i ty o f  
the representatives o f  t h e  people .  Another way t o  meet the arg ument i s  to 
challenge the proposit ion that a maj or ity of the leg islature is an adequate 
express ion of the will  of the people . Clear ly ,  these member s  are not the 
people , but the i r  representat ive s 1  fur thermore , they r epr esent only 
imper fectly the v i ews of the i r  const ituents ( even of those who elected 
them) . Nevertheless , the cour ts obv iously have even less j ust i f icat ion to 
claim to represent the actual v iews of the people .  
The best response t o  the counter-maj or itar i an argument comes bac k  
ult imately t o  a recog n i t ion that t h e  Const itut ion d id not intend that the 
val id i ty of governmental act ion should be determ ined by maj or ity r ule . To 
adapt the words o f  the CPC , the very idea beh ind the PNG Const itut ion i s  to 
ensure that there are l im its to what the maj or i ty may do ( and , on the other 
hand , to g ive val id ity to what in other r espects the maj or ity may wish to 
do) . Wh i le there are some d if f iculties with the argument that the 
Const itut ion i s  necessar ily b ind ing , th i s  seems to be a wor kable answer to 
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the counter-maj or itar ian argument . But the  argument is attract ive , and may 
be used ag a inst a cour t and undermine i t s  leg i t imacy . How might a court 
take i t  into account? 
Clea r ly ,  a court would underm ine its  leg itimacy were i t  to make a 
pol it ical dec i s ion , in the sense of one wh ich was influenced by immed iate 
pol i t ical outcome , or wh ich sought to influence the immed iate pol it ical 
s i tuat ion . Such an e f fect could follow a dec i s ion which expl ic itly 
accommodated cur rent government pol icy , but ther e  is also a r isk  that a 
dec is ion wh ich r e flected an hostil i ty to a cur rent government pol icy , or to 
the cur rent government , could also undermine the author i ty of the cour t .  
There has been no s ign that the Pac i f ic Island courts have made pol i t ical 
dec is ions in favour of a government , but some j udges of the PNG S upreme 
Cour t who del ivered j udgments in Re Rooney (No . 2 ) [ 1 9 79 ]  PNGLR 448 may 
j ustly be c r i t ic i sed for somewhat excess ive cr i t ic ism of the Government , 
and the ext r a-cur ial statements and act ions of a few j udges could be seen 
to have exceeded the j ud ic ial funct ion ( see Hegar ty 1 979 1 We isbrot 1 9 79 
and 1 9 80 ) . 
It i s  not suggested that a cour t should avoid adj ud icat ion in cases 
where  it is c lear that the g overnment attaches cons ider able s ig n i f icance to 
the outcome . The recent F i j i an cases , Director of Public Prosecutions 
v .  Attorney-General (Supr eme et . ,  Civil  Ac tion No . 1 78 ,  1 0  Apr i l  1 98 1 ) and 
Attorney-General v .  Director of Pub lic Prosecutions ( Ct . Appeal , Civil  
Appe al No . 1 8 ,  5 Aug ust 1 98 1 ) ,  would appear to  be such an instance , yet  the 
cour ts were able to f ind against the Gover nment wi thout the use of lang uage 
wh ich could lead to the i r  be ing seen as involved in the controversy . 
Neverth eless , i t  is inev itable that whatever j udges say ,  the i r  
dec is ions in matte r s  of h igh pol it ical controver sy may lead to a public 
pe rcept ion , o r  mor e l i ke ly a pe rcept ion by those who lose ground by a 
part icular dec i s ion , that the j udges are mak ing pol it ical dec is ions . Can 
the j udges take account of such react ions at the s ame t ime as they pur sue a 
pr inc ipled interpretat ion of the const i tut ion? Two pos s ib i l it ies are 
suggested : that the j udges develop pr inc iples for the exercise of 
r estraint in the use of the power of const itut ional r ev iew , and that the 
review be more or less str ict depend ing on the nature of the case . The 
f i rst poss i b i l i ty is cons idered here , the second at the end of th i s  paper . 
In Re Rooney (No . 2 )  [ 1 9 79 ]  PNGLR 448 , 49 1 , Ke arney J .  observed that " we 
may have had our Marbury v .  Madison" ,  and th is analogy may be pur sued . The 
US Const itut ion does not state c lear ly that the S upr eme Cour t may dec lare 
leg islat ion or other k i nds o f  g overnmental act iv ity i nval id for breach of 
the Const itut ion , and the asse r t ion o f  th i s  power by the Cour t in Marbury 
v .  Madison ( 1 80 3 )  5 United States Reports 1 37 ,  c aused g reat controversy ; 
( the more so because the case involved a matter of po l i t ical contest 
between the r ival par t ies in the Congress , w i th one of wh ich Marshall CJ 
had been ident i f ied) . However , the S upr eme Cour t averted a d irect clash 
with the Government because i t  d id not issue an order ag a inst the 
Government . In other cases unt i l  the present day , the Court  has by a 
variety of means attempted to avoid r ul ing on const itut ional i ssues . The 
r eason for th i s  pol icy of r estraint is " the need to minim i se fr ict ion 
between the br anches of government " . As one Amer ican commentator h as 
explained : 
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[m] ost o f  our j udges have • • • avoided const itut ional 
r u l ings wher ever pos s ible , as the i r  contr ibut ion to 
harmonious r elat ions between br anches , usually because 
o f  the i r  bel ie f  that a soc iety constantly r iven by 
cr ises produced by const i tu t ional r ul ing s cannot endure 
(Gunther 1 9 7 1 : 3 2 ) . 
further argues , " restr a int will  have to come from sources 
outs ide o f  the j ud ic iary as wel l " , for the r e  i s  a po int at wh ich " cr i t ic i sm 
and pol it ical challenges to cour ts" are not consis tent with " v iable 
consti tut ional government" (ibid . : 3 5 ) . 
These r emar ks are per t i nent to the r ecent s i tuat ion in PNG where the 
pol it ic i ans have shown a mar ked r ead iness to fur ther pol it ical obj ect ives 
by recour se to the cour ts . A pr ivate prosecution in September 1 979 by a 
then Oppos i t ion leade r , Mr Okuk , of the then Minister of Just ice , Mr s 
Rooney, l ed to her conv ict ion and sentence to e ight months ' impr i sonment 
for contempt of cour t ,  prec ipitated a severe const itut ional and pol i t ical 
cr 1 s 1 s .  Not long afterwards the then Pr ime Mi nister , Mr Somare , attempted 
to obstr uct a mot ion of no conf idence in h im moved by Mr Okuk by d irect ing 
the Governor-General to r e fer to the Supr eme Cour t quest ions concerning the 
leg al ity of the mot ion . Th is t actic depended on an argument that once the 
matte r was r efer red it became sub judice ; and outs ide Par l i ament , Mr s 
Rooney argued that her own case was analogous . The Speaker i ndeed accepted 
th is argument , and Par l i ament proceeded to vote on the mot ion only after a 
mot ion d issent ing from h i s  r ul ing was passed . Later in 1 9 80 , Mr Somare ,  
now the Leader of the Opposit ion , sought declarat ions that a mot ion passed 
by Par l iament that pa r t  o f  the De fence Force be committed to peace-keeping 
ope rat ions in Vanuat u ,  and the Defence Force (Presence Abroad) Act ( 1 98 0 ) , 
were i nval id as in confl ict with s . 20 5  of the Const itut ion ( see Bayne 
1 9 8 1 : 58-6 4 ) . 
It is suggested therefore that it is appropr iate for Pac i f ic I sland 
courts to cons ider the var ious techniques for j ud ic ial restraint , for , as 
the US exper ience suggests , a t imely use of such techniques may well 
pr eserve the role of j ud ic ial r ev iew . Much must be left to the j udge s , for 
too close a r estr ict ion of the power could comprom i se the funct ion of 
const itut ional r ev iew . The cour ts m ight address themselves to the 
questions of when cons t i tutional issue s  can be r a i sed ( doctr ines of 
stand ing , r ipeness and mootness) , how these i ssues should be r ai sed 
( procedural requ i r ements to r equire a clear showing of stand ing and of the 
pr ec ise i ssues r a i sed ; doctr ines concern ing referral of const itut ional 
issues from lower cour ts or other bod ies)  , and whe ther there  are some 
issues that are not appropr iate for j ud ic ial resolut ion ( doctr ine of 
pol i t ical quest ions ) . Courts also possess d i scret ion in the award of 
r emed ies . I t  is beyond the scope of th i s  paper to analyse these quest ions 
c losely (see Bayne 1 98 1  for an exam inat ion i n  the PNG context ) , but i t  is 
suggested that such seem i ng ly techn ical quest ions are at the heart o f  the 
efficacy of const i tut ional r ev iew . 
The manner in wh ich the PNG S upr eme Cour t resolved Mr Somar e ' s  
challeng e to the Vanuat u  peace-keeping operat ion shows too that the answe r s  
a r e  n o t  always c lear . A maj or ity of three j udges ( K idu , CJ , Kapi and Miles 
JJ ; Kearney DCJ and Grev i lle-Sm i th J d issent ing )  held , on somewhat 
d i fferent g rounds , that Mr Somare had stand i ng to seek declaratory r e l i e f  
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(Supr eme Cour t Re fer ence No . 4  of 1 980 , SC 204 , 3 Aug ust 1 98 1 ) .  On the 
substant ive quest ion , a d i fferent major ity , (Miles J join ing Kearney DCJ 
and Grev i lle-Sm ith J 1  K idu CJ and Kapi J d issent ing ) , held that Mr Somare 
had not proved that there was no " inte rnat ional obl ig at ion" be ing 
d i scharged by the De fence Force wh ile in Vanuatu 1  (Supr eme Cour t Re fe rence 
No . 4  of 1 980 (No . 2 ) , SC 220 1 March 1 982 ) . 
But , wh ile the answe r s  may not be clear , the quest ions cannot be 
avoided , and it i s , with -respect , s uggested that S t . John CJ , of the WS 
Supr eme Cour t d id not address h imself suff ic iently to these que s t ions in 
Saipa 'ia Olomalu and others v .  Attorney-General ,  ( unrepor ted , 5 Apr i l  
1 9 82 ) . S t . John CJ found that s . 1 9  o f  the WS Electora l Act ( 1 96 3 ) was void 
as contrary to Ar t . 1 5 ( 1 ) of the Cons t itut ion ( "All pe r sons are equal before 
the law and ent itled to equal protect ion under the law" ) . Sect ion 1 9  was 
inval id because i t  restr icted the r ight to vote to matai t itle holders . 
However , St . John CJ added that : 
Th is dec i s ion does not inval idate any prev ious e lect ion 
conducted pur suant to the Ac t 1  it speaks only to the 
future ( ibid. : 1 3 ) . 
The f ind ing that pr ev ious e lect ions were not affected re flects on awareness 
that const i tut ional r ul ing s should not be such as to d i s r upt the pol i t ical 
system to the po int where an impasse results , and in s im ilar cases in NZ 
( Simpson v. Attorney-General [ 1 95 5 ]  N ZLR 2 7 1 ) , and in Austr al ia ,  ( Victoria 
v .  Corrononwealth ( 1 97 5 )  1 34 CLR 8 1 , Attorney-General for N. S. W. (ex re l 
McKe ZZar) v .  Corrononwealth ( 1 97 7 )  1 2  ALR 1 29 ) , the cour ts have found ways of 
preserv ing e lect ions that took place according to laws that we re inval id . 
But S t . John CJ ' s  f ind ing that future by-e lect ions may not be conducted 
accord ing to the Act may create sever e d i ff icult ies , for the re we re pend ing 
at the t ime of h is dec i s ion a large number of e lect ion pet i t ions 
challeng ing the return of par t icular Member s  of Parl iament . If some of 
these pe t i t ions are s uccessful , the new gover nment formed after the general 
elect ion may lose i t s  maj or ity , ( see Pacific Is lands Monthly , June 1 982 , 
1 8-2 0 ) , and although under the Cons t i tut ion such of the new Pa r l i ament 
m ight meet and amend the Electoral Act , the pol it ical d i f f iculties in 
br ing ing th is about are immense . I t  i s  not , with respect , a suffic ient 
answer to say, as d id S t .John CJ , that : 
[ t ] he consequences flowing from g 1v 1ng e f fect to the 
pr ov i s ion [ o f  the Cons t i tut ion] are not the conce rn of 
the Cour t in maki ng its dec i s ion ( Saipa 'ia Olomalu , at 
p. 4 ) . 
It is leg it imate for j udges to take into account the stab i l ity of the 
constitutional system as a whole , and to so t a i lor the remed ies they award 
so as to avoid impasse . Th is may be seen in the NZ and Austral ian cases 
c ited above , ( see also to Clayton v. Heffron ( 1 96 0 )  1 0 5 CLR 2 1 4 ,  247 , 
( Austr al ia) , and P. S .  Bus Co . Ltd. v .  Cey lon Transport Board ( 1 95 8 )  6 1  NLR 
4 9 1  ( Ceylon ) ) .  In another case , the H igh Cour t of Austral ia accommodated 
the problem that by-elect ions , or ex traordinary e lect ions , m ight not be 
able to be conducted on new and const itut ional ly r equ i red boundar ies , 
( Attorney-General for Australia (ex re l .  McKinlay) v .  Commonwealth ( 1 97 5 )  
1 35 CLR 1 ) .  
* * * * * * 
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The not ion that the intent ion of the f r amer s  should be the pr imary 
cr iter ion to resolve ques t ions o f  interpr etat ion commands w ide suppor t ,  and 
i s  on the face o f  it attr act ive to j udges for the reason that i t  appears  to 
offer them a value- free method of interpr etat ion , ( othe r  than the value o f  
following the f r ame r s ' intent) . Wh i le s upe r f ic ially att r ac t ive , ther e  are 
cons ider able d i f f icult ies in the appl icat ion o f  th is not ion . 
The f r amers , of the Pac i f ic Const itut ions , have been g roups o f  
pol i t ic i ans from t h e  i s land colon ies who wor ked t o  g r eater or lesser extent 
with colon ial o f f ic ials . In PNG the whole o f  the pr e- i ndependence House of 
Assembly const i tutes the found ing fathe r s ,  and the author i ty o f  the 
Cons t itut ion der ives from the votes they c as t  in the Const ituent Assembly 
over twenty-s ix s itt ing d ays in May to Aug ust 1 97 5 . There are we ll-known 
d i f f iculties in determining the intent of a collect ive body . Apart  from 
the quest ion whether the votes of d issent ients should be ent i rely 
d isreg arded , i t  is obv ious that those who voted for the inclus ion of a 
par t icular clause may have done so for r easons qu i te d i fferent to other s  o f  
t h e  maj or ity.  
I t  i s  not suggested that th i s  log ical d iff iculty should render the 
pr eparatory mate r i als of no value . In many cases these mater i al s  will  g ive 
a c lear ind icat ion of intent ion , and if ther e  was no d i ssent expressed th is 
ind icat ion i s  a pe r suas ive argument for that intent ion to be appl ied to the 
constitut ional prov i s ion . Never theless , even i n  such c ase s , there i s  an 
element of f iction in the not ion that the i ntent ion of the f r amer s  has been 
adopted . On the other hand , it should be ax iomatic that a clear statement 
in the prepatory mater ials cannot ove r- r ide a clear constitut ional 
prov i s ion . 
The PNG Supr eme Cour t has quite often refe r r ed to the prepar atory 
mater ials , but th i s  exper ience shows that even i f  they be reg arded as 
author itat ive the further d i ff iculty ar ises o f  spe l l ing out from them a 
clear s tatement of intent ion . In Reference No . 1  of 1 9 7 7  ( 1 97 7 ]  PNGLR 362  
Frost CJ appe ars  to have con fused the intent ion o f  the CPC ( wh ich on the 
po int i n  quest ion was u l t imately accepted by the Const ituent As sembly) with 
that of a government pape r ( wh ich was u l t imately r e j ected ) , and thus 
brought to bear on the inte rpretat ion o f  a Basic Rights prov i s ion a nar row 
constr uc t ion at odds with the CPC ' s  intent ion ( see Bayne 1 9 82 ) . On some 
cr i t ical quest ions , the CPC Repor t  is qu i te obscure or cont r ad ictory and 
offe r s  l ittle g u idance to the puzzled interpr e ter . These obsc ur it ies have 
al lowed the j ust ices to ignore the Repor t ( e . g . , in relat ion to s . 4 1 ; see 
Bayne for thcoming )  ; or to d r aw confl ict ing conclus ions as to what i t  means 
( e . g . , i n  relat ion to whether the Public Sol ic itor was a " governmental 
body" subj ect to the j ur i sd ict ion of the Ombudsman Commiss ion ; see Bayne 
for thcoming )  • 
Th e d i f f ic ult ies of d i scerning a c lear intent from the preparatory 
mater ials have led some j udges to employ what are more c le a r ly f ic t it ious 
dev ices to asce r tain that inten t . One such dev ice is  to d i scern a 
s im i lar i ty between the con s t i tut ional prov is ion in issue , o r  between the 
const itution as a whole , and some other prov i s ion ( s ) i n  another 
const itut ion ( s ) , and then to reason that the former is meant to follow the 
latter . Several F i j ian j udges appear to have employed th i s  k i nd of 
reasoni ng in Director of Public Prosecutions v .  Attorney-General , and 
Attorney-General v .  Director of Pub lic Prosecutions . 
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A not ice made by the Gover nor-Gene r al under s . 76 ( 1 )  of the Fij i an 
Cons t i tut ion purported to ass ig n  to the Atto rney-Gener al " responsibil ity 
for the admini strat ion" of the Of fice of the D i rector of Public 
Prosecut ions ( DPP ) . The power in s . 76 ( 1 )  was by its terms subj ect to other 
prov is ions o f  the Cons t i tu t ion and the not ice of ass ignment r epeated th is 
phr ase . The d r afte r s  o f  the ass ignment wer e  no doubt consc ious that in 
several r e spects s . 8 5 prov ided that the DPP should be independent , and that 
s . 8 5 ( 7 ) i n  par t icular prov ided that the DPP " shall not be subj ect to the 
d i r ect ion or control of any other pe r son or author i ty" . F ive of the s ix 
j udges who cons idered the quest ion of the val id i ty of the ass ignment found 
it to be i nval id . There do not appear to be any author itat ive pr epar atory 
mater ials to eluc idate the mean ing o f  the F i j ian Const itut ion , but most of 
the maj or i ty j udges arg ued that i t  f itted the ' We stminster Model '  desc r ibed 
by de Sm i th ( 1 96 4 ) , that a feature of th i s  model so descr ibed was that the 
DPP should be protected from ministe r i al inter ference , and that therefore 
the f r amer s  o f  F ij i ' s  Const itut ion must be taken to have intended to 
ach ieve th is r esult ( see e . g . , Director of Public Prosecutions v .  
Attorney-General ,  at 8-9 , per Wi l l i ams J ) . Ther e  a r e  qu i te clear ly some 
log ical d if f icult ies in the l arge steps t aken i n  th is l ine of argument , and 
the dec is ion in the case was not b ased only on th i s  reason ing . 
Re lated to the not ion that the f r ame r s ' intent should gover n  i s  that 
the mean i ng of a constitution may be ascerta ined by r efer ence to the 
h istor ical context in wh ich it was enacted . One j ust i f icat ion for th i s  
approach i s  that t h e  framer s  should b e  taken t o  have been aware of th i s  
context . Another is that laws should b e  unde rstood t o  oper ate i n  
conj unct ion with each other , and that therefore i t  i s  relevant t o  look for 
cont inu i ty or d i scont inu i ty between pr e- independence laws and the 
cons t i tut ion . Th is second j us t i f icat ion would not be adm i ss ible where the 
constitut ion is leg ally autochthonous , for in s uch cases it may be arg ued 
that pre- i ndependence law is part of another legal system ( see Reference 
No . 2  of 1 9 76 [ 1 976 ] PNGLR 228 , 2 33 , per Frost CJ ) . There can be no 
obj ection in pr inc iple to the f i rst j ust i f icat ion so long as it is put only 
as a pe r suas ive element o f  r easoning to a par t icular conclusion . 
In Director of Public Prosecutions v .  Attorney-General and Attorney­
General v. Director of Pub lic Prosecutions several j udges compared the 
Const itut ion to pr e- i ndependence l aws of a const itut ional nature in order 
to suppo r t  the i r  arg ument that the off ice of the DPP was intended to be 
i ndependent of the m inistry . In LOl.Ua v. Damena [ 1 97 7 ]  PNGLR 4 29 Pr ent ice 
DCJ r el ied on the nature of the proceed ing s  in the Consti tuent Assembly to 
suppor t an i nterpr etat ion of the r elat ionsh ip between the Const itut ion and 
the Organ ic Law on National Elect ions . The h i stor ical context r e fe r r ed to 
in both o f  these cases was pe r suas ive . 
Se r ious obj ect ion however can be taken to an argument that the 
h istor ical backg round incl udes that body of common law that appl ied j ust 
pr ior to i ndependence and that the Cons t itut ion i ncorpor ates it d irectly .  
The argument is exempl if ied i n  the r easoning o f  Gr ev i l le-Smi th J i n  Supreme 
Court Reference No . 1 of 1 980, SC 1 93 ,  6 March 1 98 1 . That case conce rned 
s . 3 7 ( 4 )  of the PNG Const itut ion : 
( 4 )  A pe r son charged with a n  offence -
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( a) shall be presumed innocent unt i l  proved 
g u ilty accord ing to law ,  but a l aw may place 
upon a pe r son charged with an offence the 
burden of prov ing par t ic ular facts wh ich are , 
or would with the exerc ise of r easonable care 
be , peculiarly w i th in h is knowledge ; 
Grev ille-Sm i th J began h is analysi s  by r eason ing that : 
It seems clear to me that the intent ion of the 
Leg islature must have been , s ubj ect to the prov i so 
contained in the sect ion , to adopt for the purposes of 
the Constitution the concept of the so-called 
presumpt ion of innocence as it stood in the common law 
of Engl and at the t ime of coming into for ce of the 
Cons t i tut ion , a concept w i th wh ich , in its gener al ity , 
the fr amers o f  the Cons t itut ion , and the people of th i s  
country we re fam i l iar , and wh ich h ad in its  general ity 
been in force in th i s  country for a very long t ime . In 
my opin ion " accord ing to law" means in the context of 
Sect ion 3 7 ( 4 )  (a) accord ing to the common law in Engl and 
wh ich embod ied that concept (ibid . : 4 ) . 
Th us , H i s  Honour found that " the common law o f  England in 1 9 7 5  became the 
law not because of the recept ion of law prov i s ions o f  the Cons t i tut ion , but 
d i rectly by way o f  sect ion 3 7 ( 4 )  (a ) " (ibid . : 5 ) . Th is r easoning wh ich has 
not been uncommon in Pac i f ic I s l and cour ts , i s  open to the fundamental 
obj ect ion that i t  i s  contr ary to the intent ion of r ecept ion prov 1s 1ons 
( s . 2 1  and Sch . 2 ) , accord ing to wh ich the common law of England must meet 
the tests of appl icab il ity st ipulated in them . But the reasoning itself is 
fallac ious , for it is c lear ly f ict i t ious to assume that the f r amers ( in the 
sense of those who g ave author i ty to the Const i tu t ion) wer e  aware of the 
deta ils o f  the common law, and , even if this  m ight be assumed , the very 
fact that the law was stated in an entrenched Cons t i t u t ion g ives it a 
d i fferent qual ity to a common law r ule . 
* * * * * * 
Th ere i s  no other s afe g uide to j ud ic ial dec i s ions in 
g reat confl icts than a str ict and complete legal i sm 
(Dixon 1 96 5 : 247 ) . 
It is use ful to d i st ing u ish three senses in wh ich leg al i sm may be 
understood : a pe j or at ive sense , a we ak sense , and a s trong sense . 
In a pej or at ive sense , leg al i sm may be equated with "mechan ical 
j ur ispr udence " , the not ion that : 
When we speak of " the law" we mean a set o f  t imeless 
r ules stocked in some conceptual warehouse await ing 
d i scovery by the j udges , and that when we speak of 
legal obl igat ion we mean the i nv i s ible cha ins these 
myster ious r ules somehow d r ape around us ( Dworkin  
19  77 : 1 5 ) • 
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Th is sense o f  leg al i sm is descr ibed as pejorat ive because i t  i s  now almost 
univer sally rej ected , and it i s  r ecogn ised that in the select ion of leg al 
r ules ( and moreover in the cho ice o f  facts that determine wh ich r ules 
apply) the j udges have cons iderable room for choice (Twining and Miers 
1 9 76 : 1 48 -4 9 ) . 
Th e determinat ion of a r ule i s  o ften problemat ic , even in areas of 
' techn ical law ' . The law of a const itut ion , and par t icular ly one wh ich 
contains a b i l l  of r ights , is quite obv iously of an open textur e .  In 
reference to the us B i l l  of Rights , Judge Lear ned Hand observed in 1 9 59 
that : 
[ t ] he answer s  to the quest ions wh ich they r aise demand 
the appr a isal and balanc ing of human values wh ich there 
are no scales to we igh ( quoted in Brest 1 97 5 : 9 5 8 ) . 
The weak sense of legalism r ecogn ises that r ule select ion requires 
choice , in par t  at least because the common law must change as soc iety 
changes . Th is sense of legal ism sees the common law itself i ts 
substant ive pr inc iples and i t s  pr inc iples for r ule creat ion - as the source 
of change . I t  i s  probably i n  th i s  sense that S i r  Owen D ixon employed 
' leg al i sm '  (see Dixon 1 96 5 : 1 52-65 ) . The common law exerc ises a powerful 
influence on the m inds o f  l awye r s  educated in its t r ad i t ion and there are 
many instances where Pac i f ic I sland j udges have read the const i tut ions , and 
in par t icular the b i l l  of r ights prov i s ions , as if they merely s tated the 
common law ( most of the PNG cases are analysed in Bayne 1 982 : the Fij ian 
cases of R. v .  Mohamned Hanif ( 1 972 ) and R. v .  Butadx>oka ( 1 97 7 )  are 
analysed i n  Aikman 1 98 1 : and see also the WS dec is ions Ai Zafo Ainu 'u 
[ 1 96 9 ]  WSLR 203 , and Ti 'a Si 'omia ( unrepor ted , S upr eme Ct . ,  26 March 1 9 7 1 ) .  
Th is method of r eason ing avoids the d if f icult quest ions o f  balanc ing 
compet ing interests wh ich the constitutional prov i s ions r equ i re . 
As the developments in US l aw amply i llustrate , one of the most 
controver s ial aspects o f  the Bill of Rights i s  i ts e f fect on the 
admiss ib i l ity of ev idence obtained by means of a v iolat ion of the r ights of 
an accused or suspect per son . These quest ions do not admi t  of only one 
k i nd of answer , but the Pac i f ic Islands courts have avoided them by 
invok ing the common law r ules wh ich lean heav ily in favour of 
admiss i b i l i ty .  In R. v. Mohamned Hanif ( 1 972 ) ( r efer r ed to in Aikman 
1 9 8 1 : 1 88 ) , G r ant J held that ev idence obtained in breach of the g uarantee 
that " no per son shall be subj ected to the search of h is pe rson or prope r ty" 
( s . 9  of the F i j i Const itut ion) should not be excluded and the common law 
pr inc iple appl ied : ( presumably that wh ich perm its such ev idence to be 
admitted subject to a d i scret ion in the tr ial j udge to exclude) . In PNG , 
the S upr eme Cour t has held that confess ions obtained by v iolat ion of the 
Basic Rights may be admiss ible accord i ng to common law pr inc iple ( see Bayne 
forthcoming : 35 ) . 
In many of such cases , i t  is apparent that many j udges pr esume that 
the common l aw should govern and make at best only a cursory exam inat ion of 
its compat ib i l ity w i th the const itution .1 Such a presumpt ion inverts the 
re lat ionsh ip between the const itut ion and the common law . The s imple yet 
fundamental proposit ion that f lows from the supremacy clauses of the 
const itut ions , and spec i f ied in deta i l  in some of them , i s  that stated by 
K idu CJ i n  r elat ion to PNG : 
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The common law has no appl icat ion i n  post Independence 
P apua New Gu inea if it i s  in confl ict w i th s tatutes and 
the Const itut ion , (Avia Aihi v. The State , SC 1 95 ,  2 7  
March 1 9 8 1 : 8 , p e r  K idu CJ ) . 
It is not s uggested that common law may not prov ide a g u ide to the content 
of the b i l l  o f  r ights prov i s ions or  other prov i s ions of the const itut ion , 
and it may very well be the start ing po int for analysi s .  But what is 
fur ther r equired i s  analys i s  o f  whether i t  conforms to the const itut ion and 
the values and pr inciples it incorporates . At t imes the common law should 
be adopted . I n  in the Matter of Joseph Mavuk and others , sc 1 89 ,  5 
December 1 980 , the PNG S upr eme Court held that a defendant ' s  r ight to 
counsel ( s . 3 7 ( 4 )  ( e ) ) d id not embrace a r ight to a counsel who for e th ical 
r easons as def ined by COJllIDOn law should not appear 1 the spec i f ic g round 
be ing that the counsel had g ained some knowledge of the prosecut ion case 
wh i le employed in the prosecutor ' s  o f f ice . Other cases however ,  s uch as 
those concerned with i l legally obtained ev idence , will r equire a balanc ing 
of compet i ng soc ial interests . 
Al lied to an acceptance of the common l aw i s  a ready will ingness to 
apply Engl ish , Austr al ian and NZ pr ecedents and to rej ect those of other 
j ur isdict ions . Wi th the passage of t ime , several o f  the Pac i f ic Island 
j udges have adopted a more ec lect ic approach to what the PNG Const itut ion 
calls outs ide dec i s ions , and there is now fr equent c itat ion to Commonwealth 
and US cases as well as the j ur i spr udence of the European Commiss ion of 
Human Rights . 
But an eclectic approach does not solve all d iff icult ies . Outs ide 
dec i s ions do not s imply s tate r ules , but in add i t ion i ncorporate the soc i al 
values wh ich those r ules r e f lect , and there must always be a quest ion 
whe ther those values are consonant with the Pac i f ic I s land soc iety . The 
PNG school fees cases deserve an exam inat ion from th i s  aspect .  In Mileng 
v .  Tolo lo [ 1 976 ) PNGLR 447 and Mairi v. Tololo [ 1 976 ) PNGLR 1 25 ,  the 
Supr eme Cour t held inval id , on the g round that they were not author ised by 
the relevant leg islat ion governing the i r  powe r s , act ions taken by var ious 
educat ion author it ies to implement a National Executive Counc i l  dec i s ion 
that all ch i ldren , except those of " expatr iate servants of the Gover nment " ,  
should pay an " econom ic fee " of K400 for each ch i ld who attended a pr imary 
' A '  school or a mul t i- r ac ial h ig h  schoo l . The Court reached these 
conclus ions by f i nd ing that the ef fect of s .  209 ( 1 )  ( " the r a 1 s 1ng 
of . • •  f in ance • • •  i s  subj ect to author i zat ion and control by Par l i ament • • •  " )  
was to be determ ined by r efer ence to Engl ish cases , par t icular ly 
Attorney-General v .  Wilts United Dairies Ltd ( 1 92 1 ) 3 7  TLR 884 . S uch cases 
reflect the att itude of host i l ity to taxat ion laws often man i fested by 
Engl ish j udge s , as a passag e  from an Engl ish text-book quoted by Prent ice 
DCJ and W i l l i ams J i l Lustr ates : 
In a tax ing Ac t ,  one has to look to what 
said . There " i s no room for intendment . 
is c lear ly 
There i s  no 
equ ity about a tax . There i s  no pr esumpt ion as to a 
tax . Noth ing is to be read in , noth i ng is to be 
impl ied , one can only look fair ly at the l anguag e  used 
(Mairi v. Tololo [ 1 976 ) PNGLR 1 25 ,  1 39 ) . 
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Ther e i s , i t  w i l l  be submi tted below , a quest ion as to whether th i s  
att itude t o  t ax ing l aws i s  j ust i f ied in P NG  and ,  in  par t icular , whether it 
was j ust i f ied i n  th i s  par t icular case . 
* * * * * * 
The weak sense of legal i sm is not adequate for the interpr etat ion of 
the Pac i f ic Const itut ions . The strong sense of legalism recogn ises that 
legal r ules are not f ixed , but looks wel l  beyond the common law for the 
source of development . Following Dwor k in ,  the r e  can be d isting u ished r ules 
- wh ich prov ide a c lear s tatement as to the dec i s ion to be reached , from 
pr i nc iples - wh ich prov ide the sources of the r ules : 
When lawyer s  reason or d ispute about leg al r ights and 
obligations , part icular ly i n  those hard cases when our 
problems with these concepts seem most acute , they make 
use o f  standards that do not funct ion as r ules , but 
oper ate d iffe rently as pr inc iples , pol ic ies , and other 
sor ts o f  standards ( 1 97 7 : 22 ) . 
Un like r ules , pr inc iples " do not set out legal consequences that follow 
automat ically when the cond i t ions prov ided are met" 1 r ather they prov ide 
reasons to adopt a part icular r ule . P r inc iples may confl ict , and when they 
do i t  i s  necessary to have r eg ard to the i r  r elat ive we ight and importance 
<ibid . : 2 5  -2 7 ) . 
Whe r e  do pr inc iples come from? Dworkin  argues that : 
The or ig in of these as leg al pr inc iples l ie s  not in  a 
par t icular dec i s ion of some leg islature or cour t ,  but 
in  a sense of appropr iateness deve loped in the 
profess ion and the publ ic over t ime . Their  cont inued 
power depends upon th i s  sense of appropr iateness . 
We argue for a part icular pr inc iple by g rappl ing with a 
whole se t of sh i f t i ng ,  develop i ng and inter-act ing 
standards ( themselves pr inc iples r ather than r ules) 
about ins t i tut ional responsib i l i ty , s tatutory i nter­
pretat ion , the per suas ive force of var ious sor ts of 
precedent , the r e lation of all these to contemporary 
mor al pr act ices , and hosts of other such standards 
(ibid . : 4 0 ) . 
In the case of the Paci f ic Const itut ions it i s  poss ible to be more spec i f ic 
concern ing the source of pr inc iple . The preambles to most of the 
const itut ions state soc ial values that are taken to unde r l ie the 
const itut ions , and the b il l  of r ights prov i s ions are of cour se a detai led 
statement of the ind iv idual ' s  r ights aga inst the State . 
I t  is suggested that it i s  appropr iate and indeed des i r able that the 
j udges should expl ic i t ly r esor t  to such pr inc iples to j us t i fy a dec i s ion on 
con s t i tut ional rev iew .  Th is process is not e ssent ially d ifferent to the 
manner i n  wh ich the common law has developed . Common l awye r s  have no 
d i f f iculty wor k ing w i th pr inc iples as broad as that wh ich presumes that 
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proper ty shall not be taken w i thout compensat ion . The argument i s  that 
other k inds o f  soc ial v alues can be employed in  the s ame manner .  For 
example , to retur n to the two PNG school fees cases , i t  m ight h ave been 
cons idered whether the ' economic fee ' r e flected the second Nat ional Goal of 
Equal ity and Par t ic ipat ion , and par t icular ly of that D i rect ive Pr inc iple 
wh ich calls for " equal i z at ion o f  serv ices in all par t s  o f  the country" . 
Frost CJ cons idered that h is conclus ion that the Education Act ( 1 970 ) d id 
not autho r ise the economic fee was " solely a matter of law" , and that the 
cons ide r at ions wh ich led to the fee were "of  a pol it ical nature and not 
with in the prov ince of the S upr eme Cour t "  (Mairi v. Tololo [ 1 9 7 6 )  PNGLR 
1 25 ,  1 3 2 ) . With respec t , th is approach nullif ies the i ntent ion beh ind s . 25 
that account should be taken of the ph i losophy ( wh ich can be broadly 
descr ibed as pol it ical) inherent in  the Go als . Of cour se , the Cour t may 
neve r theless have concluded that the pr inc iple of s . 209  was , in these 
c i rcumstances , supe r ior to the pr inc iple in  the Goal , but the dec i s ion 
would have been ' pr inc ipled ' , and th is , it i s  submitted , i s  cr i t ical to the 
leg it imacy o f  dec is ions . 
The pr inc iples in the National Goals or in the constitutional 
prov 1s 1ons have not been ignored by the PNG cour ts ( see Bayne 
forthcoming : 1 7-20 ) . The Fij ian cases concern ing the confl ict between the 
OPP and the Atto rney-Gene r al also i l lust r ate that a pr inc iple may be 
employed to lead to a r esult d i fferent to that wh ich would have resul ted by 
the appl icat ion of ord inary pr inc iples o f  const r uc t ion . The Attor ney­
Gene r al sought to j ust i fy the val id ity of the not ice of ass ignment , by an 
argument that it was competent for the Gove rnor-General  to ass ig n  to h im 
respons i b i l ity for the ' administr at ive ' arm and requ i r ements of the Office 
o f  the OPP . The Cour t o f  Appeal acknowledged that " applying ord inary 
pr inc iples o f  const r uc tion" (Attorney-General v. Director of Public 
Prosecution, at 3 4 )  it was poss ible to r e ad down the not ice of ass ig nment 
so that it would apply to matte r s  not with i n  the DPP ' s  express and impl ied 
:Powers . The Cour t r ej ected such a construction , and c i ted Pr ivy Counc il 
author ity that a constitut ion should be r e ad generously accord ing to 
pr inc iples not appl icable to leg i slat ion gover n i ng pr ivate law (ibid . ,  
c it ing Ong Ah Chuan v .  Public PY'osecutor [ 1 96 9 ) 3 WLR 8 5 5 , 8 6 4  per Lord 
Diplock ) . From th i s  po int the Cour t then found that : 
The man i fest intent ion of the f r amer s  of the 
Const i tut ion when enact ing the words " subj ect to the 
pr ov is ions o f  th i s  Cons t i tut ion" [ in s . 7 6 ( 1 ) ]  was to 
ensure that no assignment breached the Cons t i tut ion . 
Much mor e is involved than the bare words of the 
Const itut ion The whole concept of the independent 
off ice of the OPP is involved and that includes the 
sever ance aspect (Attorney-General v. Director of 
Public Prosecutions , at 36 , 3 7 ) . 
I t  was to fur ther th i s  pr inc iple that the Cour t r efused to read the not ice 
of the ass ignment i n  a techn ical or legal i s t ic manner , and concluded 
instead that the drafting of the not ice had den ied s . 76 ( 1 )  i ts " full and 
proper e f fect" (ibid. : 3 8 ) . 
The appl icat ion of pr i nc iples may be d i f f icult because they can 
confl ict . An instance of cons iderable d i f f iculty i s  posed by the quest ion 
whether a broad constitut ional prov i s ion is s ubj ect to or on the other hand 
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over- r ides c ustom . Th is problem may be i llustr ated by cons iderat ion o f  the 
power o f  banishment exercised by the v illage counc i l s  of WS ( see Powles 
1 973 : 1 6- 1 8 ,  3 9 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 ,  1 1 8-20 ) . Powles ' analys i s  shows the r eg ular cour ts 
of WS have been troubled by the exercise o f  th i s  power .  I n  r ecent t imes 
the Land and T i tles Cour t deve loped the not ion that the power was an 
inc ident of t i t le to land wh ich must be exer c ised reasonably (ibid . : 6 2-3 ,  
1 1 9 )  and Powles suggests that th i s  accommodat ion and control of the 
ex istence o f  the power of bani shment is more sat isfactory than a reso r t  to 
the r egular cour ts ( ibid . : 1 1 9 ) . He further s uggests that the power m ight 
be reconc iled with Ar t . 1 3 ( 1 ) (d) - that all c i t i zens have " the r ight to move 
freely throughout Western Samoa and the r ight to r es ide in any part 
thereof" - by r e l iance on Ar t . 1 3 ( 4 ) , wh ich permits l im i tat ion o f  th i s  r ight 
where a l aw imposes r easonable rest r ict ions i n  the interests inter a l i a  of 
publ ic order ( ibid. : 3 9-40 , 1 1 9 ) . He also r e fe r s  to an untested argument 
that the funct ions of the ' unoff ic ial ' v illage counci ls (see below) m ight 
be rested on an argument that by Ar t . 1 00 ,  they have : 
const itut ional and leg islat ive protect ion founded on 
the concept of collect ive pule - an i nc ident of the 
hold ing of matai t itles , and the r e fore exclus ively 
w ith in the j ur isd ict ion of the Land and Ti tles Cour t 
( ibid. : 1 1 7 )  • 
De sp i te doubts concern ing the i r  legality,  the v illage counc i ls have 
thr ived , and the Police and FPisons Report 1 9 76 found that : 
The Mata i  and the v i l lage counc i l  s t i l l  have an 
impor t ant part to play i n  l aw enforcement , and command 
the r espect of the maj or i ty of the Samoan people • • • 
s ince approx imately 80 per centum of the populat ion i s  
under the Matai  system ( 1 1 ) . 
out by the counc ils  we re often 
courts  (ibid . : 7 ) , and that many 
substant ive law .  The Report 
g iven leg i slat ive recog n i t ion and 
o f fences as a j ud ic ial body" 
the quest ion requ i r ed detai led 
The Repor t  noted that the pun i shments meted 
more severe than those of the establ ished 
of the i r  r ules were contrary to the 
r ecommended that the v i l lage counci l s  be 
" j ur i sd ict ion to deal with specif ied 
( ibid. : 1 1 ) , although it conceded that 
cons iderat ion , par t ly for the r eason that : 
w i th the improvement o f  educat ion and the consequent 
awareness by people o f  the i r  r ights under the l aw ,  the 
leg al ity o f  the ope r at ions o f  the V i l lage Counc i l s  w i l l  
inev itably b e  quest ioned . T o  us , i t  i s  such a valuable 
institution that its  preservat ion must be ensured 
(ibid . : 1 1 - 1  2 ) • 
The cur rent Ch ief Just ice of WS appears  to have taken a f i rm stance that 
ban ishment is con t r ary to the Constitution . In Tariu Tuivaiti v. Sila 
Famalaga and others 1 7  December 1 980  ( repor ted par t i al ly in Sav i l i  3 0  
January 1 98 1 ) , a pe r son bani shed b y  a v il lage counc i l  for h i s  failure to 
attend church brought s u i t  for damages aga inst four matai based on causes 
of act ion in trespass , assaul t , c iv i l  conspir acy and int im idat ion . St . John 
CJ awar ded d amages based on some o f  these causes of act ion , and in the 
course of h i s j udgment commented that : 
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The fr eedom expressed i n  Ar ticle 1 1  [ that every per son 
has the r ight to freedom of thought , consc ience and 
r e l ig ion] is the fr eedom not to have any r e l ig ion at 
all • • • S i nce i ndependence , the v illage counc i l  has no 
power to enforce attendance at chur ch • • •  If those in 
power in a v illag e  agree to pun ish i n  those c ircum­
s tances it may amount to a c iv i l  conspi r acy 
( ibid. : 6-7 ) • 
In what seems to have been an extra-cur i al s tatement made shor tly after 
th is dec i s ion , S t . John CJ declared that ban ishment i tself was contr ary to 
Ar t . 1 3  of the Cons t itut ion ( freedom of movement etc . ) . S t . John CJ ' s  v iew 
that the const i tut ional guar antees over- r ide custom is also r e flected i n  
h i s  dec is ion i n  Saipa 'ia Olomalu that Ar t . 1 5 ( 1 )  and ( 2 )  requi r ed un iver sal 
suffrage (see d i scuss ion above) • 
H i s  Honour may have over looked that Ar ts . 1 1 ( 2 )  and 1 3 ( 2 )  perm i t  
" reasonab le restr ict ions • • • i n  t h e  interests o f  • • •  pub l ic orde r " . There i s  
thus a balanc ing o f  interests r equi r ed wh ich would focus attent ion d i r ectly 
on the role of the v illage counc ils  in ws . Ar t ic le 1 5 ( 1 )  is not s im ilar ly 
qual ified ,  but in analys i ng the scope of its protect ion ( as well as in 
respect o f  Ar ts . 1 1  and 1 3 ) ,  account must be taken of Ar t . 1 00 ,  wh ich 
prov ides s imply that : 
A mata i t i t le shall be held in accordance with Samoan 
custom and usage and with law relating to S amoan 
customs and usag e . 
As Powles suggests (see above) , there i s  an argument th at the powers 
of the v illage counc i l lor s ,  who are usually matai , m ight be seen as 
inc idents o f  the matai t i tle , and th is m ight be extended to the r ight to 
vote . I do not suggest that the answe r  is c lear , for it may well be that 
the matai system has undergone such chang e  that i t  i s  not operat ing 
accord ing to custom . What i s  suggested is that pr incipled dec is ion-mak i ng 
would require  these matter s  to be addressed spec i f ically and comprehens­
ively , and that by so do ing , the leg it im acy of the dec is ion will  be the 
g reater . 
Th e argument that cons t i tut ional adj ud icat ion should pay par t icular 
attent ion to pr inc iples leads to a cons ide r at ion of the second suggest ion 
for j ud ic ial restraint to meet the counter-major itar ian obj ect ion . Many 
const i tut ional cour ts have adopted a presumption that legis lation should be 
tr eated as val id ,  not only out of an awareness that i t  is d i f f icult for the 
leg islature to rever se a dec i s ion that it is inval id , but also out o f  a 
recognit ion that the expr ess ion of the leg i slator ' s  will  is , albe i t  
imper fect ly , an express ion of maj or ity opin ion . Some US commentators have 
arg ued that th i s  pr esumption should apply with more or less we ight 
depend ing on the nature of the leg i slat ion . I t  i s  argued that i t  should 
apply strong ly to nat ional leg i slat ion al leged to infr ing e  the powers of 
the states , for the states are represented in the leg islature and can 
protect the i r  interests (see Lockhar t et al . : 24 ) . On the other hand , the 
pr esumption should apply only weak ly to leg islat ion wh ich impinges on the 
r ights of i nd i v iduals ( and par t icular ly those in m inor ity and d i sadvantag ed 
groups) , for they are not well placed to res i st the leg islature 
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(ibid. : 2 5-2 7 ) . Th is k ind o f  r eason ing may b� suggest ive of po l ic ies 
towards restraint for the Pac i f ic I sland cour ts . 
* * * * * * 
The a rg ument o f  th i s  paper is not conce rned only with the aes thetics 
o f  j ud ic ial r easoning on constitutional r ev iew. To come back to the po int 
made ear l ie r , the k i nd of j ust i f icat ion offered by cour ts for dec i s ions on 
review r elates to the leg i t imacy of the exer c i se of the funct ion of rev iew .  
A mode of i nterpretat ion based on pr inc iples w i ll not y ield a n  easy answer 
i n  the way the d iscred i ted theory o f  mechanical j ur ispr udence is s a id to 
yield an answer , and as the cases on custom and the const itut ion 
i l lustr ate , it may sharpen a confl ict . It offer s no s imple pall iat ive , but 
i t  may serve not only to educate the publ ic but to foster an acceptance by 
them o f  the author ity o f  the const itut ional cour t .  
NOTES 
1See Bayne 1 980 : 1 53-56 for an examinat ion o f  the r ej ect ion by the Supr eme 
Cour t in Re Rooney [ 1 979 ] PNGLR 4 48 that the freedom of express ion 
prov i s ion in the PNG Const itut ion substant ially qua l i f ied the law of 
cr iminal contempt . 
2 I n  Ong Ah Chua.n v .  Publia Proseautor [ 1 96 9 ]  3 WLR 8 55 , 864 , the Pr ivy 
Counc i l , r epeat ing a comment in Minister for Home Affairs v .  Fisher 
[ 1 98 0 ]  AC 3 1 9 ,  328 , advocated that a " gene rous" interpretat ion , r athe r  
than " the auster ity of tabulated leg al i sm" , should b e  appl ied t o  the 
S i ng apor e Cons t itut ion to g ive to i nd iv iduals the full measure of the 
fundamental l iber t ies . 

22. H UMAN R IG HTS I N  PAC I F IC ISLAN D CONSTI TUTIONS 
N.K.F.  O 'Neill 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
All the fully independent Pac i f ic I s land States have human r ights 
provis ions in the i r  const itut ions . Tong a was the f i r s t . The Const i tut ion 
g r anted by King Georg e Tupou I in 1 87 5  contains a Declar at ion of Rights 
r unning to twenty-nine sect ions . S i nce then We stern Samoa (WS )  ( 1 962 ) , 
Naur u ( 1 96 8 ) , F i j i ( 1 970 ) , Papua New Gu inea ( PNG ) ( 1 9 7 5 ) , So lomon I slands 
( S I )  ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Tuvalu ( 1 978 ) , K i r ibat i ( 1 979 ) , Vanuatu ( 1 980 ) have followed 
with const i tut ionally establ ished fundamental r ights and freedoms well 
ahead of the i r  former colon ial master s .  
Un til  i t  j o ined the Europe an Econom ic Cormnun i t y ,  the United 
(UK) had no compr ehens ive se t of leg ally establ i shed human r ights . 
it used to rely on wh at Lord Wr ight descr ibed : 
the good sense of the people and in the 
repr esentat ive and re spons ible gover nment 
been evolved ( Liveridge v. Anderson [ 1 94 2 ]  
2 6 1 ) . 
sys tem of 
wh ich has 
AC 2 0 6 , 
K i ngdom 
In stead 
as well as on outmoded and largely irrelevant documents l i ke Magna Carta 
and the Bi ll  of Rights . In the meant ime it has found that th i s  approach 
has fallen short  of the standards r equi red by the European Commiss ion of 
Human Rights and the E uropean Court of Human Rights . 
The r ecords of Australia  and New Ze al and (N Z )  have been even worse .  
Austral ia ' s  Cons t i tution contains a hand ful o f  isolated human r ights 
prov is ions wh ich have been interpreted into ins ignif icance . It has a 
Racial Discrimination Act ,  the const itut ional val id ity of wh ich was 
recently upheld by the H igh Cour t in Koowarta v. Bjelke Petersen 
( unreported , 1 1 /5 /8 2 )  but its  e f fect has been l imited because the fund s 
nece ssary for its  enforcement have not bee n available . S i nce 1 98 1 , 
Australia has had a Human Rights Commiss ion with l imited powers . Its  most 
use ful func t ions are educat ion and re search in relat ion to human r ights . 
I t s  value cannot be assessed at th i s  ear ly stage of its f ive-ye ar l i fe . 1 I t  
h a s  been le ft t o  t h e  States in Austr al ia t o  leg is late for human r ights . So 
far only South Aust r al ia ,  New South Wales and Victor ia have responded in 
the f ield of d iscr im inat ion . 2 New South Wales also has a Pr ivacy 
Commi ttee . 
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I n  NZ the Hwnan Rights Commission Aat ( 1 977 ) estab l i shed a Human 
Rights Commiss ion under wh ich it has powe r to promote re spect for human 
r ights through educat ion and pub l ic i ty. I t  also has power to take ac t ion 
in relat ion to un lawful d iscr iminat ion and has special repor t i ng powe rs i n  
relat ion t o  pr ivacy . 
Th is pape r takes up some of the issues r a i sed by the human r ights 
prov is ions of the n ine Pac i f ic I s land nat ions named above . I t  does not 
pretend to be an exhaust ive analys i s  of those prov is ions .  T ime , space and 
unavailab i l ity of mater ials have pr ecluded cons iderat ion of the const i tut­
ions o f  the assoc iated states and other sel f-gover n i ng terr i tor ies in the 
Pacif ic . 
ECONOM I C  R I GHTS 
The Const itut ions of the n ine named nat ions deal pr imar i ly with c iv i l  
and pol i t ical r ight s ;  b u t  these r ights a r e  o f  n o  u s e  i f  the economic 
r ights of the people are not g uar anteed . People who are subj ect to hunger 
and d i sease , whose ex istence is not based on a reasonable econom ic foot ing , 
cannot enjoy c iv i l  and po l it ical r ights . 
Some of the Cons t i t ut ions address th i s  problem . Those wh ich have 
s ign i f icant land areas compar ed with the i r  populat ions , namely PNG , SI  and 
Vanuat u ,  have g uar anteed owner sh ip of land to c i t i zens only . Under s . 56 of 
the PNG Const itut ion on ly c i t i zens may acqu ire  freehold land . Protect ion 
ag ainst unj ust depr ivat ion of property is g iven to c it i zens only by s . 53 .  
These prov 1 s 1ons were intended to complement the established leg al 
restr ict ions on the al ienat ion of customar y l and so as to ensure that most 
of the al ienated land was held and used e ither by Papua New Gu ineans or the 
Government . That goal does not appear to have been ach ieved as J im 
F i ng leton re lates in the conc lus ion o f  h i s  chapter ( see below) . 
Under Ch . XI o f  the S I  Cons t itut ion , only So lomon I s lande r s  may hold 
perpetual interests in land . Others may obtain f ixed-term interests in 
land wh ich has ce ased to be customary land . In Vanuatu all land belong s to 
the ind igenous custom owner s and the i r  descendants under Ch . 1 2  of the 
Const i tut ion . 
Given that most c i t i zens o f  these three countr ies rely on food or cash 
crops for the ir subs istence , these prov i s ions o ffer cons ider ab le 
protect ion . But they do not protect ag a inst compulsor y acqu i s i t ion and 
al ienat ion of customary land by a cor r upt government in the case of SI or  
PNG , or ag ainst unwise se l l ing of land by ignorant or venal land-owner s  
with the consent of a n  uncar ing government in  the case of Vanuatu . 
Part IX of the WS Const itut ion g uar antees the cont inuance of 
owner sh ip , accord ing to custom ,  o f  customary land . I t  also places 
s ig n i f icant l im itat ion on the al ienat ion of customar y  land . 
Wh i lst there are some inter nal incon s i stenc ies in Pt . I II  o f  the Tong an 
Cons t i tut ion wh ich deals with land , the maj or pr opos i t ion i s  that r ad ical 
t i tle to the land is owned by the K i ng ,  that is essent ial ly the fe udal land 
owner sh ip concept recog nised by the Eng l ish common law .  But in Tong a  
everyone from t h e  K i ng down lacks the capac ity t o  se l l  t h e  land . However ,  
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Cabinet does have the powe r to lease the land under s . 1 0 5 .  That provis ion 
could l im i t  the amount of land avai lable for Tong an commoners  to use . 
Naur u w ith its 2 1  square k i lometres for 7 , 000  people has h ad to f ind a 
d i f ferent answer . Land is not its  maj or r esour ce , but r ather the royalt ies 
from the phosphate taken from the island . I t  prov ides for the economic 
future of its  people through its Long Te rm I nvestment Fund es tab l ished 
under s . 6 2 of its  Cons t i tut ion and by estab l ish ing a fund into wh ich the 
phosphate r oyalties are paid under s . 6 3 .  
I n  cont r ast to these Cons t i tut ions , the Cons t i t ut ions o f  Tuvalu and 
K i r ibati make no ment ion of the economic bases of those countr ies , and Fij i 
does not r e fer to land in i t s  Constitution in a way that is intended to 
protect i t  as an econom ic r e source , although other leg islat ive a r r angements 
protect the r ights o f  r ac ial F ij ian s  to the ir  land , 83 per cent o f  wh ich is 
held under customary tenur e .  3 
THE MODELS FOR THE HUMAN R I GHTS PROV I S I ONS 
Wh ilst  the Br it ish do not have a wr i tten Cons t i tut ion of the ir  own , 
they d id develop one for expor t .  I t  has ce r t ainly had plenty of use . The 
model prov i s ions for the " pr otect ion of fundamental r ights and freedoms o f  
the ind iv idual " a r e  found ( at least ) in  the Cons t i t ut ions o f  Jamaic a ,  
St . Luc i a  and S t . Vincent i n  the Carr ibean , and i n  the Cons t i tu t ions of 
S i er r a  Leone , Z ambi a  and Z imbabwe in Af r ic a .  The same model was used for 
the F i j i an Cons t i t ut ion as wel l  as for those of S I , Tuv alu and K i r ibat i .  
Moreover , the S t . Luc ia Const itut ion was used i n  the deve lopment o f  the WS 
and Naur uan Cons t itut ions . Ne ither of them fol low the model as c losely as 
the St . Luc ia Constitution , but both were clear ly influenced by i t . 
What i s  the approach of the model? I t  establishes a r ight in a sho r t  
and succ inct statement - as in s . 5  of the Tuvalu Const itut ion wh ich states : 
"No pe r son shall be depr ived of h i s  pe r sonal l ibe r ty" - but then cuts it 
down in  a ser ies o f  l imitat ions : for example , s . 5  cont inues : " save as may 
be author i sed by law in any of the fol lowing c ases , that is to say • • •  " ,  
l ist ing eleven l im itat ions wh ich take up three-quar ter s  o f  a page . 
The Br it ish export model appear s to be based in turn very 
substan t i ally on the Europe an Convent ion on Human Rights . That Convent ion 
too fol lows the ' e stab l i shment then l imitat ion ' approach . The way the 
human r ig hts prov 1s 1ons in  the export mode l are s t r uctured and worded is 
very s imilar  to the European Convent ion . Some sect ions of the 
Const itut ions (or  at least par ts of them) are ident ical in the wording with 
the European Convent ion . 
PNG h ad a Hwnan Rights Ordinance in force from 1 972 unt i l  I ndepend­
ence . I t  prov ided the bas is upon wh ich i t s  constitut ional prov is ions were 
bui lt . 
The quest ion of what human r ights prov i s ions , i f  any , should go into 
the Cons t i tut ion was a maj or issue for PNG ' s  Const i tut ional Planning 
Committee ( CPC) . I t  came out clear ly in favour of the approach taken in  
the Br it i sh expor t model . I t  was impressed by the v iew of the Cons t i tut ion 
Commiss ion of Tr inidad and Tobago that br ief and s imple statements of 
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r ights become subj ect to j udge- imposed l im itat ions ( PNG CPC 1 9 74 : 5/1 /7 ) . 
I n  the end PNG f in i shed up with three fundamental r ights in i t s  
Constitut ion , namely t h e  r ight t o  l i fe ,  fr eedom from inh umane t r eatment and 
protect ion of the law .  It  also has two type s of qual if ied r ights : r ights 
of all per sons and the spec ial r ights o f  c i t i zens . 
Wh i lst the draft ing of the human r ights prov 1s 1ons of the PNG 
Constitut ion r e flects the use of the Br it ish expo r t  mode l prov i s ions ,  as 
we ll as the Europe an Convent ion on Human Rights , 4 they are suffic iently 
d i fferent in  str ucture , layout and wor d ing to be s ign i f icantly d iffe rent 
from both these sources ; for instance they conta in the r ight to vote and 
stand for publ ic off ice and the r ight to freedom of informat ion wh ich are 
not to be found in e i ther model .  
The human r ights prov i s ions i n  the Tong a Const i tu t ion are very 
d i f fe rent from those cons idered so far . They reflect the concern of 
n i neteenth century human itar ians by outlawing slave ry and by entrenchment 
of the then establ ished due process r ights . They also re flect the fact 
that Tong a had been recently chr ist iani sed by a fundamentalist d issenter 
rel ig ion : both the freedom to pr actise r e l ig ion accord ing to consc ience 
and the pos s ibily cont r ad ictory obl ig at ion to keep the Sabbath Day s acred 
are set down . 
Vanuat u  has followed the Un ited States (US )  approach of stat ing 
constitut ionally g uar anteed human r ights in b r ief terms and then leav ing i t  
t o  t h e  cour ts t o  interpret these , t o  expl ain t h e  c ircumstance s in wh ich 
they apply , and to lay down the l imitat ions to wh ich they are subject . 
However ss . S  and 6 do g ive some g u ide l ines to the cour t s . Wh ilst  r ights 
are st ated as s i ng le words or phr ases l i ke " l ife" , " libe r ty" , " sec ur ity of 
the pe r son" and "pr otect ion o f  law" , they are to be subj ect to the r ights 
and freedoms of other s  and to the leg it imate publ ic interest in  de fence , 
safety , publ ic order and health . 
THE I NTERPRETAT I ON AND ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN R I GHTS 
Al l n ine nat ions prov ide that the human r ights prov 1s 1ons in the ir  
Const itut ions may be interpreted and enfor ced by the cour ts . The Br it ish 
export model attempts to se t out the l im itat ions that apply in  r elat ion to 
each o f  them . However th is does not r e s ult in  c lear and fully compre­
hens ive prov is ions . They s t i l l  need interpr etat ion as to the c i r cumstances 
in wh ich they apply and as to whether ther e  are further qua l i f icat ions or 
l imitat ion s .  Perhaps i t  i s  cyn ical to suggest that there are few 
d i f ferences between the Br it ish export and US model s  when i t  comes to 
interpretat ion . 
In re lat ion to the former the l im i tat ions on human r ights are 
estab l ished in statutory form and can only be removed or v ar ied by statute 
law ,  but further l imitat ions and interpr e tat ions may be appl i ed as g losses 
by the cour ts . I n  relat ion to the latter , all l im itat ions and inter­
pr etat ions are cour t- imposed , but they may be var ied over t ime as the 
interpr e t ing cour ts both change the ir  compos i t ions and r espond to the i r  
chang ing pe rcept ions o f  what a r e  appropr iate interpr e tat ions g iven the 
needs of the chang ing soc ieties for wh ich they are interpret ing . 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
There are too few j udgments availab le from the cour ts of the 
nat ions for any clear approaches to interpr etat ion to be d iscer ned . 
f ive d ir ectly relevant j udgments were available to th is author at the 
of wr i t i ng :  two from PNG , one from Fij i ,  one from WS and a repo r t  
j udgment from Naur u . 5 
3 1 1  
n ine 
On ly 
t ime 
of a 
( 1 ) In 1 9 77  impor tant aspects of PNG ' s  r ights of due process were put to 
the tes t .  In Constitutional Reference No . 1  of 19??  [ l977 ] PNGLR 3 6 2  the 
Pub lic So l ic itor , exerc1s 1ng his  const itut ional powe r to approach the 
Supr eme Cour t for an adv isory opinion , put the quest ion : 
Does failure to comply with all or par t of sect ion 
4 2 ( 2 )  of the Cons t i tut ion for that reason alone render 
subsequent adm i s s ions or confess ions by an accused 
per son as inadm issable as ev idence at h is tr i al? 6 
The Ac t ing P ublic So lic i tor and h i s  Deputy , now Andrew J and Kapi DCJ 
r espect ively , arg ued that the Cons t i tut ion , on its  prope r  const r uct ion , 
impl iedly for bade the use of mater ial obtained in breach of s . 4 2 ( 2 )  and 
that the people of PNG h ad an inal ienable r ight to have any confess ion 
rende red inadmiss ible if it was improper ly obta i ned . They further arg ued 
that the e f fect of s . 3 7 ( 1 0 ) wh ich states that " No per son shall be compelled 
in a t r ial of an offence to be a witne ss ag ainst h imsel f " , on a breach of 
the prov 1s 1ons of s . 4 2 ( 2 )  was to render confess ional ev idence rece ived in 
breach of its  terms inadmiss ible aga inst the pe r son conce rned . 
The Pub l ic Pr osec utor , Mr K . B .  Eg an , arg ued that there was no spec i f ic 
const itut ional obl ig at ion on the Cour t to r ule that all confess ional 
mater ial obtained without compl iance with s . 4 2 ( 2 )  ought to be rej ected for 
that reason alone and that the Constitut ion should not be interpreted as 
requ i r ing th is . 
The Ac ting Pr incipal Legal Of ficer (Secretary for Justice) , now Kidu 
CJ , arg ued that that sect ion was mandatory and must be compl ied with and 
that the on ly r emed ies for breach of the sect ion were to be found in the 
Const itut ion . He further submitted that s . 3 7 ( 1 0 ) d id not , on its prope r  
constr uct ion , exc lude any confess ion obta ined before t h e  tr ial commences .  
Frost CJ accepted the argument that s ince the Cons t i tut ion created the 
obl ig at ion to comply with s . 4 2 ( 2 )  and also prov ided statutory r emed ies , 
those remed ies wer e  the only ones ava ilable , so that the re was no room for 
argument on the impl ied proh ib it ion of the use of con fess ional mater ial . 
He then placed a nar row interpretat ion on s . 3 7 ( 1 0 ) , hold ing that because 
the term " the tr ial of an o ffence " had a techn ical mean ing in the Cr im inal 
Code , its o n ly e f fect was to g ive an accused pe r son immun i ty f r om be ing 
cal led as a wi tness dur ing the tr i al before a cour t ,  so that it d id not 
ope r ate in  re lat ion to pr etr ial confess ions . The Ch ief Just ice took 
comfor t from the fact that th is nar row interpretat ion had also been g iven 
to a s im ilar , but not ident ical , prov is ion in the Kenyan Const itut ion (see 
Republic v .  El Mann [ 1 969 ] EA 3 57 ) . Al l f ive j udges adopted th i s  v iew of 
s . 3 7 ( 1 0 ) and answered the Pub l ic So lic i tor ' s  quest ion in  the negat ive . 
* * * * * * 
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I t  should be added , however , that wh ilst  the Ch ief J u st ice rej ected 
the argument that s . 4 2 ( 2 )  impl iedly proh ib ited the admi ss ion of any 
mater ial obta ined after its terms had been b r e ached , he drew attent ion to 
the Na t ional Cour t ' s  power s  under ss . 5 7 ( 1 ) and ( 3 ) to protect the accused ' s  
r ights and exclude from ev idence any admiss ions by h im obta ined in breach 
of s . 4 2 ( 2 ) . 
Wh i lst th i s  wr i ter consider s  that the i nterpr etat ion proposed for 
s . 4 2 ( 2 )  by the Ac ting Public Sol ic itor is the appropr i ate one - g iven that 
words , express ions and propos i t ions in the Const itut ion are to be g iven 
the ir  f a i r  and l iber al mean i ng - i t  is conceded that the pos i t ion taken by 
the j udges is under standable and can be arg ued , on techn ical g r ound s ,  as 
cor rect . It is also under standab le g iven the desire  of j udges , s itt ing as 
arbiters o f  both fact and law ,  to have as much ev idence as poss ible before 
them . Admiss ions by the accused make th is task much easier , sweeping away 
doubts left by c i r cumstant ial ev idence . Mor eover , con fess ional ev idence 
often makes up the g r eater par t  of the prosecut ion ' s  case , and without i t  
many prosecut ions would fa i l .  Fur the r , the j udges may h ave been concer ned 
that if they adopted the Ac ting Public So lic i tor ' s  interpretat ion of 
s . 4 2 ( 2 ) , they would have opened up a Pandor a ' s  box of poss ible arg uments as 
to the extent to wh ich s . 4 2 ( 2 )  had to be compl ied with before the impl ied 
proh ibit ions on the use of mater i al gained after its breach came into 
force . 
The most d is appoint ing part of the dec i s ion was the interpr etat ion 
placed on s . 3 7 ( 1 0 ) . G iven the pos i t ion taken by the Cour t ,  that the remedy 
for breach of s . 4 2 ( 2 )  was to be found in s . 5 7 ( and probably s . 58 )  and not 
elsewhere , there was no need to expr ess any v iew about the e f fect o f  
s . 3 7 ( 1 0 ) . However , the Ch ie f Justice said : 
Fur ther , I am quite c lear on th is , that having reg ard 
to the homeg rown nature of the Constitution , no 
intent ion is shown that the not ion of due process , 
developed in detail  to meet Un ited States cond it ions , 
should be introduced into the Papua New Gu inea 
Constitution. I t  i s  t r ue that the Conun i ttee refers  to 
the " due process" as prov ided in the Un ited S t ates 
Const i tut ion , and states that s . 3 7 • • • i s  " the 
equ ivalent" of that prov is ion • • • Th is i nd icates to me 
that s . 3 7 deal s with s im ilar subj ect matter but not 
necessar ily in the same terms . Re ad ing the 
Constitution as a whole , s . 3 7 ( 1 0 )  cannot be taken so 
far as to const itute an ind ir ect method of en forcement 
of s . 4 2 ( 2 ) , for wh ich spec i f ic prov 1s 1on as to 
enforcement is made at least in D i v i s ion 3 ( 3 72 ) . 
It is submitted respectfully that the Cour t ' s  v i ew of that prov i s ion 
was both unnecessary for i ts dec is ion and wrong . Conced ing the po int made 
by the Ch ief Just ice in the last sentence , it does not follow that the 
Cour t was ent it led to impose the nar row interpr etat ion i t  d id on s . 3 7 ( 1 0 ) . 
After all the CPC Report ( wh ich can be taken into account in interpr et ing 
the Const itut ion under s . 24 )  does state i n  relat ion to the protect ion of 
law prov i s ions now fo und in s . 3 8 , "Th is is the equ ivalent of the " due 
process" prov 1 s 1ons in the US Const itut ion ( 1 974 : 5/1 / 1 0 ) . Spec i f ically in  
relat ion to s . 3 7 ( 1 0 ) the Comm ittee goes on to state that : 
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The recommendat ion spec i f ic al ly prov ides that a per son 
shall be presumed innocent unt i l  he is proven g uilty 
accord ing to law ,  that no per son should be compelled to 
be a witness ag a inst h imsel f ( ibid. ) . 
3 1 3  
There i s  noth ing in  t h e  Repor t t o  l imit t h e  ope r at ion of s . 3 7 ( 1 0 ) in  the 
way done by the S upr eme Cour t .  Indeed the words of the Report tend to fly 
in the face of the v iew expr essed by the Ch ie f Just ice and i t  is almost 
un iversal ly accepted that the " Escobedo - M i r anda doctr ine" wh ich takes the 
r ight ag ainst self- i ncr im inat ion back to con fe ss ions and admiss ions made 
well before the tr i al commences , is an esse nt ial par t  of the d ue pr ocess 
r ights g uar anteed in the US Const itut ion . The Deputy Ch ief Just ice ' s  v iew 
( 3 77 of j udgment )  that an expl ic i t  prov is ion ag ainst conv ict ion on the 
bas i s  of confess ional ev idence obta ined in breach of const itut ional r ights , 
should have been added to s . 3 7 ( 4 ) , i s , with r e spect , an excuse for avoiding 
acceptance of the real intent ion of the CPC ' s  Repor t .  Th at Repor t ,  
intended to be read by people who spoke Engl i sh a s  a second lang uage and by 
people who were not leg al ly tr a i ned or exper ienced , does not go into every 
issue in g reat deta i l . I t s  thr ust i n  r e l at ion to s . 3 7 ( 1 0 ) , however ,  i s  
c lear ly i n  t h e  oppos ite d ir ect ion t o  t h a t  t a k e n  b y  t h e  S upr eme Cour t .  I t  
certa inly doe s not g ive any g round for t h e  Cour t t o  rely o n  an 
interpretat ion g iven to a prov is ion of the Kenyan Const itut ion as the bas is 
for g iv ing a nar row interpretation to s . 3 7 ( 1 0 ) . 
( 2 )  I n  1 9 68  a sys tem of on-the- spot t r a f f ic and par k i ng f ines was 
introduced in PNG , but few people pa id the i r  f ines and most al leged 
of fender s  had to be served with summonses , t ak i ng up larg e amounts of 
d istr ict and local cour t t ime . To streaml ine th is process a l aw was 
enacted in 1 98 1  introduc ing a t r a f f ic infr ingement summons . Under the 
leg is lat ion if an al leged offender d id not appear at cour t or was not 
repr esented , a l l  the pol ice had to do was to prove that the per son had been 
served wi th a summons . The cour t then would record a plea of g u ilty and 
proceed to cons ider its sentence . 
In Supreme Court Reference IA of 1 981 [ 1 98 2 ] SC 2 2 3 , the Public 
So lic i tor quest ioned the const itut ional val id ity of the leg is lat ion . The 
Cour t was of the v iew that the t r affic infr ing ement summons procedure was 
const i tut ionally inval id because it den ied a de fendant who fai led to appear 
the r ight to a hear ing in  h is or her absence as r equ i r ed by s . 3 7 ( 5 ) . 
Fur ther , the procedure ,  because it prov ided for the record ing of a plea of 
g u ilty if the de fend ant d id not appear , den ied the de fend ant the 
presumpt ion of innocence wh ich was g uar anteed under s . 3 7 ( 4 )  ( a ) . 
Th is dec is ion is c lear ly cor r ect even though it may be inconvenient 
for those who have to deal with t r a f f ic and par king infr ingement s .  It is 
up to those respons ib le to dev ise a leg is lat ive scheme wh ich will  stream­
l ine the cour t sys tem without do ing v iolence to the due process o f  
prov i s ions of t h e  Const itut ion . 
( 3 )  The due process r ights in the F i j i Cons t i tution were cons idered by the 
Supr eme Cour t w i th i n  n ine months of the i r  com ing into force . In Mam Chand 
v. R ( 1 97 1 ) 1 7  F i j i LR 8 6 ,  Mam Ch and was charged with r ape and g r anted 
bai l .  He d id not appear at a hear ing as requ i r ed and a bench war r ant was 
issued for h is arrest . Meanwh ile he bor rowed another pe r son ' s  passport , 
forged it by subs t i t ut ing h i s  photog r aph in i t  and then left F i j i .  On h i s  
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r eturn he was ar rested . When the pol ice tr ied to interv iew h im in re lat ion 
to the forged passpo r t  he r e fused . The pol ice t r ied to interv iew h im again 
wh ilst he was held in  pr i son , but the pr i son author i t ies , knowing he d id 
not wish to be i nterv iewed , r efused the pol ice access . The pol ice left the 
pr i son wi thout charg ing h im with forgery.  Three days later the pol ice 
formally l aid a forgery charge in  the Mag istr ate ' s  Cour t .  Marn Chand was 
brought before the Cour t that mor n i ng .  The f i r s t  he heard o f  the forgery 
charge was when he entered the dock and i t  was put to h im .  I n  answer to 
the charge ,  Mam Ch and said " I t is t r ue " . When the facts were outl ined he 
admitted them . In h i s  plea on m i t igat i on , he ef fect ively admitted the 
offence ag a i n .  He was conv icted and sentenced to twe lve months '  
impr i sonment on the forgery charge .  
He appealed to the S upreme Cour t ag ainst the conv ict ion and sentence 
on the g rounds that the r e  had been a breach of h i s  r ights under the 
Const itut ion . It was argued on h i s  behal f that s . 1 0 ( 2 )  (c )  prov ides : 
every per son who is charged with a cr im inal offence 
• • • shall be g iven adequate t ime and fac i l i t ie s  for the 
preparat ion of his defence 
and that the se oppor tun i t ies had been den ied h im .  
Hammett CJ cons ide red that s . 1 0 ( 2 )  ( c )  appl ied only when a defendant 
pleaded "Not Gu ilty" to a charge ( ibid . : 9 0 ) , whe reas here the de fendant had 
ente red an unequ ivocal plea of "Guilty" . Thus the Cou r t  concluded there 
was no need to prov ide h im with adequate t ime and fac i l i t ie s  to pr epar e h is 
defence h av ing told the Cour t ,  by h i s  plea o f  g u ilty , that he d id not 
intend to make one . 
Surely the const itut ional pr ov 1 s 1on was not intended to be conf ined 
thus? Does not every pe r son charged with a cr iminal offence need adequate 
t ime and fac i l i t ies to dec ide whether or not to defend the matter ?  Is not 
the fact that the defendant pleaded g u i l ty when faced with the charge 
i r r elevant to the quest ion of whether or not he was prov ided with adequate 
t ime and fac i l it ies to cons ider his pos i t ion , wh ich it is subm itted , i s  
encompassed b y  the term " the preparat ion o f  h i s  de fence " ? 7 
( 4 )  The Naur u  Supr eme Cour t ' s  dec is ion In re Jeremiah (Miscellaneous Cause 
No . 2  of 1 9 7 1 ) has been d iscussed in deta i l  by Karen McDowell at th is 
wor kshop . 8 However it is appropr iate to r ecapitulate i t  br iefly in  th i s  
context . 9 
Jerem i ah , a Naur uan , wi shed to mar ry a non-Naur uan . He requ i r ed the 
consent o f  the Local Gove rnment Counc i l  before the mar r i age could be 
lawfully solemn i sed under Naur uan law.  Th is consent was r e fused . Jerem i ah 
approached the Supreme Cour t for an order that under Ar t . 3 he had an 
inal ienable r ight to mar r y and was ent i tled to mar ry the non-N aur uan woman . 
Ar ticle 3 s tates : 
Whe reas every per son in Naur u i s  ent itled to the 
fundamental r ights and fr eedoms of the ind iv id ual , that 
is to say , h as the r ight , whatever h i s  r ace , place of 
or 1g 1n , pol i t ical opi n ions , colour , c reed or sex , but 
subj ect to r espect for the r ights and fr eedoms of 
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other s  and for the publ ic interest , to each and all of 
the fol lowing freedoms , n amely : 
( a) l i fe ,  l iber ty , secur ity of the per son , the 
enj oyment of prope r ty and the protect ion of the 
law; 
( b )  freedom of consc ience , o f  expr ess ion and of 
peace ful assembly and assoc iat ion ; and 
( c) r espect for h i s  pr ivate and fam i ly l ife , 
the subsequent prov is ions of th i s  Part  have e f fect for 
the purpose of afford ing protect ion to those r ights and 
freedoms , subj ect to such l im itat ions of that protect­
ion as are contained in those prov 1 s 1ons , being 
l im itat ions des igned to ensure that the enj oyment of 
those r ights and fr eedoms by a pe r son does not 
prej ud ice the r ights and fr eedoms of other pe r sons or 
the publ ic interest . 
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The Supreme Cour t took the v iew that A r t . 3  - wh ich a marg inal note 
descr ibes as a preamble - was not intended to r e fer to any pr e-ex ist ing 
r ights and freedoms but only to those s ubsequently spec i f ied in the 
Cons t i tut ion . As the substant ive prov is ions of Pt . I I ,  Ar ts . 3- 1 4 ,  d id not 
confer a r ight to mar r y ,  it therefore concluded that there was no r ight 
wh ich could be enforced on Jerem iah ' s  behal f .  
I t  i s  not appropr iate to comment spe c i f ically o n  the j udgment . I t  
should b e  noted , however , that none of the Cons t i tut ions based o n  the 
Br it ish expor t  model guar antee a r ight to mar r y .  Nor d o  t h e  Const itut ions 
of WS , PNG , Tong a and Vanuatu .  Ye t ,  the Const itut ions of all the other 
nat ions , except Tong a ,  contain ant i-d iscr imina t ion prov i s ions wh ich could 
be rel ied on to put an arg ument that was not r un in  Naur u ,  namely , that a 
statutory prov is ion r equ i r ing nat ional s  to obtain consent before mar r i age 
when non- n at ionals d id not requ i r e  such consent was unconst itut ional 
because it amounted to d iscr im inat ion on the bas i s  of r ace . 
( 5 )  The most controve r s i al 
prov i s ions in the Pac i f ic 
St . John CJ i n  ws . 
dec i s ion on 
I s l and nat ions 
const itut ional human r ights 
was that g iven r ecently by 
A Mr s Moor e was taken off the " ind iv idual" electoral roll when her 
husband took a matai t itle . She complained to a lawyer about th is and thus 
beg an a cha in of events wh ich led to a full- sc ale cons t i tut ional chal lenge 
to the WS e lectoral system and then to a full- scale pol it ical cr i s i s  in the 
country.  
Under the sys tem established by the EZectoraZ Act , approx imately 
1 5 , 0 00 matai are ent it led to vote in  the elect ion for for ty-f ive member s  of 
the Parliament wh i lst the approx imately 1 , 5 00 " ind iv idual" voters on 
another roll are ent itled to vote for the other two membe r s  o f  Par l i ament . 
I t  was that sys tem wh ich was challenged in Saipa ' ia OlomaZu and Others v.  
Attorney-General ( unr epor ted j udgment ,  5 Apr i l  1 982 ) . 
The challeng e was based on Ar t . 1 5  of the Const itut ion wh ich states : 
( 1 ) A l l  per sons are equal be fore the law and ent i tled 
to equal protect ion under the law. 
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( 2 )  Except as expr essly author i sed under the 
prov 1 s 1ons o f  th i s  Const itut ion , no law and no 
execut ive or admin i st r at ive act ion of the S t ate 
shal l ,  e i ther expr essly o r  i n  its pract ical 
app l icat ion , subj ect any pe r son or pe r sons to any 
d is ab i l ity or restr ict ion or confer on any pe r son 
or per sons any pr ivilege or advantag e on g rounds 
only o f  descent , sex , l ang uag e , r e l ig ion , 
pol it ical or other opin ion , soc ial or 1g 1n ,  place 
of b i r th ,  fam ily status , or any o f  them • • •  
( 4 )  Noth ing in th i s  Ar t ic le shall affect the ope r at ion 
of any ex ist ing law o r  the maintenance by the 
State of any execut ive or adm i n i s t r at ive pr act ice 
be ing observed on Independence Day : 
Prov ided that the S t ate shall d irect its  pol icy towards 
the prog ress ive r emoval of any d is ab i l ity or restr ict­
i on wh ich has been imposed on any of the g rounds 
r e ferred to in Clause ( 2 )  and o f  any pr iv ileg e  or 
advant ag e  wh ich has been con fe r red on any o f  those 
g rounds . 
Th ree other Ar t ic les were relevan t :  Ar t . 2  makes the Const i tut ion the 
supreme law o f  WS and makes any law whether brought into force before or 
after Independence wh ich i s  incons istent with the Cons t i t ut ion void to the 
extent o f  the inconsistency ; Ar t . 4  empower s  the S upr eme Cour t to g ive 
orders  necessary to g uarantee the enj oyment of the const i tut ional human 
r ights ; and Art . 4 4  establishes the member sh ip of the Leg i slat ive Assembly 
and cont inue s : 
( 3 )  S ubj ect to the prov 1 s 1ons of th i s  Const itut ion , 
the mode of elect ing member s  of the Leg islat ive 
As sembly,  the terms and cond i t ion of the i r  
membe r sh ip , the qual i f icat ions o f  elector s ,  and 
the manner in wh ich the roll for each ter r ito r i al 
const ituency and the ind iv id ual voter s '  r oll shall 
be estab l ished and kept shall be prescr ibed by 
law.  
It  was argued that the ElectoPal Act ,  by g 1v 1 ng only matai t i tle holder s  
and cer t a in other ind iv iduals the r ight t o  vote , den ied other Samoans 
equal ity before the law and equal protect ion under the law wh ich was 
g uar anteed to them under Ar t . 1 5 ( 1 )  as wel l as amount ing to d iscr iminat ion 
outlawed by Ar t . 1 5 ( 2 ) . St . John CJ adopted the US S upr eme Cour t v iew that 
leg is lat ion impos ing l imitat ions on the ab i l ity to vote v iolated 
const i tut ional equal protect ion prov i s ions .  He was of the opinion that the 
const itut ional debates d id not ass ist the Atto rney-Gener al ' s  argument that 
those debates r evealed a des ire by the framers o f  the Const i t u t ion to 
preserve a system of vot ing by matais only and e f fect ively to phase out the 
ind iv idual elector ' s  r ol l .  Indeed , h is v iew was that because Ar t . 44 ( 3 ) , 
wh ich empowered the establishment of the e lectoral system by leg islat ion , 
was to be read " subj ect to the prov is ions of th i s  Cons t itution " , i t  was 
subj ect to the equal protect ion and ant i-d i sc r iminat ion prov i s ions o f  
Ar ts . 1 5 ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) . 
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The Ch ief Just ice descr ibed Ar t . 1 5 ( 4 )  as an adm iss ion b y  the fr amers 
of the Const itut ion that some laws ex ist ing at Indepe ndence o ffended Ar t .  
1 5 ( 2 ) . He cons idered that Ar t . 1 5 ( 4 )  allowed for the postponement o f  some 
r ights but he noted that the Ar t ic le requ ired the s t ate to d irect its  
pol icy towards the prog ress ive removal o f  any d isab i l ity or restr ict ion 
wh ich had been imposed on any of the g rounds r e fer red to in Ar t . 1 5 ( 2 ) , and 
he fur ther noted th at near ly twenty years had e l apsed s ince I ndependence . 
Th us to g ive effect to h i s  v iew of Ar t . 1 5 ( 4 )  he was prepared in the 
exercise of the Cour t ' s  powe r s  under Ar t . 4 ( 2 )  to intervene and hold that 
the ab il ity of other s  to obtain vot ing r ights could no longer be postponed . 
He took the v iew that the Const itut ion was an integ r at ion of Samoan custom 
and modern nat ional government wh ich was , to a deg ree , democrat ic . The 
Cons t i tut ion therefore d id not prevent extend ing the fr anch ise to 
non-matais . H i s  Honour was not pr epared to imply the word " reasonable " 
into Ar t . 1 5 ( 2 )  with the effect of al lowing " reasonable d i sc r iminat ion " . 
Al l these cons ider at ions led h im to conc lude that the electoral leg i slat ion 
infr inged Ar ts . 1 5 ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) . He con t in ued : 
Th e effect of th is j udgement is that , unless r ever sed 
on appeal , or  the const itut ion appr opr iately amended in 
the meant ime , the next elect ion of a member qr membe r s  
o f  par l iament in  th i s  country cannot take place o n  the 
bas i s  o f  the Ac t as i t  now stands . The l imits of the 
Cour t ' s  funct ion i s  to make that declarat ion mak ing 
void those two sect ions of the Ac t ,  b ut I express the 
op1n 1on that noth ing short  of un iversal suffr ag e  for 
al l c i t i zens male and female , who have atta ined the age 
of 2 1  year s will  suff ice to sat isfy the const itut ional 
str ictures as they now stand . Th is d ec i s ion does not 
invalidate any prev ious e lect ion conduc ted pur suant to 
the Ac t ;  it speaks only as to the future ( at p . 1 3 ) . 
The dec i s ion has already had enormous pol it ical impact in WS . An approach 
had been made by the At torney-General to NZ to e stab l ish a Court of Appeal 
of three NZ  j udges ; however , at the t ime o f  wr i t i ng no appeal had been 
made . It i s  suggested there is scope for further test ing the Ch ie f 
Just ice ' s  v iews on Ar t . 1 5 ( 2 ) , and its  relat ionsh ip with Ar t . 4 4 ( 3 ) , the 
mean ing of Ar t . 1 5 ( 4 )  and the power of the Cour t in  the exerc ise of its 
power s  under Ar t . 4 ( 2 )  to for ce progress ive r emoval of d i sab i l i t ies and 
restr ict ions under Ar t . 1 5 ( 4 ) . Neve r theless , the j udgment does show the 
power that const itut ional human r ights prov i s ions g ive to cour ts pr epared 
to r ely on them in requir ing signif icant changes in the pol i t ical structure 
of a country.  
I t  should also be  noted , however , that the  Ch ief Just ice has  g iven 
those who presently ho ld pol i t ical powe r  in  WS at least two years to dec ide 
what act ion to take if no appeal is lodged or it fails . A maj or opt ion 
open is for the Const itut ion to be amended . Under Ar t . 1 09 th is is with in 
the prov ince of the Parliament wh ich i s  dom inated by matais. 
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AMEND I NG THE CONST ITUT I ON 
In a l l  n ine nat ions the P a r l i aments are the i n i t iato r s  o f  changes to 
the i r  respect ive countr ie s ' Cons t i tut ions . Apart from Tong a ' s , they have 
complete control over the amendment process , although in  WS a r e fe r endum is 
r equi red before any var iat ion can be made to Ar t . 1 02 wh ich precludes the 
al ienat ion of c ustomary land or to the prov i so in  Ar t . 1 09 wh ich r equ i r e s  
that r e fe rendum . 
The Tonga prov i s ion makes const itut ional amendment very d i f f icult . 
Under Cl . 7 9 the Leg is lat ive As sembly must pass the amendment three t imes . 1 0  
Thus the par l iamentar ians have g reat powe r over human r ights . 
Exper ience has shown that wh ilst  they may d is ag ree on pol ic ies and d i sag ree 
among st themselves as to who should be in the gover nment , they often have 
s im ilar v iews on a number of matter s  r e l at ing to the exercise of power . 
They place g r eat impor tance on the status o f  par l i amentar i ans and on the ir  
" r ight" to gover n  accord ing to the i r  pe rcept ions as to what i s  good for the 
country.  These percept ions and the l imi tat ions placed on the exercise of 
execut ive power by h uman r ights prov is ions can come i nto stark  con f l ict . 
In such s ituat ions there are g r eat temptat ions to red uce them by 
const itut ional amendment . 1 1  
Many of the Pac i f ic I s land nat ions are made up o f  g roups who wer e ,  and 
poss ibly s t i l l  are , t r ad i t ional enemies . Coal i t ions o f  the par l iamentary 
r epr esentat ives o f  these g roups come together to form governments and 
exercise powe r .  There is much scope for suspic ion , fear and d istr ust both 
among those who are in powe r , and between those who are and are not in 
powe r .  Such s ituat ions could g ive r i se to a des i r e  by those in  power to 
r emove or reduce the human r ights o f  minor i t ies not presently par t  of the 
powe r str uctur e .  So far there i s  n o  ev idence that such moves have actually 
been cons idered . Never theless , i t  is wor th a s k ing whether the people have 
g iven the ir  member s  of Parliament not only the powe r to amend the i r  
const itut ions but also the powe r t o  r eplace those const i tut ions with 
fundamentally d i f fer ent ones? 
Th i s  quest ion has been addressed in I nd i a  where some S upr eme Cour t 
j udges h ave developed the not ion that the r e  are e ssent ial features o f  the 
Const itut ion wh ich cannot be changed by amendment . These incl ude a 
democratic form o f  government , the separat ion o f  powe r s , the sovere ignty o f  
the country,  a mandate t o  build a we l fare state . In Kesevananda. v .  State 
of Kere la ( AIR 1 9 73  SC 1 46 1 ) s ix of the f i fteen j udges held that 
fundamental human r ights were amongst  the essent ial features of the 
Const itut ion . The two j udges who g ave the ir  reasons for th i s  pos i t ion 
added : 
De spite these l im itat ion s ,  however ,  ther e  can be no 
quest ion that the amend ing power i s  a wide powe r and i t  
reaches every Ar ticle and ever y  par t  of the 
Const itut ion . Th at powe r can be used to reshape the 
Const itut ion to ful f i l  the obl ig at ions imposed on the 
State . It can also be used to reshape the Const itut ion 
within the l imits  ment ioned ear l ie r , to make it an 
effect ive instrument for soc ial good . We are unable to 
agr ee with the content ion that in  order to build a 
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We lfare S t ate , i t  is necessary to destroy some of the 
human f reedoms . Th at , at any r ate i s  not the 
pe r spect ive of our Const itut ion . Our Const itut ion 
env is ages that the State should without delay make 
ava i lable to all the c i t i zens of th i s  country the real 
bene f i ts of those freedoms in a democr at ic way . Human 
freedoms are lost g r adually and impercept ib i ly and 
the i r  dest r uct ion is g r adually followed by 
autho r itar ian r ule . Th at is what h i s tory has taught 
us . S t r uggle between l iber ty and power is eternal . 
Vig ilance i s  the pr ice that we l ike every other 
democ r at ic soc iety have to pay to safeguard the 
democrat ic values enshr ined in  our Cons t i tut ion . Even 
the best o f  governments are not adver se to have more 
and more powe r to car ry out the i r  plans and prog r ammes 
wh ich they may s i ncerely bel ieve to be in publ ic 
interes t .  But a freedom once lost is hardly ever 
r eg a i ned except by r evolut ion . Ever y  encroachment on 
freedoms sets a pattern for further encroachments . Our 
const itut ional plan is to e r ad icate pover ty without 
dest r uct ion of ind iv idual fr eedoms ( ibid. : 1 628-2 9 ) . 
Th e alternat ive v iew was put by Ray J i n  the following terms : 
The power to amend is wide and unl im i ted . The powe r to 
amend means the powe r to add , alter or repeal any 
prov is ion of the Cons t i tut ion . There can be or is no 
d ist inct ion between essent ial and i nessent ial features 
o f  the Cons t i tut ion to r a ise any imped iment to 
amendment of alleged essent ial features . P a r l i ament in  
exercise of constituent powe r can amend any prov is ion 
of th i s  Consti tut ion ( ibid. : 1 7 1 8 ) . 
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Wh ilst i t  appears  that th i s  matter has been reso lved in India ( see 
A i kman 1 9 78 : 3 5 7 ) , the quest ion ar i se s  as to wh ether there i s  room for such 
a doctr ine of essent i al features in relat ion to the Cons t i tut ions of 
Pac i f ic Island nat ions . The answer i s  probably neg at ive , at least in  
relat ion to the human r ights prov 1 s 1ons .  Those Cons t itut ions lack the 
spec ial protect ion g iven by Ar t . 1 3  of  the Indian Const i tution wh ich 
precludes e i ther the Un ion or the S t ate Leg islatures from mak ing laws to 
take away or abr idge g uar anteed fundamental human r ights . 
The PNG Const itut ion prov ides in s . 1 7  for a three quar ter s ,  absolute 
maj or ity of membe r s  be fore thr ee of the maj or human r ights sect ions ( 3 5 ,  36 
and 5 0 )  and the maj or enforcement sect ion ( 5 7 )  can be amended . Sect ion 
1 7 ( 1 )  makes it  r easonably c lear that the other human r ights prov i s ions may 
be amended by a two- thirds absolute maj or ity of member s .  The F i j ian 
ar r angements set out in ss . 6 7  and 6 8  of the Const itut ion are s im i lar . The 
other Br it i sh expo r t  model Const itut ions , includ ing WS and Naur u ,  also 
appear to be amendable in  the i r  ent irety by the requ i r ed par l i amentary 
maj or it ies . In the case of K i r ibat i a two-thirds maj or i ty of both the 
member s  of Par l i ament and the voters  is r equ i r ed to amend the human r ights 
prov i s ions . The r equ i r ement for a r e fer endum destroys the bas is for the 
' e ssent ial features argument ' i n  relat ion to K i r ibat i .  The str ucture of 
the Tongan Cons t i t ut ion appears to be ag a inst such an argument . De spi te 
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the open ing words of Ar t . 5 ( 1 )  of the Vanuatu Cons t i tut ion ( " s ubj ect to any 
restr ict ions imposed by law on non-c iti zens , a l l  per sons are ent itled to 
the following fund amental r ights • • •  " )  the r e  i s  l i ttle scope for denying 
the P a r l i ament the r ight to amend the human r ights prov 1 s 1ons ,  because 
Ar t . 4 ( 1 ) prov ides that the nat ional sove r e ignty wh ich belong s to the 
Vanuatu people may be exe rcised through the i r  elected r epr esentat ive s .  
Pe rhaps t h e  most that c a n  b e  made of the Ind ian exper ience i s  that there i s  
a t  least one l im itat ion o n  the powe r of t h e  par l i aments to amend the 
const itut ions . It was put by Matthew J o f  the India Supreme Cour t th is 
way : 
CONCLUS I ON 
The only l im itat ion is that the Const i tut ion cannot be 
repealed or abrogated in the exer c ise o f  the power of 
amendment wi thout substitut ing a mechan i sm by wh ich the 
St ate is const ituted and organi sed ( quoted in  Ai kman 
1 9 78 : 3 73 ) . 
Wh i l st th is pape r deals with only some of the i ssues r a i sed by the 
const itut ional human r ights prov is ions of the Pac i f ic Island nat ions , and 
is wr itten wi thout full access to mater ial that could be re levant to the 
topic , i t  appears  that the human r ights prov is ions are accepted and not 
under thr eat.  As yet the re have been no ( or no s ig n i f icant) amendments to 
these prov is ions in any of the Pac i f ic I sland nat ions . Pe rhaps one r eason 
why the cons t i tut ional human r ights prov is ions have so far not been an 
issue , i s  the tendency of j udges brough t up in the common law t r ad i t ion of 
statutory i nterpretat ion to interpret  con stitut ional prov 1s 1ons nar rowly , 
thus g 1v 1ng them a very low pro f i le . On the other hand , it is imposs ib le 
to pr ed ict what m ight now happen in the wake of Saipa 'ia Olomalu and Others 
v .  Attorney-Genera l i t  could we ll lead to a weaken ing of human r ights 
prov is ions not only in the WS Cons t i tu t ion . 
NOTES 
i sect ion 36 o f  the Human Rights Comm i ss ion B i ll prov ides for a f ive year 
" sunset"  clause . 
2 South Austr al i a has the Sex Discrimination Act ( 1 97 5 )  and the Racial 
Discrimination Act ( 1 976 ) . New South Wales has the Anti-Discrimination 
Act ( 1 97 7 )  wh ilst V ictor ia has the Equal Opportunity Act ( 1 97 7 ) . 
3F ij ians of Indian descent compr i se approx imately 5 2  pe r cent of the 
populat ion and even though they own less than 2 per cent of  the land , 
they g row about 9 0  per cent of the country ' s  sugar cane . They lease the 
land to produce from Fij ian s ,  the C r own and other landowners (see 
Nayacakalou in  Cr ocombe 1 9 7 1 : 206-26 ) .  
4For ex ample the r ight to pr ivacy , b ased on Ar t . 8  - wh ich i s  not par t  of 
the Br it ish expo r t  model .  
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5PNG ' s  Supreme Cou r t  Re ferences Nos . 1 and 2 of 1 9 80 , S C  1 93 and 1 92 
r espect ively , were not ava i lable in Sydney . The F i j i law r eports we re 
ava i lable only to Vo l . 1 8 , 1 9 72 . Judgments from the other Pac i f ic I s land 
nat ions are v ir tually unavai lable . One comes ac ross them by chance or by 
them be ing made avai lab le by colleag ues who h ave obtai ned them in the 
cour se of the i r  research ac t iv i t ie s . 
6sect ion 4 2 ( 2 )  states : 
a pe r son who is ar rested or deta ined -
( a) shall be in formed promptly , in a lang uage that he under stands , o f  
the reasons for h i s  a r r e s t  or detent ion and of any charge ag ainst 
h im ;  and 
( b )  shall b e  pe rmitted whenever pr act icable t o  communicate without de lay 
and in pr ivate with a member of h i s fam i ly or a pe r sonal fr iend , and 
with a lawyer of h i s  cho ice ( i nclud ing the Public Solic i tor if he i s  
ent i t led t o  leg al aid) ; and 
( c ) shall be g iven adequate oppor tun i ty to g ive inst r uc t ions to a lawyer 
of h is choice in the place in wh ich he i s  detained . 
and shall be informed immed iately on h i s  arrest  of h i s  r ights unde r th is 
subsect ion . 
7The dec is ion also seems to be out of l i ne with c ur rent j ud ic i al opinions 
elsewhere ( see R v. Thames Magistrates ' Court, ex parte PoZemis [ 1 974 ] 2 
ALL ER 1 2 1 9  - although th i s  is , admittedly , a case in wh ich the de fendant 
wi shed to pr esent a de fence but was den ied adequate t ime to prepare i t ) . 
8I n  a sect ion of her paper not included in th i s  volume . 
9As the author has been unable to consult the j udgment he i s  relying on 
McDowell ' s repor t .  
1 0 I f  it is then pas sed unan imously by both t h e  Pr ivy Counc i l  and the 
Cabine t ,  then , and only then , is it lawful fo r the K i ng to s ig n  i t . When 
s igned it becomes law. The law relat ing to the Th rone and the t it les of 
he red itary estates of nobles cannot be changed by th is process . No r can 
" the law of l iber ty" ( and ther e for e ,  pe rhaps , the human r ights 
prov i s ions ) .  But s i nce th i s  Constitution was g r anted by the K i ng ,  there 
is an argument that the K i ng could revoke , replace or amend any par ts of 
it at any t ime . 
1 1For example , after the Bank NationaZization Case and the Emergency , the 
Indian Par l i ament r emoved the r ight to pr ope r ty in  the fundamental r ights 
par t  of the Const itut ion and pl aced it in a less protected form elsewhere 
in order to make i t  eas ier for the Gover nment to ach ieve some of its 
soc ial and economic obj ect ives ( see A i kman 1 9 78 : 3 79 ,  3 82 ) . 

23. PACI F IC VALUES AND ECONOM IC DEVE LOPM ENT? HOW 
M E LANESIAN CONSTITUTIONS DEAL WI TH LAND 
J.S. F ingleton 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
On 1 8  Febr uar y  1 9 82 Father Walter Lini , Pr ime Minister of the 
Pac i f ic ' s  newest independent state , the Republ ic of Vanuatu ,  g ave the 
keynote address at a confer ence in Canber r a  on relat ions between Austr alia 
and the Pacif ic . In his  address he spoke of a com ing " rena issance of 
Me lanes ian value s "  in his  country,  and o f  a new soc ial , pol i t ical and 
economic order under wh ich Vanuatu could f inally r id itself of " the 
inh ibit ion of requ i r ing for e ign aid"  ( 1 98 2 : 2 5-2 8 ) . 
Be tween 1 9 75 and 1 980  three Me lanes i an countr ies - Papua New Gu inea 
(PNG ) , So lomon I slands ( S I )  and Vanuat u - became independent . In the ir 
Independence Constitut ions each o f  those countr ies committed itself to the 
protect ion and promot ion of Me lanes i an values and customs : the Governments 
in all three countries a im at increas ing econom ic development and nat ional 
self-rel iance . Th is paper will ex amine the role pl ayed by the three 
const itut ions i n  see k ing to r e alise these commitments and obj ect ives . 
A numbe r of pre fatory remarks are needed to ind icate the scope of the 
paper . In the f i r st place , i t  doe s not d i scuss the complex inter­
r elat ionsh ip between land tenure , a soc iety ' s  values , and econom ic 
development . Nor is it concer ned with ident i fying Me lanes ian values , or 
applaud ing or cr i t ic is ing econom ic development as an obj ect ive . Further , 
wh ile the e f fects of soc ial , pol i t ical and economic forces ex ternal to law 
( and in par t icular beyond the work ings of a const itut ion) on a nat ion ' s 
development ar e ac knowledged , cons ider at ion of the ir impor tance will be 
largely left to the conclus ion . The main purpose is to exam ine wh at a 
nat ion th rough its const itut ion says about goal s and guid i ng pr inc iples and 
what contr ibut ion the const itut ions themselves make to implement ing them . 
In the pr edominantly ag r icultur al soc iet ies of the Pac i f ic , land 
tenure is at the heart of soc i al ,  po l it ical and economic organisat ion . 
Paci f ic Islande r s  earnestly be l ieve that the i r  att itude to land is 
fundamental ly d i fferent from that of the Europe ans who colon ised them , 1 and 
most Pac i f ic Cons t i t ut ions make spec ial pr ov i s ion with re spect to land . 
Just as one of the f i r st ac ts of the colon isers was to pr ov ide for the 
acqu i s i t ion o f  land and introduct ion of Europe an land tenure concepts , so 
al so was it a pr imary concern of many independence constitut ions to prov ide 
for the r e form of tenur e to land al ienated dur ing the colon ial per iod . Not 
only was al ienated land the v i s ible man i festat ion of imposed for e ign tenure 
concepts , but i t  was also the sector where  economic deve lopment and 
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r eso urce inputs we r e  concentr ated . Because the l and pr ov 1 s 1ons o f  the 
Me lane s ian Const i t ut ions under cons ider at ion we re conc e r ned pr imar i ly w i th 
r e form ing the t e nure of a l ienated l and , th i s  pape r neces s ar i ly fol lows that 
emphas i s . Thus , as w i th the cons t i tut ions , the pape r doe s not attempt the 
task o f  ar t icu lat ing customary l and tenure pr ecepts w i th econom ic 
development obj ect ives . 
Th e t r e atment w i l l  commence w i th con s id e r at ion of the cont i tut ional 
assert ions of c u ltural value s , the purposes intended to be s e r ved the r eby , 
and what the ir funct ion m ig ht be . The impact of the Co nst i tut ions on 
econom ic deve lopment i s  next cons ide r ed . From the cent r al the s i s  that a 
Pac i f ic soc i e ty ' s values and i n s t itut ion s and i ts econom ic obj ect ives wil l 
f ind the i r  ult imate expr e s s ion in l and tenur e , the roles of the 
con s t i tut ions i n  r econc i l ing the con t r a s t ing c l a ims o f  c ul tu r a l  ident i ty 
and econom ic deve lopment thr ough the prov i s ions conce r n i ng land and 
as soc i ated factor s is then con s ide r ed . F i na l l y ,  the nature of compet ing 
soc i a l ,  econom ic and po l i t ical fo r c e s  in the countr i e s  a f ter i ndependence 
is d i scussed , and tentat ive conc lus ions are d r awn on the pr ospects for 
r econc i l i ng the d ual comm i tments to pr e serv ing cul tur al values and 
promot ing econom ic deve lopment . 
THE ASSERT I ON OF CULTURAL VALUES 
W i th the advent o f  colon i a l i sm i n  a coun t r y  the co lon i s ing state , i n  
the exe r c ise o f  i t s  s e l f-pr oc la imed sove r e ig nty , i n t r od uced t h e  leg i s l at ive 
power , and in ex e r c i se o f  that powe r en acted laws e s tab l ish i ng the 
relat ionsh ip between the i n t roduc ed legal system and the i nd igenous leg al 
systems . Th e e f fect was to subord inate the l atter to the former , in two 
re spec ts . F i r s t , ind ig enous l eg al systems thereby los t the i r  autonomy , for 
hence for th the author i ty of c u s tom and t r ad i t ional leg al i n s t i tut ions 
der ived from the enactments wh ich prov ided fo r the i r  con t i nued ope r at ion . 
Secondly , the i nd igenous legal sys tems we r e  u s u a l ly accorded only r es id ual 
ope r at ion . Th ere wa s no exc lus ive dom a i n  for the ope r at ion of c ustom , and 
i t s  scope could be and was prog r e s s ively r ed uced by leg i s l at ive enactments . 
To the colon i a l  author i t ies th i s  was pa r t  o f  the ' c iv i l i s i ng m i ss ion ' , i n  
t h e  pr oce s s  o f  r eplac ing ' pr im i t ive ' inst i t u t ions w i th the i r  ' mode r n ' 
coun terpar ts . 
Decolon i s at ion a r r ived l ate in the P ac i f ic I s land s ,  and , in the 
po l it ical sense , i s  ye t to be completed fo r the r eg ion . An advantag e  o f  
th i s  t im i ng w a s  t h e  oppor t un i ty i t  af for ded con s t i t ut ional pl anne r s  to 
exam i ne the exper ie nce of the ir Th ird Wor ld predeces sor s .2 In add i t ion ,  
mount ing ev idence of the l im i ted expor t ab i l i ty o f  We s t e r n  l eg a l  system s  and 
the values wh ich they r e f lect pre sented a favou r ab le c l imate for the 
leg i t imate a s s e r t ion o f  ind igenous i n s t itut ions and values . 
Th ere i s  noth i ng r emar kable about st atements of values and pr inc iples 
in the i n t r oductory par ts o f  a con s t i t ut ion . The e a r l i e s t  I ndepe ndence 
Const i t u t ion in the Pac i f ic I s l and s , that o f  We ste r n  S amoa ( WS )  i n  1 962 , 
r ec ites that : 
We stern S amoa should be a separ a te state based on 
Ch r i s t i an pr inc iples and S amoan c u s tom and t r ad i t ion . 
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The following Const itut ions o f  Naur u  i n  1 9 68  and F i j i in  1 970  make no 
re ference to custom , nor do the sel f-government Cons t i t ut ions of the New 
Zealand (NZ ) dependenc ies of the Cook I s lands ( CI )  ( 1 96 5 ) and N i ue ( 1 974 ) . 
PNG seems to have rev ived the pr act ice in 1 9 7 5 , and it was adopted in the 
rema ining Cons t i t ut ions o f  SI ( 1 9 78 ) , Tuvalu ( 1 978 ) , K i r ibat i ( 1 979 ) and 
Vanuatu ( 1 9 80 ) . 3 
The pr eamble to the PNG Constitution is very leng thy . In the par t  
headed " Adopt ion o f  Const i tut ion " i s  i ncluded the r ecital that the people : 
acknowledge the wor thy c ustoms and t r ad i t ional wi sdoms 
of our people wh ich have come down to us from 
generat ion to gene r at ion [ and] pledge our selves to 
g uard and pass on to those who come after us our noble 
t r ad i t ions and the Chr i st ian pr inc iples that are our s 
now . 
They assert  themselves to " g uard with our l ives our nat ional ident i ty , 
integ r ity and self r e spect" . 
The second par t  of the preamble sets down the Nat ional Goals and 
D i rect ive Pr inc iples (NGDPs ) ,  wh ich are stated to " unde r l i e "  the 
Const itut ion . Al l per sons and bod ies are d irected to be g u ided by the 
dec lared D i rect ives , in  pur su ing and ach iev ing the Nat ional Goals . The 
F i fth National Goal is headed "Papua New Gu inean Ways " , and is the one 
wh ich most concerns th i s  paper . The goal is " to ach ieve development 
pr imar i ly through the use of Papua New Gu inean forms of soc ial , pol i t ical 
and econom ic org ani zation " . The suppor t ing D i rect ive Pr inc iples deserve 
sett ing out in  ful l .  They call for : 
( 1 )  a fundamental r e-or ientat ion o f  our attitudes and the 
inst itut ions of gover nment , commerce , educat ion and 
rel ig ion towards Papua New Gu inean forms of 
par t ic ipat ion , consultat ion , and consensus , and a 
cont inuous renewal of the re spons iveness of these 
inst itut ions to the needs and att itudes of the People ;  
and 
( 2 )  par t icular emphas is in our econom ic deve lopment to be 
placed on small- scale art isan ,  serv ice and bus iness 
act iv i ty ;  and 
( 3 ) r ecog n i t ion that the cul tur al , comme rcial and ethn ic 
d iver s ity of our people i s  a pos it ive strength , and for 
the foste r i ng of a re spect for , and apprec iat ion of , 
trad it ional ways of l i fe and culture , includ ing 
lang uage , i n  all the i r  r ichness and var iety , as we ll as 
for a willingness to apply these ways dynam ically and 
c reat ively for the tasks of development ; and 
( 4 )  t rad it ional v i l l ages and commun i t ies  to remain as 
v i able un its of Papua New G u inean soc iety and for 
act ive steps to be taken to improve the i r  cultur al , 
soc ial , economic and eth ical qual ity . 
The next Melanes ian country to g ain independence was S I .  The preamble 
to its  Cons t itut ion is of a more convent ional leng th .  It rec ites the 
people ' s  pr ide in  " the wi sdom and the wor thy c ustoms of our ancestor s " , and 
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ag rees and pledg e s  that they s h a l l  " cher ish and pr omote the d i f fe r ent 
c u l tur al t r ad i t ions w i th i n  So lomon I s l and s " . 
Th e pr e amble to the Vanuatu Const i t ut ion i s  sho r ter s t i l l , only 
seventy wor d s  in al l ,  but it contains e l ements , s ucc i nc t ly s t ated , wh ich 
are present i n  many o f  the Pac i f ic Const i t ut ions , and so may useful ly be 
reproduced h e r e . It  s t a tes : 
WE the people o f  Vanua tu , 
PROUD of our s t r ug g le for fr eedom , 
DETERMINED to safeguard the ach ievements o f  th i s  
str ugg l e , 
CHERISHING our 
d ive r s i ty ,  
ethn ic , l ing u i s t ic and 
MINDFUL at the same t ime of our common de st iny , 
c u l t u r a l  
HEREBY proc l a im t h e  e s t ab l i shment of t h e  un ited and 
fr ee Repub l ic of the New H e br ides founded on 
tr ad i t ional Me lanes ian v a l ue s , f a i th i n  God , and 
Ch r i s t i an pr i nc iples , 
AND for t h i s  purpose g ive our se lves th i s  Cons t i t u t ion . 
The common e l ements of the pr e amble ( apar t  f r om the formal r ec i t a l s  in the 
f i r st and l a s t  l in e s )  are the che r i sh ing o f  e thn ic , l ing u is t ic and c u ltur a l  
d ive r s ity but recog n i t ion of common d e s t iny , q and t h e  found at ion o f  t h e  new 
s t ate on a cont inuat ion of i nd igenous v a l ue s  and Ch r i s t i an pr inc iples . 5 
"Cultur a l  d iv e r s ity" and " common d e s t iny" are r ec ited as f act s , a lthoug h 
the wor d i ng seems to ac knowl edg e  t h at t h e r e  may be t e n s ion between them . 
In any c ase there i s  a c le a r  comm itment to the ideology of u n i t y  i n  
d ive r s i t y .  Th e comb inat ion o f  " i nd igenous v a l ue s "  and "Chr i s t i an 
pr inc iple s "  assume s th e i r  compat i b i l ity . As it is unl i ke ly that they we re 
reg arded as ident ical , to the extent that they do not over l ap they we re 
appar e n t ly a s s umed not to con f l ic t . 
To g a in an impr e s s ion of the pu r poses intended to be se rved by these 
a f f i rmat ions o f  values in the i n t rod uc to r y  par ts , i t  i s  nece s s ar y  to 
cons ider the c i r cums tances and pr oce sses of con s t i tut ion-mak i ng in the 
thr ee coun tr ie s .  Th at they we r e  all decolon i s at ion con s t i t u t ions i s , of 
cour se , o f  fundamental impo r t ance . Many con s t i t u t ions o f  the wor ld make 
commitments to c u l tu r a l  and r e l ig ious values and inst i t ut ion s ,  but i n  a 
deco lon i s at ion con s t i t ut ion such comm itments m u st be accor ded the 
add it ional s ig n i f icance o f  a concer ted determ inat ion : ( 1 )  to replace , or 
at leas t to mod i fy subs tant i al ly ,  the values and inst i t ut ions intr uded 
dur ing the colon i al pe r iod ; and ( 2 )  to do so by the r e instateme nt of the 
pr imacy , or at least equal pr imacy , of the i nd igenous val ues and 
t r ad i t ions . Cons ide r a t ion o f  the con s t i t u t ion-mak i ng process r e i n forces 
the authent ic ity of th i s  add it ional s ig n i f icance . 
In the f i r s t p l ace , a l l  three Co nst itut ion s we re pr eceded by r epo r t s  
from spe c i a l ly- formed bod ies r ep r e sentat ive of the local popul at ion . 
Focus s i ng on the a f f i rmat ion of ind ig enous v alues and i n s t i tut ions in the i r  
appl icat ion t o  the land tenu r e  s i t uat ion a t  independence , the three 
Me lane s i an Const i t ut ions g a i n  add it ional authent ic ity f r om the fact that 
they we r e  pr eceded by repo r t s  f r om separ ate repr e sentat ive bod i e s  spec i a l ly 
estab l i shed to con s ider land matt e r s  and conduct pub l ic con s u l tat ion in 
antic ipat ion o f  independence . In PNG t he Comm i s s ion of Inqu i r y  i nto Land 
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Matter s  r epor ted in 1 9 73 , the S I  Se lec t Comm i ttee o n  Lands and Mining 
repor ted in 1 9 76 and Vanuatu ' s  Ad Hoe Committee on Land Re form reported i n  
1 9 79 . In each c a s e  the nat ional ist thr ust of the land reports was 
conf i rmed by the assert ions of nat ional ident ity in the subsequent 
const itut ions , and as shall be seen below , special prov 1 s 1on was made to 
implement , or fac i l i tate the implementat ion of , r ecommendat ions for land 
tenure r e form. 
To a g reater or lesser extent , then , the introductory par t s  of the 
th ree Const i tut ions contain commitments to a fundamental reor ientat ion of 
values and inst itut ions , r eached upon the recommendat ion of bod ies 
representat ive of ind igenous opinion . The nex t matter to draw out from the 
Cons t i tut ions is how th i s  purpos ive r eor ientat ion was intended to funct ion . 
It m ight be appropr iate at th i s  stage to cons ider the Pac i f ic I s lands ' 
prac t ice w i th i n  the l iterature on g ener al const itut ion types . For present 
purposes it  i s  felt that the mos t  i l l uminat ing d i scuss ions cons ider the 
d i ffe rences between u t i l i tar i an and pr og r ammat ic elements of const i tut ions 
and between normat ive and nom inal element s , and the impor tance of support 
factors  to the degree o f  normat ivity o f  a con s t i tution (see Wo lf-Ph ill ips 
1 972 ) • 
Applying these analyt ical dev ices to the thr ee Me lanes ian 
Cons t itut ions , i t  is apparent f i r s t  of all that much of each Cons t i t u t ion 
is devoted to ut i l itar ian conce rns , sett i ng out the mechanics of the 
gove rnmental proce ss in a d iv is ion of pol i t ical power largely der ived from 
the const i tut ional pattern of the prev iously- respons ible colon i al power .  
Loewenste i n  r e fe r s  to the se elements as the " hor i zontal controls " of 
pol i t ical powe r , for they oper ate e i ther with i n  a spec i f ic power-holder ,  or 
between the sever al power-holde r s  ( 1 95 7 : 1 8 ) . In contras t  are the controls 
wh ich oper ate among the d i fferent levels o f  the state soc iety , wh ich he 
terms " vert ical controls" ( ibid. ) ,  and among wh ich he includes the 
g uarantees of ind iv idual l ibe r t ies , wh ich occupy much space in the 
constitutions of Pac i f ic I s l and States and the i r  we stern pr edecessors  
al i ke . Those relating to the protect ion o f  prope r ty r ights will be 
cons idered when exam1n1ng the constitutional prov 1 s 1ons spec i f ically 
re lat ing to land . The g r ound i s  s t i l l  be ing pr epared for th i s  
cons ider at ion , however ,  and the attent ion h e r e  i s  focussed o n  the 
prog r ammat ic elements wh ich call for a fundamental reor ientat ion towards 
ind igenous values and institutions . How we re these elements of the Pac i f ic 
Const itut ions intended to funct ion? 
The f i r st po int to cons ider is that the commitment to ind igenous 
values and ins t i tut ions usually appear in the preambles to the 
Const i tution s .  The t r ad it ional leg islat ive funct ion of a preamble is 
fam i l i ar : it explains the obj ect of , o r  the r e asons for , an enactment . I t  
is , o f  cour se , a n  integ r al par t  of the enactment , and may b e  used a s  a n  a id 
to its  interpretat ion , although not , gene r al ly ,  where the words of the 
ope r at ive par ts of the enactment are free from ambig u i ty (Maxwell 
1 9 62 : 4 6 )  . ' I n  the case of con s t i tut ions , s tatements of pr inc iples and 
d i r ect ions of nat ional pol icy in the preamble must be accorded the elevated 
status due to them as par t of the s upr eme law of the nat ion . 
Apar t from the 
spec i al prov i s ion 
gene r al 
was made 
r ules 
for 
for 
the 
statutory construct ion , in PNG 
future leg al effect of the matte r s  
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contained in the preamble . Sect ion 2 5  prov ides that , although in gene r al 
the NGDPs in the preamble are non- j u st ic i able : 
Never the less , it is the duty of al l governmental bod ies 
to apply and g ive ef fect to them as far as l ies with in 
the ir respect ive powe r s . 
To the non- j u sticiab i l ity the re are two except ions . The f i r st requires  
laws to  be  appl ied , and powe r s  confe r red by law to be  exercised , so  far as  
poss ible as to  g ive e f fect to  the  NGDP s .  The second except ion i s  that the 
j ur i sd ic t ion of the Ombudsman Commiss ion over the appl icat ion of the 
Leader sh ip Code ( see Go ldr ing 1 97 8 : 1 89-2 0 3 ) is not subj ect to the 
l imitat ion on j ust iciab i l ity, and in all such cases the NGDPs are to be 
taken " ful ly into account "  ( s . 2 5 ( 4 ) ) .  
A f ur ther attempt was made in  PNG to g ive the NGDPs some prescr ipt ive 
effect . Sect ion 2 0  r equires  the Parliament to enact leg islat ion declar i ng 
the under lying law of PNG , and prov id i ng for its  development . Unt il  such 
enactment the underlying law and the manner of its development are to be as 
pr esc r ibed in  the Second Sched ule to the Cons t i tut ion . I t  prov ides for the 
recognit ion of custom and the adopt ion o f  a common law as par ts of the 
under lying law.  I t  then prov ides that , i f  i n  any par t icular matter before 
a cour t there appears to be no appl icable r ule o f  law ,  i t  is the cour t ' s 
duty to fo rmulate an appropr iate r ule as par t  o f  the under lying law ,  hav ing 
reg ard " in par t icular " to the NGDPs and the Basic Social Ob lig at ions ( see 
be low) . Th is prov i s ion g ives only very l im i ted res idual and temporary 
( un t i l  Parliament ary enactment) scope for the incorporat ion o f  the NGDPs in  
the unde r lying l aw.  Schedule 2 goes on to prov ide for the establ ishment o f  
a Law Re form Comm iss ion and invests that body with the spec ial 
respons ib i l ity:  
to invest igate and repor t • • •  on the deve lopment , and 
on the adaptat ion to the c i rcumstances o f  the country,  
of the under lying law, and on the appropr iateness o f  
the r ules and pr inc iples o f  the under lying law t o  the 
circums tances of the country from t ime to t ime ( s . 1 4 ) . 
It is poss ible that , upon the repor t o f  th i s  body , the NGDPs may be more 
effect ively incorpor ated in the legal sys tem of PNG , but the Const itut ion 
in no way ensures that this w i l l  occur . 
Another dev ice used in the attempt to g ive teeth to the prog r ammat ic 
elements of the Cons t itut ions was the impos i t ion of soc ial obl ig at ions , in 
some re spects as a coun tervail ing force to the enumerated ind iv idual 
freedoms . Th is novel pract ice f i r st appeared in  the Pac if ic in the PNG 
Cons t i tut ion . 7 I t s  inspirat ion i s  found in the pr eced ing Const itut ional 
Plann ing Committee (CPC) Repor t .  Appealing to pr e-colon ial pr ecedents , i t  
states : 
Be fore the re we re any wr i tten laws in Papua New Gu inea 
the unwr itten const itut ions o f  o ur var ious commun i t ies 
were based on the accept ance of the concept of mutual 
responsib i l ity .  Our re spon s ib i l it ies to each other and 
to our soc iety stem from the recog n i t ion that in the 
long r un the extent to wh ich our r ights and fr eedoms , 
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whether they are of a social , spi r itua l ,  
economic nature , are protected , w i l l  
extent to wh ich we recog n i se and respect 
fr eedoms of other s  ( 1 974 : 5/1 / 1 5-1 6 ) . 
pol i t ical or 
depend on the 
the r ights and 
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I t  then proceed s to enume rate cons t i tut ional , pol i t ical , soc ial and 
economic obl ig at ions . 
Th e l ist found express ion in the four th part of the pr eamble , under 
the head ing "Basic Social Ob l ig at ion s " . The one wh ich conce rns us here is 
the obl ig at ion " to re spect , and to act in  the sp i r it of , th i s  
Cons t i tut ion " . Al though the obl igat ions are addressed t o  " all per sons i n  
o u r  country" , and from the ir te rms it is natural per sons who a r e  meant , 
s . 6 3 ,  hav ing stated that in general the Basic Social Ob l ig at ions are 
non-j ust i c i able , proceeds ( in the same ve in as s . 2 5 does for the NGDPs ) :  
Never theless , it i s  the duty o f  all gove rnmental bod ies 
to encourage compliance with them as far as l ies with in 
the ir respect ive powers . 
As with s . 2 5 ,  the non- j ustic iab i l ity qual i f icat ion is exc luded by the 
requirement to apply l aws and exercise powers so far as poss ible in the way 
wh ich enforces or encour ages compl iance with the Basic Soc ial Oblig at ions , 
and in the exerc ise of j ur i sd ict ion over the Le ader sh ip Code . 
The PNG pract ice wa s adopted by Vanuatu , wh ich followed its 
enumerat ion of fundamental r ights with a l i st of fundamental duties wh ich 
closely follow those of PNG . The f i r st duty i s  " to respect and to act in 
the spi r it o f  the Const itut ion " , and , as with PNG , wh i le the dut ies are in  
general non- j ust ic iable , i t  is neve rtheless " the duty o f  all publ ic 
author i t ie s  to encour age compl iance with them so far as l ies with i n  the i r  
respect ive powers"  ( Ar t . 8 ) . The S I  Const i t ut ion contains neither expl ic i t  
nat ional goals n o r  fundamental soc ial obl ig at i ons . 
If the general prov i s ions were the only measures taken to ensure 
' enforcement ' of the reor ientat ion of value s  and inst itut ions wh ich the 
Cons t i t ut ions , to a g reater or lesser extent , were seen to call for , then 
the prospects for real i sat ion of th i s  r eor ientat ion would be uncertain 
indeed . I n  examining the l iterature on compar at ive constitut ions Wolf­
Ph ill ips counsel led that prog r ammat ic elements of a constitut ion should be 
" backed up by ' conf i rmator y '  ( that i s , c on f i rmed and enforceable) 
obl igat ions"  ( 1 972 : 3 9 ) . Ove rprog r ammat ic cons t i tut ions , he observed , 
encourage cyn ic i sm ( ibid . : 4 0 ) . To the extent that the commi tment to 
r e instat ing the pr imacy , or at least equal pr imacy , of ind igenous values 
and inst itutions fails  " to concord" with the actual " ex igenc ies of the 
powe r process" , the Const i tut ions would qual i fy as " nom inal " ,  under 
Loewenste i n ' s  c lass i f icat ion ( 1 957 : 1 49 ) . The pr imary obj ect of such 
const itut ions , he says , is educ at ional , with the goal , at some inde fin ite 
t ime in  the future , o f  becoming fully " normat ive" (ibid . ) . 
The all- impor tant elements of pol i t ical real ity wh ich will determine 
whether the commi tment to reor ientat ion r ema ins nom inal or becomes 
normat ive are the support factors - the extent to wh ich the soci al and 
economic forces in a country e i ther stand beh ind and support preservat ion 
of the pr e- independence status quo ( r ender ing the r eor ientat ion commi tments 
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endur ing ly nom inal ) , or stand beh ind and support  the post- i ndependence 
reor ientat ion ( ther eby al lowi ng the commitments to become fully normat ive ) . 
So far the concentr at ion has been on elements o f  the Const i tu t ions 
asse r t ing cultur al obj ectives . The PNG Const i tut ion expl ic i t ly r ecog n ises 
that these obj ect ives ar e only attainable through a " fundamental 
reor ientat ion" of  soc ial , pol i t ical and econom ic organisat ion , and it 
commits all per sons , corporat ions and governmental bod ies to wor k  towards 
that r eor ientat ion . In s imilar ve in , the Const i tut ion of Vanuatu calls on 
all per sons and pub l ic autho r i t ies " to act in the spir it of the 
Cons t i tu t ion" , and th is r equ i rement m ight be r eg arded as impl ic i t  in  the SI 
Const itut ion ' s  comm itment to promote cultur al values . To balance the 
survey of prog r ammat ic prov is ions i t  is now necessary to d i scover the 
const itut ional commitments made to the goal of econom ic development , in 
pr epar at ion for examining the manner of r econc il iat ion of these goal s . 
ECONOMIC  DEV ELOPMENT OBJ ECTIVES  
Expl ic it commitments t o  economic development obj ect ives a r e  not 
usually found in const itut ions , and th i s  pr ac t ice holds t r ue for the 
Pacif ic I sland S t ates . The usual place for such commitments is in the 
rhetor ic of pol i t ical leader s ,  or more formally stated in development plans 
or str ateg ies . I nherent in the three Const i tut ions , however ,  are e lements 
wh ich tog ether can be seen as cr eat ing an env ironment wh ich suppl ies the 
accepted pr erequ i s ites for econom ic deve lopment , and , indeed , two of the 
Cons t i tut ions at least may be seen as pr ed icated on the under s t and ing that 
econom ic development is a se l f-ev ident goal . 
In the f i r st place ( and what is to some people the ir most important 
purpose) , the Const it u t ions prov ide for a separ at ion o f  powe r s , and control 
over arbitrary exerc ise of pol i t ical powe r .  Th is i s  v ital to the econom ic 
env ironment for the stab i l ity and pr ed ictab i l ity wh ich it is intended to 
produc e .  The const itut ional elements are fam i l i ar , and inc lude the 
prov 1 s 1ons for representat ive democracy and the decentr a l isat ion of 
po l i t ical power , the ass ignment of powe rs between leg islature , execut ive 
and j ud ic i ary,  and the ope r at ion of the r ule of law .  
Th e second ma in feature of the Const i t ut ions a s  they e ffect the 
economic env ironment is found in  the g uar antees of ind iv idual l iber t ies . 
Al l three Const itut ions include among the ir " b i l l  of r ights" prov 1 s 1ons a 
protect ion from unj ust depr ivat ion o f  prope r ty ,  supported by prov i s ions for 
enforcement of the r ight , and for compensat ion for any infr ingement . The 
prov i s ions will be cons idered in det a i l  later , but suff ice it to say at 
th is stage that the ir antecedents may be found in the " s anct i f icat ion of 
the r ig ht of proper ty" wh ich " j u st i f ied the economic order o f  the laisse z  
faire soc iety" o f  European l iber al i sm ( Loewenstein  1 95 7 : 3 20 ) . The i r  
econom ic s ig n i f icance i s  obv ious . 
Th e t h i r d  general econom ic feature of the Cons t i tut ions , and one wh ich 
qual i f ie s  the second , is the inte rvent ion of the state in  the econom ic 
process . Loewenste in observes of its Europe an or ig ins that : 
free-enterpr i se capital i sm was compelled to g r ant • • •  the 
demand s of the masses for economic betterment and 
soc ial j ust ice [ and the result was ]  the emergence • • •  o f  
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the state as the reg ulat ing , manag ing , d irect ing , 
controll ing , and supe r v is ing agency of soc ioeconomic 
l i fe (ibid . : 3 24 ) . 
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Th us the constitut ional prov i s ions protect ing prope r ty r ights a r e  qual i f ied 
by the state ' s  powe r to over r ide them in  the publ ic interest ( subj ect to 
payment of compensat ion) . It has been observed , however , that the 
prov is ion for state intervent ion has had the e ffect of leg i t imat ing 
ex isting econom ic interests ( F i tzpatr ick 1 980 : 2 46 ) . According to th i s  
argument , as t h e  state has t a k e n  upon i t se l f  t h e  respons ibil i ty o f  
med iat ing i n  t h e  econom ic process , then econom ic act ivi t ie s , prov ided that 
they meet the state ' s  r equ i r ements , c an claim the state ' s  support in 
res ist ing soc ial and economic pressures at large in  the soc iety . 
I f  expl ic i t  const itut ional commitments to econom ic development as an 
absolute value are absent , the r e  are two const itut ions wh ich imply such a 
commitment , by mak i ng r e ference to the type of development wh ich is sought . 
The S I  Const itut ion s imply states in the pr eamble a pledge to uphold " the 
equ i table d i str ibut ion of i ncomes" . The PNG Const itut ion , as is its  wont , 
elabor ates in great det a i l . I t  has already been ment ioned that the Fi fth 
National Go al cal led for development to be ach ieved "pr imar i ly through the 
use of Papua New Gu inean forms of soc ial , pol i t ical and econom ic 
organi sat ion " , and the suppo r t ing D i rect ive Pr inc iples have already been 
enume rated . In add it ion the re are the Second National Goal of Equal ity and 
Pa r t ic ipat ion , and the Th ird Nat ional Goal of National Sovere ig nty and 
Se lf-Re liance . 
The Second Nat ional Goal is " for all c i t i zens to have an equal 
oppor tunity to par t ic ipate in , and bene f i t  from ,  the development of our 
country" . The suppo r t i ng D i rect ive Pr inc iples include the call s  for 
ach ievement of an equ itable d i str ibut ion of i ncomes and other bene f i ts of 
deve lopment among ind iv iduals and throughout the country,  equal 
par t ic ipat ion of women in  econom ic ac t iv i t ies , and " the max im i zat ion of the 
number of c i t i zens par t ic ipat ing in every aspect of deve lopment " . 
The Th ird Nat ional Goal is " for 
econom ically independent ,  and our 
attempt to par aphr ase would lose 
indulgence is sought for se tt ing 
Pr inc iples i n  ful l :  
Papua New Gu inea t o  be pol it ically and 
economy bas ically se l f-relian t " . Any 
the fer vour of the commitment , so 
out some of the suppor t i ng D i rect ive 
( 2 )  all governmental bod ies to base the i r  plann ing for 
polit ical , econom ic and soc ial development on these 
Goals and Pr inciples ; and 
( 4 )  C i t izens and governmental bod ies to have control o f  the 
bulk of economic enterpr i se and produc t ion ; and 
( 5 )  s tr ict con trol o f  fore ign i nvestment capital and wise 
assessment of for e ig n  ideas and val ues so that these 
will be subord inate to the goal o f  nat ional sove re ignty 
and sel f- r el iance , and in par t icular for the entry of 
for e ign capital to be geared to internal soc ial and 
economic pol ic ies and to the integ r i ty of the Nat ion 
and the People ;  and 
( 6 )  the State to take e f fect ive measures to control and 
act ively par t ic ipate in the nat ional economy , and in 
3 3 2  J . S .  FINGLETON 
part icular to control maj or enterpr ises eng ag ed in the 
exploitat ion of natural resources ; and 
( 7 )  economic development to take pl ace pr imar i ly by the use 
of s k i lls and resources available in the country e i ther 
from c i t i zens or the State and not in dependence on 
impor ted sk i lls and resources ; and 
( 8 )  the constant recognit ion o f  o ur sove r e ig nty , wh ich must 
not be underm ined by dependence on for e ig n  ass istance 
of any sor t , and in par t icular for no investment , 
m i l i tary or fore ign- a id ag reement or under st and ing to 
be entered into that imper i l s  our sel f- r e l i ance and 
sel f-r espect , or our commitment to these National Goals 
and D i rect ive Pr inciples , o r  that may lead to 
substant ial dependence upon o r  influence by any 
countr y ,  investor , lender or donor . 
As i f  th i s  l itany of r equ i r ements is not enough , the pr eamble ends with the 
statement : 
IN ADDITION , WE HEREBY DECLARE that all c i t i ze ns have 
an obl igat ion to themselves and the i r  descendants , to 
each other and to the Nation to use prof its from 
econom ic act ivit ies in the advancement o f  our country 
and our people , and that the law may impose a s im ilar 
obl igat ion on non-citi zens carrying on econom ic 
act iv it ies in or from our country.  
These excerpts are an eloquent test imony to the CPC ' s  unde rstand ing of the 
fundamental importance of red irect ing econom ic development i n  order that 
the soc i al ,  pol i t ical and cultural goals of the Const itut ion m ight be 
ach ieved . These commitments to economic r eor ientat ion gain  pr escr ipt ive 
effect through the same ' enforcement ' measures that have already been 
cons idered with respect to the commi tment to a reor ientat ion of values and 
inst itut ions . But the same conclus ion must be d r awn that they are 
essent ially ' pr og r ammat ic ' , and that noth ing so far cons idered would ensure 
that the commitment to economic reor ientat ion would become " normat ive " 
rather than remain " nominal" . 
RECONC I L I ATION OF CULTURAL VALUES AND ECONOM I C  DEVELOPMENT OBJ ECT IVES 
On ly in the case of PNG has an attempt been found in the introductory 
statement of goals and pr inc iples in the Cons t i tu t ion to reconc i le the 
commitments made to restore and preserve ind igenous values and 
inst itut ions , w i th the realit ies of econom ic development . There are 
ins istent demands for integ r ated human development ( and equal ity o f  income 
d i str ibut ion and economic oppo r tun ity to that end) , nat ional self- r el iance 
( and state econom ic intervent ion to that end ) , and a " fundamental 
re-or ientat ion " of development attitudes and i n s t i tut ions towards 
ind igenous forms o f  soc ial , pol it ical and economic org anisat ion . But a 
cr i t ical commentator has observed : 
Papua New Gu inean ways were advocated b ut without 
fac ing the con f l icts and compat ib i l it ies between them 
and capital i sm .  These ways prov ided a tr anscendent 
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path , a unique sol ut ion that seemed to make such i s sues 
i r re levant or subord inate ( F i tzpat r ic k  1 980 : 2 1 8 ) . 
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I n  th i s  context attent ion may now b e  turned to the body of the 
Const itut ions , to see whe ther the prov is ions de al ing with spec i f ic subj ects 
might ind icate the terms of convergence between comm itments to ind igenous 
values and economic development obj ect ive s .  The most l ikely s ite where the 
terms o f  th is convergence m ight be found i s  in the const itut ional 
prov is ions relat ing to land . The prov i s ions a f fect ing land in the Pac i f ic 
Islands Const i tut ion s up to 1 975 were e i ther var iants ( i n long or short 
form and content) of the convent ional balance between an ind iv idual ' s  
r ights to the protect ion of prope r ty and the s t ate ' s  power to ove r r ide i t  
in the publ ic interest , o r  we re conce rned with the prese rvat ion of a 
customary tenure reg ime over land wh ich was c us tomary land at the d ate of 
the Cons t it ut ion . No concer ted attempt to e stabl ish the terms of 
convergence between ind igenous values and econom ic obj ect ives can , however ,  
be d i scovered , unless it be i n  the apparent con f inement o f  each to its 
exclus ive sphe re of i n fluence . There appears to be l ittle , if  any , at tempt 
to mod i fy the status quo through the Cons t itut ions themselves . New 
restr ict ion s m ight be imposed on the ( tempor ary or pe rmanent)  al ienat ion o f  
land from customary tenure b u t  wh at was customary land rema ins customary 
land wi thout any const itut ional prov i s ion for its adaptat ion to the new 
demands of the cash economy and commercial ag r iculture , wh i le the already 
alienated land is left v i r tually una ffected by the asse r t ion of ind igenous 
interests and values impl ic i t ,  at least , in sel f-gover nment and 
independence . 
In 1 97 5  the PNG Const i t ut ion made i t s  c l amorous appear ance on the 
scene . Fr om its preamble we are le ft in no doubt that a " fundamental 
reor ientat ion" of values and inst itut ions is demanded , and that economic 
obj ect ives are to be harmon ised with ind igenous values and inst itut ions in 
the pursuit  of " integ r al human development " . What act ive role do the land 
prov i s ions of the Const i t ut ion play in promot ing th is reor ientat ion? The 
short answer i s ,  v i r t ually none . 
The only d i rect r e fer ences to land in the Cons t itut ion appear in  the 
"Basic Rights" D iv i s ion of Par t  I I I , " Basic Pr i nc iples of Government " .  
Un ique ly i n  the Pac i f ic , the PNG Const itut ion ascr ibes d i fferent ranks to 
its " b i l l  of r ights" pr ov 1s 1ons . Th us the " Fundamental Rights " are the 
r ight to l i fe ,  f reedom from inhuman t r e atment , and protect ion from the law.  
The remain i ng r ights are "Qual i f ied Rights "  and are further d iv ided between 
" R ight s of Al l Pe r sons" and " Spec i al Rights o f  C i t i zens" . The famil iar 
prope r ty r ights protect ion i s  with in the latter categor y .  There are a 
number of spec ial features of the protect ion wh ich d i s t ing u i sh it from its 
Pac i f ic Is lands ' counterparts . 
F i r st there is the fact th at the r ight is a " qual if ied" r athe r than a 
" fundamental" r ight . Wh ile no other Pac i f ic Cons t i tut ion expl ic itly makes 
th is d ist inct ion , the par amountcy of prope r ty ( and the other )  r ights is 
usually ind icated by the ir  inclus ion under a head ing such as " Fundamental 
Rights" . We have seen , however , that in all these cases the r ight is 
qual if ied , by the abi l ity of the state to intervene and compulsor ily 
acqu ire prope r ty in the publ ic interest . How, i f  at al l ,  is the s i tuat ion 
d i f fe rent in  PNG? 
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Under the const itut ional scheme , the pr act ice is for the "Qual i f ied 
Rig hts"  to be subj ect to a general qua l i f icat ion that they may be reg ul ated 
or restr icted ( but not over-r idden) by a law wh ich compl ies with certain 
requ i rements . The ve ry detai led requ i rements in s . 3 8 do not , however , 
concern us here for , although the prope r ty r ights protect ion is inc luded in 
the "Qualif ied Rights" subd iv i s ion , i t  i s  not subj ect to th is gene r al 
qua l i f icat ion . Rather it is subj ect to par t icular qua l i f icat ions , wh ich 
are set out in the sect ion itse l f .  In  gene r al e f fect , these qua l i f icat ions 
turn out to be l ittle d i ffe rent from those prov id ing for the intervent ion 
of the state to acqu ire prope r ty in the publ ic interest , found in all the 
Pac if ic Const itut ions wh ich pr edated 1 9 7 5 .  
The second d ist ingu ish ing feature i s  o f  real s ig n i f icance . Th i s  is 
the con finement of the const itut ional pr otect ion to c it i zens . No such 
d ist inct ion is found in the pr e- 1 97 5  Cons t i tut ions . Fur thermore , by 
s . 6 8 ( 4 )  this protect ion is withheld for a f ive-ye ar pe r iod from 
Independence Day from per sons who g ain c i t i zensh ip by natur al isat ion .  The 
only protect ion non-c it i zens and natural ised c it i zens are afforded is that 
the ir prope r ty can only be compulsor i ly acqu ired in accordance with an Ac t 
of the Pa r l i ament ( s s . 5 3 ( 4 )  and 6 8 ( 4 ) ) .  I n  theory,  th i s  prov is ion offe r s  
cons iderable scope for soc io-econom ic reorg anisat ion b y  enabling v i r tually 
unfettered al ienated land reform , but the prov i s ion is only fac i l i t atory ,  
and whether such reform eventuates depend s ent i rely o n  fur ther state 
act ion . 
A third d ist ing u ish ing fe ature is the r e f i nements in the Cons t i tu t ion 
of the normal obl igat ion on the state to pay upon a compulsory acqui s it ion . 
The f i r s t  such aspect is the fact that the quest ion of adequacy of 
compensat ion is independent of the quest ion o f  leg al i ty of acqu i s i t ion . In  
other j ur i sd ict ions , if  the compensat ion requ i rements are not sat i s f ied the 
acqu i s it ion is inval id . In PNG it is c lear that in such c i rcumstances the 
acqu i s it ion s t i ll stands ( although the re remains the duty to sat i sfy the 
compensat ion requi rements ) .  Th is has impor t ant pr act ical e ffects , for i t  
allows t h e  publ ic purpose for wh ich the land i s  acqui r ed t o  pr oceed even 
though the quest ion of adequacy of compensat ion i s  s t i l l  unre solved . 
The second refinement is that in cons ider ing the j ustness of 
compensat ion and its  terms for payment , " full  we ight" must be g iven to the 
NGDPs , and " due reg ard" must be pa id " to the nat ional interest and the 
expr ess ion of that interest by the Par l i ament , as wel l  as to the pe r son 
affected " ( s . 5 3 ( 2 ) ) .  The quest ion of adequacy of compensat ion is clear ly 
relat ive , r athe r than absolute . The th ird ref inement is an expanded 
prov i s ion for manner of payment of compensat ion . Section 5 3 ( 3 )  prov ides 
that : 
compensat ion shall not be deemed not to be j ust and on 
j u st te rms sole ly by reason of a fair  prov i s ion for 
de ferred payment , payment by instalments or compen­
sat ion otherwise than in cash . 
Sect ion 5 4  i s  headed , " Spec ial prov i s ion in re lat ion to cer tain 
lands" . It was spec if ical ly des igned to al low implementat ion of recommend­
at ions ( some already leg islated for ) in the 1 9 73 Report of the Commiss ion 
of Inquiry into Land Matte r s . I t s  e f fect is to exc lude from the ope r at ion 
of the protect ion from unj ust depr ivat ion of prope r ty a law " that i s  
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r easonably j us t i f i able in  a democr a t ic soc iety that h as a prope r  reg ard for 
human r ights " , and that prov ides : 
( 1 )  for the recog n i t ion of the state ' s  t i t le to 
d i sputed government l and purpor tedly acquired 
be for e  independence , prov ided the l and is needed 
for a par t icular publ ic purpose ; 
( 2 )  for the extr a- j ud ic ial sett lement o f  d i sputes over 
ownersh ip of customary l and , whe re a j ud ic ial 
settlement does not seem pr act icable ; or  
( 3 )  for the proh ib i t ion or regulat ion o f  the ho ld ing 
of ce r t a in interests in l and by non-c i t i zens . 
The f i r st exclus ion is a minor enlargement o f  the state ' s  power s  to 
intervene i n  prope r ty r ights , wh ile the second is more not able for its 
over-r id ing of the d ue process protect ion in  s . 3 7 .  The th ird  exclus ion is 
the one re lev ant to the present d iscuss ion , but , g iven the g ene r al d ilut ion 
of non-c iti zens ' prope r ty r ights , it is doubtful if th i s  prov is ion takes 
the matter much fur the r . 
F i nally , s . 5 6 prov ides that only c i t i zens may acqui re freehold l and , 
and it enables P a r l i ament to leg i s late on the forms of owner sh ip that are 
to be reg arded as  freeho ld , and the corpo r a t ions that are to be reg arded as  
c i t i zens , for  th i s  purpose . The proh ib i t ion only appl ies pr ospect ively 
from Independence , and has no e f fec t on the fr eeholds he ld by non-c i t i zens 
at Independence , except by l imit ing the i r  negot i abil ity. Sect ion 5 6  also 
enables P a r l i ament to leg i slate for further r ights and pr iv ileges to be 
reserved for c i t i zens . 
In summar y ,  despite the fe rvent commitments in the preamble , the PNG 
Consti tut ion ' s  only contr ibut ion to a " fundamental reor ientat ion" through 
use of the l and prov is ions is f ac i l it atory.  It excludes the ope r a t ion of 
the prope r ty r ights protect ion from non-c i t i zens , and from natur al ised 
c i t i zens for a f ive-year pe r iod a fter Independence , and in its  appl icat ion 
to c i t i zens the state ' s  duty to compensate for compulsory acqui s i t ions is 
l ibe r al ised in a number of ways . The l and pr ov i s ions play no ac t ive role , 
however ,  i n  e f fect ing the reor ientat ion cal led for , and in  par t icular they 
make no contr ibut ion to reconc il ing cus tomary tenure precepts with the 
impl icit economic obj ect ives in the Const itut ion . The assumpt ion seems to 
be that customary tenur e will be compat ible with the r eor iented development 
env ironment , and that customary inst itut ions will retain the i r  v iab i l ity 
and funct ions in  the face of developmentalist  fences . 
In the S I  Const itut ion of 1 9 78 , the famil iar property r ights 
protect ion ag a i n  appe ar s ,  spelt out in cons ide r able de t a i l  as was the 
fash ion for former Br itish colon ies . The only s ign i f ic ant innovat ion is 
that , instead of the usual r equ i r ement for " prompt payment of adequate 
compensat ion " , the requ irement is for " payment o f  reasonable compensat ion" . 
Payment may " take the form of c ash or some other form" , and "may be payable 
by a lump sum or by instalments" , but payment must be "within a reasonable 
pe r iod of t ime hav ing due reg ard to all the relevant c i rcumstances"  
( s . 8 ( 1 ) (c )  ( i ) ) .  Also included in  the fundamental r ights and freedoms is a 
protect ion from d iscr iminat ion , but the protect ion is exc luded in the case 
of l aws with re spect to non-c iti zens , and l aws "with respect to land , the 
tenur e of land , the resumpt ion and acqu i s i t ion of land and othe r l i ke 
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purposes " ( s . 1 5 ( 5 )  (b) , ( e ) ) .  S uch a prov is ion al lows future pos i t ive 
d i scr imi nat ion in  favour of c it i zens , but in no way over-r ides the 
constitut ional protect ion of prope r ty r ights already held . 
Chapter XI of the SI Const itut ion deals spec i f ically with land . S I  
h ad followed t h e  PNG example in  set t i ng u p  a spec i al body t o  repor t  o n  land 
matter s be fore Independence , and cer t a in land r e form leg i slat ion had 
already come into ope r at ion pr ior to the Cons t i tut ion . Th is mai nly 
concerned the reservat ion of freeholds ( c al led " perpetual estates " )  to 
So lomon Islande r s , and the subst itut ion of f ixed-term leases for freeholds 
owned by non-Solomon I slander s .  The provi s ions in  Ch . XI in  par t  con f irm 
that approach . 
Sect ion 1 1 0 r eads : 
The r ight to hold or acqu ire a pe rpetual interest in 
land shal l vest in any pe r son who i s  a Solomon Islander 
and only in such other per son or per sons as may be 
prescr ibed by Par l iament . 
Sect ion 1 1 1 deals with " non-customary land" , and enables Par l i ament to 
prov ide for the conver s ion of pe rpetual inte rests held by per sons not 
ent itled to hold them unde r s . 1 1 0 to fixed-term interests , to prov ide for 
the compulsory acqu is i t ion of non-customary land , and to pr escr ibe the 
compensat ion cr iter ia for such conver s ion or compulsory acqu i s i t ion . The 
compensat ion cr i ter i a :  
may take account of , but need not b e  l im ited to , the 
fol lowing factor s :  the purchase pr ice , the value o f  
improvements made between the d ate of purchase and the 
date o f  acqu i s i t ion , the cur r ent use value of the land , 
and the fact of its  abandonment or derel ict ion . 
Sect ion 1 1 2 makes spec ial prov i s ion with respect to compulsory 
acqu i s i t ion of c ustomary land , r equi r ing Parl iament to leg i slate requ i r e­
me nts that there be pr ior negot iat ions with the owner ,  that the owner have 
a r ight of access to independent leg al adv ice , and that so far as 
prac t ic able only a f ixed-term interest be acqu i red . 
These prov i s ions were des igned to meet the spec i al wishes of the S I  
const itut ional deleg at ion with respect t o  land . However t h e  repo r t  o f  the 
Const itut ional Confe rence shows that ag r eement was reached " that all land 
in the So lomon Islands belong s to the c i t i zens of Solomon I s l ands "  ( S I  CC 
1 9 7 7 : 8 ) and if s . 1 1 0 was intended to implement th i s  pr inc iple , the r e  i s  
consider able doubt that it does so . I t  is cur iously expr essed a s  a 
"vest i ng "  of " the r ight to hold or acqu i r e  a perpetual interest in land " , 
and the vest ing is " in any per son who is a So lomon Islande r "  and " only in  
such other per son or per sons" as Par l i ament may pre scr ibe . 8 I t  has the 
effect of con fining the hold ing or acqu i s i t ion of a pe rpetual interest to 
So lomon Islander s  and any other prescr ibed per sons , but , whatever the 
nature of the r ight wh ich is vested , it i s  certa inly not a r ight in  land . 
Nor does the declarat ion in the pr eamble that " the natural resources of our 
country are vested in the people and the government of So lomon Islands "  
con fer any land r ight s .  
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The con fe rence also ag reed that the leg islature should b e  enabl�d to 
lay down spec ial cr i ter ia for the assessment and payment of compensat ion 
for the compulsory acqu i s it ion of al ienated land ( ibid. : 9 ) . If th i s  is 
what s . 1 1 1 wa s intended to do , then it must be flatly stated that it does 
not . The f inal prov i s ion of Ch . XI of the Cons t i tut ion , s . 1 1 3 ,  prov ides 
that noth ing in the Ch apter :  
shall be cons t r ued as enabl ing Parliament to make any 
prov i s ion wh ich is incons istent with the prov is ions of 
sect ion 8 ( 1 )  ( c )  , 
the property r ights protect ion . 
reasonable compensat ion " , and 
under s . 1 1 1  may , or may not , be 
the general requ i rement must be 
The gener al r equ i r ement is for " payment of 
wh ile any cr i te r ia pre scr ibed by Par l i ament 
re lev ant to the que s t ion of r easonableness , 
sat isf ied in a l l  cases . 
In terms of a soc io-economic r eor ientat ion , the lands prov is ion of the 
SI Const itut ion have l ittle impact , e ithe r of themselves or in what they 
fac il itate . Without ac tually vesting any land in So lomon Islanders , they 
do con fine the owner sh ip of land to them ( and to any other per sons 
prescr ibed by Pa r l iament ) , but any future land r e form in the cause o f  
reor ientat ion is clear ly l im ited b y  t h e  l iab il ity t o  pay compensat ion for 
loss of prope r ty r ights . Some l ibe ral isat ion of the state ' s  powe r to 
intervene in ex ist ing prope r ty r ights is afforded by the fact that the test 
of compl iance with the compensat ion r equ i r ement i s  " r easonableness " ,  a test 
wh ich presumably incorporates cons iderat ion o f  the nat ional interes t ,  as 
we ll as that of the prope r ty owner . 
The 1 9 80  Const itut ion of Vanuatu has been descr ibed as : 
[ I ) n  many vital respects a prog r ammat ic , r athe r than a 
prescr ipt ive , document : it tends ver y  much to set out 
requ irements for par l i amentary ac t ion , and to leave 
important matter s  to be wor ked out by the cour ts , and 
does so somet imes with and somet imes without st atements 
of pr inc iple s to be appl ied { Lynch 1 98 1 a : 4 8 ) . 
Although Ch . 1 2  of the Const i tut ion , headed " Land" , is in some re spects 
prog r ammat ic , it is in many fundamental respects prescr ipt ive , and at last 
we f i nd a Cons t itut ion wh ich act ively implements the soc io-economic 
reor ientat ion called for in i t s  introductory pa r ts .  
I n  keeping with its  gene r al brevity the fundamental r ights are s imply 
st ated in Ar t . S .  The l ist of r ights is pre faced by the general prov i s ion 
that they a r e  recog n i sed " subj ect to any restr ict ions imposed by law on 
non-c i t i zens" , and " subj ect to respect for the r ights and freedoms of 
other s  and to the leg i t imate publ ic interest i n  defence , safety , publ ic 
order , wel fare and health " . Included among them is " protect ion for the 
pr ivacy of the home and other prope r ty and from unj ust depr ivat ion of 
prope r ty" . 
Ch apter 1 2  contains n i ne ar t ic le s . The f i r s t  two are absolutely 
c r uc ial to the assert ion of Me lane s i an Values found in the pr eamble . They 
state : 
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7 1 . Al l land in the Republ ic belong s to the ind igenous 
custom owner s and the i r  descendants . 
7 2 .  The r ules of custom sha l l  form the basis  of  
ownersh ip and use of l and in the Repub l ic . 
Wh i le the approach invar i ably taken elsewher e  in the Pac i f ic was s imply to 
fac i l it ate the future introd uct ion of re forming l aws , Vanuatu ' s  approach 
has been to go beh ind the whole land tenur e system imposed dur ing the 
colonial  e r a  and r e instate the pre-colon i al l and tenur e sys tem . It d id 
th is by probably the only means ava i l able to a country wh ich adheres to 
r ule of law pr inc iples , that is by accompl i sh i ng it under its  Independence 
Cons t i tut ion . As the " supreme l aw" wh ich speaks " for all  t ime " , the 
Constitution has in a r e al sense rewr itten the h istory books so far as the 
land tenure s ituat ion in  Vanuatu i s  concer ned . The s ituat ion i s  now , and 
is taken always to h ave been , that all l and in the Republic belong s to its  
customary owner s and the i r  descend ants .  Fur the rmore ,  a s  a result o f  Ar t . 7 2 
the cus tomary land tenure system mu st be reg arded as the pe rmanent 
fr amewor k for all future economic development in the country.  
The revers ion to customary tenure i s  further implemented by Ar t . 7 3 ,  
wh ich prov ides : 
On ly ind igenous c i t i zens of the Republ ic who h ave 
acqu i red the i r  land in accordance with a recog n i zed 
system of l and tenure shall have perpetual ownership of 
the ir land . 
Hav ing e stablished the bas ic pr inc iple s , Ar t . 7 4 r equ i r es P a r l i ament to 
prov ide for the implementat ion of Arts . 7 1 , 7 2  and 7 3  " in a nat ional land 
l aw" . I t  is poss ible to see Ar ts . 7 1 , 72 and 7 3  as prog r ammat ic , ind icat ing 
the broad fr amewor k with in wh ich government pol icy is to be formulated and 
implemented , and Ar t . 7 4 lends suppor t to th is v iew in  calling for 
leg islat ion to implement these art ic les . Th is is not , however ,  the v iew 
wh ich has been t aken by the Vanuatu Government , wh ich has treated the 
ar t ic les as  h av i ng the pos i t ive leg al e f fect of vesting all land in Vanuatu 
in  its  par t ic ular customary owner s .  Ar t icle 7 4 ,  in  requ i r i ng a " nat iona l  
l and law" t o  implement the pr eced ing a r t ic le s ,  i s  seen as  prov id ing for the 
el abor at ion of the pr inc iples enunc i ated , in  order that they may be fully 
implemented . The Gover nment ' s  v iew of the e f fect of these ar t ic les has not 
been cha l lenged in cour t .  
As a re sult o f  th i s  approach a number o f  consequences occur . In the 
f i r s t  place , a l l  introduced t itles wh ich pu rpor t to be t itles of ownersh ip 
and the land administrat ion system wh ich c r eated and suppor ted them are 
reg arded as  having been aboli shed . Second ly , the Const itut ion impl ic i t ly 
recog n i ses that pe r sons whose interests are " adver sely affected " by 
leg islat ion implement ing the rever son of a l ienated land to customary 
owner sh ip are ent itled to compensat ion , although P a r l i ament i s  able to : 
pr escr ibe such cr iter i a  for the assessment 
s at ion and the manne r of its payment 
appropr i ate ( Ar t . 7 5 ) . 
o f  compen­
as it deems 
I t  is noteworthy that the Const itut ion does not env isage an ent it lement to 
compensat ion as ar i s ing d ir ectly from the restorat ion of customary tenur e �  
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r ather , the ent i tlement would only ar ise in the event of an actual loss 
su ffe red under any implement ing law ,  over and above loss of land . 
The fol lowing four prov 1s 1ons c i r cumscr ibe the state ' s  powe rs to 
intervene in land tenur e matters . Ar t ic le 7 6  deals with land d i sputes . I t  
requires  t h e  Government t o  hold former ly- al ienated land wh ich i s  the 
subj ect of d i spute among the customary owner s unt il  the d i spute is 
resolved , and r equ ires the Gove rnment to " ar r ange for the appropr iate 
customary institut ions or proced ures to reso lve d i sputes concerning the 
owner sh ip of custom land" . By Ar t . 7 7 the Government ' s  approval is 
necessary for al l land transact ions " between an ind igenous c it i zen and 
e i ther a non- indigenous c i t i zen or a non-c i t i zen" . The approval must be 
g iven unless a proposed tr ansact ion is prej ud ic ial to the interests of the 
cus tomary owner s ,  the ind igenous c i t i zen where he is not the customary 
owner , the local communi ty , or the Republic . Ar tic le 78 enables the 
Government to own land acqu i r ed by it in the pub l ic inter est , and the f i nal 
prov i s ion in the Ch apter , Ar t . 79 ,  enables the Government to " buy" land from 
customary owners in order to red istr ibute i t  to ind igenous c it i zens or 
communit ies from over-populated i slands . 
The Const itut ion of Vanuat u i s  tr uly r emar kable in a number of 
respects . The f i r st i s  its  use as an instrument to ach ieve a fundamental 
reform of land tenure . The latter Pac i f ic Const itut ions fac i l it ated reform 
by enabling par l i aments to leg i slate for the mod if icat ion of the inher ited 
land tenure system , but of themselves they play no act ive par t  in ach iev ing 
a reor ientat ion towards ind igenous values and inst itut ions as reflected in 
land tenur e .  Th is leads to the second d i st inct ive feature of the Vanuatu 
Const itut ion . Whereas most other countr ies were reluctant to inter fere 
with the pre-const itution status quo on land tenure , Vanuatu inte r fe red in 
the most absolute way poss ible . It abol i shed all t it les cr eated dur ing the 
colon ial er a ,  and re instated the pre-colon i al land tenure s i tuat ion . I f  
the problem in othe r countr ies is how there can b e  a soc io-econom ic 
reor ientat ion if pr e- independence commercial interests are pr eserved and 
protected , the problem in Vanuatu is how there  can be econom ic development 
if the soc io-economic r eor ientat ion completely abol i shes the basis of mos t 
ex ist ing commerc ial act ivit ies . 
Apar t  from spec i f ic prov i s ions r e l at i ng to land , the Const itutions 
deal with other subj ects wh ich may e f fect the terms of convergence be tween 
commi tments to ind igenous values and econom ic development obj ect ives . The 
two mai n  ones cons idered br iefly here , are the prov i s ions on c i t i zensh ip , 
and those deal ing with the place of c ustom in the leg al system and the role 
of t r ad i t ional author i t ies . 
In general , the s i tuat ion in the Pac i f ic I s l and States at Independence 
was that commercial ac t iv it ies wer e  concentr ated on al ienated land , wh ich 
was ma inly owned or held on lease by expat r i ate ind iv iduals or corp­
orat ions . C i t i zensh ip is an obv ious matte r to deal with in an independence 
consti tut ion , and most Pac i f ic Constitutions prov ide for automat ic 
c i t i zensh ip , and the g a in ing of c i t i zensh ip by natural isat ion . Whereas the 
ear l ier Const itut ions took an expans ive approach to the quest ion of who 
qual if ied for c i t i zensh ip , the qual i f icat ions became prog ress ively mor e 
restr ict ive in succeed ing Const itut ions . The r ecog n i t ion of c i t i zensh ip as 
a v ital economic factor is more ev ident , and , together with more 
restr ict ive prov i s ions for qual i f icat ion , came the reservat ion of certain 
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impor tant econom ic r ights and freedoms to c i t i zens or " ind igenous" 
c i t i zens , and the creat ion of special pr iv ileges allowing po s i t ive 
d iscr iminat ion in  the i r  favour , a s  h a s  been seen i n  t h e  t r eatment of the 
land prov is ions o f  the three Me lane s i an Const i tut ions . 
The incorporat ion of c ustom in the leg al system and the involvement of 
trad it ional author it ies in the processes o f  gover nment may have the effect 
of promot ing ind igenous value s  and inst itut ions and the pos t- independence 
soc io-econom ic reorg an isat ion . Where the i r  author i ty is con f ined to custom 
and customar y land i t  is unl ikely that they will  exe r t  much pressure for 
change on the pre- i ndependence status quo . On the other hand , in  countr ies 
where the i r  author ity has been extended beyond the " tr ad it ional" area ( in 
Vanuatu , for example , where the r ules of custom are the bas i s  of owner sh ip 
and use of all  land in the country,  and where the Nat ional Counc i l  of 
Ch ie fs must be consulted in  formi ng the nat ional land law) , custom and 
trad i t ional autho r i t ies are l ikely to have a determining influence on the 
nature and extent of future econom ic development . 
CONCLUS I ONS 
In th is rev iew i t  has been seen that the three Me lanes ian 
Constitut ions make a commi tment to pr eserve and promote ind igenous values 
and inst itut ions as a consc ious r easse r t ion of the i r  d i st inct ive cultur al 
ident ity , probably perce ived by most Pac i f ic Islande r s  as having been 
suppr essed and devalued dur ing the colon ial e r a .  The demand for economic 
development , and improved pub l ic ser v ices and wel fare wh ich th i s  al lows , is 
general , and i s  at least impl ic i t  in the goals and pr inc iples o f  gover nment 
in the Const itut ions . Common const itut ional elements have the funct ion of 
creat i ng a c l imate favour able to econom ic development . 
The Const itut ions were found to s ay or do ver y  l ittle to estab l i sh the 
te rms o f  reconc i l iat ion between the commitments to pr eserve ind igenous 
value s  and inst itut ions and to ach ieve economic obj ect ives . The intro­
duc t ion to the PNG Cons t i tut ion does contain a long l ist of pr inc iples 
intended to harmon ise economic obj ec t ives with the pr imacy of nat ional 
se lf- r e l iance and Melanes ian cultural ident ity in the pur suit of " integ r al 
human development" , but very l ittle contr ibut ion to th i s  end is made by the 
ope r at ive prov is ions in the body of the Cons t i tut ion . The general picture 
there and in S I  i s  for m i n imal intervent ion by the Const itut ions in the 
pre- independence soc io-economic fr amewor k ,  and for prescr ipt ive effect to 
go l it t le fur ther than fac i l itating future s t ate intervention to med i ate 
between pr ivate and pub l ic r ights in the nat ional interest - an accepted 
pr erogat ive and duty of all sovere ig n  nat ions . 
The Vanuatu Const itut ion is a s ingular except ion , for it is itself the 
instr ument by wh ich a maj or soc io-econom ic r eorgan isat ion has been 
effected . Almost in  despa ir  of the prospects for g r adual r e fo rm , th i s  most 
recent of the Pac ific ' s  independence const i tut ions attempts a restorat ion 
of the pre-colon i al status quo , in  v i r tual de f i ance of the soc io-economic 
cond it ions left as its colonial leg acy at independence . It must be 
acknowledged that th i s  approach is essent ially r eg ress ive r ather than 
progress ive , and that the g u idel ines for the new nat ion ' s  future 
or ientat ion are s t i l l  to be formulated . Th i s  i s , after al l ,  the most 
d i f f icult task . 
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For the othe r two States , are the i r  calls for cultur al ident i ty to 
remain only educat ional and insp i r at ional , to be taught to the youth of the 
country,  and g iven l ip- service by the leader s ,  before pr ess ing on with yet 
another drear ily famil iar ' deve lopment ' pl an? Is culture to be someth ing 
for the depressed r ur al v illages , the occas ional arts fest ival and the 
tour ist sh ips , wh ile econom ic ac t iv ity remains concentr ated in the towns 
and on the fore ign-dominated plantat ion estates - that archetypal creature 
of colon ial settlement? Or may d ist inct ive Me lanes ian inst i tut ions emerge , 
wh ich blend ind igenous values and inst itut ions with economic imper at ives , 
al lowing for self-sustain ing growth and the soc ial needs and mate r ial 
asp irat ions of the Me lane s ian peoples to be real i sed? Because the 
Const itut ions have no determin ing influence on the se quest ions , the key to 
the ir resolut ion will be found in the support  factors the soc i al , 
pol i t ical and econom ic forces in  the country wh ich e i ther stand beh ind and 
support preservat ion of the pr e- independence s t atus quo , or stand beh ind 
and support  the demanded post- i ndependence reor ientat ion . 
The post- i ndependence h i s tory of PNG i s  a salutary example of how 
these forces ope r ate to detemine the normat iv ity or nom inal ity of 
reor ientat ion goals . Th at country ' s  Const i tu t ion was most expl ic i t  in its 
demand for a " fundamental r eor ient at ion" . At Independence the PNG 
Gover nment had adopted pol ic ies for a maj or land reform , and the 
Const itut ion made spec ial prov 1 s 1on to fac i l itate the ir implementat ion . 
The rad ical reform of al ienated land was tentat ively commenced , but after 
f ive year s '  desultory operat ion , has been abandoned by a new gover nment , 
wh ich has moved to increase the secur ity of fore ig ners over al ienated land 
in order to promote export earn ing s  ( see Larmour 1 98 2 : 44-4 5 ) . The 
f ive-ye ar per iod of g r ace al lowed in the Cons t i tut ion to fac i l itate the 
adj ustment of the t i t les of natur al ised c i t i zens has been let pass with no 
remed ial ac t ion be ing taken . The convers ion of non-c iti zens ' freeholds to 
leases has not occur red . The cour ts have c i rcumvented the relaxat ion of 
compensat ion requ irements prov ided in the Cons t i tut ion with re spect to 
state acqu i s i t ion of the land of non- automat ic c i t i zens ( see Minister of 
Lands v .  Frame S . C .  1 86 ,  unrepor ted , and the comments by Bayne 1 9 8 1 : 3 8-3 9 ) . 
So far as the ach ievement of the NGDPs through other dev ices is 
concer ned , implementat ion of the Leade r sh ip Code has been frustr ated , and 
the move for a more str ict code was defeated in Par l iament , and was par tly 
respon s ible for the fall of the Somare Government in 1 9 80 . The cour ts have 
made a tr i fl ing effort  to incorpor ate custom in development of the 
under lying law ( see the chapte r s  of Sakor a and We isbrot in th i s  volume ) , 
and the Law Re form Comm i s s ion ' s  recommendat ion that cus tomary law should be 
adopted as the under lying law has been ignor ed . In general , desp ite an 
auspic ious beg inn ing , the pre- independence soc io-economic fr amework has 
emerged from the trans i t ion v i r tually int act , and the prospects of a 
fundamental r eor ientat ion r ap idly r ecede . 
In g lobal geopo l i t ical powe r terms , the Pac i f ic Islands States are 
char acter ised by the ir extr eme soc i al and geog r aph ical fragmentat ion , 
smal lness of populat ion , and nar rowness of resource base . There is no 
doubt that external factor s ,  press ing in as a consequence of the i r  
str ateg ically weak pos i t ion in  the internat ional pol i t ical and econom ic 
order , exe r t  a power ful influence on the pol ic ies that such pe r ipher al 
countr ies may adopt in seek ing sel f-sustaining econom ic growth . The forces 
for susta in ing the pre- independence status quo include the need for expor t 
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earning s ,  and the centr al po s i t ion of over seas and res ident bus iness 
interests in the nat iona l  economy . The pol it ically powe r ful minor i ty of 
the c it i zenry c apture and monopolise what l im ited economic oppor tun i t ies 
fall from the t able of the for e ig n  bus inessme n ,  and contr ive to conso l id ate 
them . The inher ited colon ial  bureaucr acy r e s i sts change ( see F i ng leton 
1 9 8 1 : 2 33-3 4 ) . 
The support f actors for reor ientat ion are  d i f f icult to f i nd . 
Pol it ic al and pecun iary advancement seem inev itably to r un in tandem , and 
measures for the equal isat ion of econom ic oppor tun i t ies seem unl i kely to 
emerge from the leg is latures . Incorporat ion of custom in the leg a l  system 
and t r ad i t ional author i t ies in the processes of gover nment may lead to 
g r e ater influence by ind igenous values . St rong ' g r ass roots ' -based 
po l i t ic a l  par t ies can be a compel l ing f actor for change , as has been the 
exper ience in  Vanuatu .  I t  i s  too e a r ly t o  see whether the soc io-po l i t ical 
' ren a i ss ance ' in  th is count ry can be a r t iculated with the new n at ion ' s  
des ire for econom ic growth and nat ional sel f- r e l i ance . On the Pac i f ic 
I s lands ' expe r ience so far the cho ice is between cultur a l  d is t i nct iveness 
and economic development , for no nat ion has yet managed to r econc i le the ir  
contr ast ing requ i rements . The ult imate conc lus ion dr awn from the Pac i f ic 
I s lands ' exper ience is that unless the bas ic e lements o f  r eor ientat ion 
goal s are  actually implemented ( and not j ust f ac i l it ated) in  the body of 
the Const i tut ions brought in  at Independence , the l ikel ihood that the goals 
will ever be integ r ated into the pos t- independence soc iety seems doubt ful . 
NOTES 
1Father L i n i , for example , in  the address refer red to above , called 
Vanuatu a ' land-us ing '  cultur e ,  and Austr a l i a  a ' land-own i ng '  culture . 
He cont inued : "The We ste rn concept of land as a mar ket able commod i ty i s  
not j ust al ien t o  the Me lanes ian , b u t  is cons idered impr act ical  and 
immor a l  in  the very best sense that the terms can be appl ied" ( ibid. : 26 ) . 
2PNG ' s  Constitut ional Pl anning Committee ( CPC ) , for example , wh i le 
asse r t ing that its recommendat ions were ' home grown ' , f reely acknowledged 
the d iverse or ig ins of many of them (PNG CPC 1 9 74 : Pt . I ,  par a . 9 ,  at 1 /2 ) . 
30 f  the other P ac i f ic I s land countr ies , the 1 8 75 Const itut ion of the 
K i ngdom of Tong a is s i lent on the matter of c ustom , but the three 
ent i t ies o f  the Amer ican- admini stered Tr ust Te r r i tory of the Pac i f ic 
I sl ands make impor tant assert ions of custom in  the Const itut ions of the 
Feder a ted S t ates of Mic rone s i a  ( FSM) ( 1 97 8 ) , the Mar shall  I s l ands (MI ) 
( 1 9 79 ) and Be lau ( 1 9 8 1 ) .  
4Found i n  varying forms in the Constitutions of F i j i ,  PNG , SI  a nd FSM . 
5Found i n  the Const itut ions of WS , PNG and Tuvalu , and , less d i rectly 
assoc iated , in  the Const itut ions of Tong a ,  S I , K i r ib at i , MI a nd Be lau . 
6The PNG Const itut ion spec i f ically prov ides to th is effect : Sch . 1 . 3 . ( 1 ) .  
LAND 3 4 3  
7 Although the Cons t i tut ion of Tong a assoc iates the r ight to protect ion of 
prope r ty with a recognit ion that " it i s  r ight for all people to suppor t 
and contr ibute to the Gover nment accord ing to law" [C l .  1 8 ] • 
8 Th is reflects an ag reement reached at the con ference to al low G i lbe r t  
Is lands settlers in S I  t o  retain the i r  perpe tual es tates (ibid . : 29 ) . 

24. TRAD I TIONAL I NSTITUTIONS IN PACI F IC CONSTITUTIONAL 
SYSTEMS: BETTER LATE OR N EVER? 
G .  Powles 
RELEVANCE OF TRAD IT I ONAL L EADERSH I P  
Cons t i tut ion-mak ing i s  over and new paths are be ing trod . The past 
remains par t  of the present , however ,  and any const itut ional stock-taking 
in the ' post- i ndependence ' Pac i f ic involves a re-appr a i sal of the place of 
t r ad it ional and neo- t rad it ional concepts o f  pol i t ical power and dec i s ion­
mak ing . The scope of th i s  pape r does not ex tend beyond ' Paci f ic 
constitut ion s ' , wh ich expr ess ion is taken to r e fer to the four teen states 
wh ich have become independent ( n ine)  or have adopted ' free assoc i at ion ' 
( f ive) dur i ng the past twenty year s .  
' Pos t-col on i a l  1 scene 
I t  is d angerous to make gene r al isat ions about the ' post-colon i al '  
scene i n  the Pacif ic but c e r t a in elements s t and out . 
The f i r st is undoubtedly a sense of sat i sfact ion i n  the attainment of 
pol i t ical aspi r at ions and the r easse r t ion of c u ltur al ident ity . National 
independence , o r  an acceptable deg ree o f  autonomy , has been accompan ied in 
each case by the assumpt ion of pol i t ical power by the pr edominant 
leader sh ip g roup ,  in  a re lat ively smooth transit ion . ( I t  is debat able 
whe ther sel f-cong r atulat ion should be shared by ' colon ial ' nat ions whose 
maj or cons iderat ions o ften appeared to have been to keep d i scord , censure 
and , above al l ,  expense , i n  the t r ansfer process to a m i n imum . ) But ,  
wh i le satis fact ion i s  felt by those who have assumed pol it ical control 
under const itut ions wh ich they , as pol i t ic ians , are lear n i ng to employ to 
the i r  advant age , t r ad i t ional leade r sh ip also has enj oyed renewed support on 
the wave of cultu r al revival . 
Such feel ing s  draw attent ion to the inescapable fact of the 
term inat ion of colon ial author ity - and to the sober real ity th at , sho r t  of 
revolut ion , maj or pol it ical and leg al change in the new states must have 
reg ard to the terms of the const itut ions wh ich have been adopted . Wielders  
of power soon apprec i ate the s ig n i f icance o f  the new s t atus . For the 
v il lager and l abour er , the face of centr al government has probably altered 
l ittle , and i t  will  be a very long t ime before they learn the real rules of 
the new g ame . 
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Another par t  of the scene has been fam i l iar for over two centur ies 
the clash o f  Pac i f ic and Western cultures . The new constitutions - as 
further developments in  the con t inu ing saga - do not purport to resolve 
fundamental incons istenc ies between cultures except in relat ion to the 
ins t i tut ions of centr al government , where ,  in most countr ies , a Western 
model or  its  var i ant has been adopted . Ge nerally speak i ng , pol i t ical 
autonomy means that i t  i s  left to the new leaders to f ind polic ies and 
techniques wh ich will red uce cultur al conf l ict and will prod uce wor kable 
compromi ses in such areas as the maintenance of orde r , d i spute 
sett lement , l and tenur e ,  fam i ly law and s uccess ion and local government . 
It is the v ulnerab i l ity of chiefly powe r ,  however ,  in the l ight of its 
h i therto remarkable pe r s istence in  the face o f  the We ste r n  onslaught , wh ich 
const itutes pe rhaps the most sensit ive and d i f f icult factor for the leader s  
of countr ies w i th chie fly sys tems . 
A pervasive element in the scene i s  the r e fore the re levance of past 
events and histor ical depth in  determining the extent of change and the 
acceptance o f  comprom ise . In Tong a , the n ineteenth century introduction of 
ideas of monarchy and par l iament , fo llowed by adaptat ion dur ing a long 
pe r iod of re lat ive i solat ion , has ensured that today ' s constitut ional 
institut ions are regarded as t r ad it ional (see Powles 1 9 79 ) . Naur uan 
soc io-pol it ical org an isat ion , on the other hand , was v ir tually destroyed by 
events assoc iated with success ive colon i al and m i l i tary occupat ions and 
phosphate min ing - capped , now , by a phosphate economy . It is not 
surpr i s i ng that the Cons t i tut ion of Naur u and related leg islat ion today 
takes no account of a system of d i str ict chiefs wh ich may have been 
shor t- l ived ( see Al k i re 1 9 77 : 8 3-8 4 ) . The ear ly formal r ecognit ion of 
chiefs in F i j i as instr uments of centr al author i ty - and par t icular ly the 
mass ive F i j ian Admin i s t r at ion of 1 94 3  to 1 967  wh ich involved chiefs at 
every level ( see Nayacakalou 1 9 75 ) e stab l i shed relat ionsh ips and 
att itudes between ch iefs and government wh ich cont inue to have a profound 
effect on F i j i an pol i t ics ( see Nat ion 1 9 78 ) . 
I nc i denc e of i ncorpora ti on of c h i ef ly  author i ty i n  the consti tuti ona l 
framewor k  
Surveys o f  const itut ional prov is ions often prov ide ste r ile 
informat ion , but such a survey would estab l i sh two th ing s .  F i rst , i n  only 
two countr ies , Western  Samoa (WS )  and Tong a , c an ch iefs rely on the 
cons t itut ional str ucture to play a c lear ly dom inant role at the nat ional 
level . 1 Secondly , the s ig n i f icance of ch iefsh ip i s  by no means restr icted 
to Polynes i a ,  and the not ion that ch iefs should have a voice , whether 
merely i n  an adv i sory capac ity or a dec is ive voice in  certain areas such as 
customary l aw ,  l and tenure and local affai r s , appe ars to be widely accepted 
in parts  of Me lane s i a  and Microne s i a .  
When one looks further into pract ical po l i t ics , o f  cou r se , i t  i s  
usually more s ig n i f icant t o  know the extent t o  wh ich chiefly author i ty i s  
not prov ided for in const i tut ions and related documents and i s  
accord ingly free from t h e  l imitat ions wh ich such documents m ight impose on 
i t . By and large , and as will  be d iscussed below , ch iefs in the Pac i f ic 
are ' fr ee ' to operate at sub- national levels and par t ic ular ly in the 
cruc ial areas of l and tenure and local gover nment . 
TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS 3 4 7  
A ma tter of l i fe or death ?  
Just a s  the quest ion o f  whether o r  not t o  prov ide for ch iefly 
author ity pe rplexed pre- i ndependence const itut ional adv i se r s , d i f f icult 
dec i s ions a r e  now to be faced in  many countr ies . The Solomon Islands ( S I )  
and Vanuatu must cons ider the funct ion of ch iefs  in  relat ion t o  land and 
local government ,  and the role of chiefs is very much to the fore in  
relat ion to local d i spute-settlement and law-and-order issues in  ( to the 
wr iter ' s  knowledge) F i j i ,  WS and Ponape . The place of unimane ( e lder s )  i n  
local gover nment i s  under cons iderat ion in  K i r ibat i ( see Neem i a  1 9 8 1 : 6 2 ) . 
Ch iefsh ip and t r ad it ional decis ion-mak ing cannot survive incorporat ion 
into impor ted author i ty systems wh ich , in  order to ach ieve the i r  purpose , 
are requi r ed to retain the i r  we ste r n  funct ion and style . To those who 
reg ard chiefship - and par t icular ly ch iefsh ip i n  respect of wh ich inher ited 
status plays a s ig n i f icant role - as incons i stent with the eg alitar ian 
pr inc iples upon wh ich par t ic ipatory democr acy should be based , the sooner 
ch iefship r ece ives ' the k i ss o f  death ' the bette r . For others , i t  seems 
that small-scale non-Western soc iet ies lac k i ng expens ive infrastructures 
cannot afford to lose too qui�kly any inst itut ions wh ich contr ibute to the 
qual ity of d a i ly l i fe in a manner acceptable to the people concerned . 
C h i efs : l eg i t imacy , rec i proc i ty a nd ' l aw ' 
Although Pac i f ic cultures have produced many types of ch iefsh ip , 
cer tain common elements d ist ing uish th i s  form of leadership .  The scope of 
th is d iscuss ion r anges from the dynast ic l i neage heads o f  the older 
Polynes i an soc iet ies in  the d istr ict , v i ll age and fam i ly chiefs found 
throughout Po lynes i a  and in many par t s  of Melanes ia and Micrones i a . 2 
Ch ie fsh ip is an office , the inst i tut ional character of wh ich is today 
more h ighly developed in soc iet ies where ch iefs h istor ically wielded 
greater powe r .  In  the Samoas and Tong a ,  the o f f ice is iden t i f ied by a 
t itle borne by success ive i ncumbents . A ch ief is the head of a g roup to 
wh ich the o f f ice belong s .  Land in  wh ich the g roup has r ights and wh ich is 
administered by the chief is usually appur tenant to the off ice . The 
relat ionsh ip between chief and g roup is founded in  k insh ip and descent , but 
ch iefsh ip becomes te r r i tor ial when the dominance of one g r oup over othe r s  
in an area establishes its  head a s  a r e a  chief . O f f ices confer de f ined 
status wh ich is r anked inter se . Wh ile tens ion be tween compet ing not ions 
of k i nsh ip , r es idence and t e r r itor i al i ty is almost un iversal in the 
Pac i f ic , pr eocc upat ion w i th status r ivalry is a feature of ch iefly sys tems . 
Ch iefsh ip is further d i stingu ished from othe r forms of leadership by 
the fact that the ideology of qual i f ic at ion for off ice emphas ises the 
closeness of inher ited t ies with , and act ive membe rship of , the g r oup . 
Wh ile cultural var i at ions are wide - as is the g ap between ideology and 
pr act ice - chiefly success ion involves ex aminat ion of actual or myth ical 
common ancestry and r elat ionsh ips built  upon service to the g roup . Today , 
str ict pr imogen iture funct ions only i n  Tong a ,  and elsewhere importance of 
blood- l ine h as d iminished re lat ive to other relat ionsh ips . 
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Ch iefly author i ty i s  somet imes assoc i ated with the mana of ancesto r s ,  
and r itual and deference ind icator s may s t i l l  def i ne and pe rpetuate ch iefly 
status . However ,  the leg i t imacy of that author ity r equi r es public 
recog n i t ion and re inforcement , for wh ich the ch ief i s  dependent on the 
g roup .  As success ion increas ing ly turns less on i nhe r ited character is t ics 
and mor e  on g roup assessment , the g roup ' s role in chiefship i s  enhanced . 
In soc iet ies where the strat i f icat ion of s tatus within h ie r arch ies of 
off ices has d i stanced mor e  powe r ful fam i lies  and g roups from the rest of 
the popul at ion ( in Tong a , F i j i and the S amoas , for example) , the dependence 
of the chief on h i s  own g roup is l inked with factors involvi ng the 
ma intenance of g roup status . 
Ch iefly power is a funct ion of the rec iprocal nature of the serv ices 
rendered be tween ch ief and g roup .  The ch ief prov ides leadersh ip in 
fur the rance of the g roup ' s interests and rel ies upon its support . 
Consequently , the vulnerab i l ity of the mutual dependence of chief and group 
const itutes the most v i tal feature of moder n  ch iefsh ip . The eros ive 
effects o f  access to competing sources o f  power - such as pe r sonal income 
and the accumulat ion of d i sposable we alth , and pol i t ical and government 
off ice - apply to both the ch ief and membe r s  of the g r oup . The latter seek 
independence through these alternat ives . The ch ief , whether in an 
endeavour to restore author ity , o r  s imply to pur sue ambit ions for g reater 
power , u se s  h is init ial advantages to improve h is pos i t ion by the same 
means . The rec iprocal bas i s  of the relat ionsh ip is undermined . 
Hi s word i s  1 l aw 1 
The exerc ise of ch iefly author ity is e ssent ially a pol i t ical funct ion . 
The ch ief is pol icy-maker and administr ator , but not adj ud icator in the 
We ste rn sense , as a br ief reference to dec i s ion-mak ing in customary law 
will show. Ch iefs ( and , where they ex i st , chiefly counci l s )  do not apply 
r ules of law as they are unde r s tood by We stern lawye r s . Convent ional 
th inking about the nature of the funct ion i s  m islead i ng . For ex ample , 
Ha rt ' s  approach is based upon the assumption that the pr imary unof f ic i al 
r ules o f  obl ig at ion wh ich pr e- leg al soc iet ies understand through the i r  
" inte rnal" percept ion are capable of determining outcomes (see Hart 
1 96 1 : 89-90 , 1 1 3 - 1 4 ;  Roberts  1 979 ) . Such a v i ew pays too l ittle attent ion 
to the role of power in the reso lut ion of confl ict . The ch ief is required 
to take into account a range of r ecogn i sed cons iderat ions in relat ion to 
the matter in hand and then to exe r c i se h i s  d iscret ion . Such 
cons iderat ions may be inte rnally pe rceived but , where ch iefs wield more 
ex tens ive pub l ic power , the cons iderat ions are  expressed and debated - and , 
indeed , are they not matte rs of public pol icy? 
Some soc iet ies ach ieved a deg ree of spe c i f ic ity in the a r t iculat ion of 
so-called ' r ules ' of customary l aw ,  but these are pr inc iples wh ich , as 
Dworkin puts it " arg ue • • •  i n  one d i rect ion but do • • •  not neces s itate a 
par t icul ar dec i s ion " ( 1 9 78 : 2 4 ,  2 6 ) . P r obably the bes t  examples in the 
Pac i f ic are the pr inc iples appl ied by the WS chiefly counci l s  and the Land 
and T i tles Cour t ,  part icular ly in the areas of appo intment to ch iefly 
office , r ights to land , serv ice to family and v illage , and the preservat ion 
or order ( see WS 1 9 76 ) . In a g iven case , not only will  there be 
con f l ict ing pr inc iples appl icab le to success ion to t i tle but cons iderat ions 
of publ ic harmony will  be re levant . Other characte r i s t ic s  of t r ad i t ional 
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dec i s ion-ma k i ng are that i t  is not intended to prod uce immutable j udgments 
and b i nd ing pr ecedents , and it is concer ned not to exerc ise an i solated 
transgress ion or d i spute from its context of on-going relat ionsh ips . 
Gene r ally speaking then , the exerc ise of chie fly power involve s the 
cons iderat ion of recognised pr inc iples r ather than the appl icat ion of 
dec i s ive r ules . As in  the case of the we ste rn administrator or 
administrat ive tr ibunal , the power i s  d i scret ionary, and reviewable only 
where there ex ists a h igher level of ac knowl edged author i ty . Ar eas of 
j ur isd ict ion may be te r r i tor ial or funct ional . Some Pac i f ic soc iet ies 
developed a d ual ity o f  author ity so that in e ach local ity the two types of 
ch ief would inte r act in a sys tem of checks and balances - for example ,  the 
a li ' i  and tulafale in Samoa , and the namwarki and naniken in Ponape . 
Where ch iefs con sult with the i r  groups or with other ch iefs , 
collect ive dec is ions are ach ieved by a type of consensus intended to 
exhibit  outward un ity - but wh ich usually involve more conform ity than 
unan imi ty .  Op in ions are we ighted accord ing to the status of the holders , 
and those h e ld by the h ighest r anks are usually known in advance . Unless 
open con f l ict is envisaged , the re may be no s tatement of intent ion to 
d i ssent from the col lect ive dec i s ion ( wh ich may not be reached for days or 
weeks , and , in S amoa at least , b inds those who attend ) . 
CHARACTERISTICS  OF CURRENT CONSTI TUT I ONAL SYSTEMS 
In the space of only twenty year s , fourteen Pac i f ic soc ieties have 
changed the i r  status under const itut ional charters wh ich appe ar to 
represent a remar kably wholesale adopt ion of We stern th ink ing . With the 
ass i stance of some general isat ions , the following analys is ind icates how, 
in fact , the adopt ion has been less than wholesale . 
I ngred i ents of the i mporta ti on 
Those ingr ed ients wh ich confront ch iefship and are re levant for th is 
d i scuss ion may be summar i sed : 
1 .  
2 .  
the nat ion- state , 
org an i sat ion is 
nat ional fr amewor k ;  
i n  wh ich 
centr al ised 
pol i t ical and leg al 
and ex tend s across a 
the c i t i zen- i so late , who bears r ights 
in re lat ion to the state and among st 
on the foot ing of equal pol i t ical and 
c i t i zens ; 
and obl ig at ions 
fe l low c i t i zens -
legal status for 
3 .  l aw-mak ing bod ies , wh ich are respons ible to an 
elector ate compr i s i ng the adult popul at ion co-extens ive 
with the i r  j ur isd ic t ion , and the leg i t imacy o f  whose 
dec i s ions depends upon the opin ion of not less than the 
maj or i ty of equal ly we ighted voices ; 
4 .  a n  administration , wh ich i s  accountable to such bod ies 
or , through its head , to the elector ate ; 
3 5 0  
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a cour t sys tem , wh ich administe r s  law and tests the 
exerc ise of powe r aga inst the const itut ional char ter . 
Absence of concomi tants 
By the i r  nature , const itut ions expr ess only certain essent ials , and 
the Pac i f ic importat ions have indeed been l im ited to the bare bones of the 
constitut ional models from wh ich they der ive . One must look e lsewhere for 
the flesh and blood necessary to enable the const i tut ional skeleton to 
funct ion e f fect ively . Those components wh ich are usually missing in the 
Pacif ic S t ates ( yet , i ron ically , are now i ncr eas i ng ly r eg arded as essent ial 
in those countr ies wh ich have expor ted the model s )  are concer ned with 
par t ic ipat ion and dec i s ion-making and the rev iew of government act ion . 
Generally lack ing are the mass med i a  and invest ig at ive informat ion 
services , the procedures for public examinat ion of proposed leg islat ion , 
budgets and economic plans , and the procedur es for the rev iew of admin­
i strat ive r ules and dec is ions , wh ich are needed for pub l ic part ic ipat ion 
and the chec k i ng of government powe r . 3 A more obv ious result of the 
development of ' str ipped down ' centr al government in the Pac i f ic has been 
the l ac k  o f  attent ion pa id to par t ic ipat ion in local government and to 
l inks between v illage and cap ital town . The ' bare bones ' leave spaces 
wh ich are open to exploitat ion . 
Lac k  of penetrati on of consti tu ti ona l precepts , a nd protec ti on of customary 
l aw 
Const itut ions , also character ist ically , do not purport to deal with 
such matters as local government and land tenur e .  In Weste r n  soc iet ies , 
however ,  the value s  and att itudes beh ind the const itut ion are pervas ive . 
In the Pac if ic they stop shor t ,  and it is important to see where and how 
th i s  occur s in each soc iety . In th i s  pape r the re is scope to refe r  only to 
the two most obv ious techniques for formally del ineat ing the ideolog ical 
boundary . 
Some const itut ions impose a set of pr ior i t ies on the adopt ion and use 
of sources o f  law wh ich are intended to r eg ulate the extent to wh ich the 
country r eta ins unwr itten customary law :  PNG ( ss . 9 , 20 , and Sch . 2 ) , WS 
( s . 1 1 1 ) , S I  ( s .  7 6  and Sch . 3 ) . 
Vanuatu ( ss . 4 9 and 7 4 )  and Marshall I s l ands (MI ) ( Ar t . X )  requi r e  the i r  
Leg islat ures t o  cons ider fur ther and make prov i s ion for t h e  content and 
status of c ustomary law .  PNG places the obl ig at ion , in the f i rst  instance , 
on the cour ts and Law Re form Commiss ion ( s . 2 1 and Sch . 2 ) . The other 
const i tut ions ignore the quest ion , leav ing it to the leg islature and the 
cour ts to dec ide whe ther to inte r fere with the pr e-const i t ut ion pr ior i t ies 
of f i rstly,  s t atute : then common law and equ ity:  and finally customary 
law .  Wh i le the d istinct ion between wr i t ten and unwr itten law has no leg al 
s ignif icance , unwr itten customary law i s  bel ieved to be ser iously 
d isadvantaged in pub l ic compet i t ion with the supe r ior status o f  the wr itten 
word and with cour ts trained to apply common law and equ i ty .  I t  remains to 
be seen to what extent cons t i tut ional support  w i l l  e ncourage the use and 
v i ab i l ity of c ustomary law .  Wh i le the ear ly momentum of the PNG Law Re form 
Commiss ion in the development of under lying l aw appe ars to have halted ( its 
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Repor t  No . 7  o f  1 9 77 on the s ubj ect has not been cons idered by Parliament ) , 
such con s t i tut ional support  i s  r elevant to the cons iderat ion of chiefsh ip 
in the remaining countr ies wh ich have prov ided for i t . 
The second techn ique is to dec lare that cer tain areas of l aw shall be 
the exclus ive domain of customary law - s ubj ect only to the const itut ion . 
The post- i ndependence v ital i ty of WS ' s  ch iefly sys tem owes much to the bald 
statement in the Cons t i tut ion that matai t itles " shal l be held in 
accordance w i th Samoan customs and usag e "  ( Ar t . 1 00 )  - and s imilar prov i s ion 
for customary land in Ar t . 1 0 1 . It is a feature of Pac i f ic countr ies that 
most of the land is subj ect to customary tenur e .  Wh ile proh ib i t ion of 
al ienat ion to non-c it i zens is common , e f fect i ve constitut ional protect ion 
of the bas i s  of the tenure requ i res proh ibi t ion of change of status per se , 
and is r a r e  ( e . g . , WS Ar t . 1 02 ) . Vanuatu declares that the r ules of custom 
shall form the bas i s  o f  a l l  land ownersh ip and use ( s . 7 2 ) . F i j i ach ieves 
protect ion of customary land as a ch iefly domain by entrench ing the 
relevant leg islat ion (Native l£lnds Ordinance ( 1 90 5 )  and Native l£lnds Trust 
Ordinance ( 1 94 0 ) ) so that amendment requi res the support of three-quarters 
of the appo intees o f  the Counc i l  o f  Ch iefs ( s . 68 ) . 
A fur the r  cons ider at ion for ch iefs operat ing within customary law 
areas is the extent to wh ich they may be s ubj ect to the j ur i sd ict ion of 
cour ts . Th e topic would requ i r e  more space than th i s  paper permits . As to 
special cour ts with exclus ive customary j ur i sd ict ion , recent creat ions 
( such as the MI Tr ad i t ional Cour t )  may have d i f f iculty maintaining status 
in compet i t ion with convent ional supe r ior cour ts - wh i le the long- stand ing 
and extens ive powers of the WS Land and T i tles Cour t have enabled it to 
retain i t s  influence . 
Confl ict between d i fferent sub- systems o f  law is inev itable , and 
occur s at d i ffe rent levels . For ex ample , much depends on approaches taken 
by j udges to the interpretat ion of const i tut ional " b i l l  of r ights" 
prov 1s 1ons . Jud ic ial restraint , and not a l ittle d i f f idence on the part of 
short- term expat r iate j udges have usually prevented such con f l ict from 
crystal l is i ng .  In WS , e ighteen ye ars e l apsed before the expatr iate j udges 
felt obl iged to state publ ic ly that , in the i r  opin ion , the common pr act ice 
of ban i shment from the v i l lage was inconsistent with Ar t . 1 3  g uarantee ing 
" fr eedom o f  r e s idence " . The latest Ch ie f Just ice , however ,  hav ing awarded 
pun i t ive d amages ag a inst three ch iefs whose dec i s ion in v i l lage counc i l  
const ituted " a  h igh-h anded demonstrat ion of powe r "  (Tariu T .  v .  Sila , 
F. and ors ( SC) 1 7  December 1 9 80 R . St . John CJ ) appeared to have no 
hes itat ion in f i nd ing that the l im itat ion of the r ight to vote to men and 
women of ch iefly s t atus is unconst i tut ional and void (Saipa 'ia Olomalu 
v. Attorney-General ( SC)  5 Apr i l  1 982 R . S t . John CJ ) . In th i s  last case , he 
accompl ished at a j ud ic ial level what par l i amentary commiss ions and 
committees , and Pa r l i ament it sel f ,  h ave resolutely set the i r  faces ag a inst 
s ince the UN Gene r al As sembly approved independence for WS on the bas i s  of 
matai suffr age 2 1  ye ars ago .  
A t  the level o f  implementat ion , where  central author ity , represented 
by the pol ice force , confronts local leadersh ip in v illage counc ils , 
con f l ict may r ema in unreso lved for some t ime ( e . g . , the wr iter has been 
informed that the plaint i ff and law enforcement o f f ic ials had , by Apr il 
1 9 82 , been unable to recover the d amages awarded in Tariu, T. , refe rred to 
above)  • 
352  G .  POWLES 
Depth of compromi se  a nd pers i s tence of u n i ncorpora ted i nsti tuti ons 
Ove r t ime , many Pac i f ic soc iet ies have mod i f i ed the const i tut ional 
models der ived from We stminster and Wash i ng ton , and , in some cases , have 
ach ieved remar kable amalg am s .  The pe r s istence of ch iefsh ip as a fact of 
l i fe has been respons ible for much of th i s  adapt ive pr ocess and i t  i s  
not iceab le t h a t  chiefly leader sh ip has , i f  anyth i ng ,  r easser ted itself 
under post-colon ial administrat ions . 
The four teen Pac i f ic systems of today are char acte r i s t ic not only for 
the d ivers ity of the ir h i stor ical exper ience but also for the var iety o f  
ar r angements wh ich have been adopted in  th i s  a r e a  of comprom i se between 
' old ' and ' new ' . Factor s  wh ich have played a par t  include the nature and 
streng th o f  t r ad it ional leade r sh ip at the t ime of ar r ival of miss ionar ies 
and colon ial admin i str ator s ;  the pol icy o f  the newcomer s  in deal ing with 
such leade r sh ip ;  the fluctuat ion of colon i al interests ove r several 
generat ion s , often in  r esponse to pe rce ived local imper at ives ; and , in the 
lead-up ( somet imes a ' r un-up ' ! )  to independence , the extent of pol i t ical 
exped iency i nvolved in  r ecognis ing local leader sh ip . 
Th e cases of Tong a ,  Naur u  and F i j i have been ment ioned above . WS and 
Ponape prov ide ex amples of ch iefly sys tems parts of wh ich have avoided 
formal incorporat ion into new governmental str uctur es . The WS v i l lage 
counc ils  have act ively resisted the cent r al administrat ion several t imes 
th is century - and cont inue to do so . Ye t ,  everywhere it ex ists , chiefly 
power seems to have been too sen s it ive a subj ect to be adequately 
cons idered in the const itut ion-mak ing process and is today seldom debated 
in the context of pol it ical and economic plann ing in the countr ies most 
conce rned . A thorough study o f  each such soc iety i s  cal led for be fore 
dec is ions involv ing the future of ch iefship are made ( see Powles 1 9 79 ) . 
I NCONGRU I T I ES AND ABUSES 
I t  may be helpful to h ighl ight some of the areas o f  concer n  - and to 
draw attent ion to the conceptual conflicts and eros ion of values impl ic i t  
in any fus ion o f  chiefly and We stern  sys tems . 
Chi efs a s  publ i c  servants 
The pol it ical nature of ch iefly author i ty and power render s  the chief 
unsu itab le as an instr ument o f  modern gover nment . As has been shown , the 
cus tomary law and dec i s ion-mak ing of ch iefs are i nappropr iate for the needs 
and style of such government . Co lon ial admini strat ions sought to eng age 
ch iefs i n  administrat ive and j ud ic i al roles . They were requ ired to apply 
and en force regulat ions wh ich wou ld usually exclude the broader 
cons ide r at ions wh ich have been descr ibed above as tr ad i t ionally relevant . 
Also they were seen as owi ng some al leg iance to an author i ty outs ide 
the i r  system - and a mere suggest ion of such al leg iance was suffic ient to 
beg in the eros ion of g roup suppor t .  
Never theless , the case for the adopt ion and supe r v i s ion o f  chiefly 
power i n  the aid of a formal structure of v i l lage gover nment has had 
pe r suas ive advocates , such as Ratu S i r  Lala S u kuna in 1 94 2  (see Davidson 
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1 95 0 ) . F ij i ' s  s t r uc ture lasted for f i fteen ye ars and ves t iges remain . In 
ws , where proposal s under Ge rman and New Zealand adminis t r a t ions in the 
1 9 00s  and 1 920s , respect ively , were , l ike Professor Dav idson ' s , never 
accepted , the res istance of chiefs , both in the v i l lages and at the centre , 
is s t i l l  success ful . The intent ion of the Mini ster of Just ice in 1 9 77 , as 
expressed in a pape r to a meet ing of Commonwealth Law Ministe r s  at Winnipeg 
in Aug ust of that year ( 1 9 77 : 2 8 )  - to con fer j ud ic i al author ity on the 
v illage counc ils  was subsequent ly r eg arded by h i s  col leagues as 
pol i t ically unacceptable . Ch iefs cor rectly sense that , if the inherent 
confl icts are exace rbated , the values suppor t i ng the i r  sys tem have poorer 
prospects o f  survival . 
Local  l eve l s of c h i efsh i p 
Ch ie f ly author ity was trad i t ionally l im i ted to g roups and local 
ter r itor ies . Today , in some countr ies , chiefs are forced onto the wider 
d i str ict o r  nat ional stage , par t icular ly i f ,  as local ch ie fs , they are 
requ i r ed to exer c i se funct ions at h igher levels of gove rnment . Ch ie fly 
power is thus a r t i f ically ex tended in Tong a ,  We stern and Amer ican Samoa , 
Fij i ,  Be lau and MI . In Tonga , where monarch and ' nobl e '  ch iefs have 
nat ional powers , it may be arg ued that al l-power ful chiefly dynasties 
ex isted t r ad i t ionally , but it was an acc ident o f  h i s tory that , over 1 00 
year s ago , froze a sho r t  pe r iod of dom inance by an outstand ing leader into 
hered itary r ule pe r petuated by a const i tut ion . Conver sely ,  one might say 
that , on the nat ional scene in WS , it is the ch iefs who have moved to force 
government and commerce into a chiefly mould . People in the public se rv ice 
and bus iness , forme r ly areas outs ide the ch ie f ly system ,  have in large 
numbe r s  sought and taken t i tles to c lose the g ap between Samoan and 
pa r t-S amoan status . 
Loya l ty to whom? 
A fund amental incong r uity in the not ion o f  ch iefly l eader sh ip in the 
serv ice of the state is that such leader sh ip is pr ed icated upon serv ice to 
the chief ' s  t r ad i t ional g roup .  In retrospect , the unceas ing battle on the 
par t  of colon ial adm in i strator s  to encour age ch iefly impar t ial ity would 
seem comic if it had not resulted in the adopt ion of ' acceptable ' double 
standards . Clear ly ,  one could not impose the type of ' leader ship code ' 
env isaged in PNG , S I  and Vanuatu on gover nment leade r s  and offic ial s  who 
hold the i r  pos i t ions in gover nment by v i r tue of the i r  ch iefly office . Le t 
us take the case of a hypothet ical d i str ict system unde r wh ich local 
government is in the hands of the t r ad i t ional ch iefs from v i l lages in wh ich 
they are t r ad i t ional ly selected . If any such chief were to hold 
admin i str at ive or j ud ic ial o f f ice , h is " conf l ict of  interest " would be of 
the same order as a pe r son with " per sonal and bus iness incomes and 
financ i al affa i r s "  whose act iv i ty " might be expected to g ive r i se to doubt 
in the publ ic mind" as to whether " the f a i r  exerc ise of h i s  offic ial dut ies 
m ight be comprom i sed " ( S I  ss . 9 3-9 5 ) . 
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ELECT I NG CH I EFS 
Double standards are also seen in the e lecto r al process . How should 
ch iefly cand idates and the i r  suppor te r s  conduct themselves? Le av ing as ide 
the quest ion o f  suffrage referred to ear l ier , one of the most d i f f icult 
tasks fac ing the WS Government , e . g . , i s  to dev i se e lectoral r ules wh ich 
are suff ic iently acceptable to be enforceable . Elector al pet i t ions 
followi ng each elect ion have pe rplexed a S upr eme Cour t trying to apply 
standard ' Br itish ' def init ions of elector al offences .  De spite the seeming 
imposs i b i l ity of f i t t ing the We stern and t r ad i t ional concepts into one 
process (see Al a ' i l ima 1 9 6 6 ) , there is no al ternat ive but to endeavour to 
resolve the confl ict as far as nat ional elect ions are concerned . 
REACTI ON TO CHANGE 
To what extent are chiefs themselves r e sponsible for inequ i t ies and 
abuses? The Pacif ic has exper ienced no d i rect clash between ch iefs and 
' commone r s '  s ince the down fall of the Hawai ian Monarchy ( when armed 
c i t i zens deposed Queen L i l iuokalan i in 1 893 ) . In the three maj or ' chiefly ' 
states o f  today - Tong a ,  WS and F i j i - however , r eact ion to the threat of 
inev itable change has intens i f ied . 
The present K i ng of Tong a has , s ince succeed ing to off ice in 1 9 67 , 
sought to as soc iate in h i s  people ' s  m inds the awesome pr esence and powe r of 
the t r ad it ional Tu ' i  Kanokupolu and the ancestral Tu ' i  Tong a with the 
pos i t ion of ' const itut ional ' monarch and the role of educated and 
wor ld ly-wi se leader . Growing bus iness and profess ional sectors support the 
status qua , as does o f  cour se the small class o f  cons t i tut ional ly-protected 
nobles and hered itary land-owner s ( about twenty-n ine ind iv idual s )  and the i r  
famil ies . W i t h  control of cab inet , par l iament , pol ice , army and 
commun icat ions , the K i ng and h i s  ' estab l i shment ' have l it t le to fear , 
except pe rhaps from industr ial ac t ion in the publ ic se r v ice . Tong an 
soc iety r emains org ani sed pol i t ically ' from the top downwards ' . The recent 
proposal to increase the number of member s  o f  par l iament from four teen 
elected member s  ( seven representat ives of the people and seven of the 
nobles)  to e ighteen such membe r s  ( n ine repr esent ing each c lass)  - to wh ich 
are added the Pr ime Mini ster and s ix Cabinet ministe r s  appointed by the 
K i ng - must be reg arded as a cyn ical exer c i se if i t  i s  claimed that i t  will  
afford s ig n i f icantly g reater popular par t ic ipat ion in government . The 
reasons for the absence to date of open chal lenge and repress ive r eact ion 
are complex ( see Powles 1 9 79 ) and it would be dangerous to think that Tong a 
has learned how to deal with demand s for wider po l i t ical express ion . 
Ch iefs in F i j i often comb ine government pos i t ions with some per sonal 
wealth and unt i l  recently have been reg arded as symbol ic of the s treng th of 
F ij ian culture and polit ical org anisat ion in the face of compet i t ion with 
the Indian , Ch inese and wh ite populat ions . The d r amat ic r ise and fall of 
Sakeas i Butadroka and the F i j i an Na t ional ist Par ty i n  the two elect ions o f  
1 9 77 demonstrated f i r s t , that the ( thither to dom inant) All iance Party had 
been payi ng insuffic ient attent ion to its  ' g rass-roots ' ,  and , subsequent ly , 
that Ratu S i r  Kam isese Mara and the F i j i an leader sh ip could swi ftly and 
fi rmly employ t r ad it ional assoc iat ions with ch ie fsh ip to put down and shame 
those who sought advancement in an ' upstar t '  f ash ion . The following 
quotat ions i l lustr ate c r i t ic i sm :  
TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Most of the F i j ian ch iefs no longer serve the i r  people . 
In fact most o f  them th i n k  that the people have noth ing 
to do with the i r  pr ivilege s  and status . What they are 
forgett ing is that they are wh at they are because they 
have people be low them .  In other words , a ch ief i s  a 
chief because he or she i s  supposed to have some people 
to lead {quoted in Nation 1 978 : 1 ) .  
and r e act ion : 
We in F i j i are for tunate to see ag a in in Lakeba 
[ meet i ng of the Gr eat Counc i l  of Ch iefs in May 1 978 ] 
a ll of the good th ing s  we can ach ieve i f  we cont inue to 
adhe re to the t r ue foundat ion of F i j ian leade r sh ip ,  
that i s  mutual reverence , mutual respect , and mutual 
regard for one another in s i ncer e  adherence to the 
Ch iefs { quoted ibid . : 1 46 ) . 
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Ch iefsh ip in WS exh ibits g reater adaptab i l i ty and streng th than 
elsewhere i n  the Pacif ic , but the pr e-occupat ion o f  the Samoan people with 
status r ivalry in all spheres of l i fe has brought about profound change in 
the t r ad i t ional system . On the one hand , c h iefs  have used the i r  r ank to 
secure nat ional po l i t ical advancement and commer c i al success , wh ile 
unt i t led po l i t ic ians , pub l ic servants and bus inessmen have sought ch ie fly 
t i tles to enhance the i r  prospects . With the creat ion and spl itting of 
t i tles , the sys tem has been ' watered down ' - and , after the removal o f  some 
2 , 500 t itles conferred ' contr ary to custom ' , the re remain over 1 1 , 000 
reg i stered matai { about 9 , 200  o f  whom went to the polls in the recent 
elect ion ( see Saval i ,  1 0  March 1 9 82 ) ) or a r a t io of one in every f ive 
adults as compared with one in n i ne in 1 96 1 . 
Proposals for shar ing ch iefly author ity w i th the unt itled { as in the 
control of land and i ncome from land ) have been f i rmly rej ected , however 
( see Powles 1 9 79 ) and a par l iamentary committee report  recommend ing the 
introduc t ion of un iversal suffrage { for matai cand idates ) was d i sm i ssed by 
a clear maj or i ty of member s  of P a r l i ament as r ecently as Febr uary 1 98 1  (see 
Samoa Times , 27 Febr uary 1 98 1 ) . � 
EXCLUS I V E  ' CLUBS ' 
Ch ar ac ter istic o f  the inequ i t ies pe rce ived by ' commoner s '  is the 
refusal of chiefs to d i scuss with them any matters involv ing the status , or 
indeed the interests , of ch iefs . Tr ad it ionally,  pe r sons of no rank would 
remain out o f  earshot . Under the Tongan Cons t itut ion , only nobles of the 
Leg is lat ive As sembly may " discuss or vote upon laws relat ing to the K i ng or 
Royal Family or the t i tles and inhe r itances o f  the nobles " { c l . 6 7 ) . Today , 
attempts to hold public meet ing s in i s lands and v i l lages in many par ts o f  
the Pac if ic in order t o  d iscuss nat ional and local government issues a r e  
often f r ustr ated b y  t h e  reluctance o f  people o f  low r ank t o  express v iews 
in the pr esence of r e spected chiefs or elde r s  { this has been the wr iter ' s  
expe r ience i n  Po lynes i a ,  Fij i and Ponape - for K i r ibati see Neemia 1 9 8 1 ) .  
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LETHAL STATUTORY CLOTH I NG 
In many Pac i f ic soc iet ies , i f  the relat ionsh ip between ch iefs and 
people is inter fered with , both will  suffer . Nayacakalou puts i t : 
[Ch iefs ' ]  pos i t ions are inextr icably interwoven with 
the structure of the ir g roup so that the goals for 
wh ich the g roups organ ise under the leade r sh ip of the i r  
ch iefs remain common goal s ( 1 97 5 : 1 1 5 ) . 
Whe re statutory author ity i s  confer r ed on the ch ief , he becomes less 
rel iant on the support of his group and the rec iprocal bas is of the 
relat ionship weakens . Ult imately , the ch ief in statutory c loth ing may 
d i sappear from with in . With the loss of ch ie fly status , only the t r apping s  
of government off ice remain - and , in t h e  me ant ime , the i ncumbent h a s  been 
under pr essure to abuse both pos i t ions . 
FUTURE OF CH I EFSH I P  
Tr ad it ional chiefs will  compete for power with those who enj oy other 
sources of influence , s uch as po l i t ical o f f ice , the public serv ice and 
commerc i al enterpr ise . In countr ies where the sources of power have 
already been comb ined under the const itut ional system it is too late to 
suggest any mod i f icat ion at the nat ional level . In F i j i ,  Tonga and ws , 
const i tut ional entrenchment impedes r e form . 
Th roughout the Pac i f ic , the use of ch iefsh ip in an unincorporated 
capac i ty at local level , and pe rhaps w i th other funct ions , deserves fur ther 
cons ider at ion . There are seve ral matters  to be taken i nto account :  
1 .  Viabil i ty o f  chief-g roup r e lat ionsh ips ; ideal ly , th i s  
requires thorough invest igation by s u i tably expe r ienced 
pe r sonne l .  
2 .  Local patterns of power and par t ic ipat ion ; i n  a 
par t icular soc iety , or sect ion of i t , it may be 
necessary to assess the extent to wh ich the ch ie fly 
system contr ibutes to , and/or impedes , par t ic ipat ion 
and repr esentat ion by the adult populat ion in local 
dec i s ion-mak ing . Inte r act ion be tween soc i al g roups and 
levels , and the mob i l ity of ind iv iduals , may be looked 
at . Th is area i nvolves matter s  o f  soc ial scale and an 
under stand ing of the roles and funct ions employed (see 
Be ned ict 1 967 ; Robe r ts 1 9 79 ) . 
3 .  Cost of new or replacement services ; some countr ies 
may have l it tle cho ice but to see k ways o f  taking 
advan tag e  of the c h i efly sys tem i n  local government . 
Fo r the foreseeable future , the economy cannot meet the 
cost o f  the whole infr a- s tructure involved in the 
introduct ion and suppor t of , e lected counc i l s  and 
administr at ive and j ud ic i al office r s . 
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T h e  types o f  funct ion wh ich chiefs m ight b e  encour aged t o  c a r r y  out 
but without statutes wh ich would assoc iate ch iefs , a� a c lass , with those 
funct ions - may be d i scussed in general terms , subj ect to the above 
cons iderat ions . 
1 .  To beg in with , those t r ad it ional funct ions wh ich help 
to maintain and st imul ate the ope r at ion of trad i t ional 
mechan i sms o f  soc ial cont rol through k i nsh ip respons­
i b i l ities and inter-group relat ions could be left 
unaffected - or , where appropr i ate , encouraged . 
2 .  Ch iefly tasks in relat ion to the administrat ion of 
c ustomary land could be approached s imi lar ly . I t  may 
be d e s i r able to reassure those with customary land 
r espons ib i l it ies that government does not propose to 
inter fere in th i s  v ital and sens i t ive area . 5 
3 .  In the complex scene of local po l i t ics , where ch iefs 
t r ad it ionally r epr esent the interests of g roups and 
v i llages on counc i l s , it may be des i r able not to 
inter fere leg islat ively . Where such counc i l s  fail  to 
administer local government adequately , supplementary 
and/or superv i sory pos i t ions may be created by 
government . The role of ch ief as r epresentat ive may be 
st imulated where government offic i als regularly call 
meet ings of such leader s .  
4 .  D i spute sett lement as a natural ch iefly funct ion i s  
part icular ly valuable where t h e  formal cour t sys tem has 
not fully penetr ated . 6 As an integ r al par t  of the 
t r ad i t ional process , the ch ief ' s  role should not be 
inter fered with . It is necessary to al low people 
ultimate access to the cour ts ( and const itut ional 
' dec larat ions of r ights ' usually r equire  th i s ) , 
l eg islat ion may prov ide that t r ad i t ional methods of 
settlement should be exhausted or dec lared inapprop­
r iate be fore a matter - without d i st inct ion between 
' cr im inal ' or ' c iv i l '  - will be admitted to the courts 
on the ce r t i f icate of a ' gate keepe r ' ( wh ich was the 
technique proposed by the wr iter and favoured by the 
Jud ic i al Advisory Counc i l  of the Ponape State 
Leg i s l ature at its plann ing sem inar i n  Apr i l  1 98 1 ) .  
5 .  Ch iefs act natural ly a s  the repositor ies not only of 
g roup and local h i s tory but also o f  important inform­
a t ion in v i ll ag e , i s l and a nd d i str ict affa i r s . Th is 
funct ion m ight be fur ther developed informally to 
promote the upward movement of informat ion and op1n1on 
from g roup to local counc i l , and from reg ion to 
centr e .  Indeed , the adv i sory funct ion o f  councils  of 
ch iefs at d i str ict or nat ional level i s  adopted in the 
Cook I slands ( C I )  ( the House of Ar i k i  has been act ive 
i n  the c lar i f icat ion o f  c ustomary law in re lat ion to 
t r ibes , c lans and chiefs , but pe rhaps over-conce rned to 
re-asser t ch iefly author i ty (CI  Leg islat ive As sembly 
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Pape r s  1 9 70 : No . 2 8 ;  1 9 77 : No . 29 ) ) .  There i s  scope for 
ch iefs in an adv i sory c apac ity under the Cons t i tu t ion 
of the Fede r ated States o f  Mic rones ia ( FSM) wh ich 
author i ses Cong r ess to establish a " Ch ambe r of Ch iefs " , 
and the Cons t itut ion of a State hav ing trad i t ional 
leade r s  may prov ide " an act ive funct ional role" for 
them ( Ar t .  V) . 
The above d i scuss ion appear s to have par t icular relevance for SI  
(where Parliament i s  requi red by the Const i t ut ion ( s . 1 1 4 )  to cons ider " the 
role of t r ad i t ional chiefs" in the government of the pr ov inces )  , for 
Vanuatu ( custom ch iefs make up the Nat ional Counc i l  of Ch iefs and 
Parliament is required to make prov is ion for " the role of ch iefs " at the 
v il lage , i sl and and d i str ict level and in  v il lage or i s land cour ts , and for 
the " repr esental ion " of c ustom chiefs on reg ional counc i l s  ( s s . 29 ,  5 0  and 
8 1 ) , for FSM ( see above )  and for other soc iet ies where the place of chiefs 
is now being cons idered . In  the const i tut ionally mor e established 
ch iefdoms , such as ws , F i j i and MI , the funct ion of chiefs at the local 
level remains an impor tant subj ect for pol icy-mak i ng .  For Tong a ,  the fate 
of leader sh ip r ema ins in  the hands o f  the par amount chief . 
In the l ight of wh at is seen as the inev itable sweep of eg al itar i an 
th inking , the pe rpetuat ion by statute of a leader sh ip system based upon 
elements of i nhe r ited status or ' c lass d i st inct ion ' would appear short­
s ighted and anachron ist ic .  To supplement ch iefly w i th statutory power 
seems contr ary to the interests of both systems - and of g reater publ ic 
par t ic ipat ion in the dec i s ion-mak i ng wh ich affects d a i ly l ives . As an 
inst itut ion compet ing freely w i th government and commerce , however ,  
independent ch iefsh ip cont r ibutes to a wider and more i nter-act ive f ield 
for the exercise of power , the express ion o f  opi nion and mobi l i ty i n  the 
ach ievement of asp i r at ions . 
NOTES 
1 Such r e l i ance i n  WS has been somewhat shaken by the very r ecent S upr eme 
Cour t dec larat ion ( under appeal at the t ime of wr it ing )  that ch iefly 
suffrag e  i s  hencefor th void as inconsistent with the ant i-d isc r im inat ion 
prov 1 s 1ons of Ar t . 1 5  (Saipa 'ia OZomaZu v. Attorney-General ( SC) , 5 Apr i l  
1 982 R . S t . John CJ ) . 
2 Ch iefship is s t i l l  o ften regarded as a Po lyne s i an special ty - but see now 
Doug las 1 9 79 ( for Me lane s ia)  and Alk ir e  1 977 ( for M icrone s ia) . In fact 
the s im ilar it ies between , e . g . , the ch iefly sys tems of Ponape and Samoa 
are remar kable ( see F i sche r 1 9 74 and G i lson 1 9 70 ) . 
3 0f cour se , each sys tem has its  streng ths and weaknes ses . Leg islat ive 
commit tees are gener ally inadequate and ineffect ive . On ly F i j i ,  Papua 
New Gu inea ( PNG ) , SI and Vanuatu have ombudsmen . Tuvalu ( s . 60 )  and 
K i r ibat i ( s . 6 8 )  prov ide t ime for cons iderat ion of bills  by island 
counc i l s .  
TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS 3 59 
4Th is was in the form of a d ir ect ion by S i r  Gaven Donne CJ as Pres ident of 
the Land and T i tles Cour t to the S amoan Judges of that Cour t o f  1 7  Apr i l  
1 9 80 , a s  expl ained in a publ ic statement b y  B . S .  Johns ACJ , Samoa Times 
2 3  January 1 98 1 . 
5 In the l ight of increas ing WS Government act iv i ty in the compulsory 
acqui s i t ion of l and for public purposes - for wh ich compensat ion was held 
by the public t r ustee in t r ust for the land owners the ch iefs in 
Parliament overreacted in 1 9 70 to require  all such compensat ion to be 
pa id d i rect to the chief concerned " as the only pe r son ent it led " and 
without ment ion of c ustomary obl ig at ions ( Taking of La.nd Amendment Act 
(No . 1 )  ( 1 970 ) ) .  
6 How far i s  such a sys tem capable of penetr at ing in any soc iety? The 
clear need in We stern societ ies to br ing d i spute- settlement techn iques to 
the people i s  seen in the remar k able growth of ombudsmen ,  domestic 
conc i l iator s ,  small c l a ims tr ibunals and commun ity med iat ion centres . 
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